Jeremy Varon (67 page)

“militant democracy,” it would seem, sought both to defend democratic institutions and procedures from the assaults of radical minorities and to defend against any possible “tyranny of the majority.”

74. Quoted in Backes,
Bleierne Jahre,
43.

75. Quoted in Radvanyi,
Anti-Terrorist Legislation in the Federal Republic,
49–50. Mann most likely did not coin the term
streitbare Demokratie.
Backes and Jesse suggest that German émigré Karl Lowenstein first introduced it in a 1937 essay entitled “Militant Democracy and Fundamental Rights.” They argue that the basic concept of militant democracy goes back to Plato and is implied wherever political theorists warn of the “tyranny of the majority.” Backes and Jesse,
Politischer Extremismus in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland,
461–97.

76. Brückner,
Ulrike Marie Meinhof und die deutschen Verhältnisse,
48.

77. In 1977, the CDU held a conference on the “intellectual and social origins of terrorism,” whose proceedings are compiled in
Der Weg in die Gewalt: Geistige
und gesellschaftliche Ursachen des Terrorismus und seine Folgen,
ed. Heiner Geissler (Munich: Günter Olzog, 1978). Understanding the roots of terrorism with a view to eliminating it was the broad mandate of the massive study Analysen zum Terrorismus, commissioned by the West German government in 1978.

78. Scheel quotes from
Zum Gedanken an die Opfer des Terrorismus,
5–17.

79. The decision was not an automatic one. Though Schmidt immediately rejected the kidnappers’ demand that efforts to find them be called off, he did contemplate exchanging the prisoners for Schleyer. Officials went so far as to ask Baader et al. if they would accept an exchange and, if freed, desist from further violence. Baader and the others answered in the affirmative. Behind-the-scenes negotiations are detailed in
Dokumentation zu den Ereignissen.

80. “Regierungserklärung von Bundeskanzler Helmut Schmidt am 20 Okto-ber 1977,” in
Zum Gedanken an die Opfer des Terrorismus,
25.

356

Notes to Pages 280–85

81. The SPD, CDU, CSU, and FDP reiterated their support in a joint statement issued just after the raid on the hijacked plane. “Erklarung vom 18. October 1977,” in Binder,
Terrorismus,
94.

82. “Erklärung des Präsidums der SPD vom 13. September 1977,” in ibid., 101.

83. Aust,
Baader-Meinhof Group,
466–67.

84. “‘Bekenntnis zur Mithaftung,’” in Binder,
Terrorismus,
96–97.

85. “‘Was haben wir getan oder unterlassen,” in ibid., 98–100.

86. “Erklarung von Hochschullehren und 54 wissenschaftlichen Mitarbeit-ern, September 1977,” in ibid., 105.

87. “Hessischen Schriftsstellerverbandes, 28. September 1977,” in ibid., 106.

88. “Entschließung des Gewerkschaftstages der IG Metall,” in ibid., 107.

89. “‘Feind der Arbeitnehmer und Gewerkschaften,’” in ibid., 108.

90. Scheel,
Zum Gedanken an die Opfer des Terrorismus,
12. Quotations from the speech follow.

91. Ibid., 9.

92. Ibid.

93. Binder,
Terrorismus,
documents such laws.

94. Marcuse, “Repressive Tolerance,” 109.

95. Ibid.

96. Kraushaar, “44 Tage ohne Opposition,” 16.

97. Quoted in William E. Scheuermann,
Between the Exception and the Norm:
The Frankfurt School and the Rule of Law
(Boston: MIT Press, 1995), 20.

98. Ibid., 19.

99. Ibid., 21.

100. Scheuerman elaborates: “Given Schmitt’s view of politics, the idea of a universal moral consensus resting on a process of rational will formation has to be interpreted as just another universalistic normativity with no rightful place in the political sphere. In his view, an authentic political theory has no room for naive moralistic ideas like that of the social contract. . . . The problem with parliamentarianism is not simply that it has been overwhelmed . . . by a set of sudden and unexpected social and political transformations, but that its preference for negotiation, compromise, and debate conflicts head-on with the decisionist core of all genuinely political experiences.” Scheuerman,
Between the Exception
and the Norm,
21.

101. In “44 Tage ohne Opposition,” Kraushaar presents the conventional view of Schmitt as a conservative and even reactionary legal philosopher—a view common among left-wing intellectuals throughout Schmitt’s lifetime. In recent years, Schmitt has undergone thorough and often favorable reconsideration by, among others, left-wing theorists of “radical democracy,” who see in Schmitt’s thinking tremendous insight into processes of social change and the constitution and regeneration of power. For an overview of this interpretative trajectory, see Andreas Kalynis, “Review Essay: Who’s Afraid of Carl Schmitt?”
Philosophy and
Social Criticism
25, no 5 (1999): 87–125. Though aware of this revision, I invoke Schmitt here as his German detractors saw him.

