Authors: Jason Burke
24
. Parliament ISC report, p. 13.
25
. Significantly too, Dhiren Barot had pursued a similar form of action. He drafted a signed document found in Pakistan which described a project for a series of attacks in London and which was presented to senior al-Qaeda figures somewhere along the Afghan-Pakistani frontier in early 2004. Rosie Cowan, ‘Buried inside a Bruce Willis video, the evidence of a plot to kill thousands’,
Guardian
, 7 November 2006.
26
. Author interviews with Islamic activists, intelligence officers, senior journalists in Qatar, June 2005, in Islamabad and Lahore, Pakistan, July 2005, in London, November 2006.
Conclusion
1
. Interviews with senior soldiers, aid officials, government officials, Lashkar Gah, Kandahar and Kabul, May and June 2006.
2
. In January 2007, John Negroponte, the US national intelligence director, said bin Laden was in Pakistan. ‘Al-Qaeda “rebuilding” in Pakistan’, BBC, 12 January 2007.
3
. Osama bin Laden, videoed speech broadcast by al-Jazeera, 27 December 2001.
4
. Quoted in Analysis of Recent al-Qaida documents, by Colonel (res) Yoni Fighel and Yoram Kehati, ICT, March 2004. Al-Zarqawi quoted in Gilles Kepel, ed.,
Al-Qaida dans le texte
, p. 413.
5
. See the series of
Pew Global Attitude Surveys
for useful figures.
6
. The composition of the conspirators, and their demands, are further evidence of the convergence of local groups. The kidnappers were led by Omar Saeed Sheikh, the British-born Pakistani whose release had been forced by the HUM hijackers of the Indian plane two years previously. It is thought that Pearl was actually killed by a Yemeni who had been fighting in Afghanistan.
7
. ‘Les maquis Algériens inquiètent la France’,
Le Monde
, 14 Novembre 2006, Gérard Davet et Piotr Smolar. ‘Terrorisme: Un réseau maghrébin?’
L’Express
, 30 November 2006.
8
. Author interviews with Hezb-i-Islami representatives, Kabul, June 2006.
9
. The British parliamentary Intelligence and Security Committee’s report into the 7/7 London bombings, presented May 2006, reveals (p. 8) that in autumn 2001 the security service knew of approximately 250 primary investigative targets in the UK. By July 2004 this had risen to over 500. By July 2005 the number of such targets in the UK had risen to around 800. From my own research I know that the list of 250 included many individuals who had been involved in Kashmiri militancy in the early and mid 1990s but had since ceased their activism. The resulting rise in numbers of ‘primary targets’ is thus all the more impressive.
10
. The question of funding is important. In the aftermath of 11 September, the Bush administration was swift to move against those they felt were sponsoring or financially facilitating terrorism. The Americans publicly identified 300 individuals and entities and within months $112 million had been frozen in accounts all over the world. Yet over the following year the difficulties of tackling the funding of radical activism became clear. In 2002 only another $10 million was seized. In September 2002 the United Nations committee monitoring ‘al-Qaeda’ announced that the group’s financial backers in North Africa, the Middle East and Asia were still managing at least $30 million in investments, with some estimates going as high as $300 million. And, the committee also noted, private donations to the group were continuing ‘largely unabated.’ See Reuters, ‘Al-Qaeda Has Access to Millions’, UN Says, 29 August. Colum Lynch, ‘Al Qaeda Is Reviving, U.N. Report Says,
Washington Post
, 18 December 2002. The FBI designated nine men as key terrorist financiers: seven Saudis, a Pakistani and an Egyptian. But to pick out individuals is ludicrous. The basis for the funding of modern Islamic terrorism, whether committed by individuals linked to bin Laden or any other group or acting on their own, is the sympathy felt for his cause among millions of Muslims worldwide. Stopping the activities of seven men will do nothing to address the problem. The FBI and US Treasury estimate that as much as $100 million has flowed from private sources within Saudi Arabia alone to ‘terrorist groups’ in recent years, let alone other Gulf countries. Huge sums flow from devout and not so-devout Muslims, to Islamic charities from all over the world. Much of this money is spent on spreading hardline Wahhabi-style Islam, some is spent on relief for needy Muslims, some is diverted to fund terrorism. See Douglas Farah, ‘Saudis Face U.S. Demand On Terrorism’
Washington Post
, 26 November 2002. Matthew Levitt, Washington institute, Policywatch, Number 687 10 December 2002, ‘Saudi financial counter-terrorism measures, smokescreen or substance?’ It is worth remembering that while the 11 September attacks are thought to have cost around $500,000, the London attacks cost less than a thousand pounds.
11
. The fact that Mahathir Mohammed was applauded for his anti-semitism by the assembled heads of states at the Islamic Leaders’ summit is a particularly repugnant example of the failure of senior Muslim leaders to make a stand against racism and prejudice in any form. John Aglionby, ‘Malaysia’s Man of Iron Quits With Stinging Salvo’,
Guardian Weekly
, 6 November 2003.
12
. Author interview with senior Scotland Yard police officer, London, November 2002.
13
. In 2005, there were 15.2 million Muslims in the fifteen countries that joined the EU before 2004 – only about 4 per cent of the total population there and a proportion that is smaller still when the Eastern European countries that have joined the EU in 2006 and 2007 are added. Even with Turkey’s 68 million-plus citizens, the EU’s Muslim population remains proportionately small.
