5. Ground on which each side has liberty of movement is open ground.
Ts’ao Kung [explains this as] “ground covered with a network of roads,” like a chess-board. Another interpretation, suggested by Ho Shih, is “ground on which intercommunication is easy.” In either case, it must evidently be “flat country,” and therefore [it] “cannot be blocked.”
6. Ground which forms the key to three contiguous states,
[Ts’ao Kung writes:] “Our country adjoining the enemy’s and a third country conterminous with both.”
so that he who occupies it first has most of the Empire at his command,
China was divided [into a loose confederacy of states] under the Chou dynasty. The belligerent who holds this dominating position can constrain most of them to become his allies.
is ground of intersecting highways.
7. When an army has penetrated into the heart of a hostile country, leaving a number of fortified cities in its rear, it is serious ground.
Wang Hsi explains the name by saying that “when an army has reached such a point, its situation is serious.” Li Ch’üan instances (1) the victorious march of Yo I into the capital of Ch’i in 284 B.C., and (2) the attack on Ch’u, six years later, by the Ch’in general Po Ch’i.
8. Mountain forests, rugged steeps, marshes and fens—all country that is hard to traverse: this is difficult ground.
Chia Lin explains [steeps, marshes and fens] as ground “that has been ruined by water passing over it,” and Tu Yu simply as “swampy ground.” But Ch’ên Hao says [it refers particularly] to deep hollows—what Chu-ko Liang [designated] “earth-hells.”
9. Ground which is reached through narrow gorges, and from which we can only retire by tortuous paths, so that a small number of the enemy would suffice to crush a large body of our men: this is hemmed-in ground.
10. Ground on which we can only be saved from destruction by fighting without delay, is desperate ground.
As pictured by Ts’ao Kung, . . . here escape is no longer possible: “A lofty mountain in front, a large river behind, advance impossible, retreat blocked.” Ch’ên Hao says: “To be on ‘desperate ground’ is like sitting in a leaking boat or crouching in a burning house.”
Tu Mu quotes from Li Ching a vivid description of the plight of an army thus entrapped: “Suppose an army is invading hostile territory without the aid of local guides:—it falls into a fatal snare and is at the enemy’s mercy. A ravine on the left, a mountain on the right, a pathway so perilous that the horses have to be roped together and the chariots carried in slings, no passage open in front, retreat cut off behind, no choice but to proceed in single file. Then, before there is time to range our soldiers in order of battle, the enemy in overwhelming strength suddenly appears on the scene. Advancing, we can nowhere take a breathing-space; retreating, we have no haven of refuge. We seek a pitched battle, but in vain; yet standing on the defensive, none of us has a moment’s respite.
“If we simply maintain our ground, whole days and months will crawl by; the moment we make a move, we have to sustain the enemy’s attacks on front and rear. The country is wild, destitute of water and plants; the army is lacking in the necessaries of life, the horses are jaded and the men worn-out; all the resources of strength and skill unavailing, the pass so narrow that a single man defending it can check the onset of ten thousand; all means of offence in the hands of the enemy, all points of vantage already forfeited by ourselves:—in this terrible plight, even though we had the most valiant soldiers and the keenest of weapons, how could they be employed with the slightest effect?”
Students of Greek history may be reminded of the awful close to the Sicilian expedition, and the agony of the Athenians under Nicias and Demosthenes.
11. On dispersive ground, therefore, fight not. On facile ground, halt not. On contentious ground, attack not.
But [according to Ts’ao Kung] rather let all your energies be bent on occupying the advantageous position first. Li Ch’üan and others, however, suppose the meaning to be that the enemy has already forestalled us, so that it would be sheer madness to attack. . . .
When the King of Wu inquires what should be done in this case, Sun Tzu replies: “The rule with regard to contentious ground is that those in possession have the advantage over the other side. If a position of this kind is secured first by the enemy, beware of attacking him. Lure him away by pretending to flee—show your banners and sound your drums—make a dash for other places that he cannot afford to lose—trail brushwood and raise a dust—confound his ears and eyes—detach a body of your best troops, and place it secretly in ambuscade. Then your opponent will sally forth to the rescue.”
12. On open ground, do not try to block the enemy’s way.
Because the attempt would be futile, and would expose the blocking force itself to serious risks [this interpretation follows] that of Chang Yü. [Another interpretation] is indicated in Ts’ao Kung’s brief note: “Draw closer together”—
i.e
., see that a portion of your own army is not cut off. Wang Hsi points out that “open ground” is only another name for the “accessible ground” described in chapter X, paragraph 2, and says that the advice here given is simply a variation of “keep a sharp eye on the line of supplies,” be careful that your communications are not cut.