15
. For raising this issue, thanks to Saint-Andre (5 January 1993C).
16
. Rand (January 1965), “Bootleg romanticism,” in
Romantic Manifesto
, 129–30.
17
. Rand (October–November 1963), “The goal of my writing,” in
Romantic Manifesto
, 169.
18
. See Cox 1986, in which Cox relates Rand’s aesthetic theories to her own literary craft.
19
. Rand (May–July 1969), “What is romanticism?” in
Romantic Manifesto
, 99.
20
. Rand (October–November 1963), “The goal of my writing,” in
Romantic Manifesto
, 167. Among Russian writers, Yuri Karlovich Olesha has also been identified as both a Romantic and a Realist. Guerney 1960, 375.
21
. In
Anthem
Rand experimented with futuristic themes.
Atlas Shrugged
also contains elements of science fiction and fantasy.
22
. Rosenthal 1975, 15–18, and (1986), “Introduction,” in Rosenthal 1986, 46–47.
23
. Rand (April 1965), “The psycho-epistemology of art,” in
Romantic Manifesto
, 22–23. In this context, Rand argued: “The greater a work of art, the more profoundly universal its theme.” Thus, while her own fictional works have a strong propaganda element, they also incorporate themes that transcend a particular time or place.
24
. Rosenthal (1986), “Introduction,” in Rosenthal 1986, 36–37; Steele 1988, 41. For additional parallels between the “God-builders” and Rand, see
Chapter 13
.
25
. Rand quoted in N. Branden (1962), “The literary method of Ayn Rand,” in Branden and Branden 1962, 97.
26
. Rand (1943–44), “From Ayn Rand’s unpublished writings: A speech to architects,” in Binswanger 6.6.13.
27
. Rand (4 May 1946), “From Ayn Rand’s notes for
Atlas Shrugged
,” in Schwartz 6.1.5.
28
. Rand (4 May 1946), quoted in Peikoff 1991a, xiv.
29
. Rand 1961T. Childs (1993, 46) observed correctly that Rand’s writings do not make a single reference to—and that the N.B.I. has never carried a single book written by—Hayek.
30
. Hayek (1968), “The confusion of language in political thought,” in Hayek [1978] 1985, 81. The notion of a “tacit” dimension does not originate with Ryle, Polanyi, or Hayek. Livingston (1991, 174) argues that Aristotle’s discussion of the “topic or commonplace is roughly the same as Hayek’s tacit dimension or tradition.”
31
. There are many other differences between Rand and Hayek. For example, Rand would have disagreed with Hayek’s endorsement of Popper’s falsifiability criterion. Gray (1984, 12, 19–21) notes, however, that Hayek’s acceptance of a “falsificationist methodology” comes with “massive qualification.”
32
. In this regard, N. Branden (1994, 288) has suggested a closer affinity with the Hayekian-Polanyian perspective. He argues that every person has a tendency to accept certain cultural beliefs that are never “the subject of explicit awareness.… It is not possible for anyone, even the most independent, to make
every
premise conscious or to subject
every
premise to critical scrutiny.” Each of us is a being of our time and place. “None of us can entirely escape the influence of our social environment.” I discuss these issues further in
Chapters 11
and
13
.
33
. Rand (February 1966), “Philosophy and sense of life,” in
Romantic Manifesto
, 30.
34
. Rand (October 1975), “From the horse’s mouth,” in
Philosophy
, 99. Even a thorough “materialist” such as Engels argued for the primacy of philosophy over science: “Natural scientists may adopt whatever attitude they please, they will still be under the domination of philosophy. It is only a question whether they want to be dominated by a bad, fashionable philosophy or by a form of theoretical thought which rests on acquaintance with the history of thought and its achievements.” Engels 1882, in Selsam and Martel 1963, 171.
35
. Rand (6 March 1974), “Philosophy: Who needs it,” in
Philosophy
, 6.
36
. Rand (3 January 1972), “‘What can one do?’” in
Philosophy
, 246.
37
. Rand (June 1970), “The chickens’ homecoming,” in
New Left
, 107.
38
. Smith (1979) provides a Rand-influenced defense of atheism.
39
. N. Branden [1969] 1979, 127–28. On reciprocal causation, see N. Branden 1987, 41, and 1983b, 60, and Peikoff 1974T, Lecture 9.
40
. N. Branden 1994 is Branden’s most detailed treatment to date of the impact of cultural institutions on the development of self-esteem and efficacy.
41
. See Emmons 1971, and Barry 1983 and 1986.
