Dönitz: The Last Führer (54 page)

‘We’ll get them!’ he would say to Hansen-Nootbar—meaning the British—‘We’ll get them in the end! But first we must have the new boats!’
⁷³

His passion appeared to derive as much from the First War ‘starvation blockade’ as from the present position. ‘He could not forget about the hunger blockade,’ Hansen-Nootbar recalled; ‘he said to me again and again and again that he wanted to undo what England had done in the First War. He wanted to starve out the English, not only physically, but in weapons and war materials.’

On the question of whether Dönitz hated the English, Hansen-Nootbar hesitated: ‘I cannot unconditionally deny it,’ and on another occasion, ‘When he [Dönitz] talked himself into a frenzy, he would say, “A man must be able to hate”.’

This phrase was common currency in Hitler’s circle. Mussolini had said something very similar to him in Rome. Hate was a weapon in Goebbels’ armoury—as indeed in the armoury of Germany’s enemies; Churchill’s hatred of Nazis was well known. The infamous allied mass raids on German civilians under cover of the euphemism of ‘military targets’ and the declaration by Roosevelt and Churchill in Casablanca in January that year that allied war aims were unconditional surrender provided more material for ‘hate-propaganda’. Hate was in the air; there can be no doubt that a man of Dönitz’s extreme temperament, who ‘talked himself into a frenzy’ on occasions, would have attuned to it—indeed the previous year’s interrogation reports on ‘fanatical Nazis who hated the English’ suggest that it was nothing new to him.

On July 5th Dönitz was shown plans for the sectional method of constructing the type XXI boats by the man Speer had chosen to direct the programme; his mind was evidently made up by then—despite the continuing opposition of his own construction department—for he exclaimed, ‘With this we begin a new life!’
⁷⁴

Three days later he was expanding on the ‘successful’ design of the ‘electric’ U-boat to Hitler at the
Wolfschanze
; it introduced entirely new
possibilities to the U-boat war by allowing a rapid approach to convoys and evasive action under water without the need to surface.

‘This will make all former enemy striving for counter-measures ineffective since the construction of escort vessels is based on the low speed of U-boats under water …’
⁷⁵

He went on to give similarly optimistic reports on other developments; by the end of July he expected to have an efficient radar warning set, and Professor Krauch of I. G. Farben had told him he was convinced he would soon find a material with 100 per cent absorption of radar waves; ‘this will effectively nullify radar location’!

Until the convoy battle could be resumed he was using U-boats for minelaying so that the enemy’s gain in tonnage could be held as low as possible. ‘The goal must be for sinkings to keep pace with new construction, and this will be possible with the new U-boat’—which brought him back to the personnel problem: according to the latest report they would soon be facing a situation where Minister Speer was producing these new U-boats but there would be no one to man them. He needed 262,000 men by autumn 1944, ‘and indeed young men’.

Hitler began to prevaricate, and although Dönitz stuck to his demands he failed this time to extract a firm promise. Finally Hitler suggested he investigate the possibilities of recruiting men from the occupied countries as the SS had done so successfully. He agreed to look into it; he would contact the
Reichsführer SS
, Heinrich Himmler.

Before he left he returned to the subject of the electric U-boat, again stressing the need to build with the utmost speed. Hitler absolutely agreed and, as Speer entered the room as if on cue, turned to him and said, ‘The most important thing is the construction of this new boat.’

‘Of that there is no doubt,’ Speer agreed. ‘We have already given instructions that the new boat is to take precedence over everything else.’

In the constant press of activity Dönitz did not lose sight of his duty to provide personal inspiration for the U-boat service. Although he could no longer see all returning Commanders, he continued to interview as many as he could, particularly those with special experiences or success to relate. According to Hansen-Nootbar his understanding approach was the foundation for the morale that was preserved through this difficult period of defeat. He insisted his Commanders ‘spare neither criticism nor grievances, on the contrary he demanded they tell him just “where the shoe pinched.” ’
⁷⁶

The approach stemmed from genuine concern. He was always upset when a loss was reported, Hansen-Nootbar recalled; beneath the taut exterior was a heart which grieved for the men he had sent to their deaths. This may seem difficult to reconcile with his chilling request to Hitler for additional thousands of men for a so-far untried weapon—‘and indeed young men’—but not perhaps if one remembers his lament for those who went down in UB 68 in 1918. Undoubtedly he operated on several levels.

