Authors: Jason Burke
14
. The only al-Qaeda links were the provision of $50,000 to the bombers by an expatriate Moroccan, whose links to bin Laden were never particularly clear, and the discovery of ‘al-Qaeda’ bomb manuals in houses linked to the attackers. The man alleged to be the main al-Qaeda connection died on his first day in custody.
15
. Elaine Sciolino,
New York Times
, 23 May 2003, ‘Moroccans say al-Qaeda was behind Casablanca bombings’.
Los Angeles Times
, ‘Morocco indicts 6 more suspects in Casablanca blasts’, 30 May 2003, Sebastian Rotella. Author interviews in Casablanca, January 2006.
16
. Jamal Halaby, ‘Military Court Opens Trial of 10 Suspected Terrorists’, Associated Press, 11 September 2002. Ten men arrested in Jordan in March 2002 for conspiring to carry out terror attacks against US and Israeli targets had, security officials stressed, ‘no links to al-Qaeda’.
17
. Sheela Raval, ‘Return of Terror’,
India Today
, 8 September 2003. ‘Three Americans Shot Dead at Hospital in Yemen’, Reuters, 30 December 2003. Bert Herman, ‘Uzbekistan Bombings’, Associated Press, 30 March 2004. Author interviews in Srinagar, India, November 2003.
18
. ‘Madrid bombing probe finds no al-Qaeda link’, the Associated Press, 9 March 2006. Javier Jordan and Robert Wesley,
Terrorism Monitor
, The Jamestown Foundation. Author interviews with senior Spanish police officers, Madrid, October 2006.
19
. Lawrence Wright,
New Yorker
, 2 August 2002, ‘Were the Madrid bombings part of a new, far-reaching jihad being plotted on the Internet?’
20
. Madrid bombers ‘were inspired by Bin Laden address’, Elizabeth Nash,
Independent
, 7 November 2006.
21
. See White House press release, 10 January 2006. In a key speech Bush laid out ‘the political, security, and economic elements of the strategy for victory in the central front of the War on Terror, what has been achieved, the challenges faced at the start of 2006.’
17: Iraq and London
1
. A thorough rebuttal of all the various claims of al-Qaeda connections to Iraq beyond those alleged via Ansar ul Islam would take more space than is available here. We have already seen how claims that Mohammed Atta met with Iraqi agents were entirely fallacious. Much of the material claiming connections between bin Laden and the Iraqi dictator was supplied by Iraqi exiles in Washington or London, in particular Iyad Allawi, who was to become prime minister later. Its provenance alone should have provoked extreme scepticism. There is a possibility that bin Laden came into contact with some Iraqi intelligence officials in the mid 1990s in Sudan as part of Baghdad’s attempts to foster relations in the broader Arab world and to develop poles of influence to counter those of Riyadh and Cairo. See 9–11 commission report, p. 61. Senior al-Qaeda figures interrogated by the Americans have repeatedly told their questioners that attempts by Saddam Hussein to build a relationship were rejected by bin Laden and documents found with the former Iraqi dictator on his arrest in December 2003 hint that Saddam’s own feelings about the jihadis were deeply ambivalent. Bin Laden’s own antipathy for Saddam is well known. A CIA report cited by the 9–11 commission says: ‘We have seen no evidence that these or earlier contacts ever developed into a collaborative relationship. Nor have we seen evidence indicating that Iraq co-operated with al-Qaeda in developing or carrying out attacks against the United States.’ See also James Risen,
New York Times
, 14 January 2004 Hussein warned Iraqis to beware outside fighters, document says.
2
. Author interviews with American intelligence officials, Tikrit and Baghdad, May 2004. Interviews with former associates, Amman, June 2003. There are many useful accounts of al-Zarqawi’s life and works. Cross-referencing between works such as Loretta Napoleoni,
Insurgent Iraq, Zarqawi and the New Generation
, Constable and Robinson, London, September 2005 and very different publications such as
Al-Qaida Dans Le Texte
, ed. Gilles Kepel, pp. 370–416, (Paris, PUF, September 2005) allows a coherent and relatively accurate picture to emerge.
3
. German police intelligence report on al-Tauhid, compiled spring 2003, Author collection. Colin Powell’s speech, 5 February 2003, was broadcast live around the world and excerpted in most major English-language newspapers the following day. Author interviews with Afghan and Libyan former activists, in London and in Pakistan by telephone, February 2003.
4
. Dexter Filkins, ‘U.S. Says Files Seek Qaeda Aid in Iraq Conflict’,
New York Times
, 9 February 2004. The Shia population of Iraq is roughly 65 per cent of the total.
5
. Patrick Cockburn,
The Occupation, War and Resistance in Iraq
, Verso, London 2006, p. 119. Donna Van Natta, ‘The struggle for Iraq, terror recruits’,
New York Times
, 1 November 2003.
6
. Author interviews, Baghdad and Basra, June 2003. Baghdad and Tikrit, April 2004.
7
. The remaining 5 per cent were said to be predominantly non-Iraqi (Sunni) Arabs.
8
. Crisis Group interview, p. 14, Amman, 25 October 2004. Jonathan Finer,
Washington Post
, 17 November 2005, ‘Among insurgents in Iraq, few foreigners are found.’ Author Interviews with Iraqi police and intelligence officers, Baghdad, April 2004. Interviews with insurgents April 2004 and September 2004. Kepel
et al.
