The Burden of Power: Countdown to Iraq - The Alastair Campbell Diaries (96 page)

In for the usual morning meetings, with both CDS and C more hopeful. John Scarlett also reported that the general picture was a lot better. TB later saw CDS and a general from the campaign and said he got more talking direct to the general than he had from weeks of meetings. The truth was that the military and intelligence campaigns had not been wholly successful. The morning meetings were not very productive, and the mood at the War Cabinet was the usual mix of sullen and concerned. Then to TB’s meeting with JR, HA, DA, Peter H, Jonathan, Pat McF, Sally, David Hanson [Blair’s PPS]. TB went through what he wanted on the political and media fronts. It was basically a war room à la Millbank, with all the main tasks being overseen from there, and everyone knowing what was going on in all the different parts of the operation.

I then spent most of the day in a series of meetings working out how to put it into practice. I called in the key people from CIC, FCO and MoD, and explained we needed much more centralised coordination. We were heading for another version of the Kosovo model, though as I pointed out to TB, getting real co-ordination with the Americans wasn’t easy because their own internal co-ordination was not there. Another TB/Bush call, which was basically just going through TB’s note. A lot of the discussion was about presentation and Bush said he would speak to Dan ‘who is kind of responsible for this’. He did so, because Dan called later and said TB had really got GWB ‘spun up’, because he was asking what we were going to do to
grip it. I said we had to have a real exchange of people and we also needed them to get their act together internally. He said the reality was they had no real grip of Rumsfeld. The main story of the weekend was division between Rumsfeld and the military over the way the campaign was being waged.

TB called later and asked if I thought it had been OK to raise the comms and media issues like he did. I said it was, but don’t underestimate how hard it will be to grip. We have our own internal problems but they are nothing compared with the Americans’. He had to be more direct with Bush because at least he tended to get things done when he cared enough about it. I sensed on the call today that Bush was maybe sharing TB’s feeling that the military campaign was not quite right. They were both desperate for better communications. The BBC was a bit better today but we had to do more to slow the rhythm. Shock and awehad to become steady progress.

I did a note overnight on the communications effort for TB. Last night had been better but we were still having real problems with the BBC, particularly the reports out of Baghdad and the embedded reporters. TB was involved in a series of meetings with GB re EMU. GB had suddenly announced last week that he wanted to do the euro assessment in the Budget, and say that four out of the five [economic] tests were met, and set out how we intended to meet the fifth, plus there was the suggestion, from us, that we could do the [euro] referendum bill. Andrew Adonis and Peter Hyman in particular were against it, felt it would be seen as sneaky. I felt it was big and bold and TB should use GB’s desire to do it now to extract maximum leverage for a pro position. But then after one of the sessions, TB said ‘God knows what he’s up to. I just can’t work it out.’

The military campaign was going better. There was a classic Clare moment at the War Cabinet when she asked CDS if we shouldn’t be talking to the local military down there. ‘We’re killing them, not talking to them,’ he said. She was more and more ridiculous at these meetings. At the pre-meeting TB raised the
Guardian
splash that the US was going to run Iraq from Kuwait. We worked up a line ‘Iraq for and by the Iraqi people’. But most of my day was taken trying to set up TB’s war room. I got him to raise it at the War Cabinet so ministers and top brass knew we would be changing things on the comms front. GH said he would like to have it at the MoD.

I chaired a ninety-minute meeting to work through all the things we would need for it and started to bring in the people we would
need to drive it. Anne Shevas [chief press officer] found premises at the FCO and rebuttal in MoD. Things were feeling better at the moment, and it was also the case that sometimes if we got the communications right, and the PR situation settled, things then improved in reality because people could focus better. We had intelligence, which I wanted to use, that Saddam was planning to attack holy sites as a way of generating real anger against us, not exactly difficult in the Arab world at the moment. CDS said we had to wait for the US to agree never to attack holy sites, even if they were being used to store weapons.

