Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the Roots of Terror (36 page)

121 Between 1971 and 1975, Sadat: Karen Armstrong,
The Battle for God: A History of Fundamentalism
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2000), pp. 290-91.

123 CIA and State Department documents: Steve Galster, “Afghanistan: The Making of U.S. Policy, 1973-1990,” p. 11, in the National Security Archive, September 11th Sourcebooks, “Volume II: Afghanistan: Lessons from the Last War,” available at
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB57/essay.html
.

123 This much was confirmed: Cited in Ali,
Clash of Fundamentalisms
, pp. 207-8.

123 The CIA was determined: Barnett R. Rubin,
The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System
, 2d ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), p. 223.

124 Among the more influential: Pervez Hoodbhoy, “The Genesis of Global Jihad in Afghanistan” (Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad, Pakistan, mimeographed) p. 5.

126 The coup and the Soviet invasion: Galster, “Afghanistan,” p. 15.

126 They flocked to ISI-run: Hamid Hussein, “Forgotten Ties: CIA, ISI & Taliban,”
CovertAction Quarterly
72, spring 2002, p. 3.

126 There is the well-known example: Cited in Lawrence Wright, “The Man Behind Bin Laden: How an Egyptian Doctor Became a Master of Terror,”
The New Yorker
, September 16, 2002, p. 72.

127 A CIA asset: John K. Cooley,
Unholy Wars: Afghanistan, America, and International Terrorism
(London: Pluto Press, 1999), pp. 87-88.

128 In March 1985, Reagan: Steve Coll,
Washington Post
, July 19, 1992; quoted in Michel Chossudovsky, “Who Is Osama Bin Laden?” Montreal, Centre for Research on Globalisation, available at
http://globalresearch.ca/articles/CHO109C.html
, posted September 12, 2001, see n. 4.

129 The redefined war: Ahmed Rashid,
Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), pp. 129-30.

130 While ISI was the main: John Cooley, a former Middle East correspondent for
The Christian Science Monitor
and ABC-TV, writes of Israeli involvement:

As for Israel, the evidence is much sketchier. At least half a dozen knowledgeable individuals insisted to the author, without citing proof, that Israel was indeed involved in both training and supply; … Several Americans and Britons who took part in the training program have assured the author that Israelis did indeed take part, though no one will own to actually having seen, or spoken with, Israeli instructors or intelligence operatives in Afghanistan or Pakistan. What is certain is that of all the anti-Soviet coalition, the Israelis have been the most successful in concealing the details and even the broad traces of a training role. (Cooley,
Unholy Wars
, p. 101).

Tariq Ali, the Pakistani-born British political commentator, also agrees that Israel’s role “remains one of the best-kept secrets of the War” and then recounts a significant detail: “In 1985, Ahmed Mansur, a young Pakistani journalist working for
The Muslim
, accidentally stumbled across a group of Israeli ‘advisors’ at the bar of the Intercontinental Hotel in Peshawar. Aware that the news would be explosive for the Zia dictatorship, he informed his editor, some friends and a visiting WTN correspondent. A few days later, the mujahidin, alerted by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence, captured and killed him.” (Ali,
Clash of Fundamentalisms
, p. 209).

132 Martin Stone writes: Martin Stone,
The Agony of Algeria
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), pp. 182-83.

132 Fighters in the Peshawar-based: Ibid., p. 183.

132 Bin Laden was recruited: Robin Blackburn,
Terror and Empire
, chap. 3, “The U.S. Alliance with Militant Islam,” available at
http://www.counterpunch.org/robin3.html
.

132 In 1986, bin Laden worked: Rashid,
Taliban
, p. 132.

133 That organization was al-Qaeda: Wright, “Man Behind Bin Laden,” p. 75. Rashid’s account confirms 1989 as the year of its founding. Cooley gives the improbable date of 1985. See Rashid,
Taliban
, p. 132, and Cooley,
Unholy Wars
, pp. 120, 220-21.

134 To get an idea: Cooley,
Unholy Wars
, pp. 83, 86.

135 He had “sent his sons”: Ibid., pp. 87-88.

136 Cooley’s list includes: Ibid., pp. 188-89.

136 The London-based Indian journalist: Quoted in Chossudovsky, “Who Is Osama Bin Laden?” at
http://globalresearch.ca/articles/CHO109C.html
.

136 By the late 1980s: Ahmed Rashid,
Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), p. 44.

137 Pervez Hoodbhoy gives: Pervez Hoodbhoy, “The Genesis of Global Jihad in Afghanistan,” revised version, paper presented to the conference Civil War and Cold War, 1975-1990: A Comparative Analysis of Southern Africa, Central America, and Central Asia (Institute of African Studies, Columbia University, New York, N.Y., November 14-15, 2002, mimeographed) pp. 7-8.

137 In spite of their proliferation: Barnett Rubin, private communication, February 10, 2004.

137 Brigadier Muhammad Yusuf: Hussein, “Forgotten Ties,” p. 3.

137 United States authorities:
Los Angeles Times
, August 4 and 5, 1996.

138 Eventually, Rashid concludes: Rashid,
Taliban
, p. 44. These numbers are reproduced in several articles, often without a distinction between those trained in the madrassahs and those who actually fought in the war. This is why one can find a wide a range of figures—ranging from 35,000 to more than 100,000—when it comes to estimates of how many were trained or fought in the Afghan War. Arundhati Roy, for example, says that the CIA recruited “almost 100,000” “soldiers for America’s proxy war.” Cooley gives a figure of 40,000 to 50,000 non-Afghan fighters who “either trained or fought in Afghanistan.” See Arundhati Roy, “The Algebra of Infinite Justice,”
The Guardian
(London), September 29, 2001; Cooley,
Unholy Wars
, p. 232.

