Authors: Lamar Waldron
originally supposed to be brought out before the December 1 coup, but
JFK’s death caused a delay, and she didn’t defect until the following
summer.39
Sforza was also “fiercely loyal” to Shackley, which may be why Shack-
ley chose Sforza to coordinate Miami’s JFK assassination inquiry, using
Morales’s network of AMOT assets. However, choosing someone like
Sforza, with ties to the Mafia and Morales, would also protect Shackley
himself, and keep secret both his own contact with Rosselli and his
involvement in the unauthorized portion of the Cubela operation. It
would also safeguard Shackley’s mentor, William Harvey. Not surpris-
ingly, instead of looking at possible Cuban exile involvement in JFK’s
murder, Sforza’s inquiry concentrated almost exclusively on trying to
tie Fidel to JFK’s murder. In the coming years, Shackley, Morales, and
Sforza would continue to work together for the CIA in a variety of hot
spots, from Laos to Vietnam to Chile, each country winding up much
worse because of these men’s lethal involvement. Harvey wasn’t part
of the clique in those years; his exclusion suggests that even lifelong
admirers like Shackley saw reasons to keep their distance from him.
Another associate of William Harvey in the Castro plots, the CIA’s
spectral Counter-Intelligence Chief James Angleton, may also have had
his own reasons to cover up, which would have also protected Har-
vey. In his Congressional testimony, Whitten said that Angleton had
psychological problems. Worse, as author David Talbot noted, Whitten
told the investigators that Angleton had ties to the Mafia and “had cov-
ered for them in federal investigations . . . and he had used them in
Cuba operations.”40 Angleton’s Mafia ties have been described by other
authors, but his role with the Mafia in Cuban operations is missing from
CIA accounts. Then again, recently released CIA files have shown those
accounts, originally supervised by Helms or his associates, to have been
woefully incomplete (leaving out, for example, Artime’s work with the
Mafia while he was working on AMWORLD).
British spymaster Peter Wright indicated one avenue that Angleton
and Harvey may have pursued, which could help explain unusual
French activity in Dallas around the time of JFK’s murder. As recounted
in Wright’s autobiography, in a discussion between Wright, Angleton,
and Harvey that took place before Harvey was reassigned to Italy,
Harvey brought up the subject of assassinating Castro, telling Wright,
“We’re developing a new capability in the [CIA] to handle these kinds
of problems, and we’re in the market for the requisite expertise.” Wright
says Harvey was looking for “deniable personnel,” preferably foreign,
who couldn’t be traced to the United States. Wright suggested “the
French. . . . It’s more their type of thing, you know, Algiers and so on,”
and Harvey carefully wrote down Wright’s recommendation, as Angle-
ton looked on.41 It was a good idea in some ways, since the French still
had diplomatic relations with Cuba that would allow for easy travel,
and at least one French heroin partner of Michel Victor Mertz still had
a business in Havana.
Harvey’s European assassin recruiter QJWIN was still on the pay-
roll in November 1963, ostensibly working for FitzGerald with Helms’s
approval, even though the released CIA files make it appear as if QJWIN
was being paid handsomely each month for producing no results. As
we’ll soon document, French assassin Michel Victor Mertz, who had
worked undercover for French intelligence in Algiers, was deported
from Dallas by the INS on the weekend of JFK’s murder. Mertz had
many parallels with QJWIN, which suggests that Mertz could have used
QJWIN’s identity or assistance in his operation.
If Angleton were involved with Harvey in an operation involving
Cuba and the Mafia (perhaps through French gangster Mertz), then
Angleton could have had much to hide after he took over the CIA’s inter-
nal investigation of JFK’s murder from Whitten. Based on most indica-
tions, Angleton thought the Soviets might have been behind Oswald,
perhaps with Cuban assistance, and that Gilberto Lopez and the phony
Cuban agent (Miguel Casas Saez) who had appeared to shadow JFK in
Chicago, Florida, and Texas were involved. However, it’s also possible
that Angleton was just trying to divert attention and blame away from
an operation for which he was at least partially responsible. Even his-
torians agree that Angleton had psychological difficulties and became
increasingly paranoid as the years went on (he eventually thought that
even Henry Kissinger was a Russian agent). But Angleton also may
simply have been trying not to look at areas that could have ended his
own career.
In exploring the reactions and roles of CIA officials like Angleton,
Shackley, Harvey, Sforza, Helms, and others, we aren’t saying they were
210
LEGACY OF SECRECY
involved in the plot that killed JFK. Morales confessed his role before his
death, but no evidence exists regarding the others. However, they still
would have had ample reason to avoid or obstruct a genuine investiga-
tion into JFK’s murder, for fear it could have exposed their own unau-
thorized actions. As with the Chicago and Tampa cover-ups, once they
withheld certain information from superiors or subordinates, and from
other agencies, they would always have to continue doing so.
Moreover, what were they, or others in the CIA, to do if they suspected
one of their CIA associates—like David Morales—had been involved in
JFK’s murder? Because of their own ties to the CIA-Mafia plots, all the
individuals listed above would have basically wrecked their careers if
they had tried to expose a plot involving Rosselli and his associates.
The same is probably true of others as well. In addition, there is a fine
line between protecting a trusted CIA colleague from embarrassing,
potentially career-ending revelations (like associating with Rosselli, or
running a legitimate operation involving Oswald) and protecting them
because you suspect they might have been used, knowingly or unknow-
ingly, in JFK’s assassination.
As for the Mafia bosses, they could always bring pressure if one or
more CIA officials tried to point suspicion in their direction. Leaking
the whole story of the CIA-Mafia plots to the press (even the foreign
press) in the wake of JFK’s murder would have essentially destroyed
the public’s faith in the CIA. But a more personal approach is the mob’s
style. Even without resorting to the numerous murders the Mafia would
commit in the 1970s, other pressure could have been brought to bear
by the mob.
