Dönitz: The Last Führer (58 page)

Kummetz went on extended leave in November, and command of the battle group devolved on his destroyer Commander, Rear Admiral Bey. He was quite as sceptical of the chances of a successful sortie as his chief, and on November 22nd he concluded a report on the tactics he would employ if he were to be ordered out with a passage reminiscent of the words of another fleet Commander faced with an impossible task, the Duke of Medina Sidonia in 1588: ‘… thus the feasibility and the success of the convoy operation depends largely on luck and the chances of the enemy somewhat exposing himself or making great mistakes. From the experience of this sea war,’ Bey went on, ‘which despite the weakness of our forces has brought much good fortune, it is correct to hope that now too fortune will be on our side.’
¹¹¹

Despite the clearly expressed doubts of the Admirals who would have to carry out the operation, on December 2nd Dönitz’s operational staff in ‘Koralle’ reaffirmed the official position that a sortie by the
Scharnhorst
in the winter months was both practicable and had prospects of success.

There can be few possible interpretations of this: either the Chief of Staff, Meisel, in his time noted as a
Draufgänger
(‘daredevil’), was as emotionally committed to action as Dönitz himself and was determined to ignore—or was even ignorant of—the allied lead in radar and radar-controlled gunnery, or he knew that Dönitz was determined on this course and believed it impracticable to oppose him. He was either an irresponsible gambler or completely under Dönitz’s thumb. The only other possibility is that the staff at ‘Korrale’ were aware of something Group North did not know, that time was running out for the big ships and unless they somehow proved their value Hitler would force their scrapping; that had been his ‘unalterable decision’ when Dönitz struck his bargain.

Probably there were elements of all three in the extraordinary staff appreciation. At all events, a fortnight later at the Flag Officers’
Tagung
Dönitz proclaimed his intent, ‘should the opportunity arise for the battlegroup to strike I will under all circumstances go at the enemy’.
¹¹²
And two days afterwards at the
Wolfschanze
he told Hitler of his intention to attack the next allied convoy by the northern route with
Scharnhorst
and the destroyers if there were prospects of a successful operation. He had, he said, ordered additional U-boats to the Arctic.
¹¹³

Three days later, on December 22nd, a report from aerial reconnaissance
of ‘about 40 ships including transports, escort vessels and presumed carrier. Course 0450, speed ten knots’ was interpreted as a raiding force heading for the Norwegian coast and Battle Group North was put on six hours’ notice. By the following day the force had been identified as a normal convoy to Russia; it was kept under air surveillance and a U-boat group was ordered to form a patrol line across its estimated track between the North Cape and Bear Island.

The question of using Battle Group North against the convoy now came to the fore. The final decision did not have to be taken until the morning of the 25th when the ships would be near the North Cape area; in the meantime the overall Commander, Admiral Schniewind, ordered air searches to gain ‘certain news of a possible distant heavy escort group’. Only when and if such intelligence came in, he reported to ‘Koralle’, and if the prospects then appeared favourable, would he feel justified in ordering the sortie of the Battle Group. The naval staff concurred.

Dönitz was in Paris at this time, on his way to take part in the Christmas festivities at the U-boat bases. As he explained to Hansen-Nootbar, ‘I must go to the front—that is where I belong. I must be with the troops. I must ever and always have an ear for my people.’
¹¹⁴
It was therefore at Admiral Krancke’s Group Headquarters West that he received the
Luftwaffe
reconnaissance reports and appreciations of the situation from ‘Koralle’ via Schniewind at Group Headquarters North in Kiel. Krancke’s first staff officer, Edward Wegener, noted his extremely serious attitude as he took the messages; in the mess after dinner he recalled Dönitz took no part in the general conversation; he was far away, immersed in his own thoughts.
¹¹⁵

By midnight on Christmas Eve the position was still very uncertain. A wireless transmission from a British ship at sea had been plotted by three D/F bearings as coming from 200 miles west of the convoy; it had been assumed at Arctic Command in Narvik that this must be the position of the expected distant heavy covering force. The
Luftwaffe
, however, had failed to find such a force. The Narvik station pointed out to Schniewind in Kiel that weather conditions had precluded comprehensive reconnaissance, and there was no certainty that a support group was not in the area, hence the sortie of the battle group carried an element of risk. Schniewind was well aware of this, and while his summary of the situation shortly before midnight started with the proposition that no heavy support group had been located, it concluded that
favourable conditions of weather, visibility and clarification of enemy strength were unlikely, ‘prospects of major success improbable, the stakes high’.
¹¹⁶

