The Burden of Power: Countdown to Iraq - The Alastair Campbell Diaries (91 page)

In for 8.30 meeting. Up to see TB in the flat. He was in the bath and Jack was pissed off not to be able to speak to him when he called in from Blackburn. TB was in very odd-looking shorts as he finally came down, said right, sorry I’m late, sat down and got going. He said it was clear now what the French would try – yes to the tests, even to the possibility of military action, but they would push for a later date.
We had a pre-meeting with JP, GB and DA downstairs before all the officials came in. GB was beginning to motor a bit, firing with good media and political lines. He also felt we needed to explain more clearly why we had been so keen to get the second resolution when now we were saying we didn’t need one. The answer lay in the pressure we had been putting on the Iraqis, through the building of international support. He also felt we should be pressing publicly over some of the questions he still felt Blix had not fully answered.

Goldsmith was happy for us to brief that in the coming days he would make clear there was a legal base for action. We now had to build up the Azores as a genuine diplomatic effort, which was not going to be easy. It was running as a ‘war not peace’ situation. John Scarlett joined us, reported signs of the Iraqis really hunkering down, said there were reports of summary executions. Godric and I were briefing ministers and then the media re the coming AG advice. A few decisions having been taken, the travel of direction clear, we felt in a stronger position. Robin sent over his draft letter which was pretty negative. I worked on TB’s, set it in a place that would make Robin want changes in both. TB went off to call Lagos. I got home in time to listen to a very long TB/Bush call. ‘Hey Tony, how are you?’ ‘I’m very well.’ ‘That is what I want to hear every time.’ He accepted we had done the right thing pushing him on the road map. ‘Good advice and it has helped a lot.’ The
New York Times
had it as ‘Blair insistent, Bush responds’ but it was a good move.

Bush was pretty vile about Fox, Chirac and Schroeder and to a lesser extent Lagos. He wanted to go for a ‘coalition of the willing’ meeting next week, but exclude France and Germany. He was venomous re Fox, said he could not believe they were not supporting us. He had guys like the Danes saying they were trying to help but had constitutional difficulties. Or Musharraf with all his problems saying let’s get it over with. TB said it was time for the UN to show it could do its job, Bush that anything that weakened 1441 was not on. His plan now was: 1. get through Monday; 2. get through our vote, then 3. coalition of the willing. He and TB then came up with the idea of doing the press conference before rather than after the meeting in the Azores. I was opposed, felt it would fuel the idea that this was all a bit of a charade. There was the odd flash of Bush humour in there. He said he would call some of our backbenchers and tell them he was converted to Kyoto, planning to go vegetarian, would legislate so that all fertiliser could only come from cows and horses and campaign for an agrarian society.

His main line was that anything that takes us back from 1441 was
not enough. This was the final stage of the diplomacy. TB said the UN had to be seen to do its job. Bush felt the TB line re the divisions being between those prepared to use force and those who were not would come best from TB not him. ‘People kind of know where I am on force.’ He said we have come to a conclusion at the UN. If we issue an ultimatum and the prospect of force, and France says no, it becomes impossible. TB said he still thought Chirac might say yes, but with a delay. Bush said if he went for yes with twenty-one days, he would reject it. They are the ones being unreasonable, not us. TB said he would definitely lose one minister, RC. ‘What does he do?’ Was Foreign Secretary, now Leader of the House. Bush said the ranks of the disaffected swell after a time.

Then going over the various timing issues again. TB said he was not sure where Kofi was. Bush said he had totally different problems to us re the UN, that the pressure in the States was to bury it. Then ‘I told Fox he has seriously messed up. He has really let me down on this.’ He then went off on one about the just demands of the free world. Was the UN really serving the world as it should? It had been pathetic in Rwanda. Then a discussion about anti-Semitism in Germany. TB said as things stood he was probably the only EU leader whose natural instincts were to go out and defend Israel. TB said the view here was of an all-powerful Jewish lobby in the States which could prevent a president moving on MEPP. Bush reckoned he had ten to fifteen per cent of the Jewish vote so it was all a bit of a myth. He had a lot less to lose than a Democratic president would.

