Art of War (Barnes & Noble Classics Series) (41 page)

The general who has attained a responsible post must be careful to study them.

 

Out of the foregoing six, it will be noticed that nos. 3 and 6 have really no reference to the configuration of the country, and that only 4 and 5 can be said to convey any definite geographical idea.

14. Now an army is exposed to six several calamities, not arising from natural causes, but from faults for which the general is responsible. These are: (1) Flight; (2) insubordination; (3) collapse; (4) ruin; (5) disorganisation; (6) rout.

15. Other conditions being equal, if one force is hurled against another ten times its size, the result will be the
flight
of the former.

 

See chapter III, paragraph 10. The general’s fault here is that of “not calculating the enemy’s strength.” . . . As Li Ch’üan very justly remarks, “Given a decided advantage in position, or the help of some stratagem such as a flank attack or an ambuscade, it would be quite possible [to fight in the ratio of one to ten].”

16. When the common soldiers are too strong and their officers too weak, the result is
insubordination
.

 

Tu Mu cites the unhappy case of T’ien Pu, who was sent to Wei in 821 A.D. with orders to lead an army against Wang T’ing-ts’ou. But the whole time he was in command, his soldiers treated him with the utmost contempt, and openly flouted his authority by riding about the camp on donkeys, several thousands at a time. T’ien Pu was powerless to put a stop to this conduct, and when, after some months had passed, he made an attempt to engage the enemy, his troops turned tail and dispersed in every direction. After that, the unfortunate man committed suicide by cutting his throat.

When the officers are too strong and the common soldiers too weak, the result is
collapse
.

 

Ts’ao Kung says: “The officers are energetic and want to press on, the common soldiers are feeble and suddenly collapse.” . . . Tu Mu explains it as “stumbling into a death-trap.”

17. When the higher officers are angry and insubordinate, and on meeting the enemy give battle on their own account from a feeling of resentment, before the commander-in-chief can tell whether or no he is in a position to fight, the result is
ruin
.

 

Wang Hsi’s note is: “This means, the general is angry without just cause, and at the same time does not appreciate the ability of his subordinate officers; thus he arouses fierce resentment and brings an avalanche of ruin upon his head.” . . . My interpretation of the whole passage is that of Mei Yao-ch’ên and Chang Yü. Tu Mu gives a long extract from the
Tso Chuan
, showing how the great battle of Pi [597 B.C.] was lost for the Chin State through the contumacy of Hsien Hu and the resentful spite of Wei I and Chao Chan.

18. When the general is weak and without authority; when his orders are not clear and distinct;

 

Wei Liao Tzu says: “If the commander gives his orders with decision, the soldiers will not wait to hear them twice; if his moves are made without vacillation, the soldiers will not be in two minds about doing their duty.” General Baden-Powell says, italicising the words, “The secret of getting successful work out of your trained men lies in one nutshell—in the clearness of the instructions they receive.” . . . Wu Tzu [says]: “The most fatal defect in a military leader is diffidence; the worst calamities that befall an army arise from hesitation” [
Aids to Scouting
].

when there are no fixed duties assigned to officers and men,

 

[Tu Mu puts it thus]: “Neither officers nor men have any regular routine.”

and the ranks are formed in a slovenly haphazard manner, the result is utter
disorganisation
.

19. When a general, unable to estimate the enemy’s strength, allows an inferior force to engage a larger one, or hurls a weak detachment against a powerful one, and neglects to place picked soldiers in the front rank, the result must be a
rout
.

 

[From Julius Caesar’s first rules in “De Bello Gallico” (the Gallic Wars)]: “Whenever there is fighting to be done, the keenest spirits should be appointed to serve in the front ranks, both in order to strengthen the resolution of our own men and to demoralise the enemy.”

20. These are six ways of courting defeat,

 

Ch’ên Hao makes them out to be: (1) “neglect to estimate the enemy’s strength”; (2) “want of authority”; (3) “defective training”; (4) “unjustifiable anger”; (5) “non-observance of discipline”; (6) “failure to use picked men.”

which must be carefully noted by the general who has attained a responsible post.

21. The natural formation of the country is the soldier’s best ally;

 

Ch’ên Hao says: “The advantages of weather and season are not equal to those connected with ground.”