At ‘Koralle’ Meisel discounted these doubts and those expressed at Narvik just as he had discounted the earlier doubts of Kummetz and Bey; one of his comments suggests that he was indeed ignorant of the possibility of radar-controlled gunnery, for on a message from Bey pointing out that conditions would be against artillery action, he scribbled, ‘Then the English cruisers could not shoot either!’
¹¹⁷

In these circumstances Dönitz decided to cancel his trip to the bases and fly back to headquarters. Arriving some time after 2.30 in the afternoon of Christmas Day, he found the situation unchanged, no support group located and Meisel of the opinion that ‘the long-awaited opportunity to bring the Battle Group to action’ was upon them. As time was pressing, the preparatory order for a sortie, ‘
Ostfront
’, had been sent out a few minutes before his arrival. This suited Dönitz’s own determination; it was easy to find arguments of necessity: the convoy was obviously carrying war materials to Russia and the Navy had ‘the opportunity of making an important contribution to the easing of the strained situation on the eastern front’.
¹¹⁸

Once again the goal was occupying Dönitz’s whole attention—and it must be assumed that in this case the goal had as much to do with Hitler’s opinion of the big ships and the urgent need for some success after the second failure of the U-boats as of the situation on the eastern front. He ordered instructions for the sortie to be prepared by the operations staff. Later in the afternoon these were laid before him, and he set about stamping them with his own style.

The first paragraph ran, ‘Enemy intends aggravating heroic struggle of our eastern armies with important convoy of supplies and arms for Russia.’ He added, ‘We must help.’

The second paragraph, ‘
Scharnhorst
and destroyers to attack convoy’ he left unchanged, but hacked at the third: originally it read, ‘Turn to account changing tactical situation. Greatest chance lies in superior artillery
Scharnhorst
. Therefore strive to bring it to action.’ To the first phrase Dönitz added ‘skilfully and boldly’ then he inserted ‘Fight not to be ended with half success. Opportunities seized to be pressed home’ and at the end: ‘Destroyers to engage as suitable.’

The fourth paragraph read, ‘Break off on own judgement. Basically break off on the appearance of heavy forces.’ He left this as it stood,
then added a fifth and final paragraph, ‘Crews to be briefed in this sense. I trust in your offensive spirit,’ and ended ‘
Heil und Sieg!
Dönitz,
Grossadmiral
.’

During the time he was putting the order into shape the northern area weather report was received:

This virtually ruled out prospects of success; the destroyers would be unable to use their speed in this kind of weather, indeed they would be hard put to keep the sea, effective aircraft reconnaissance would be impossible and an average visibility of three to four miles with the possibility of snowstorms made nonsense of the passage in the orders about using the superior artillery of the
Scharnhorst
.

Apparently none of these considerations affected Dönitz or the staff at ‘Koralle’; the order was transmitted exactly as edited by Dönitz over three-quarters of an hour after receipt of the weather report. What was the mood then at nearly eight o’clock on Christmas evening? Had wine passed at dinner, had glasses been raised to the success of Battle Group North? Were Meisel and the other staff officers weary perhaps after the long vigil since the convoy was first sighted? Did the final transmission of the order represent a relief in tension or had tension relaxed as soon as Dönitz returned to assume full responsibility?

The battle group had sailed meanwhile, the crew of the
Scharnhorst
cheering wildly as they were told of the purpose of the mission; later as the big ship started heaving to the swell outside, most of them cooped up for so long in the smooth water of the fjord began to feel the torments of sea-sickness.