42
. Aside from some references to rationalism and empiricism in
For the New Intellectual
, Rand did not write much on the subject. The material herein discussed is primarily from Peikoff’s lectures, which derive from Rand’s teachings and from the oral Objectivist tradition.
43
. Rand (28 January–11 February 1974), “Philosophical detection,” in
Philosophy
, 19.
44
. Rand (25 February 1974), “Ideas v. goods,” in
Ayn Rand Letter
3:296.
45
.
New Intellectual
, 39. Though there are
many
different meanings attached to rationalism and empiricism, Rand does not make any distinction between “concept-empiricism” and “judgment-empiricism,” or “concept-rationalism” and “judgment-rationalism.” “Concept-empiricism” sees all concepts as arising out of experience, whereas, “concept-rationalism” denies this. “Judgment-empiricism” views all propositions as either verifiable-in-principle or analytic, whereas “judgment-rationalism” views propositions as synthetic and a priori. Thanks to Hospers (17 July 1993C) for these qualifications. Rand would have prohably rejected each of these incarnations.
46
. Peikoff 1983T, Lecture 7. This course is described by Peikoff as a product of his own struggle with methodological rationalism. Peikoff (1983T, Lectures 1, 3, and 12) argues that Objectivism cannot be filtered through the dualism of mind and body without causing interpretive distortions. He offers useful guidelines against “rationalist Objectivism.”
47
.
Introduction
, 76; Rand (30 July 1973), “Perry Mason finally loses,” in
Ayn Rand Letter
, 225.
48
. Rand (28 January–11 February 1974), “Philosophical detection,”
in Philosophy
, 15.
49
. Rand (January 1994), “‘Memory-storing’ epistemology,” in Schwartz 8.1.3.
50
. Rand (7–21 May 1973), “The missing link,” in
Philosophy
, 45–46.
51
. Smith (1979, 133) uses this phrase.
52
. Peikoff 1976T, Lecture 6. For Objectivism’s contextual view of “certainty,” see Peikoff 1991b, 171–82.
53
. Hollinger (1984), “Ayn Rand’s epistemology in historical perspective,” in Den Uyl and Rasmussen 1984, 42, 49.
54
. Binswanger 1990, 30–32. Both Rand and Branden argued that human rationality required responsibility—a willingness to accept the intended
and
unintended consequences of one’s actions. They were fond of the old Spanish proverb, “God said; ‘Take what you want and pay for It.’” Rand (July 1970), “Causality versus duty,” in
Philosophy
, 122; N. Branden 1980, 188; N. Branden and E. D. Branden 1983, 148.
55
. On the Marxian view, see Flacks 1982, 16. Rand’s resolution actually lies somewhere between the optimism of Marx and the conservatism of Hayek. Marx believed that capitalism perpetuated and was constituted by unintended consequences. To focus purely on unintended consequences reified characteristics that were historically specific to capitalism. He envisioned a future society in which people conquered the unintended consequences of their actions. Although Rand did not exhibit such intellectual hubris, her resolution required the emergence of a degree of cognitive efficacy hitherto unseen in human history.
56
. Sciabarra 1988a; 1995b.
57
. Hayek (1970), “The errors of constructivism,” in Hayek [1978] 1985, 20.
58
. Hayek (1946), “Individualism: True and false,” in Hayek 1948, 15.
59
. In Hayek (1965), “Kinds of rationalism,” in Hayek [1967] 1980, 85, he cites Gladstone as the first person to use the term “constructivism” to describe the “engineering type of mind.”
60
. Hayek 1981, 129; 1988.
61
. Hayek (1965), “Kinds of rationalism,” in Hayek [1967] 1980, 93.
62
. Hayek (1962), “Rules, perception and intelligibility,” in Hayek [1967] 1980, 62.
63
. Hayek (1964), “The theory of complex phenomena,” in Hayek [1967] 1980, 39.
64
. Lavoie (1982, 21–22) has a provocative insight when he writes: “Both Marx and Mises pointed out that rationality as we know it is itself a product of the emergence of market relations.” The belief that rationality is internal to capitalism is one held by thinkers as diverse as Marx, Mises,
Weber
, and Rand. I further explore Rand’s conception in
Chapters 9
and
10
.
65
. See her
New Intellectual.
Also see Peikoff 1982. Rand added that it was this fallacious view of pure reason that Kant criticized in a “straw man” argument that undermined a proper understanding of the rational faculty. Rand (17 February 1960), “Faith and force: The destroyers of the modern world,” in
Philosophy
, 77–78; Rand 1972T.