Briefly they discussed proliferation of nuclear weapons. We do not need Saudi Arabia popping up with nuclear weapons, said Bush. The IAEA is pathetic. It’s got Cuba on its board. He said he was convinced we would help world peace and at the end said ‘It has been a great conversation. Let’s get a bit of exercise and rest up for the Azores summit. It will be historic. And I’ll be nuanced, I promise.’ TB: ‘We don’t want anything unnatural now.’ I went out for a longish run before getting back for Neil and Glenys coming for dinner. Neil was pretty much with me on Iraq, Glenys against, but we managed to avoid a big flare-up. Neil told me he had written to Robin saying don’t resign, that he ought to stay in there and be part of the dealing with the aftermath.

In for a long meeting in David Manning’s office after TB came back from church. First just David, Sally, Matthew [Rycroft] and I, then GB, JR and HA joined us. We were trying to boil down the central
arguments and dividing lines now. I suggested we say we intend to go back to the French and test their position – do they support any element of what we are saying? Are they really saying there are no circumstances in which they would support anything seen as a threat of military action? If they are, we go. If not, we have to look again. David M said there was no indication the French intended to shift. GB did
Frost
, and came back saying the really tough questions were in the field of legality. GB also said if we are saying this is the final shot at diplomacy, what are we actually saying we are going to do after today? Bush didn’t want a process story but I suggested one, namely a last round of contacts at the UN post the Azores meeting. I spoke to RC. He said he had thought about the changes I had suggested to his letter. He was happy to say TB had helped keep this on the international, multilateral track. He was happy to make clear he felt TB should remain as leader.

It was now time to leave. There was the usual last-minute stuff to do before we got into the cars and set off for the airport. Pretty big media turnout in the street but we pretty much ignored them. I travelled with TB in the car to the airport and first he spoke to Margaret B, then a call with [Jan Peter] Balkenende [Dutch Prime Minister]. Then we just chatted a bit. This was as tough as any decision we would have to make, he said. He felt it very deeply. It was a tough, tough call. He was still angry at the way the US had handled it. ‘If we had been totally in charge of this, I am absolutely sure we could have won the French round,’ he said. I felt the US and France both, for different reasons, did not want to meet on this. We got on to the plane and for most of the flight were working on other papers and TB’s message for the press event after the summit. It felt a bit insubstantial, especially given where it all now seemed to be heading. It was an opportunity though to set out the whole story, how we got to here, the French intransigence and so on.

It was a four-hour flight and the media were pretty much in ‘council of war’ mode. It was hard to sell this as a genuine diplomatic effort. Clinton sent through a draft of an article for the
Guardian
. He was trying to say he supported TB but the unspoken message was that he didn’t support the war. TB asked me to work on a different version. I was also working on the Iraq vision document and the RC letters, and shifting paper. Alison [Blackshaw] said she was always amazed how much work we seemed to get through on planes, and this one was particularly prolific. Re RC I put in a reference to his support for Operation Desert Fox [1998 bombing of Iraq], and Kosovo, and also hinted he could go on to another big role, having successfully got the
Sunday Times
to do a story saying he might go to Europe as a commissioner. We were also still negotiating the texts for the summit. DM felt there were too many references to terrorism and the language – e.g. peace-loving people – was too American. Also on the road map, they were saying it was a prospect. We needed it clearly there as a fact, something that was happening. They were pretty low-key re UN aftermath involvement and David was getting very fed up with them. I said why can’t we just say we will work for new UNSCRs on appropriate post-conflict government? We arrived in the Azores for what was going to be a fairly odd meeting. At the airbase we had a meeting with Barroso, then joined by Aznar. TB spoke by phone to Kofi who was pretty much in agreement that the French had fucked up. He agreed to see him in New York later in the week. Then we heard Chirac was intending to set out a new proposal, but it turned out simply to be calling for more time, thirty days. It was clear now, said TB, that the French did not intend to move.