We had an internal meeting on some of the domestic policy issues, foundation hospitals, asylum, health and NICs. There was a lot to be sorting on the domestic front but most of our time and energies were going on Iraq. At the lobby we were starting to use the basic narrative set out in TB’s note – 1, strategic grip, 2, steady advance then 3, end of regime. It was the best way to slow the media rhythm. I was working on humanitarian stories for tomorrow. Clare did [Jonathan]
Dimbleby
on ITV and was talking about the illegality of the US approach. We were making good progress finding out what happened at the first Baghdad bombing, enough for Jack to say it was ‘increasingly probable’ it was caused by Iraqi missiles. The sense of strategy was finally beginning to get communicated through the media. I lodged another complaint with the BBC re their output from Baghdad from [Andrew] Gilligan and Rageh Omaar.

Definitely a sense that the military campaign was going better, plus we had a strong humanitarian message running alongside. The major news overnight was the battle getting closer to Baghdad, and also the rescue of a female US PoW [Private Jessica Lynch] by the Marines. Jack sort of got up the holy sites issue on the
Today
programme. I got a cab in and on the way up the street Alisdair Macdonald [
Mirror
photographer] showed me a picture he’d taken of Geoff Hoon yesterday as he left Number 10, with a ‘Top Secret’ paper facing the camera, and with the text legible. I thanked him and later spoke to Geoff about it. We had a fairly brief PMQs preparation meeting. TB now had maps of Iraq in his room. At the pre-meeting the picture given was a lot better, particularly in Basra. CDS made a revealing comment when he said in Basra we were using lessons from Northern Ireland. Troops were getting to know people, finding out who the ringleaders were, then seeking them out. ‘Did you do that in Northern Ireland?’ I asked. Laughter.

The War Cabinet proper was the usual blather. At the political meeting we agreed: 1. big push on holy sites; 2. pull back the military narrative so that it did not appear like we were about to win any day now, and 3. more out there re Iraq vs Iraqi people. I was working on a TB speech re a future vision for Iraq. Jack S called to say he was intending to go to ORHA. He said not to mention to Clare because she would want to come and it would change the whole tone and nature of the visit. Then to a meeting with John Reid and Douglas [Alexander] to see how they would fit in the war room. We agreed Douglas would be semi-permanent, JR in and out, though later TB told me he was thinking of moving JR to Leader of the House and Ian McCartney [pensions minister] to party chairman.

Over for PMQs which was fine though it was interesting that there were no questions on the conduct of the war – it was all about the post-conflict questions. I got back and started to insert people into different parts of the war room. The conference call was a mix of wandering conversations and pipe dreams about how well we were doing. I just didn’t see it. I had a separate chat with Dan re the Northern Ireland visit. We were thinking about a joint interview, and also getting over their guy from Homeland Security. TB saw GB again re EMU and was clearly now thinking he was being stitched up to do something he didn’t particularly want to do. I saw Peter M, PG and PH and discussed the BBC coverage. I got a nice letter from Neil [Kinnock] saying his favourite game at the moment was imagining how the BBC of today would have covered World War Two. ‘Hitler would have lived to 1978.’ PG felt the public were making up their own minds and that TB was in OK shape. The public liked TB being so big in the States and he felt we should build that side of the profile even more. My big worry was the Arab media. We were kidding ourselves if we thought we were making real inroads.

TB had issued instructions to ministers in the War Cabinet that they couldn’t go on holiday at Easter. When I mentioned it to Fiona, and said we needed to work out how to handle it if the press came after me when we were away, she snapped back ‘I suppose that’s a polite way of saying you can’t have a holiday.’ I couldn’t understand why she felt we both had to leave. We still had a lot going for us. But she didn’t really believe we could get our lives back until we were both out of their [the Blairs] shadow, and maybe there was something in that. I got Sally to speak to her, and Peter M. Both felt that her anger
with me for being a driven, obsessive, selfish bastard had boiled over but because she basically wanted us to stay together she preferred to express it as hatred for TB and CB who in turn gave her lots of ammunition. But it was really grim at the moment.

On the war front, things were going better. The movement towards Baghdad was quickening, more people were deserting, and more was coming out re the nature of the regime. TB was late for the pre-meeting because he had another euro meeting with GB. He was now firmly of the view that GB was trying to bounce him while his eye was off the ball because of Iraq. GB was now trying to make out that he had always intended to do the assessment now, and that TB had agreed to it a while back, which he hadn’t. Also that it was somehow TB’s fault Iraq was ‘taking so long’! And he was back on to a Peter M kick, saying that Peter was responsible for foundation hospitals and the division they were causing. So it went on.

