Art of War (Barnes & Noble Classics Series) (22 page)

1. Sun Tzu said: The control of a large force is the same in principle as the control of a few men: it is merely a question of dividing up their numbers.
 
 
That is, cutting up the army into regiments, companies, etc., with subordinate officers in command of each. Tu Mu reminds us of Han Hsin’s famous reply to the first Han Emperor, who said to him, “How large an army do you think I could lead?” “Not more than 100,000 men, your Majesty.” “And you?” asked the Emperor. “Oh!” he answered, “the more the better.”
2. Fighting with a large army under your command is nowise different from fighting with a small one: it is merely a question of instituting signs and signals.
3. To ensure that your whole host may withstand the brunt of the enemy’s attack and remain unshaken—this is effected by manœuvres direct and indirect.
 
We now come to one of the most interesting parts of Sun Tzu’s treatise, the discussion of
chêng
and
ch’i
. As it is by no means easy to grasp the full significance of these two terms, or to render them at all consistently by good English equivalents, it may be as well to tabulate some of the commentators’ remarks before proceeding further. . . . Chia Lin: “In presence of the enemy, your troops should be arrayed in normal fashion, but in order to secure victory abnormal manœuvres must be employed.” Mei Yao-ch’ên: “
Ch’i
is active,
chêng
is passive; passivity means waiting for an opportunity, activity brings the victory itself.”
Ho Shih: “We must cause the enemy to regard our straightforward attack as one that is secretly designed, and vice versa; thus
chêng
may also be
ch’i
, and
ch’i
may also be
chêng
.” He instances the famous exploit of Han Hsin, who when marching ostensibly against Lin-chin, suddenly threw a large force across the Yellow River in wooden tubs, utterly disconcerting his opponent. Here, we are told, the march on Lin-chin was
chêng
and the surprise manœuvre was
ch’i
. . . .
A comment of the T’ang Emperor T’ai Tsung goes to the root of the matter: “. . . The whole secret lies in confusing the enemy, so that he cannot fathom our real intent.” To put it perhaps a little more clearly: any attack or other operation is
chêng
on which the enemy has had his attention fixed; whereas that is
ch’i
, which takes him by surprise or comes from an unexpected quarter. If the enemy perceives a movement which is meant to be
ch’i
, it immediately becomes
chêng
.
4. That the impact of your army may be like a grindstone dashed against an egg—this is effected by the science of weak points and strong.
5. In all fighting, the direct method may be used for joining battle, but indirect methods will be needed in order to secure victory.
 
Chang Yü says: “Steadily develop indirect tactics, either by pounding the enemy’s flanks or falling on his rear.” A brilliant example of “indirect tactics” which decided the fortunes of a campaign was Lord Roberts’ night march round the Peiwar Kotal in the second Afghan war.
6. Indirect tactics, efficiently applied, are inexhaustible as Heaven and Earth, unending as the flow of rivers and streams; like the sun and moon, they end but to begin anew; like the four seasons, they pass away but to return once more.
Here we simply have an expression, in figurative language, of the almost infinite resource of a great leader.
7. There are not more than five musical notes, yet the combinations of these five give rise to more melodies than can ever be heard.
8. There are not more than five primary colours, yet in combination they produce more hues than can ever be seen.
9. There are not more than five cardinal tastes, yet combinations of them yield more flavours than can ever be tasted.
10. In battle, there are not more than two methods of attack—the direct and the indirect; yet these two in combination give rise to an endless series of manœuvers.
11. The direct and the indirect lead on to each other in turn. It is like moving in a circle—you never come to an end. Who can exhaust the possibilities of their combination?
12. The onset of troops is like the rush of a torrent which will even roll stones along in its course.
13. The quality of decision is like the well-timed swoop of a falcon which enables it to strike and destroy its victim.
As applied to the falcon, [this quality] seems to me to denote that instinct of
self-restraint
which keeps the bird from swooping on its quarry until the right moment, together with the power of judging when the right moment has arrived. The analogous quality in soldiers is the highly important one of being able to reserve their fire until the very instant at which it will be most effective. When the “Victory” went into action at Trafalgar at hardly more than drifting pace, she was for several minutes exposed to a storm of shot and shell before replying with a single gun. Nelson coolly waited until he was within close range, when the broadside he brought to bear worked fearful havoc on the enemy’s nearest ships.
14. Therefore the good fighter will be terrible in his onset, and prompt in his decision.
Wang Hsi’s note . . . : “This is just how the ‘psychological moment’ ought to be seized in war.”
15. Energy may be likened to the bending of a crossbow; decision, to the releasing of the trigger.
16. Amid the turmoil and tumult of battle, there may be seeming disorder and yet no real disorder at all; amid confusion and chaos, your array may be without head or tail, yet it will be proof against defeat.
 
Mei Yao-ch’ên says: “The subdivisions of the army having been previously fixed, and the various signals agreed upon, the separating and joining, the dispersing and collecting which will take place in the course of a battle, may give the appearance of disorder when no real disorder is possible. Your formation may be without head or tail, your dispositions all topsy-turvy, and yet a rout of your forces quite out of the question.”
17. Simulated disorder postulates perfect discipline; simulated fear postulates courage; simulated weakness postulates strength.
 
Tu Mu . . . put it quite plainly: “If you wish to feign confusion in order to lure the enemy on, you must first have perfect discipline; if you wish to display timidity in order to entrap the enemy, you must have extreme courage; if you wish to parade your weakness in order to make the enemy over-confident, you must have exceeding strength.”

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