Certainly there are tell-tale signs in Hansen-Nootbar’s recollections that as a Grand Admiral he remained basically unsure of himself. For instance, he sometimes showed off the sea paintings he had collected in France to young officers who, because of their lack of background in this direction, were quite unprepared for the experience and consequently ill at ease. This tallies with his often showy reports to the naval staff about his relationship with the Führer, and comments about the ‘rightness’ of the course he was pursuing which were now turning up in the naval staff war diary as frequently as they had in the U-boat war diary.

And there is one telling remark after the visit of an officer whom Hansen-Nootbar commented on as a very clever man.

‘Hänschen,’ Dönitz interrupted, ‘I have enough clever people. What we lack is men with stamina.’

The significance of this is that it was a stock idea from the Führer’s collection. Throughout his adult life Hitler professed absolute contempt for educated men ‘spoon-fed with knowledge’ but ignorant of real life; it was one of the
motifs
of his monologues, particularly in adversity. After von Paulus’ capitulation at Stalingrad, for instance, his denunciation had contained the phrase, ‘In Germany there has been too much emphasis on training the intellect and not enough on strength of character.’
⁷⁷

Taken together with Dönitz’s repetition almost
verbatim
of other ideas from Hitler’s basic stock, particularly about the Jewish ‘virus’—as will appear—the remark recalled by Hansen-Nootbar is further evidence of his uncritical acceptance of the transcendental genius of the Führer’s mind. Those who have had a glimpse into that mind through the records of his table talk are bound to be surprised that the third-hand, usually silly nonsense emanating from it could ever have been mistaken for genius, and must wonder at the poverty of Dönitz’s own mind after his education at Jena and Weimar, or at the strength of his emotional need for a cause and a father to serve—but they may not be surprised at his
actions as the National Socialist
Reich
fought savagely to preserve itself against the assaults from without and disaffection within.

For there was another Germany. It was small and virtually impotent. Nearly all the men of an age to resist effectively were at the front or in concentration camps or were Party members, nearly all women were so fully absorbed in war work or struggling to keep a home going that they had no energy left over, yet a core of brave men, nearly all under constant surveillance by Himmler’s agents, sought to keep alive values that Goebbels had destroyed for the majority. It is no coincidence that they were Christians or intellectuals, their strength grounded in standards whose existence Dönitz and so many others denied. One of the leaders of this select circle, Helmuth von Moltke, wrote: ‘The individual must be reawakened to an awareness of his inner commitment to values that are not of this world … Yes must be again yes, and no, no. Good must once again be an absolute, and evil likewise.’
⁷⁸

On July 9th news came of an allied invasion force heading for Sicily. Once again Hitler was taken completely by surprise. Dönitz ordered the German torpedo boats into action and pressed Riccardi to unleash the Italian fleet, held back for just this eventuality. Riccardi refused to commit his heavy units against the superior enemy, and as the allies landed and occupied the greater part of Sicily virtually unmolested Dönitz repeated his Tunisian performance, bombarding the Supamarina with personal requests, recommendations and operational suggestions—all to no effect. When an Italian flotilla sortied on the 15th it failed to find the enemy!

By the 17th he had become desperate and he suggested to Hitler that the Italian Navy be taken over. Hitler doubted if this was feasible.

At the next crisis the roles were reversed; as news came on the evening of the 25th that Mussolini had resigned and General Badoglio had taken over the Italian government, it was Hitler who temporarily lost his head and called for the radical solution of surrounding Rome with German parachutists, disarming the Italian forces and reinstating the dictatorship, and Dönitz, flying to him the next day, who counselled moderation. The change in Dönitz’s attitude can probably be put down to the excellent intelligence he was receiving from his men in Rome, Ruge and the German naval attaché, Löwisch. Ruge reacted to Hitler’s preparatory order to disarm the Italian services by sending an urgent report that such a measure would rouse the population and the greater
part of the Italian forces against them without any corresponding advantages.
⁷⁹

