Emperor of Japan: Meiji and His World, 1852’1912 (104 page)

The visit of the Chinese fleet served as an occasion for those Japanese who had received a traditional education to demonstrate how much they knew about Chinese culture. Some referred deferentially to the Chinese as their “elder brothers.”
²
Commodore Ting and the other high-ranking Chinese officers were feted wherever they went, and they fitted into the Japanese scene in a way impossible for Europeans. The pleasure that Japanese literary men and scholars experienced in exchanging poems in Chinese with these visiting dignitaries was possible because the writing of characters transcended national boundaries and the ideal of the “gentleman scholar” was shared by China and Japan. Probably none of those who participated in the various manifestations of friendship dreamed that in little more than two years’ time Japan and China would be fighting a bitter war.

Perhaps the most welcome news for the emperor in the summer of 1891 was the birth on August 7 of his eighth daughter, Nobuko, to Sono Sachiko. He now had three children—the crown prince, Princess Masako, and Princess Nobuko. After having lost so many children in infancy, he could anticipate with pleasure the growth to maturity of his children.

Nothing much else happened that year, but in October the emperor sent the Russian crown prince a set of armor, a broadsword, a dirk, bows and arrows, and a photograph of himself, together with a personal letter.
³
Probably the gifts were by way of further apology for the
Ō
tsu incident.

The first important event of 1892 was the election held on February 15. The emperor was worried about the future of the Diet. He told Matsukata he feared that if the same members kept getting reelected, this would lead again and again to the Diet’s dissolution. He suggested that leading regional officials encourage good people in their districts to run for office.

The cabinet minister who took these words most to heart was Interior Minister Shinagawa Yajir
ō
(1843–1900). He sent directives to regional officials explaining governmental policy and urging the election of distinguished men who were fair, impartial, and not affiliated with parties; men deeply involved with political parties should be dismissed.
⁴
Shinagawa directed the police to deal severely with acts of intimidation or bribery, implying that was the work of the political parties. But despite the high-flown sentiments of his directives, the election of 1892 was probably the most corrupt in Japanese history, and the worst offender was none other than Shinagawa himself.

Unlike the peaceable elections of the previous year, the election of 1892 was marked by violence and arson. Clashes between officials and ordinary citizens resulted in deaths and injuries in many parts of the country.
⁵
Ruffians stole ballot boxes in K
ō
chi Prefecture, and made voting impossible in parts of Saga Prefecture. It was generally believed that these irregularities had been planned by Shinagawa, who had decided that political parties opposed to the government were disloyal and must be suppressed. Yet for all the scheming and brutality, the populist parties maintained their majority in the House of Representatives—163 seats against 137 for the progovernment forces.
⁶

Soon after the election, the emperor, disturbed by reports of intimidation and violence, sent chamberlains to the four prefectures where violations had been most conspicuous: Ishikawa, Fukuoka, Saga, and K
ō
chi.
⁷
The new House of Representatives was convened on May 6. On May 11 the House of Peers passed a resolution condemning the manner in which the election had been conducted:

It needs hardly be said that officials should not have used their authority to interfere in the election of members of the House of Representatives. There was consequently no reason for the government to issue orders or warnings concerning interference. Nevertheless, at the time when the elections of members were held in February of this year, officials interfered in the contests, and this precipitated reactions on the part of the people, leading finally to terrible scenes of bloodshed. These events have been the focus of public attention and the subject of universal protest. In every region, there is now indignation over the interference of officials in the elections and the officials are looked on as enemies. The government must now speedily deal with this situation and demonstrate to the public its fairness. If this is not done immediately, it will truly harm the security of the nation, and will in the end invite great and irremediable misfortune. This House consequently hopes that the government will reflect deeply on the matter, and by taking appropriate action at present, end future abuse.
⁸

There were conflicting views in the cabinet concerning the election. Matsukata decided to visit It
ō
and ask his advice; but It
ō
, getting wind of his intention, sent a letter to Mutsu complaining that whenever a problem arose in the cabinet, Matsukata always asked him to settle it. He refused to become involved at this stage, suggesting that Matsukata and the members of his cabinet first reach an accord on future policies before asking his advice. Their conclusion when they conferred was that the only way to surmount the crisis was for It
ō
himself to form a cabinet. They begged him to accept, but he refused.
⁹

The problem was complicated by It
ō
’s repeated attempts to resign as president of the House of Peers. As was usual in such cases, he alleged illness, but the emperor refused his request, fearing the consequences if he were deprived of the services of the man he trusted most in the government. On March 11 the emperor sent Tokudaiji Sanetsune, the senior chamberlain, to It
ō
’s house with this message: “I am aware of the extremely earnest nature of your request. However, I hope I shall always have you by my side and be able to depend on your frank advice. Reassure me by getting plenty of nourishment and rest. I am unable to release you from your post as my adviser.”
¹⁰
It
ō
, moved to tears of gratitude, hastened to the palace to accept the emperor’s command.

