Tested by Zion (63 page)

Will there ever be peace between Israelis and Palestinians, or is there still (as the story I told in the introduction suggests) hope but no chance?

More than a century of violence between Israelis and Arabs in the area once called Mandatory Palestine has finally produced a broad consensus that two entities should exist there – Israel and Palestine. At least since the Arab or Saudi Plan of 2002, Arab states appear to have given up hope of destroying Israel. The PLO leadership has long since sought a deal with Israel that would lead to its withdrawal from the West Bank and to the creation of a Palestinian state. And since the days of Ariel Sharon's leadership, most of the Israeli right has joined the center and left in believing that Israel should separate from the Palestinians and allow them to rule themselves in their own entity.

Yet progress since the Oslo Agreement of 1991 has been very slow. This is generally
viewed as a great problem, but I am inclined to see it as both inevitable and salutary. In the Oslo Agreement, Israel took a defeated and exiled Yasser Arafat and placed him back in the West Bank at the top of Palestinian politics. This was quite similar to the disastrous British decision to appoint Haj Amin al Husseini as Mufti of Jerusalem in 1921, which also elevated a terrorist and poisoned Palestinian political life for a generation. Both decisions were avoidable errors, and both led to years of violence and many Jewish and Arab deaths. For like Husseini, Arafat saw the murder of Jews as a reasonable tactic to achieve his goals. And as in the case of Husseini, the “Palestinian self-rule” that was one of Arafat's key goals meant not that the people would rule themselves but that he himself would rule them.

So Arafat crushed the Palestinian civic life that had grown up after 1967 under Israeli rule. By 1995, it was estimated that there were seven hundred NGOs in the West Bank and Gaza – before they were systematically eliminated. Arafat's “security” organizations, which Sharon rightly called “security-terror organizations,” reported only to him and engaged in violence and corruption. The reigning theory was that handing him Palestine to govern was smart
because he would use that muscle to protect Israel from terrorist groups (that were also his enemies) without the human rights limitations that bound Israeli forces. It was with this in mind that Yitzhak Rabin appeared ready to give Arafat a state, perhaps concluding as well that in view of President Clinton's passionate commitment, it would be unwise for Israel to cross its greatest ally. This calamity was avoided only because Arafat himself was not ready for any compromise, preferring to end his life believing in his own myth rather than helping his fellow Palestinians.

It was only after the collapse of
Camp David and Arafat's return to terror that the United States abandoned the idea that an Arafat state could somehow lead to peace. As has been explained here, President Bush's conclusion that Arafat must go was viewed by most of the world as an outrageous step away from peace. But Bush understood that it was in neither Israel's interests nor our own to permit a terrorist state in Palestine, and he understood as well that Israel would, after the first and second intifadas, never permit such a state. So in 2002, he began to articulate a new policy, demanding reform as the price of Palestinian statehood.

He thought in 2002 that such a state could be built during his presidency. This was overly optimistic because it was not possible to push Arafat aside, and real progress began only after his death. In Bush's second term, progress was slower than might have been possible because of the determined focus on diplomacy, as if diplomacy would create the sinews of Palestine self-government. It did not and could not because as Tony Blair articulated, reality on the ground would dictate the diplomatic progress and not vice versa. State-building is an arduous task and four years were not sufficient to accomplish it.

Progress has also been endangered by the strength of Palestinian terrorist groups, above all Hamas, whose coup in Gaza has now split the Palestinians in two. That strength is hard to measure because Hamas depends so greatly on outside support, largely from Iran. More broadly, the PA leadership under Prime Minister Fayyad is trying to create a moderate, responsible Palestinian politics – for the first time in history – at a moment when Islamist extremism has been spreading in the entire Muslim world. In that sense, he is rowing against strong currents. The changes that are visible in the PA are nevertheless striking, not least the creation (with help from American trainers) of security forces that maintain law and order and fight terror. The PA leadership is moving, as Blair has put it, from a resistance mentality to a government mentality. This is critical if diplomacy is ever to have a chance, and in an interview Blair explained why:

The only way [the Palestinians] will ever feel strong enough to make the compromises is if what is happening on the ground leads people to believe that actually if we keep going, we're
really
going to get a state.…The Palestinians have to create the circumstances in which these compromises are possible. The only way of doing that is if the people actually within the Palestinian Territories are feeling sufficiently positive about life and what is happening that they say, “Well, OK then. Let's go for it.” You see, the people who are actually within the West Bank – and I suspect even within Gaza too – they
don't have many illusions about what they can get or what they can't get. The illusions are all outside. But for the Palestinians, what they've got to do is, they've got to give up that kind of dream. Now, it may be an illusory dream, but it's a dream. If you ask them to give it up in exchange for a theoretical agreement, then they say, “Well, why?” If what you're doing is you're actually creating the circumstances in which not the dream, but nonetheless a very substantial and clear gain is in prospect, then I think they will go for it. That's why the political consequence of this building from the bottom up is so important.
¹

Thus, nothing would contribute more to progress than a reorientation of American priorities – and those of Israel, the Arab states, and the EU – away from the obsessions with diplomacy and with settlement construction and toward actually building the bases for Palestinian self-government. And progress there would have another byproduct of great value: allowing a return to Palestinian politics. It is impossible to build a democratic Palestinian state without democratic political parties and free elections that create legitimate governments. It is impossible to create legitimate governmental institutions if the Palestinian parliament does not meet and pass laws. Through the Bush years and into the Obama administration, the Fatah Party emerged as an obstacle to democracy, its own incompetence and intractable resistance to reform leading it to prefer rule by decree to electoral tests. Moreover, it viewed Fayyad and
his work as a threat, choosing to struggle against the PA rather than seeking to enhance and take credit for its achievements. But it is reasonable to believe that continuing advancement in the credibility of PA institutions and improvement in the standard of living in the West Bank will allow, sooner rather than later, a return to free elections. This can create a virtuous cycle between the political system and the PA institutions, each enhancing the other; conversely, if this cannot be achieved, if Fatah not only attacks but also weakens or even destroys the work of the PA, independence will be much further off.

Salam Fayyad has described his own views of the process of state-building:

The idea was to impart a sense of possibility about what might happen, what we would want to see happen: an end to the Israeli occupation and an opportunity for Palestinians to be able to live as free people in a country of our own.…It's the power of ideas translated into facts on the ground – taking Palestinian statehood from abstract concept to reality.…[I]f we manage to create that kind of critical mass of positive change on the ground, I imagine it would be very difficult for anyone looking at us fairly to then still argue that Palestinians aren't capable of managing something that looks like a state.…I’d argue that the strength of our program derives, at least in part, from its transformative potential, in the sense that it really begins to allow people to see a state in the making – in a way that grows on them, not happens to them, or for them. Often, people come to the conclusion that it's hopeless. I understand that. But they're thinking about things in a static way. The state-building program goes well beyond the world as it is now. You begin to move; you begin to act; you begin to create new realities; and that in itself provides a much better dynamic. All this, I believe, feeds into a sense of inevitability that undercuts the pervasive feeling of despair.
²

I am not an optimist about negotiating a final status agreement because the compromises are terribly difficult for both Palestinians and Israelis. It is often said that the outlines of a compromise deal are very clear and have been clear for 20 years, so that finishing the negotiation must be simple. The opposite is true: Both sides do see what a compromise must look like and neither side appears to want it. Both, or at least the political leadership on both sides, prefer the status quo. This is another reason why progress on the ground is so important: A final agreement is not in sight. How people actually live in the years before one is possible should depend not on the bad feelings produced by endless failed efforts at diplomacy but on genuine change in their lives: On the Palestinian side, that means more prosperity, more mobility, and less Israeli intrusiveness, and on the Israeli side it means more security. All that can be achieved.