102.
Dokumentation zu den Ereignissen,
4.

103. Quoted in Kraushaar, “44 Tage ohne Opposition,” 13.

104. Quoted in Scheuerman,
Between the Exception and the Norm,
18.

Notes to Pages 285–96

357

105. Kraushaar, “44 Tage ohne Opposition,” 13.

106. Ibid., 17.

107. “Kontaktsperre,” in
Anti-Terror-Debatten,
ed. Vinke and Witt, 283.

108. Ibid., 283–87.

109. Jean Baudrillard, “Our Theatre of Cruelty,” in id.,
In the Shadow of
the Silent Majorities,
116. Baudrillard has extended this analysis to the events of September 11, 2001, in “L’Esprit du Terrorisme,”
Harper’s,
February 2002, 13–18.

110. Fetscher,
Terrorismus und Reaktion,
104.

111. Bopp, “Die ungekonnte Aggresion,” 142.

c o n c l u s i o n

1. Jean-Paul Sartre, “France: Masses, Spontaneity, Party,” in id.,
Between Existentialism and Marxism,
trans. John Mathews (New York: Pantheon Books, 1974), 125.

2. Jaffe interview.

3. Braley interview.

4. Interview with Jonah Raskin.

5. William Ayers, Bernardine Dohrn, Jeff Jones, and Celia Sojourn,
Prairie
Fire: The Politics of Revolutionary Anti-imperialism—Political Statement of the
Weather Underground
(n.p.: Communications Co., 1974), 2.

6. Ibid., 1, 4.

7.
Takeover,
September 4, 1974, 8.

8. Ayers interview.

9.
Prairie Fire,
16–17.

10. Neufeld interview.

11. Gilbert, Columbia, 279; Roth interview.

12.
Osawatomie,
Winter 1975–6, 30; Summer 1974, 4.

13. Bill Ayers and Celia Sojourn, “Politics in Command”; letter and article sent to
Seize the Time
and
Midnight Special,
June 1975, 9. Materials received by the FBI on June 20, 1975. WUO-FBI.

14.
Osawatomie,
Summer 1974, 4; Autumn 1975, 3–6.

15. Braley interview.

16.
Prairie Fire,
2–3.

17.
Osawatomie,
Winter 1975–76, 30.
Takeover,
May 10, 1974, 1, 7–8.

18. Ayers and Sojourn, “Politics in Command,” 9.

19. Ibid., 12–13.

20. Ibid., 14.

21. Weiss interview.

22. FBI memo, Cleveland to Rosen, October 26, 1971, 1. FBI-WUO.

23. Ibid., 2.

24. FBI memo, Putman to Wannall, August 13, 1974, 7. FBI-WUO.

25. Ibid.

26. FBI memo, Shackelford to Wannall, December 6, 1973, 1. FBI-WUO.

27. Ibid., 3–9.

28. Ibid., 4.

358

Notes to Pages 296–301

29. FBI memo, director to SAC, September 17, 1973, 1.

30. Cril Payne,
Deep Cover: An FBI Agent Infiltrates the Radical Underground
(New York: Newsweek Books, 1979).

31. FBI memo, Shackelford to Wannall, January 4, 1974, 1–2.
WUR
132.

The 1970 Detroit indictment had been superseded by a second indictment in 1972.

It dropped some of the original indictees, added others, and specified more than forty conspiratorial acts.
WUR
132.

32. FBI memo, Shackelford to Wannall, January 4, 1974, 1–2.

33. The indictments, filed in 1978, were against former Acting FBI Director Patrick Gray, former Acting Associate Director Mark Felt, and former Assistant Director Edward Miller. Felt and Miller were convicted in 1980 and given modest fines. The charges against Gray were dropped due to a lack of evidence that he had personally approved any break-ins. In 1981, to the great regret of federal prosecutors, President Reagan pardoned Felt and Miller. See Athan G. Theo-haris, “National Security and Civil Liberties: FBI Surveillance: Past and Present,”

Cornell Law Review
883 (April 1984), esp. fn. 15.

34. FBI memo, Putman to Wannall, August 13, 1974, 1–8. The group claimed collective responsibility for its acts of violence, and seldom if ever left any hard evidence that could tie an individual to a particular crime. Lacking the equivalent of Germany’s section 129, U.S. authorities could not indict the Weathermen simply for alleged membership in the group.