66
. “Appendix,” 148–49. On the concept of infinity, compare Aristotle,
Physics
3.4.204a34–5. 206a7, in Aristotle 1941, 260–64.
67
. N. Branden [1969] 1979, 175. Compare Shaffer 1976, 14.
68
. Rand (April–May 1966), “Our cultural value-deprivation,” in
Voice of Reason
, 102.
CHAPTER 9. ETHICS AND HUMAN SURVIVAL
1
. Among those articles on Rand’s egoism that appeared in the
Personalist:
N. Branden 1970a and 1970b; Emmons 1971 and 1972; Machan 1971; Hospers 1970; Mack 1971; Den Uyl 1975; Dwyer 1972, 1973, and 1974; Bold 1973; and Lugenbehl 1974. Also see Nozick (1971), “On the Randian argument,” and Den Uyl and Rasmussen (1978), “Nozick on the Randian argument,” both reprinted in Paul 1981.
2
. Many Western philosophers, as well, have criticized the fact-value distinction. Peikoff (1970T, Lecture 8) argues that Dewey developed a contextualist ethic that opposed both subjectivism and rationalism as mystical and intuitivist. Despite his disagreements with Dewey, Peikoff acknowledges his effective denunciation of the dichotomy between body and mind and fact and value. Veatch (1992) also discusses the similarity between Rand’s critique and the critiques of the “old-line analytic-linguistic philosophies” of MacIntyre, Williams, and Nussbaum.
3
. Rand (April 1965), “The psycho-epistemology of art,” in
Romantic Manifesto
, 16; (9 February 1961), “The Objectivist ethics,” in
Virtue of Selfishness
, 34.
4
. Rand (August–September 1967), “Requiem for man,” in
Unknown Ideal
, 313–14, and (July–August 1971), “The age of envy,” in
New Left
, 163; and N. Branden (July 1962), “Benevolence versus altruism,” in
Objectivist Newsletter
1:27.
5
. N. Branden (October 1963), “Intellectual ammunition department,” in
Objectivist Newsletter
2:39.
6
. Rand (October 1975), “From the horse’s mouth,” in
Philosophy
, 96.
7
. Rand (17 February 1960), “Faith and force: The destroyers of the modern world,” in
Philosophy
, 75.
8
. Peikoff 1972T, Lectures 2 and 10; 1970T, Lecture 5.
9
. Kaufmann, in Nietzsche [1886] 1966, 138 n. 35, and 228 n. 35.
10
. Interestingly, Nietzsche’s rediscovery of classical antiquity was foreshadowed by Hegel. Copleston ([1963] 1985, 208) maintains that in Hegelian thought, “the moral agent
has a right to seek his own welfare, the satisfaction of his needs as a human being.” Hegel appropriated this view from “Greek ethics as represented by Aristotle.” He rejected “the Kantian notion that an act loses its moral value if performed from inclination.”
11
. Rand (15 May 1934), “From Ayn Rand’s unpublished writings: Philosophic journal,” in Binswanger 4.4.6.
12
. Rand (6 October 1949), “From Ayn Rand’s unpublished writings: Philosophic notes,” in Binswanger 5.42.
13
. Rand (November–December 1965), “What is capitalism?” in
Unknown Ideal
, 21–22.
14
. Rand (June 1982), “To the readers of
The Fountainhead
,” in Binswanger 3.3.5.
15
. The phrase “counterfeit individualism” is actually used in N. Branden (April 1962), “Counterfeit individualism,” in
Virtue of Selfishness
, 135. Though not in the individualist tradition, there are several Russian thinkers who attempted to transcend the egoist-altruist distinction, including Fedorov and Chernyshevsky, who defended a form of psychological egoism. See
Chapter 1
, and Lossky 1951, 61–62, 78. Even such nonindividualists as Marx and Engels ([1845–46] 1970, 104–5) projected a transcendence of egoism and altruism. They recognized “that egoism, just as much as self-sacrifice, is in definite circumstances a necessary form of the self-assertion of individuals.” Though Marx shows humanistic tendencies, especially in his early works, he is apt to condemn capitalism precisely for its “selfishness.”
16
. Rand (January 1963), “Collectivized ethics,” in
Virtue of Selfishness
, 81.
17
. O’Neill [1971] 1977, 201. Whereas O’Neill criticizes Rand’s redefinition of “altruism,” Steele (1988, 43) criticizes Rand’s redefinition of “selfishness” for much the same reason. For Steele, Rand’s definition leaves “most of traditional bourgeois morality … unscathed.”