14
. Alan Richards, ‘Socio-economic roots of Radicalism?’, US Defense Department Research paper, 2003.
15
. Laurence Caramel, ‘Un “Grand Moyen-Orient”, le rêve controversé de Bush’.
Le Monde
, 24 March 2004.
16
. It is worth remembering that failed mega cities, such as Karachi, are as dangerous as failed states.
17
. Author interviews with Lashkar-e-Toiba cadres, in prison, Jammu, India, October 2003.
18
. George Tenet, the director of the CIA, recognized that Iraq was seen as a ‘golden opportunity’ for radical groups to rally their cause in early 2004. Greg Miller, ‘Scattered Terror Groups Pose New Threat, CIA Chief Says’,
Los Angeles Times
, 25 February 2004.
19
. Network analysis of al-Qaeda cells has shown that removing individual leaders results in the emergence of a series of new ones. Though none has the same operational capability as the old, unique leader, their creation strengthens the network as a whole. The group’s power to organize major spectacular attacks is traded for greater resilience. K. Carley, ‘Modeling Covert Networks’, paper, 2003. K. Carley, J. Lee and D. Krackhardt, ‘Destabilizing networks’,
Connections
, 24, 2001. Quoted by Scott Atran, ‘Suicide Terrorism: Strategic Threat and Counterstrategies,’ unpublished paper kindly made available to the author, January 2004. See also Jessica Stern,
Terror in the Name of God
, p. 141
20
. Donald Rumsfeld himself recognized this in October 2003 when he circulated a memo to senior Defense Department colleagues. ‘We are having mixed results with al-Qaeda, although we have put considerable pressure on them… a great many remain at large,’ he said. ‘Are we capturing, killing or deterring and dissuading more terrorists every day than the medrassas and the radical clerics are recruiting, training and deploying against us?’ ‘Rumsfeld’s War-on-terror Memo’,
USA Today
, 22 October 2003.
Glossary
Al-Haramain: the holy places of Mecca and Medina
Alim: senior Islamic scholar
Amir (or emir): one who commands, a prince or a military commander, one who has authority in any given situation. Often used to refer to the leader of an Islamic group
Amir-ul-Momineen: ‘commander of the faithful’. Title of the caliph. Used by Mullah Omar, leader of the Taliban
Ansar: those in the city of Medina who had pledged to help the Prophet Mohammed after his migration from Mecca
Ayatollah: ‘sign of God’, title of high-ranking Shia religious leader
Badr: battle in 624 ce when Mohammed and 300 followers defeated a far larger Meccan force
Barelvi: school of Islam dominant in Pakistan, relatively tolerant and mystic
Bida: innovation, deviation from orthodox Islamic tradition
Caliph: from Arabic ‘khalifa, successor or viceroy’, refers to political and spiritual leader of the world community of Muslims, the successor of the Prophet Mohammed, God’s viceroy on earth
Caliphate: lands ruled by a caliph, originally from Medina. Later from Baghdad and Cairo. The Ottoman caliphate, the most recent, was ended in 1924 through the creation of Turkey
Da’wa: literally ‘call’ or ‘invitation’; effort by pious Muslims to convince non-Muslims to accept Islam and Muslims to live more religiously
Dar ul Harb: ‘abode of war/hostility’, the territory ruled by unbelievers
Dar ul Islam: ‘abode of peace’, the territory ruled according to Muslim law
Deobandi: conservative school of Islam. Founded in India but subsequently split into Indian and Afghan-Pakistani strands
Fatwa (plural fatawa): a legal opinion given on a religious question by a recognized scholastic authority that is binding
Fedayeen: those willing to sacrifice themselves in the course of battle
Fiqh: the science of Islamic law
Fitna: strife, sedition, literally ‘ordeal’; infighting among political factions with ideological differences, such as in the time after the death of the Prophet
Ghazi: warrior, one who takes part in a ghazwa, or military expedition
Hadith: the traditions of the Prophet, including his habits and the sayings attributed to him. Not revealed, but very important in establishing the shariat, especially for Sunni Muslims
Haj: the pilgrimage to Mecca, one of the five ‘pillars of Islam’, which all Muslims should perform within their lifetime
Halal: permitted under Islamic law
Haram: forbidden by Islamic law
Haraqa, harkut: movement/group
Hijra: literally ‘migration’; refers most often to the journey of the Prophet Mohammed to Medina with the early Muslims in 622 bc to escape persecution in Mecca. A similar migration is a duty for all Muslims who are unable to practise their faith freely
Hizb: party
Hizbollah: party of God
Ijtihad: the process of interpretative reasoning as applied to the core Islamic texts. Comes from the same root as ‘jihad’, thus the implication that it is the ‘effort’ to understand
Ikhwan: brotherhood, often used as shorthand for Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamist group founded in Egypt in 1928
Islah: reform and revival of the Islamic community through a return to authentic religious practices
Jahillyya: barbarism and ignorance that preceded the coming of Islam in Arabia
Jamaa, gamaa, jemaa: association, group
Jihad: effort, struggle, a legitimate war. A much-debated term with many different meanings at different times. Not one of the five pillars of the faith but seen as a duty on every individual if the umma is threatened. ‘The Jihad’ usually refers to the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan
Jihadi: preferring the violence of jihad as a tactic to the non-violence of da’wa, social or political activism
Ka’aba: cube-shaped shrine in the centre of the grand mosque, Mecca
Kafir, kufr: unbeliever, unbelief; one who rejects the truth despite being shown it