Admiral Schniewind in Kiel received Dönitz’s attack order at nine minutes past eight. He had been in possession of the weather report for some time, and also an urgent request from Narvik Command to break off the operation. At eight-thirty he called up Meisel at ‘Koralle’ and told him of this, and that Air Commander Lofoten had ruled out reconnaissance on the 26th because of the weather, and he suggested abandoning the mission. Meisel made no comment, but passed the message to Dönitz. Shortly afterwards he rang back and told Schniewind that he had
reported his remarks to the C-in-C who had nevertheless decided to carry on (
durchzuhalten
).

Schniewind, who had been Dönitz’s immediate superior the previous year, was already composing a message explaining his anxieties. The deteriorating weather ‘burdens the operation with too many unfavourable conditions. Sweeping success not to be expected. Therefore propose breaking off. In case total position nevertheless demands sortie, can only suggest sending
Scharnhorst
without destroyers to seek and seize convoy.’
¹²⁰
At a quarter to nine, shortly after taking the call from Meisel, Schniewind passed the message over the teletype to ‘Koralle’; the effect was heightened by the timing, so soon after Dönitz had reaffirmed his decision; no doubt Schniewind intended this; it was bold dissent and an indication of his extreme anxiety.

Whether his proposal to send the battlecruiser out without an escort was intended seriously—for he might have reasoned that the enemy destroyers would make just as heavy weather as their own—or whether it was intended to point up the foolhardiness of the mission will never be known, nor what discussions Dönitz now had, what advice he received, what pressures or habits of mind, what toughness or weakness, fanaticism or desperate optimism conditioned his decision. But his reactions at the crisis of the U-boat war and Italian campaigns should be borne in mind; he had never allowed rational considerations of profit and loss to affect his commitment to strike or to endure—
durchzuhalten
—whatever the odds. It is not necessary therefore to see the brooding figure of the Führer as the chief pressure on his mind during these critical hours. The decision he came to was in line with all his others, made with blood, not reason.

There was much deliberation nonetheless; it was three hours before Schniewind received his reply: the operation was to go ahead; if the destroyers could not keep the sea the question arose of the
Scharnhorst
working on her own as a commerce raider; this decision should be left to the force commander, Rear Admiral Bey. Schniewind could do no more. He passed this latest instruction to the battle group, now well out at sea.

As suspected at Narvik and Kiel, the signal intercepted by
B-Dienst
on Christmas Eve from 200 miles astern of the convoy had indeed been from the British distant covering force; this consisted of the new 14″-gun battleship,
Duke of York
, flying the flag of Admiral Sir Bruce Fraser, C-in-C Home Fleet, and the heavy cruiser
Jamaica
. The numerous
signals to the German battle group and to and from the Air Commander, Lofoten, had alerted the Admiralty to the probability of the
Scharnhorst
coming out, and the executive signal,
Ostfront
, which Schniewind passed to Bey at 3.27 am had confirmed this belief;
¹²¹
consequently Fraser knew the
Scharnhorst
was at sea, and he was heading east at his best speed to interpose himself between the convoy and Bey’s escape route home to Altenfjord. Also in the area was another support group of three heavy cruisers under Vice Admiral Burnett; this force was to the east of the convoy and was heading south-west to intercept Bey, who, unaware of the enemy closing from both sides, was heading north to get ahead of the merchantmen; Bey had a good idea of their position from earlier shadowing reports passed by one of the U-boats from the patrol line positioned across the convoy’s track. So the forces converged through the night and early morning of the 26th.

By 7.30 am Bey considered he was close ahead of his prey and he detached his destroyers to search southwesterly. This was a departure from his original ideas for a convoy action, which envisaged keeping two destroyers with the battlecruiser; probably he was acting on Dönitz’s latest instructions passed by Schniewind, difficult as these were to reconcile with the conditions in which he found himself. The convoy had been ordered to a more northerly course by Fraser and the destroyers failed to find it, but Burnett’s cruiser group was closing, and just over an hour later the lone
Scharnhorst
was detected on the flagship.
Belfast
’s, radar at just under thirteen miles. Burnett held on a converging course until the battlecruiser was sighted visually at six and a half miles; Bey was not using radar—no doubt in order not to give away his presence—and had no idea of the enemy in the vicinity until star shells from the
Belfast
burst overhead; moments later he found himself under fire. He turned away at high speed, replying with his after turret, whose control officer had only the British gun flashes to range on.