Authors: Lamar Waldron
Rusk had not known of these developments prior to my communication
with him.”19
This call from McCone might have been when Rusk first learned
about the JFK-Almeida coup plan, an operation so sensitive that McCone
would not have included it in a routine office memorandum. When we
interviewed Rusk, he indicated that he had first learned shortly after
JFK’s death that all of the planning he and other officials had been doing
for months—for a Cuban coup and invasion—was for an “active” opera-
tion.20 Before that, Rusk had thought the planning was so the United
States would be ready just in case a powerful Cuban official was found to
overthrow Fidel. Like other top officials present at JFK’s big November
12, 1963, meeting about Cuba, Rusk had heard Desmond FitzGerald say,
the “CIA is in touch with three persons who are in the military” in Cuba,
and that the CIA was trying to get them “to talk and plot Castro’s down-
fall.”21 We know from interviewing someone who worked with Rusk on
one of Bobby’s Cuban subcommittees that Rusk probably already knew
about Rolando Cubela, but thought he was only a midlevel official with
little power, whom the CIA was using to try to find a far more power-
ful Cuban official. Rusk and his associate never considered Cubela as
someone who could actually stage a coup; they (along with McCone)
had also not been told that Helms and FitzGerald were trying to con-
vince Cubela to assassinate Fidel.
Our impression from talking to Rusk was that he was told briefly and
generally about the JFK-Almeida coup plan within a day or so after JFK’s
death, and then learned more at a later time. Rusk was adamant in our
interview that the “coup” and “second invasion” he had learned about
after JFK’s death were completely different from the Cubela operation,
which would have required Rusk to have gained more than a passing
knowledge of the JFK-Almeida coup plan.
Rusk also indicated in our interview that he was told about the coup
plan not by Bobby Kennedy or one of his close associates, but in the
course of his duties as Secretary of State. Rusk wasn’t as close to Bobby
Kennedy as some Cabinet officials who agreed to stay on under LBJ,
such as Defense Secretary McNamara. Perhaps that’s one reason Rusk
was told about the coup plan after JFK’s death, while some other offi-
cials, like McNamara, apparently weren’t told at all. But even McCone
couldn’t tell Rusk everything, since Helms was withholding so much
from his boss. (Helms would eventually withhold information directly
from Rusk, when Rusk asked Helms in 1966 if the CIA had tried to use
Cubela in an assassination operation. Helms told Rusk it hadn’t, and
Rusk wouldn’t learn that Helms was lying until 1975. In stark contrast
with his normally placid demeanor, Rusk’s anger about being lied to by
Helms was quite evident in our 1990 interview.)
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LEGACY OF SECRECY
A somber Bobby Kennedy took time out from his family and official
duties for a private meeting with Harry Williams, who told us the meet-
ing occurred within two days of JFK’s death, placing it on either Sat-
urday or Sunday. Almeida was still in Cuba, and his family was still
outside of Cuba under US surveillance, but any plans for a coup were
completely on hold. Harry says that Bobby “didn’t say much,” but told
Harry that “things are going to change,” now that Bobby no longer
essentially ran Cuban operations and policy for the United States. Harry
says he already knew that Bobby and “Johnson . . . hate[d] each other’s
guts,” so Bobby’s role and the plans would no doubt be very different.
Bobby didn’t voice any suspicions to Harry about Artime or any other
Cuban exiles, probably because by that time, Oswald’s seemingly pro-
Castro stance had been publicized extensively. In addition, Bobby knew
about some of the information coming from Mexico City, which would
have made him suspect, only briefly, that Castro might have had a hand
in JFK’s death.22
At the time, Harry didn’t suspect any Cuban exiles; that would only
come later, after he saw the ties between two of E. Howard Hunt’s exile
associates and Santo Trafficante. For the time being, Harry’s suspi-
cions were also directed at Fidel, especially once a Cuban exile linked
to Artime and the CIA showed him a photo of Oswald going into the
Cuban embassy in Mexico City. In 1992, when Harry told us about see-
ing the photo, he didn’t know about our Naval Intelligence source who
had described a similar photo. The accounts of Win Scott and other CIA
personnel who saw the Oswald photo had also not been publicized or
declassified at that time.
It’s important to point out a significant difference between Bobby
Kennedy and Richard Helms in the aftermath of JFK’s murder. Helms
would continue at least some of his unauthorized operations, hiding
them from LBJ the same way he had hidden them from JFK and Bobby.
In contrast, while Bobby withheld some information about the coup
plan from LBJ, he didn’t try to proceed with the plot behind LBJ’s back,
even after it became clear that Castro had nothing to do with JFK’s death
and that Almeida was still in place, unexposed, and willing to stage a
coup. Harry still had a direct line of communication to Almeida that
didn’t require CIA assistance, and enough exile contacts (and goodwill
from spearheading the release of the Bay of Pigs prisoners) that Harry
could have gotten into Cuba even without the help of US authorities at
Guantanamo. Once inside Cuba, Harry could have met with Almeida
and proceeded with the coup. Bobby knew that all the planning and
preparations for the invasion and post-invasion occupation had been
completed, so LBJ would have had little choice but to commit the already
trained and ready US forces if Almeida sent word of Castro’s death.
However, it appears that Bobby never even considered the option of
going behind LBJ’s back. Once it became apparent, by late December,
that Almeida was still willing to go forward with the coup, Bobby would
deal with LBJ directly on the matter.