There is a brief account of the conference at which Dönitz showed this message to Hitler in the diary of Field Marshal von Richthofen, who had just flown in from Italy: ‘… Dönitz is moderate and sensible. Everybody else, especially Ribbentrop, just repeating whatever the Führer says.’
⁸⁰
In fact Jodl and von Richthofen himself did their utmost to dissuade Hitler, who was convinced that Badoglio was already negotiating surrender to the allies. Finally the moderates won. Preparations for disarming the Italian forces were to go ahead, but were not to be put into effect until Italy deserted the cause. Dönitz ordered the necessary measures for securing the Italian fleet and merchantmen in such an eventuality; where this could not be done the ships were to be sunk.

During the crisis, which lasted throughout August, Dönitz was one of Hitler’s most intimate advisers and supports. He spent days at a time at Führer headquarters, was present at most of the key conferences and the select discussions within the inner circle; he dined and breakfasted alone with the great man, or with Goebbels and Ribbentrop also present, or on another occasion in company with Himmler, Ribbentrop, Jodl and Rommel. Rommel’s attitude at this stage was similar to his own, combining touching faith in Hitler with hatred of the Italians, who he considered had let him down. His diary entries and Dönitz’s notes in the naval staff war diary reveal that the Führer for all his ravaged health and dull eye could still exert himself to flatter and had lost none of his persuasive power; both men obviously revelled in his good opinions; here, for instance, is the naval staff war diary entry for August 3rd when Dönitz requested permission to leave the
Wolfschanze
for Berlin: ‘…in view of the fact that the C-in-C Navy can return in short time the Führer reluctantly consents to his departure’.

In the continuous discussions over the Italian question he maintained a level-headed approach, but he was as fanatical about holding the bridgehead in Sicily as he had been for holding Tunisia to the last man, and continuing the U-boat war in the Atlantic; his reasons were identical: ‘We are tying up considerable forces in Sicily, which if released to become available for new landings, will hang over us like a sword of Damocles. Therefore it is best we prevent new operations by binding the enemy’s forces in Sicily.’
⁸¹

More interesting than his strategic views was his political education,
for it was during this period in August when he was expecting Italy to break away from the Axis any moment that Hitler developed the idea of an inevitable split in the allied coalition against them! Quoting from history and drawing as he was wont on the wars of Frederick the Great, he pointed out to Dönitz how often during the darkest hours for a nation unexpected developments brought a sudden turn for the better. In this case, he said, ‘the harder the war becomes for us, the more the divergent views of the allies will grow and reveal themselves’.
⁸²
Already England’s war aim of maintaining the balance of power in Europe had proved false; Russia had been so stimulated as to become a threat of a wholly new dimension. ‘In future the onslaught from the east can only be met by a Europe united under German leadership,’ and he added a significant rider, turning the clock back to his original strategic conceptions, ‘This will also be in England’s interest.’
⁸³

Dönitz agreed that England’s vital concern to keep Russia from the Balkans and prevent her gaining access to the Mediterranean via the Dardanelles brought her directly up against Russia’s aims, and concluded, ‘Everything will depend upon our holding out stubbornly. We are much better off with regard to food than we were in 1918. In addition we have the great plus of the unity of the German people, our most precious possession, which must be carefully preserved.’ He was referring to National Socialism, and this led him to a theme that was to preoccupy him for the rest of the war, ‘I believe there are numerous groups among the German people who lack hardness and easily incline to criticism without being able to do better themselves or even to comprehend the whole picture.’

Was he speaking in general terms here, or did he have special knowledge of the resistance groups Himmler’s agents were watching? Hansen-Nootbar recalls that Himmler tried very hard to establish a relationship with Dönitz in early 1943, sending him a spate of invitations. This was natural in the jockeying for power around the Führer’s throne; Himmler would obviously have sought out the new favourite; noting his ardent National Socialism, it would have seemed an obvious ploy to court him with the shocking tales of disloyalty being uncovered in the higher reaches of the Army. That is speculation. Hansen-Nootbar characterizes the relationship between the two as ‘good, or better described as correct’—yet ‘correctness’ was as close as anyone got to this reserved and coldly pedantic zealot.