Emperor of Japan: Meiji and His World, 1852’1912 (105 page)

The most important political development of 1892 was It
ō
’s emergence from his retirement in Odawara, where he had worked behind the scenes as a manipulator of the government. Again and again, he had refused reappointment as prime minister. When approached after Matsukata’s resignation at the end of July, he at once left T
ō
ky
ō
and returned to Odawara, alleging sudden illness. It seemed as if he was trying (as before) to escape appointment, but when the emperor sent the imperial household minister to ask It
ō
to return to T
ō
ky
ō
, he apparently judged the time was ripe for assuming the post of prime minister. He insisted, however, that he must have assurances that all the
genr
ō
would join the cabinet and assist him. This wish was granted. It
ō
’s cabinet included Yamagata Aritomo (minister of justice), Kuroda Kiyotaka (minister of communications), Inoue Kaoru (minister of the interior),
Ō
yama Iwao (minister of the army), Got
ō
Sh
ō
jir
ō
(minister of agriculture and commerce), Mutsu Munemitsu (foreign minister), K
ō
no Togama (minister of education), Nirei Kagenori (minister of the navy), and Watanabe Kunitake (finance minister). It would be hard to imagine a more impressive array of able men.
²⁰

When It
ō
went before the emperor to accept his appointment as prime minister, he promised that he would leave all major decisions to the emperor but would take responsibility for everything else. The emperor responded by promising not to interfere in any decisions; all he asked was that when making reports, It
ō
would give him the benefit of his opinions.

The cabinet was more effective than its predecessors and remained in office longer, but in November the jinrikisha in which It
ō
was riding was overturned by a passing horse carriage. It
ō
suffered head and face injuries that kept him from attending court until February 1893.
²¹

That year opened in what was now the standard fashion: the emperor did not perform the ritual worship of the four directions, and most of the other New Year observances were performed by the chief protocol officer, Nabeshima Naohiro. Lectures were offered to the emperor on British history, a section from the Confucian classic the
Book of Rites
, and poetry from the
Man’y
ō
sh
ō
. The emperor paid his customary New Year visit to the empress dowager at the Aoyama Palace. The subject of the poetry meeting this year was “Turtles on the Rocks.”

Everything seemed quite normal, but the festive New Year mood was rudely broken on January 12 when the House of Representatives voted to cut appropriations for officials’ salaries and warship construction. Although the government had constantly called for economy, these were areas where it would not tolerate any cuts. The reductions amounted to about 11 percent of the budget submitted by the government. Members of the House of Representatives argued that the cuts in wages for officials were reasonable and would not result in any loss of efficiency. They also argued that it was premature to increase the size of the navy without having first established a policy of national defense. Watanabe Kunitake, the finance minister, replied that the proposed cuts in the appropriation for civil officials would impede the functions of administrative organs. Neither side would yield, and the House was adjourned for five days. This was the first head-on collision between the government and the Diet, and it brought up the fundamental question of whether the government was entitled to have its way in matters it deemed to be of vital importance, even if this violated the Diet’s constitutional privileges.
²²

Deciding that their only recourse was the emperor, members of the House of Representatives submitted a petition with 146 signatures. The emperor’s response was to suspend sessions until February 6.
²³
On February 7 Hoshi T
ō
ru (1850–1901), president of the House, submitted a petition to the emperor justifying the decision to cut the budget and appealing for his intercession in preserving the rights of the Diet as stipulated in the constitution. Also on February 7 the House voted to submit to the emperor a petition condemning the cabinet and begging for the emperor’s intercession.
²⁴
It
ō
responded with a plea to the House of Representatives to reconsider its decision and not trouble the emperor, but the House affirmed its decision by a vote of 281 to 103.

The only person who could end this confrontation was the emperor himself. He is often portrayed by historians as a mere figurehead, but this was one of many occasions when the pleas, couched in ritual formulas, for the emperor to vouchsafe his wisdom were not empty formalities. His was the only decision that everyone would have respected.

In a memorial submitted on February 9, It
ō
recommended that the emperor choose one of two courses: (1) to command the House of Representatives and the government to open negotiations with the purpose of securing a rapprochement (if the House of Representatives failed to obey this command or if negotiations failed to achieve the desired results, the House should be dissolved) or (2) to dissolve the House immediately. On the following day the emperor issued his decision. He reiterated his belief that it was necessary to increase Japanese military preparedness at a time when other nations were steadily growing more threatening. He had decided therefore to reduce palace expenditures and, for six years, to make an annual grant of 300,000 yen from palace funds for armaments. At the same time, the salaries of all civil and military officials would be reduced by 10 percent for the costs of building warships.
²⁵

The House of Representatives responded deferentially, accepting the emperor’s command and promising to reach a compromise with the government. Members of the House of Peers also agreed on February 14 to donate one-tenth of their salaries to the costs of building warships. The emperor’s decision represented a compromise: civil and military officials would have their salaries reduced—as the House of Representatives had proposed—but the money saved would be used for warships—not what the House had voted. The imperial family as a whole voluntarily reduced its expenditures by 5 to 15 percent, but the empress insisted on reducing her palace expenditures by 20 percent during the coming six years.
²⁶

The other major undertaking of the House of Representatives in 1893 was its action on treaty revision. The unequal treaties, most of them signed during the waning days of the shogunate, had been a source of discontent for the Japanese for many years. Everyone desired the end of extraterritoriality and the recovery of tariff autonomy, but the price for the Japanese to achieve these goals had again and again proved to be a stumbling block. Some people had asserted that it was easier to bear the humility of extraterritoriality than the danger of allowing foreigners to exploit the chance to control the lands and livelihoods of the Japanese.

