From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776 (7 page)

With North's resignation, an unwieldy government headed by Lord Rockingham took power in England. Two men were nominally responsible
for negotiations with the Americans, the Whig Charles James Fox, secretary of state for foreign affairs, who favored immediate independence, and the more cautious Shelburne, secretary of state for home and colonial affairs. Before North's resignation, Franklin, through an especially effusive letter of thanks to Shelburne for a gift of gooseberry bushes sent to a friend in France, had hinted that the Americans might negotiate a separate peace. Shelburne agreed that negotiations could begin in France. Not yet in full control, however, he refused to accept independence except as part of a broader settlement. Franklin again pleaded for British generosity, hinting that in return the United States might help end Britain's wars with France and Spain by threatening a separate peace.

The two sides got past the first major hurdle in July 1782. Shelburne maneuvered Fox out of the negotiations and then out of the cabinet. Rockingham died shortly after, making Shelburne head of the cabinet and giving him control over the negotiations. By this time, Shelburne had resigned himself to full American independence. He named Oswald to negotiate with Franklin. Reflecting the new nation's importance in the balance of power, he instructed his envoy that "if America is to be independent, she must be so of the whole world. No secret, tacit, or ostensible connections with France." Shelburne went along with Franklin's ploy not because of the strength of the American's bargaining position but rather because he was eager for peace with France and Spain and agreed with Franklin that peace with the United States could help end the European war. Oswald accepted in principle Franklin's "necessary" terms: complete and unqualified independence, favorable boundaries, and access to the fisheries.
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This left numerous thorny matters unresolved. Britain demanded compensation for property confiscated from those Americans who had remained loyal to the Crown. Americans insisted upon access to the Mississippi. Franklin was furious with Britain's initial reluctance to concede independence and the atrocities he claimed its troops had committed. The fact that his estranged son, William, was a Loyalist gave him a deeply personal reason to oppose for this group the sort of generosity he repeatedly asked of Britain. He exclaimed regarding the Mississippi that "a Neighbour might as well ask me to sell my street Door" as to "sell a Drop of its Waters."
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Initial discussions produced little progress.

From this point, John Jay, and to a lesser extent Adams, replaced Franklin as the primary negotiators. Both men were profoundly suspicious
of Britain—and even more of France. Their approach to the negotiations differed sharply from their elder colleague. From the moment he had arrived in Europe in 1778, Adams had raised a ruckus. "Always an honest Man, often a Wise one, but sometimes in some things out of his Senses," Franklin had said of Adams, and in terms of the younger man's service in Paris, the criticism was understated.
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Adams repeatedly complained of "the old Conjurer's" indolence, his "continued Discipation," and his subservience to France. He even accused Franklin of conspiring to get him aboard a ship that was captured by the British. Like other Americans, Adams inherited from the British a deep dislike for France, an "ambitious and faithless nation," he once snarled.
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His staunch republican ideology bred suspicion of all men of power. Adams railed against the "Count and the Doctor." He insisted that France was determined to "keep us poor. Depress us. Keep us weak."
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A descendant of French Protestants, Jay came by his suspicions naturally. They were heightened and his disposition soured by the three frustrating and largely fruitless years he spent in Madrid seeking to persuade Spain to ally with the United States. Adams's and Jay's suspiciousness and their often self-righteous, moralistic demeanor, one suspects, were also born of the anxieties afflicting these neophytes in the settled world of European diplomacy. They protested the immorality of that system, but, given their suspicions, they had no qualms about breaking the terms of their treaty with France and negotiating separately with Britain. Jay arrived in Paris in May 1782, but he was bedridden with influenza for several months. When he recovered and Franklin became deathly ill with kidney stones, he turned his worries on the British. Because Oswald's commission did not mention the United States by name and therefore did not explicitly recognize American independence, Jay broke off talks with England.

Within several weeks even more suspicious of France and Spain, Jay abruptly changed course. The trip of one of Vergennes's top advisers to Britain persuaded him that some nefarious Anglo-French plot was afoot. With the consent of Franklin and the enthusiastic support of Adams, he dropped his demand for prior recognition of U.S. independence at about the time Shelburne was prepared to grant it. He sent word to London that the United States would abandon the alliance with France if a separate peace could be arranged. Oswald's commission was revised to include
the name of the United States, thus extending formal recognition of independence. It was a curious and costly victory for the Americans. In the hiatus caused by Jay's breaking off of the discussions, the British lifted Spain's siege of Gibraltar, leaving them in a stronger negotiating position and less eager to end the European war. When the talks resumed, Jay compounded his earlier mistake by conceding on the fisheries. He also devised a harebrained scheme to encourage America's enemy, Britain, to attack its backer, Spain, and retake Pensacola. The proposal undoubtedly reflected Jay's passionate hatred for Spain and perhaps his Anglophilia. Had the British gone along, their position on the Gulf Coast would have been greatly strengthened, threatening the safety of a new and vulnerable republic.
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Despite Jay's dubious maneuvers, a peace settlement was patched together in October and November of 1782. Adams and Jay argued interminably over countless issues—"the greatest quibblers I have ever seen," one British diplomat complained.
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In the end, they got much of what they wanted and far more than their 1781 instructions called for. Britain agreed to recognize U.S. independence and withdraw its troops from U.S. territory, the essential concessions. Although many complicated details remained to be worked out, the boundary settlement was remarkably generous given the military situation when the war ended: the Mississippi River in the west; the Floridas in the south; and Canada to the north. Britain extended to the United States its rights to navigate the Mississippi, a concession that without Spain's assent was of limited value. The fisheries were one of the most difficult issues, and the United States could secure only the "liberty," not the right, to fish off Newfoundland and the Gulf of St. Lawrence. Other troublesome issues were "resolved" with vague statements that would cause prolonged and bitter disputes. Creditors in each nation were to meet no legal obstacles to the repayment of debts. Congress would recommend to the states the restitution of Loyalist property confiscated during the war.