David Talbot wrote that one of Bobby’s aides, Adam Walinsky, talked
in his oral history at the JFK Presidential Library about “some disturb-
ing information . . . about high-ranking CIA officials” that the aide had
relayed to Bobby. “The aide had been informed by a close friend—a psy-
chiatrist at the National Institutes of Mental Health who treated ‘the top
CIA wives’—that the upper ranks of the intelligence agency were filled
with sexually deviant personalities.” Walinsky said the psychiatrist told
him “the people who are running the CIA are really very very very sick
and disturbed . . . real fetishes and crazy sado-masochistic behavior’ . . .
he was talking about the very top level people.”42 In the early 1960s, the
revelation of such behavior, even at home, could end an official’s career.
If any of the officials pursued those activities with people besides their
wives, they could also be subject to blackmail. The rarely publicized
Mafia boss of Washington, D.C., Joe Nesline, was a close associate of
Carlos Marcello, who often stayed with Nesline when he visited Wash-
ington. Nesline was also involved in high-end call girl operations that
generated blackmail potential, as well as income.
In fact, some in the CIA worried that exile leader Manuel Artime
would be blackmailed in just such a fashion. The CIA not only illegally
bugged Artime’s safe house near Washington, but also discovered that
he had a mistress.43 According to David Corn, Shackley conducted an
investigation that found Artime’s mistress was “bisexual, had been a
mistress to [former dictator] Batista in Cuba and a Venezuelan dicta-
tor, and had posed for pornography.” CIA officials worried what might
happen if someone decided to “leak the information to harm Artime’s
reputation,” but in the end there was little they could do.44 FitzGerald
only asked AMWORLD official Henry Heckscher to talk privately with
Artime, telling the exile leader that the affair packed “a considerable
amount of political dynamite which his political opponents might be
strongly tempted to set off.”45
When Artime learned that JFK had been assassinated, he called a
CIA officer. However, after briefly mentioning JFK’s death, the rest of
the CIA memo of Artime’s call makes it seem like business as usual.
Artime discusses various aspects of his operation with the CIA officer,
almost as if Artime didn’t think JFK’s death would have any impact on
his plans.46
Artime’s reaction stands in stark contrast to Harry’s reaction, for
whom JFK’s death essentially brought everything to a halt. Harry spoke
to Bobby on Saturday, November 23, and arranged to meet with Bobby
at his home, later that day or the next. Bobby was spending much time at
the White House, and had pressing personal, family, and official duties,
but Almeida was in place and waiting, so they had to decide what to
do next.
As for the other Cuban exile leaders that Bobby and Harry had wanted
for the coup plan, Tony Varona’s actions around the time of JFK’s death
are unclear. Information soon surfaced that linked one of Varona’s asso-
ciates to a visit from Oswald on November 17, 1963, the day before the
Tampa attempt. However, Varona, like the other exile leaders in the coup
plan, wouldn’t be investigated or interviewed by the FBI.
The day before JFK’s death, one of Manolo Ray’s boats had missed
meeting a CIA boat to pick up military equipment to go into Cuba. As
recorded in the documents released so far, Ray’s explanation didn’t sat-
isfy the CIA.47 It’s possible the incident involved Ray’s preparations for
getting into Cuba for the coup, in which case important details might be
212
LEGACY OF SECRECY
missing from the released files, the same way the CIA withheld much
about Ray from Congressional investigators. Ray’s exile group, JURE,
soon became embroiled in the matter of Oswald’s visit to Silvia Odio, an
operation that seemed designed to taint Ray and his organization.
According to a CIA report, Eloy Menoyo—the other very liberal exile
leader for the coup—was getting ready to go into Cuba “sometime before
30 November 1963.” This was said to be for “Plan Omega,” an informal
name some exiles on the periphery used for the JFK-Almeida coup plan.
The CIA memo also says that Menoyo’s associates had been talking
to Carlos Prio about getting more financial backing. Prio, the corrupt
former President of Cuba, was an associate of Trafficante and had been
barred from the coup plan by Bobby and JFK.48 The CIA’s Miami station
received two reports about Menoyo’s group and JFK’s death that tended
to cast suspicion on Menoyo’s operation. One of Morales and Sforza’s
AMOT informants “reported hearing” that “Menoyo commented 21
[November] 63 that ‘something very big would happen soon that would
advance [the] Cuban cause.’” While it sounds suspicious, as if Menoyo
might have been referring to JFK’s murder, a CIA official notes that “this
remark, when taken out of context, is impossible to evaluate.” The most
likely explanation is that Menoyo was referring to the upcoming coup
plan, something known to only a very few at the Miami CIA station
(like David Morales). In the same CIA memo, vague suspicion is also
directed at a member of Menoyo’s group in Dallas.49 While some exiles
seemed to want to disparage Menoyo, the Miami CIA station seemed
disinclined to take the comments seriously.
The bottom line is that Helms and others in the CIA were acting the
same way officials (and businessmen) often do in a crisis: protecting
themselves, their associates, and their organization first, then dealing
with the crisis. Helms set the tone with his actions that weekend, and
subordinates like FitzGerald and Shackley clearly got the message.
However, their cover-ups would start to have serious ramifications, as
new reports surfaced that threatened to trigger a conflict with Cuba
and the Soviets.
Chapter Sixteen
On November 23, 1963, President Johnson, CIA Director McCone, and
other top officials started getting ominous information from Mexico City
indicating that Fidel Castro and the Soviet KGB were behind JFK’s assas-
sination. CIA officers in Mexico City, in particular David Atlee Phillips,