In Dallas, the press was still feeding the public a steady diet of news
stories, even as Chief Curry told tired journalists that Oswald’s transfer
to the county jail was being put off until Sunday morning. He assured
them that if they were back by 10:00 AM, “they won’t miss anything.”23
Earlier that day, CBS radio reporter Dan Rather had delivered the big-
gest scoop of his young career, when he told his listeners about being
one of the very first journalists to see what would become known as the
Zapruder film. Illustrating the power of suggestion, and most journal-
ists’ desire at the time to please authorities and network bosses, Rather
described the movie this way: “I have just returned from seeing a movie
which clearly shows the President’s assassination . . . his head went
forward with considerable violence.”24
Of course, the film shows no such thing; instead, JFK’s head jerks
back and to his left. But it would be more than a decade before any of
the American public could glimpse the actual film and many more years
before the public could easily view and study clear copies of the footage.
We should point out that Rather was allowed to see the film just once,
and only at normal speed, and the grainy 8-millimeter home movie was
nothing like the digitally enhanced version available today. But it does
demonstrate that the “official” version of the shooting—three shots, all
from the rear—was so prevalent among officials by Saturday that Rather
believed that more than his own eyes.
Also in Dallas, Jack Ruby was getting ready to lay the groundwork for
the following day, when his excuse for being near police headquarters
at the time of Oswald’s transfer would be that he had to wire $25 to one
of his dancers, Karen Carlin. To begin preparing this cover story, Ruby
had Carlin and several others go to Nichols Garage. All those involved in
this meeting later gave authorities different accounts of what happened
there. Carlin was willing to agree to whatever Ruby said, because the
previous day, a Ruby associate had ordered her to meet him and threat-
ened, “If you’re not down here, you won’t be around too long.”
Karen Carlin arrived at Nichols Garage before Ruby did; then Ruby
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LEGACY OF SECRECY
called the parking attendant and told him to loan Carlin $5—and be
sure to time-stamp the receipt—for which Ruby would reimburse him.
(The following day, Ruby’s time-stamped Western Union receipt would
be designed to “prove” that Ruby just happened to be near the police
station when Oswald was being moved.) When Ruby arrived at the
garage, his cover story was that he was supposed to loan Carlin another
$25. But Ruby claimed he didn’t have it and couldn’t get it, ignoring the
fact that his club and its safe were next door. The plan was for Ruby to
wire Carlin the money the next day, from a Western Union office only
one block from the police station where Oswald would be moved. It’s
clear this was only a cover story, since there were two Western Union
offices much closer to Ruby’s Oak Cliff apartment.25 There was no need
for Ruby to go all the way downtown to use the Western Union office
near the police station—except for the fact that Ruby had to silence
Oswald.
Chapter Eighteen
On November 24, 1963, at 10:00 AM (Eastern time), CIA Director McCone
met with LBJ to tell him about “the Cuban situation,” including “our
operational plans against Cuba,” according to McCone’s notes.1 How-
ever, the briefing was only twenty minutes long, and there was much to
go over besides the JFK-Almeida coup plan and AMWORLD, so John-
son’s understanding of Cuban operations was still in its early stages. LBJ
and McCone no doubt also discussed the latest information from Mexico
City about poor Silvia Duran and KGB agent Kostikov. Such information
would keep LBJ worried about possible Cuban or Russian involvement
in JFK’s murder; in another meeting that weekend, LBJ asked former
JFK aide Ted Sorenson, “What do you think of the possibility of a foreign
government being involved [in JFK’s assassination]?”
These concerns would drive LBJ’s need for secrecy and his desire
to limit any real investigation that might expose foreign links to JFK’s
murder that could generate a crisis with Russia or Cuba. Hence, the
Miami Herald
was unable to publish anything further about the Tampa
assassination plot mentioned in the previous day’s
Tampa Tribune.
In
addition, no newspaper or TV station followed up on the
Miami Herald’
s
intriguing November 24 newspaper story—which included many “no
comment” responses from officials who didn’t deny anything in the
original
Tampa Tribune
story (some of which the
Herald
repeated). In
hindsight, that type of story should have attracted attention from at
least some other journalists, and perhaps it did. But nothing was ever
published or broadcast, at least not for decades.
In South Carolina, white supremacist and Marcello associate Joseph
Milteer was having breakfast with his friend William Somersett, unaware
that Somersett was an informant for the Miami police. The subject of
JFK’s murder came up again, and “Milteer advised that they did not
have to worry about Lee Harvey Oswald getting caught because he
‘doesn’t know anything.’” However, as if he needed to make sure, Milt-
eer excused himself so that he could telephone someone.2
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LEGACY OF SECRECY
In Dallas, Jack Ruby was spruced up, dressed in his finest, for the spot-
light he was sure to occupy after he completed his assignment. Ruby
was probably nervous, but not about the length of time he might have
to spend in jail after shooting Oswald. Under Texas law, for murders
involving a “sudden passion,” the sentence could be as brief as two
years, with time off for good behavior, or even just probation.3 Instead,
Ruby was probably only worried that after he pulled out his gun and
started shooting at Oswald, he might hit a policeman or a policeman
might start shooting at him. Getting into the police station basement
where the transfer would take place would be no problem for Ruby,
since the FBI later acknowledged that “as a result of his friendship with
a number of police officers, Ruby had easy accessibility to the Dallas
Police Department.”4
The executive director of the House Select Committee on Assassina-
tions, former Mafia prosecutor G. Robert Blakey, said that “the murder
of Oswald by Jack Ruby had all the earmarks of an organized crime hit.”5
Also, the Committee found that Ruby’s shooting Oswald wasn’t “spon-
taneous,” and that Ruby probably had help entering the basement of
the police station for the transfer.6 The staffs of both the Committee and
the Warren Commission focused particular attention on one of Ruby’s