The American negotiators have often been given the credit for this favorable outcome. They shrewdly played the Europeans against each other, it has been argued, exploiting their rivalries, wisely breaking congressional instructions, and properly deserting an unreliable France to defend their nation's interests and maximize its gains. Such an interpretation is open to question. The Americans, probably from their own
insecurities, were anxiety-ridden in dealing with ally and enemy alike.
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Jay's excessive nervousness about England and then his separate approach to that country not only broke faith with a supportive if not entirely reliable ally but also delayed negotiations for several months. It eased pressure on Shelburne to make concessions and left the United States vulnerable to a possible Shelburne-Vergennes deal at its expense. Jay and Adams had reason to question Vergennes's trustworthiness, but they should have informed him of the terms before springing the signed treaty upon him. Ultimately, the favorable settlement owed much less to America's military prowess and diplomatic skill than to luck and chance: Shelburne's desperate need for peace to salvage his deteriorating political position and his determination to settle quickly with the United States and seek reconciliation through generosity.
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News of the preliminary treaty evoked strikingly different reactions among the various parties. Finalization of the terms required a broader European settlement, which would not come until early 1783, but warweary Americans greeted news of the peace with relief and enthusiasm. At the same time, some members of Congress, encouraged by the ardently pro-French Livingston, sought to rebuke the commissioners for violating their instructions and jeopardizing the French alliance. The move failed, but Franklin was sufficiently offended to muse that the biblical blessings supposedly accorded to peacemakers must be reserved for the next life. Britons naturally recoiled at Shelburne's generosity, and the architect of the peace treaty fell from power in early 1783. His departure and British anger at defeat ensured that the generous trade treaty he had contemplated would not become reality. Vergennes was at least mildly annoyed at the Americans' independence, complaining that if it were a guide to the future "we shall be but poorly payed for all we have done for the United States." He was shocked at British generosity—the "concessions exceed all that I should have thought possible."
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He was also relieved that the Americans had freed him of obligations to fight until Spain achieved its war aims and thereby helped him secure the quick peace he needed to address European issues. It was Franklin's task to repair the damage done by Jay and Adams (with his consent, of course) and
also to secure additional funds without which, Livingston implored him, "we are inevitably ruined."
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He begged Vergennes's forgiveness for the Americans "neglecting a Point of
bienseance
." Adding a clever twist, he confided that the British "flatter themselves" that they had divided the two allies. The best way to disabuse them of this notion would be for the United States and France to keep "this little misunderstanding" a "perfect Secret."
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The old doctor even had the audacity to ask for yet another loan. Already heavily invested in his unfaithful allies and hopeful of salvaging something, Vergennes saw little choice but to provide the Americans an additional six million livres.

The treaties ending the wars of the American Revolution had great significance for the people and nations involved. Most Native Americans had sided with Britain, but the peace treaty ignored them and assigned to the United States lands they regarded as theirs. "Thunder Struck" when they heard the news, they issued their own declarations of independence, proclaiming, in the words of the Six Nations, that they were a "free People subject to no Power upon Earth."
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For France, an ostensible winner, the war cost an estimated one billion livres, bankrupting the treasury and sparking a revolution that would have momentous consequences in America as well as in Europe. Britain lost a major part of its empire but, ironically, emerged stronger. Its economy quickly recovered, and with the industrial revolution flourished as never before.
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The treaty sealed U.S. independence. The extensive boundaries provided the springboard for continental empire. Americans would quickly learn, however, that securing the peace could be even more difficult than winning the war.

Peace brought scant stability. Debt weighed upon nation and citizens alike. War had ravaged parts of the country. Slaves had been carried off, traditional markets closed, and inflation unleashed. Shortly after the war, the nation plunged into its first full-fledged depression. The economy improved slowly over the next five years, but a Congress lacking real authority could not set economic policies. Wartime unity gave way to snarling rivalry over western lands. Attendance at the Congress was so erratic that there was seldom a quorum. The shift of its meeting place from
Philadelphia to Princeton and then to Annapolis, Trenton, and New York City symbolized the instability of the institution and the nation itself.
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Challenges from abroad posed greater threats. The rebelling colonies had exploited European rivalries to secure economic and military aid from France and Spain and a generous peace treaty from Britain. Once the war ended, divisions among the major powers receded along with opportunities for the United States. The Europeans did not formally coordinate their postwar approaches, but their policies were generally in tandem. They believed that the United States, like republics before it, would collapse of its own weight. The sheer size of the country worked against it, according to Britain's Lord Sheffield. The "authority of Congress can never be maintained over those distant and boundless regions." Some Britons even comforted themselves that their generosity at the peace table would hasten America's downfall; the time often estimated was five years.
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A French observer speculated that the whole "edifice would infallibly collapse if the weakness of its various parts did not assure its continuance by making them weigh less strongly the ones over the others."
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Europeans were not disposed to help the new nation's survival. To keep it weak and dependent, they imposed harsh trade restrictions and rebuffed appeals for concessions. Britain and Spain blocked the United States from taking control of territory awarded in the 1783 treaty. Lacking the means to retaliate and divided among themselves on foreign policy priorities, Americans were powerless to resist European pressures. More than anything else, their inability to effectively address crucial foreign policy problems persuaded many leaders that a stronger central government was essential to the nation's survival.