35. Braley interview.

36. See Airtel, FBI director to SAC, Albany, July 6, 1976, WUO/PFOC Sum-mary Reports. FBI-WUO. The FBI’s investigations culminated in the mammoth report, “Foreign Influence—Weather Underground Organization,” Chicago, August 20, 1976. FBI-WUO. The report desperately sought to illustrate some direct, operational connection between the WUO and foreign “enemies” like Cuba and China, which would give intelligence agencies greater latitude in investigating and acting against the group, but it revealed no such connection. It mostly assembled years of material on the group, chronicled the overseas travels of individual members, and noted the
ideological
influence of the Cuban model and Maoist theory on the Weathermen and other 1960s radicals.

37. Documents related to the collapse are to be found in
The Split of the
Weather Underground Organization: Struggling against White and Male Supremacy,
ed. John Brown Book Club (Seattle: John Brown Book Club, 1977).

38. See, e.g.,
Trial Statement of New Afrikan Revolutionary Kuwasi Balagoon
(Paterson, N.J.: Paterson Anarchist Collective, 1993).

39. See Brent L. Smith,
Terrorism in America: Pipe Bombs and Pipe Dreams
(Albany: State University New York Press, 1994), esp. 93–129.

40. Individual prisoners, their causes, and their cases are profiled in the booklet
Can’t Jail the Spirit: Political Prisoners in the U.S.
(4th ed., n.p.: n.p., 1998), which describes fifty-six prisoners, some of whom have since been freed.

41. Roth interview.

42. A partial transcription of the parole board hearing from which I am quoting is provided by Greg Yardley, “American Terrorist,” frontpagemagazing.com, September 22, 2003, available at www.frontpagemag.com/Articles/ReadArti-cle.asp?ID=9947. The article intersperses vituperative commentary on Boudin’s Notes to Pages 301–5

359

testimony that reflects the enduring antipathy many feel toward the Weather Underground.

43. “Chronologie,” in
Der blinde Fleck,
249.

44. Rabert,
Links- und Rechtsterrorismus,
133–34.

45. Earlier campaigns had focused on subway fare and rent increases; the all-women
Rota Zora,
a subset of the Red Cells, used violence to protest restrictions on reproductive freedoms. Ibid., 198–221. See also
Die Früchte des
Zorns: Texte und Materialien zur Geschichte der Revolutionären Zellen und der
Roten Zora,
ed. Redaktionsgruppe Früchte des Zorns, 2d ed. (Berlin: ID-Archiv, 1993).

46. Della Porta,
Social Movements,
Appendix.

47. Backes and Jesse,
Politischer Extremismus,
240.

48. The Autonomen and others denounced the killings at the 1976 Frankfurt conference “Antiimperialistischer und antikapitalistischer Widerstand in Westeuropa.” Rabert,
Links- und Rechtsterrorismus,
135.

49. Documents related to the incident are contained in
“Ihr habt unseren
Bruder ermordet”: Die Antwort der Brüder des Gerold von Braunmühl an die
RAF: Eine Dokumentation
(Reinbeck bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1987).

50. “‘Ein moralisch leerer Mensch’?”
Spiegel,
no. 21 (1992): 97.

51.
“Wir ware so unheimlich konsequent . . .” : Ein Gesprach zur Geschicte
der RAF mit Stefan Wisniewski
(Berlin: ID-Verlag, 1999), 11.

52. Rabert,
Links- und Rechtsterrorismus,
133.

53. Amnesty International,
Amnesty International Report
(AI Publications, 1985), 264.

54. “Tod und Trauer,”
taz,
May 18, 1992, 11. Early debates about amnesty are contained in
Der blinde Fleck,
160–81, and
Spiegel,
no. 53 (1979).

55. “Angst vor mancherlei Rachegschrei,”
Spiegel,
July 18, 1988, 32–42.

See also Klaus Jünshke,
Spätlese: Texte zu Knast und RAF
(Frankfurt a.M.: Neue Kritik, 1988).

56. In West Germany, both regional officials and the federal chancellor had the power to issue pardons. With respect to RAF members, it amounted to the commutation of sentences, not any kind of absolution from guilt. On the
Aussteiger
see “Die Ausgrenzung ist für beide Teile tödlich,”
Spiegel,
October 19, 1987.

57. Laqueur,
New Terrorism,
167. The decision to grant asylum was likely made between 1978 and 1980 by the DDR’s minister of state security, Erich Mielke. The extent to which the DDR sponsored any of the RAF’s violence remains a matter of speculation. See also Rabert,
Links- und Rechtsterrorismus,
222–30.

58. Schiller,
“Es war ein harter Kampf,”
227.

59. RAF, “Aprilerklärung,” quoted in Rabert,
Links- und Rechtsterrorismus,
140. The cease-fire proved fleeting: in March 1993, RAF bombs demolished the newly built Weiterstadt Prison, a maximum security facility for women. (The RAF