The House of Representatives prepared in May 1892 a bill for submission to the emperor calling for the end of extraterritoriality and foreign control of customs. The ultimate objective was to secure equality, and to achieve that objective, it would allow foreigners to live in the interior, although it would deny them permission to own land or to own or operate mines, railways, canals, and shipbuilding facilities. It also called for most-favored-nation treatment from all countries with which it concluded treaties.
²⁷
But the bill went nowhere because the Diet was dissolved. It was introduced again in December when the new Diet was convened and was discussed in secret sessions (by request of the government) in February 1893.

Even though there was little progress, the issue was by no means forgotten. In July the House passed a bill calling for the end of extraterritoriality. The foreign minister, Mutsu Munemitsu, believed that the history of attempts to modify the treaties had been a history of failures and that the causes of failure were always internal, based on the Japanese inability to act together. He himself drew up a new treaty of commerce and navigation and presented it to the cabinet for its consideration. In preparing the treaty, he consulted the British-Italian treaty concluded in 1883 and the Japanese-Mexican treaty, both of which were based on equality. He proposed that the treaty take effect five years after being signed, giving adequate time for the transition between the old and new systems.
²⁸

Mutsu believed that the best course was to open separate negotiations with the various nations, and he chose to begin negotiations with England, the longtime opponent of equal treaties. He selected as his negotiator Aoki Sh
ū
z
ō
, the minister plenipotentiary to Germany. The emperor approved the plan. Aoki met Hugh Fraser, the British minister to Japan (then on leave in London), in September and started preliminary preparations for discussions with the British government.

Treaty reform would be by no means easy. Foreigners living in Japan repeatedly protested the prohibition on their residing in the interior, contrasting this with the freedom that Japanese enjoyed to travel and live anywhere within the principal Western countries. Some Japanese, fearful of the disasters that would occur if foreigners were permitted to live among them, had committed acts of violence against the foreigners. They hoped that this show of violence would make foreigners understand that they were not welcome, but their actions made it difficult for the Japanese government to reassure foreigners who feared that if extraterritoriality was ended, the Japanese courts would not punish such acts of violence. But treaty reform was of immense psychological importance to most Japanese, as it would signify that Japan had been recognized as a modern nation.

The opposition between those who favored treaty revision and those who preferred to extend the existing treaties (rather than allow foreigners to live in the interior), continued throughout 1893. At the heart of the matter was the xenophobia common to most Japanese. In December, when Mutsu examined the various proposals concerning treaty revision before the House of Representatives, he was dismayed by their content. He commented,

These bills look on foreigners as if they belonged to a different species, rather the way the Russian government still treats the Jews. This runs counter to the imperial policy of opening the country to the world. The government must at this time make it absolutely clear that its policy ever since the Restoration has been one based on this policy; and it must adopt means of eradicating and suppressing contrary movements that oppose this policy. If it fails to do so and merely watches on in silence, these tendencies will spread increasingly throughout the country. There is a danger that eventually this will create great confusion in internal and external negotiations and will be a major obstacle to the negotiations now under way for treaty reform. The government must not hesitate another day.
²⁹

Mutsu made a similar statement at a cabinet meeting on December 11. When the cabinet appeared reluctant to take positive action, he announced his intention of resigning. It
ō
reminded Mutsu, however, that a display of impatience was not the way to settle the important matter before them. He urged Mutsu not to be rash. Mutsu, mollified, withdrew his resignation.

Opposition to treaty revision continued in the House of Representatives. A resolution was put forward on December 19 calling on the government to clarify Japan’s rights and duties as prescribed in the treaties. To this resolution were appended descriptions of the rampant disorders of foreigners that would accompany any relaxation of national control over the interior.

The debate became so heated that an edict suddenly arrived from the emperor adjourning the Diet for ten days. During the debate, the emperor had been greatly upset by the acrimonious arguments. He sent chamberlains to listen to the proceedings and keep him informed. When disputes arose over major matters, these men reported the situation to him moment by moment by telephone.
³⁰

On December 29 debates were resumed in the House of Representatives. Mutsu delivered a speech against renewing the existing treaties, once again insisting that the government’s basic policy ever since the Restoration was one of an open country and progress. The renewal of existing treaties would be contrary to national policy. These treaties did not suit the modern society that had evolved since the time they were first signed. Now was the time to reject the shogunate’s policy of “close the country and expel the foreigners” and to recoup the rights that had been lost. In return, it was appropriate to reward the foreigners with privileges not provided in the existing treaties. Moreover, the Japanese should not forget that if foreigners were free to travel inland, the money they would spend would enrich the people living there. And if Japan wished to modify the treaties, the only way would be to make the foreigners aware how greatly Japan has progressed, which could be done only by following a policy of “open country.” In conclusion, Mutsu asked the House to withdraw the proposal to preserve the existing treaties. He failed to get support for this motion. An edict was issued ordering a suspension of the Diet for another fourteen days.
³¹

On December 30 Prime Minister It
ō
and President of the Privy Council Yamagata Aritomo had an audience with the emperor, after which the House was dissolved. It
ō
had requested permission to suspend debates in order to keep the House from passing its resolution in favor of extending the existing treaties. This had been the reason for the two-week suspension issued the previous day, but the House showed no signs of reconsidering. It
ō
decided that there was no other way to deal with the situation than to dissolve the House. The emperor ordered this the same day.