 | Goncharov, John W. Lewis, and Xue Litai,
Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao and the Korean War
(Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1993), chap. 4 (which we believe is the best chapter of the book); Pei Jianzhang,
Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaoshi,
16-27.
|
| 20. During Mao's visit to the Soviet Union, China ordered 586 planes, including 280 fighters, 198 bombers, and 108 trainers and other planes. From February 16 to March 5, 1950, a mixed Soviet air defense division, following the request of the PRC government, moved into Shanghai, Nanjing, and Xuzhou, to take responsibility for the air defense of these areas. From March 13 to May 11 this Soviet division shot down 5 GMD planes in the Shanghai area, greatly strengthening Shanghai's air defense system. Han Huanzhi and Tan Jinjiao,
Dangdai Zhongguo jundui de junshi gongzuo
[Military affairs of contemporary Chinese army] (Beijing: Jiexangjun, 1989), vol. 2, 161; Wang Dinglie,
Dangdai Zhongguo kongjun
[Contemporary Chinese air force] (Beijing: Jiexangjun, 1989), 78-9, 110.
|
| 21. Mao Zedong's address to the Sixth Session of the Central People's Government Council, April 11, 1950,
Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao,
vol. 1, p. 291.
|
| 22. Mao later would repeatedly recall that during his meetings with Stalin from December 1949 to February 1950, Stalin did not trust him and failed to treat him equally. See, for example, his statements to the Soviet ambassador in Beijing in 1956 and 1958 in
CWIHP Bulletin
6-7 (Winter 1995/1996): especially 155-6, 165-6.
|
| 23. We now know that in 1949 and early 1950, Kim Il Sung made extensive efforts to convince Stalin that there existed a real revolutionary situation on the Korean peninsula, so that he would get Stalin's support for his plans to unify Korea by military means. See, for example, Kathryn Weathersby, "Korea, 1949-1950: To Attack, or Not to Attack? Stalin, Kim Il Sung, and the Prelude to War,"
CWIHP Bulletin
5 (Spring 1995): 1, 2-9.
|
| 24. For a more detailed discussion, see Goncharov et al.,
Uncertain Partners,
chap. 5.
|
| 25. For Stalin' s discussions with Kim Il Sung, see Weathersby, "Korea, 1949-1950"; see also "New Russian Documents on the Korean War," trans. Kathryn Weathersby,
CWIHP Bulletin
6-7 (Winter 1995/1996): 36-9.
|
| 26. Mao Zedong, however, did not believe that the Americans would intervene directly in a revolutionary civil war in Korea. For a more detailed discussion, see Chen Jian,
China's Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 88-90.
|
|