If it is achieved, it will undercut Hamas's rule in Gaza. No one has a “solution” for the situation there, unless it is the eventual collapse of the Iranian regime, the end of its support for Hamas and other terrorist groups, and the defeat for Islamic radicalism that the Iranian regime's demise would mean. But steady improvements in political and economic life in the West Bank combined with Hamas repression of dissent and imposition of sharia in Gaza will surely lead a good majority of Gazans to hate Hamas rule and wish to end it. They cannot achieve that now, but we should do all we can to erode support for Hamas by showing another, competing model for Palestinian life.

What kind of entity will Palestine be? Once upon a time, optimists believed that Gaza, freed from Israeli rule, could be the model. It is, in its way: That is one kind of Palestine. That kind will be prevented in the West Bank by Israel – and by Jordan, whose security is also at stake. The greatest single issue for Palestine being security – internal security (given the threat from Hamas and other terrorist groups) for the new state and the security of Israel and Jordan – it is hard to avoid wondering about Jordan's future role. This is a taboo subject and has been since King Hussein “abandoned” Jordan's claims and role in the West Bank in 1988. “We respect the wish of the P.L.O., the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, to secede from us in an independent Palestinian state,” the king said then. But what if the new, independent Palestinian state has another wish – to have a more organic relationship with Jordan? Surely, the two states would have an economic union; surely, Jordan would serve as Palestine's bridge to the world, via Amman rather than Tel Aviv, or via Aqaba rather (or at least far more) than Eilat or even Ashkelon. Surely, the two states would cooperate fully on security matters, having a long and easily crossed border. One can easily envision that the “international forces” that would assist the young Palestinian entity in maintaining security might be substantially Jordanian.

The question is whether intimate economic and security ties would lead further, to some form of political connection. This too is a taboo topic, but the subject ought to be broached. The Jordanian government fights hard to defeat
the view that “Jordan is Palestine,” but the goal would not be eliminating the Hashemite Kingdom and subsuming it to the Palestinian state. Rather, it would be some form of link, perhaps a Habsburg-like dual monarchy where one king reigned but two prime ministers governed two independent states, each having its own parliament, cabinet and executive bodies, and judicial system. If Palestinians on both sides of the Jordan River became convinced that this formula would best provide security as well as decent, legitimate, efficient government, the taboo would slowly disappear.

Whatever its relationship with Jordan, would the Palestinian state be a decent democratic society? This is perhaps a tougher challenge even than building reliable institutions. As one scholar wrote, “Having rejected a separate state in 1947, Palestinians fell under Jordanian and Egyptian occupation. In the ensuing years, they built a national identity founded on anger, ‘steadfastness,’ self-pity, resentment, and entitlement.”
³
The key Israeli goal in any final status agreement is the “end of conflict” with Palestinians and all Arab states, and this will require not only the right phrases in a signed agreement but also a transformation of Palestinian attitudes and sense of identity. In Israel, there has been a decade-long untrammeled debate over the conditions of a final status agreement, but nothing of this sort has occurred on the Palestinian side. The PA and PLO have not prepared the Palestinian people for the national concessions that any final status agreement with Israel will require. If such concessions are understood as unjust and evil steps that are acceptable only in the context of “ending the occupation,” and if establishment of an independent state is understood only as a stage in the elimination of Israel and recovery of “all Palestinian lands,” Palestinian statehood is a guarantee of more conflict rather than its end. It is in this context that both Israeli complaints about “incitement” (usually meaning gross anti-Semitism and celebration of violence and those who commit it) in the Palestinian media and Israeli demands about recognition of Israel as a Jewish State should be understood. The underlying question is whether Palestinians are agreeing to a permanent peace and wish to move from a military and political struggle with Israel to a lasting compromise. Given the strength of the Palestinian groups expressly supporting irredentist views (not least Hamas), Israelis are wise to demand proofs and protections from the entities, presumably the PLO and
PA, with which they are dealing and which will be running a Palestinian state. For, after all, the goal of all these decades of negotiations is not a paper peace treaty – it is peace.