,
ibid
.p. 399. The idea that al-Qaeda was behind the violence in Iraq proved remarkably persistent in the White House and, at least publically, among senior American commanders. See ‘Al-Qaeda tries to foment Iraq civil war’ US general, Reuters, 29 November 2006. ‘Bush says troops will stay till task accomplished’, Reuters, 28 November, 2000.
9
. Cockburn,
Occupation, War and Resistance in Iraq, p. 5.
10
. Clashes between Sunni tribes and foreign militants were common. John Ward Anderson, ‘Seven al-Zarqawi Insurgents Killed in Retaliation for Khaldiya Slaying’, 2005,
Washington Post
, 2005.
11
. Author interviews with American army intelligence officers, Tikrit, May 2004 and Baghdad September 2004. Author interviews with British army intelligence officers, Basra, August 2004. Also with insurgents, Baghdad and Ramadi, April and September 2004. Greg Grant, ‘The IED Marketplace’,
Defense News
, March 2005. Amatzia Baram, ‘Who are the insurgents? Sunni Arab rebels in Iraq’, United States Institute of Peace. See also Rory McCarthy, ‘For faith and country, insurgents fight on’,
Guardian
, 16 December 2004.
12
. Bin Laden’s speeches are widely available in different translations on the internet. However, many are heavily edited.
Messages to the World: The Statements of Bin Laden
, Bruce Lawrence, includes the speeches in their entirety, accompanied by a useful commentary.
13
. See Jean Chichazola, 20 September 2005,
Le Figaro
, ‘les Djihadistes de banlieue s’apprêtaient à partir en Irak’, and ‘Le nouveau visage des Jeunes djihadistes’,
Le Figaro
, 18 October 2006.
14
. Jason Burke, ‘The Murder that Shattered Holland’s Liberal Dream’,
Observer
, 7 November 2004. Ian Buruma,
Murder in Amsterdam
, Atlantic Books, 2006.
15
. I interviewed a series of these activists in London in the early 1990s. Few could speak good English, clearly a prerequisite for anyone planning a campaign of proselytization in the UK.
16
. When in 1998 I discussed such activity with British diplomats in Islamabad they manifested a resigned lack of concern in the phenomenon. It is worth remembering that the original Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front which pioneered the first revolt against the Indian government in the Srinagar valley was based in the UK for a time.
17
. Jason Burke, ‘Britons hold key to master terrorist trial’,
Observer
, 20 May 2001. Multiple author interviews with senior police officials between 2000 and 2005.
18
. Eliza Manningham-Buller, ‘Global Terrorism: Are we meeting the challenge?’ James Smart lecture, 16 October 2003.
19
. Tariq Panja and Martin Bright, ‘Man Utd bomb plot probe ends in farce’,
Observer
, 2 May 2004. Jason Burke, ‘Revealed: how secret papers led to ricin raid’,
Observer
, 17 April 2005. Interrogation statements, police evidence brief, Algerian interrogation documents. Author collection.
20
. Accused admits buying fertiliser for bomb, but ‘not to use here’, Jeevan Vasagar,
Guardian
, 27 September 2006. Barot allegedly planned an explosion on a tube train under the Thames and bombs in limousines in underground carparks as well as a gas attack on the Heathrow Express and a radioactive dirty bomb. Barot was born in India, but he moved to Kingsbury, north London, as a baby in 1972 and attended a local school before leaving in 1988 after taking his GCSEs. He got a job as an airline ticket clerk in Piccadilly in 1991, but left on an overseas trip in 1995, which turned out to be to a terrorist training camp in Kashmir. By then he had converted to Islam and was growing more radical. In Pakistan, he was instructed in the use of weapons and explosives. In 1999 Barot travelled to the Philippines, where he attended another terrorist camp and underwent further training in small arms, mortars, explosives handling, navigation and jungle patrolling. When he was arrested in the summer of 2004, he had been working on his plans for at least 41/2 years. Further interesting details about the career of Barot and his links to Khalid Shaikh Mohammed can be found on p. 150 of
The9/11 Commission Report: The Full Final Report of the National Commissionon Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States
(May 2004, Claitors Publishing Division). Author interviews with police and associates of Barot, 2004. The essentially ‘home grown’ threat remained underestimated. After the 7/7 attack, a senior policeman admitted: ‘We were working off a script which actually has been completely discounted from what we [now] know as reality.’
21
. Duncan Gardham, ‘The four bombers who targeted London’,
The Daily Telegraph
, 13 May 2006. Alan Travis, ‘Candidates for indoctrination identified at youth clubs, bookshop and the “al-Qaida gym”,’ 12 May 2006,
Guardian
. Author interviews.
22
.
UK Parliament Intelligence and Security Committee Report into the London Terrorist Attacks on 7 July 2005
, presented May 2006, HMSO.
Government Response to the Intelligence and Security Committee’s Report into the London Terrorist Attacks on 7 July 2005
, presented May 2006. HMSO. Interviews with senior British intelligence officers, London, September 2006. For excellent work on ‘small group dynamics’, see Mark Sageman,
Understanding Terror Networks
(University of Pennsylvania Press, April 2004). Author telephone interview with Sageman, August 2006.
23
. ‘Evidence points to al-Qaida link to 7/7 bombs’, Alan Travis and Richard Norton-Taylor, 12 May 2006. UK Parliamentary Report, p. 13.