We hung around for Bush to arrive and once he did we all moved to the US part of the base. TB travelled with Bush in the presidential limo and the ludicrously large motorcade. We sat around a fairly small square table. The mood shifted regularly from serious, e.g. going through texts, running over difficult arguments, to light-hearted. Bush at one point just looked over at me and said ‘You’re just like a faucet. Can’t stop leaking.’ I said we called it tap. Barroso did a long and ponderous opening and said we had to make the last effort for peace. Everyone kept going on about it being ‘the last effort for a political solution’. But there was a more than slight feeling of going through motions. The meeting itself was in an odd room, way too big for the numbers, with a kind of weird grey crazy paving-type set-up on the walls, thick white tablecloths.

Bush talked about it being a last effort. But he said it was important the world saw we were making every effort to enforce 1441. He said everyone had to be able to say we did everything we could to avoid war. But this was the final moment, the moment of truth, which was the line most of the media ran with. He stressed he wanted the UN to play an important role in the post-Saddam era. He was clear we had to emphasise Iraq’s territorial integrity. He was emphasising he would really move on MEPP. He said again TB had been right to push him on the road map, and said he intended to spend a lot of time on this. He said re Chirac ‘I don’t want to provoke him into unreasonableness.’ He was however keen to say he wanted the UN properly involved in the post-Saddam era. He would not deal with Arafat though. Condi and Karen [Hughes, AC’s opposite number]
later showed me the current draft of GWB’s ultimatum speech which I felt was a bit too warlike. Too much war, not enough ultimatum.

TB said we had reached the point of decision for people. We had been here before, but there really had to be a decision. How many times could there be a last chance, serious consequences for material breach? He reported that Kofi had said the French and Russians would not rule out force but would not agree to an ultimatum, which was an odd position. He really hit the UN buttons post Saddam, and was trying to force Bush to go further on that. ‘It has to be a UN-authorised government.’ He was also hammering home the advantage on MEPP, but I wasn’t convinced it would happen. We needed some kind of process story. I suggested to TB they all instruct their ambassadors at the UN to have one last go, see if the position of the others has changed. TB was constantly emphasising final appeal, final opportunity for the UN. Bush was scathing re the Turks, said Erdogan ‘just doesn’t get it. The Turkish military are setting him up.’ He was pretty keen to get on with things now, wanted to pull down the SCR now. He then said he would address the American people tomorrow – say diplomacy had failed, issue the ultimatum. He said to TB we should say we were issuing one last set of instructions to UN ambassadors to have a go at securing agreement. Aznar said he was concerned the French, Russians and Chinese would come up with a proposal. Bush said he would be happy to veto if they did. He was even talking about not going to the G8 summit.

Aznar was really pushing the importance of the transatlantic alliance, but he was in even more political hot water on this than we were. I introduced Bush to Godric, said he was our Ari Fleischer. ‘You gotta be bald or something to do these spokesmen jobs? Or is it the job makes you bald?’ TB had vanished to the loo. I said we’ve lost the PM. ‘I hope not,’ said Bush ‘’cos he’s the reason we’re all here on this island on a Sunday.’ He asked about the vote, said he was confident we would win. I said Robin C might shift a few. As we left I said to Bush, if I do a sub-four-hour marathon will you sponsor me? He said ‘If you win the vote in Parliament, I’ll kiss your ass.’ I said I’d prefer the sponsorship. Over to the press conference and now he went into ‘bastards’ mode in a kind of imitation of me. Dan said he was amused by the fact I dealt with the press in the way I did. He saw them as bastards too, but in the US nobody dare say it.

The press conference was very well set up and at least the Yanks knew how to do these kind of things. They did their statements, then one question from each country, and all on-message though Bush went off on one a bit re Chirac. He did his ‘moment of truth’ well,
but there was something very odd about his manner today. Bush had just about had enough of the serious talk and we had another half-serious, half-jokey conversation re marathon training. The last hour or so dragged a bit and we were basically just chatting, filling the time while the hacks all filed before getting back on the plane and heading home. In the car to the plane TB seemed to think it had gone OK, though we were all pretty clear the US had decided and nothing that came out of the French or anyone today would have changed their approach. I told him re the kiss-ass threat. He laughed, but then said it is not that often that a major US policy depends on a UK parliamentary vote. Sally reported from Hilary A there had been some movement our way.