Shinagawa Yajir
ō
was not at all satisfied with the cabinet’s reactions to what he considered to be his loyal behavior during the election. Sure that he had acted appropriately and angry that his intentions had been misunderstood, he decided to resign.
¹¹
Matsukata, embarrassed by the need to make a cabinet change at the very outset of the new administration, asked Yamagata to dissuade him, but Shinagawa presented Yamagata instead with two
tanka
that obliquely conveyed his feelings. The second was

Shinagawa’s request to resign for reasons of health was granted by the emperor the same day. Various men (naturally including It
ō
) were suggested as possible successors in the post of interior minister. The most likely candidate was Soejima Taneomi, but the emperor objected to Soejima, saying that he was too old for such a demanding position, and he feared that Soejima might resign midway. The emperor recommended instead K
ō
no Togama, but Matsukata, pointing out that Soejima’s reputation was far higher than K
ō
no’s and that K
ō
no enjoyed little popularity with provincial officials, decided to appoint Soejima despite the emperor’s disapproval.
¹³

This episode demonstrates that Meiji (although he seldom expressed political views openly) kept a close watch on the officers of his government and formed his own judgments of their capabilities. It also shows that even when he intervened concerning an appointment, he did not necessarily have his own way.

The emperor’s opinions of the principal figures of the government are most clearly recorded in the diaries kept by his long-time adviser Sasaki Takayuki. For example, during their conversation on March 19 the emperor said, “Shinagawa is honest, but he is narrow-minded and has no patience. Even at cabinet meetings he sometimes flies into a rage, weeps and behaves in a completely unreasonable way. The other day It
ō
questioned him about irregularities in the election and criticized his interference, whereupon Shinagawa became greatly excited and said he had heard It
ō
intended to resign and organize a political party. Then he said, ‘Your political party is no concern of mine, but if you persist in your abusive language, I will deal with you by putting emergency measures into effect immediately.’ It
ō
became angry, and his face colored as he answered, ‘Do you think you can dispose of It
ō
as you please, even if you use your authority as Interior Minister?’”
¹⁴

Meiji had obviously listened with the utmost attention as Shinagawa and It
ō
exchanged threats, and his comments on the characters of the two men, as well as on Soejima, Got
ō
Sh
ō
jir
ō
, and Mutsu Minemitsu, were frank and illuminating. Sasaki was one of the few people to whom the emperor could express his views freely, and Sasaki in turn spoke his mind to the emperor, although he naturally was always deferential.

As the emperor predicted, Soejima did not last long in office. He resigned in June and was appointed as an adviser to the Privy Council, the standard assignment for ministers who resigned or were dismissed. The political situation was marked by so many quarrels between individuals and parties that Inoue Kowashi concluded that the emperor was the only hope for a stable government. He appealed to the emperor to give a “great command” and take the lead in giving the country a course to follow. He specifically asked the emperor, who was known for his love of simplicity, to eliminate wasteful expenditure on ceremonies, suggesting that a reduction of 10 percent in court expenditures might be used for augmenting the navy.
¹⁵

The emperor no doubt agreed in principle to Inoue’s call for economy, but even though he preferred to have his uniform patched rather than buy a new one, he was surrounded by the luxury of others and had to respond appropriately. When he visited the house of a minister or other dignitary, he expected to be suitably entertained, regardless of the cost. On July 4, for example, the emperor visited the residence of Got
ō
Sh
ō
jir
ō
in Takanawa. He was obliged by precedent to give Got
ō
the customary gifts—a set of silver cups with the imperial crest, a pair of cloisonné vases, and 1,000 yen, along with a bolt of silk for Mrs. Got
ō
and presents for their children. Got
ō
offered in return a valuable sword, a Korean tea jar, and a porcelain badger. That afternoon there were performances of n
ō
by outstanding actors of the day—Kanze Tetsunoj
ō
, H
ō
sh
ō
Kur
ō
, and Umewaka Minoru. After dinner the imperial party was entertained with recitations by Momokawa Joen and performances of Satsuma biwa by Nishi K
ō
kichi, both recognized masters of their art. Apart from these special entertainments, musicians of the Household Ministry played Japanese and Western music all day long. At night, thousands of lanterns were lit and bonfires burned under the trees. Tens of thousands of fireflies were released over the pond, making a sight more beautiful than any picture. The emperor did not leave until after midnight. The next day, similar entertainment was offered to the empress.
¹⁶
Despite his predilection for simplicity, the emperor enjoyed the extravagant entertainment that Got
ō
had provided that evening.

Less than a week later, on July 9, he visited the residence of Nabeshima Naohiro. The entertainment was not quite on the scale that Got
ō
had offered, but there was the usual exchange of gifts, followed by demonstrations of martial sports, a banquet, conjuring, recitations, and so on, but not any n
ō
plays.
¹⁷
Such visits by the emperor, though profoundly appreciated by his hosts, did nothing to foster his policy of thrift.

Again, although the emperor informed the Interior Ministry that he desired economies to be practiced in the imperial household in order to raise money for building warships, he specified that in two areas there must be no skimping of funds—the expenses of observances for his ancestors and for maintenance of their tombs, and the household expenses of the empress dowager. When the empress dowager learned of the economies being practiced in the palace, she indicated that she too wished to cut the expenses of her household by one-tenth, but the emperor indignantly refused to allow any reduction, saying that she should not worry about such matters.
¹⁸

In any case, much of the money from the royal purse was used by the emperor and empress not on themselves but to relieve suffering or rebuild schools in towns and villages where there had been fires and other disasters. There was also a royal obligation to protect and encourage the arts. For example, on July 12 the empress presented the Japanese Women’s Association for the World’s Columbian Exposition in Chicago with 10,000 yen to improve the quality of the Japanese exhibition.
¹⁹
Buddhist temples that had long been neglected were given funds to repair their buildings and works of art. There were also gifts to members of the imperial family, even relatively distant members, on the occasion of their marriages or when they built new residences. Even if the emperor and empress had desired nothing more than to live in perfect simplicity, they still needed funds to meet these public obligations.