There was an established meeting rhythm now – TB with me, Jonathan, DM, sometimes Sal, then pre-meeting with CDS, C, John S, then the War Cabinet, then a mop-up, and today full Cabinet as well. The mood was OK. TB went through the whole picture and was emphasising steady progress. I helped GH with his Commons statement and then went over to the war room. Dickie Stagg [director of public services and information, FCO] had done a great job and it was pretty much all there now, now needed the fine-tuning and the drive. It would definitely make a difference and we had some good people in there already. I worked on TB’s ‘message to the Iraqi people’ and we brainstormed on the different ways to get it across. TB was out on a troops visit so I tried to clear my in tray.

TB had asked GH and others to work on a counter-plan on the future of Iraq to offer to Bush that was not Rumsfeld’s eccentric ideas. TB said there was no point just going on about Rumsfeld the whole time. We needed a counter-plan. David M, Jonathan and I did a secure videolink with Condi, Dan and Karen. They agreed that on Tuesday we should publish a joint statement similar to the Azores. We also discussed [Bush visiting] Northern Ireland. I asked what the US media would make of GWB pitching up there. They said their approach was to say it was to show those involved in the MEPP that peace processes can work. Good idea. It was a good discussion, pretty frank about each other’s difficulties, so at one point we joked about swapping Rumsfeld for Clare. But I sensed we were at least gripping some of the post-war issues and had a sense of a stronger strategy going forward. Then a rash of calls on the euro, as GB’s lot seemed to be putting it about that there would be something on it in the Budget,
which confirmed the suspicions this was an attempted bounce. TB got back at 6 [from Aldershot and RAF Lyneham] and we went through the outstanding issues. HC [Hilary Coffman, special adviser] said he had been terrific with the troops.

More EMU meetings and TB was reverting to his original view that it would be seen as sneaky to do it in the Budget while a war was going on. Jeremy [Heywood] had been up until 1.30 negotiating with Ed Balls and trying to make the language more positive. After all the morning meetings TB called an office meeting and he looked pretty fed up. While GB’s rationale to TB was glass more than half full, it was the empty bits that would get the attention. TB saw him again later and said it was the worst meeting yet (again). GB said the assessment was done and he was not having it rewritten ‘for political reasons’. He was back to speaking in code again. He said ‘I know what your plan is’ – i.e. you are going to sack me. TB tried to get him to say that was what he meant, but he didn’t. TB said he was not prepared to be bounced into something that he felt was wrong. His instincts were telling him this was the wrong way, and the wrong time. He had discussed it with JP who had said he should follow his instincts, and also that there had to be more time for the Cabinet to be brought properly into the discussion.

GB said he was not prepared to let them rewrite the assessment and if that was what we intended, he would have to go. ‘There’s the door,’ said TB. GB claimed he had been trying to have these discussions for ages, which was total balls. The Treasury had already prepared for printing, and now sent to the printers, 3,000 pages of background material. TB said he had been trying to discuss this for months and GB had resisted, all the time preparing for this decision and announcement, and we had to wait for something written by someone called Dave Ramsden!
³⁷
Sally said it would be hard to win a referendum campaign without GB. But what he was doing was ensuring there wasn’t one for the foreseeable future.

TB and I went out on the terrace later. ‘One thing is for sure,’ he said. ‘At the moment he is crackerjack. My big worry is that he will bring the whole show down.’ I saw Ed Balls later and although we were able to talk in a civilised way about it, there was no getting away from how grisly things were between them at the moment. I
had told TB I was seeing him and he asked me to get over the message that he didn’t want to sack him, they had to work together but he did not fear him any more. I discussed my own situation with TB. He said if things were bad and I was feeling demotivated, I had to decide what I really wanted to do, but he felt I would regret it if I left. The truth was I didn’t really know if I wanted to leave or not. He had a lot on his plate at the moment. Iraq, then the euro suddenly thrown in and I felt bad adding to the problems, but I really need to resolve in my own mind what I intend to do.