138 Tariq Ali gives: Ali,
Clash of Fundamentalisms
, p. 196.

138 Cooley notes that: Cooley,
Unholy Wars
, 2000 edition, p. 90.

140 “Your government”: John-Thor Dahlburg, “Legacy of Fear: Afghanistan’s Mix of Faith, Terror—A Global Scourge,”
Los Angeles Times
, August 4, 5, and 6, 1996.

141 Years later, Musto: Alfred W. McCoy,
The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Trades
(New York: Lawrence Hill Books, 1991), pp. 436-37.

141 As early as February 1980: Cooley,
Unholy Wars
, p. 60.

141 In fiscal year 1987 alone: Eqbal Ahmad and Richard J. Barnet, “Bloody Games,”
The New Yorker
, April 11, 1988, pp. 44-86.

141 Noting that this sum: Galster, “Afghanistan,” p. 18.

142 As the Mujahideen: Alfred McCoy, “Drug Fallout: The CIA’s Forty-Year Complicity in the Narcotics Trade,”
The Progressive
, August 1, 195)7, pp. 24-27.

142 Writing in
The Nation:
Lawrence Lifschultz, “Bush, Drugs and Pakistan: Inside the Kingdom of Heroin,”
The Nation
, November 14, 1988, pp. 477, 492-96.

142
The Herald
of Pakistan: Cited in McCoy,
Politics of Heroin
, p. 454.

142 Finally, the CIA provided: McCoy, “Drug Fallout,” pp. 24-27.

143 Accounting for less than: The United Nations International Drug Control Program Report (part of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes) is cited in “Drug Prohibition and Political Violence: Making the Connection,” in
The Week Online with DRCNet
, Issue 203, September 21, 2001 available at
http://stopthedrugwar.org/chronicle/203/politicalviolence.shtml
. Similar information can be found in “The Opium Economy in Afghanistan: An International Problem,” a study published by The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes in January 2003, available online at
http://www.unodc.org/pdf/publications/afg_opium_economy_www.pdf
.

143 “Just as CIA support”: McCoy,
Politics of Heroin
, pp. 440-41.

143 The worst example: Ibid., p. 451.

144 The
New York Times
reported: John F. Burns, “Afghans: How They Blame America,” February 4, 1990; cited in McCoy,
Politics of Heroin
, p. 450.

144 Mullah Nasim:
New York Times
, June 18, 1986; cited in McCoy,
Politics of Heroin
, p. 458.

145 In the end, Mullah Nasim: The information on the turf war is from Barnett Rubin, testimony before the House Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, pp. 18-20, 35, cited in McCoy,
Politics of Heroin
, pp. 454, 458, 450.

145 From the start of: McCoy,
Politics of Heroin
, p. 452.

146 With fourteen thousand employees: Canal Walsh, “Spies Hide as Bank Faces BCCI Charges,”
The Observer
(London), January 19, 2003.

146 The New York prosecutor: Cooley,
Unholy Wars
, p. 114.

147 The subcommittee complained: For the report of the congressional subcommittee, see “The BCCI Affair,” available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/1992_rpt/bcci/index.html
.

149 The Saudi-BCCI link: Cooley,
Unholy Wars
, p. 113. The BCCI question is discussed on pp. 112-16.

149 Zia ul-Haq: Cited in Tariq Ali,
Clash of Fundamentalisms
, p. 156.

150 The harvest came: Ahmed Rashid, “The Taliban: Exporting Extremism,”
Foreign Affairs
78, no. 6, November-December 1999, p. 22.

151 When declared a “terrorist”: Tariq Ali,
Clash of Fundamentalisms
, p. 199.

151 “The sole child”: Dahlburg, “Legacy of Fear,”
Los Angeles Times
, August 5, 1996.

152 Both major religious sects: Tariq Ali,
Clash of Fundamentalisms
, p. 198.

152 The number of officially registered: The official figures are from Tariq Ali,
Clash of Fundamentalisms
, p. 195. The UN estimates below are from McCoy,
Politics of Heroin
, pp. 454-55.

155 Thus, Ahmed Rashid: Rashid,
Jihad
, p. 210.

155 As early as 1985: Cooley,
Unholy Wars
, p. 62.

156 Barnett Rubin: Rubin,
Fragmentation of Afghanistan
, pp. 83, 203, 210–21, 272, 279.

158 It led to a brief alliance: Eqbal Ahmad, “In a Land Without Music,”
Dawn
(Karachi), July 23, 1995.

159 Rebel leaders had admitted: Galster, “Afghanistan,” p. 23.

159 When the international press: Rubin,
Fragmentation of Afghanistan
, pp. 250–51, 257.

160 On October 4, 1996: John-Thor Dahlburg, “Conspiracy Theory Links U.S. with Afghan Militia,”
Los Angeles Times
, October 4, 1996.

160 After a State Department meeting: Rashid,
Taliban
, p. 179.

161 An old man in a mosque: Ahmad, “In a Land Without Music.”