27
. On the links between “begging the question” and the “stolen concept”, see Peikoff 1974T, Lectures 1 and 13.
28
. N. Branden (January 1963), “The stolen concept,” in
Objectivist Newsletter
2:2–4.
29
. Aristotle defined the law of noncontradiction (also called the law of contradiction), as well as the law of excluded middle (that everything is either A or not-A at a given time or in a certain respect). In
Atlas Shrugged
, vii-viii, Rand employs the various forms of these laws of logic in the titles of three successive parts: “Non-Contradiction,” “Either-Or,” and “A is A.” Peikoff (1972T, Lecture 4) tells us that the law of identity (“A is A”) was formally enunciated in the twelfth century, by Antonias Andreas, but it is implicit in Aristotle’s law of contradiction.
30
. Aristotle,
Metaphysics
4.3.1005bl8–21, in Aristotle 1941, 736.
31
. Peikoff states that unlike Aristotle, Aquinas saw the law as a first principle of being. Locke believed it was an inductive principle.
32
. See
Chapters 1
and
3
herein. Peikoff (1974T, Lecture 1) agrees that Marxists do not detach logic from reality. Though Peikoff recognizes that Marxists retain the ontological view, he argues that this is undermined by their belief in reality-as-contradiction. As I indicated in the introduction to this book (and elsewhere), dialectical “contradiction” is more properly described as
relational
, rather than logical. I return to this issue in
Chapter 11
. Also see Sciabarra 1988a, 1990a, and 1995b.
33
. N. Branden 1967T, Lecture 3. Marcuse ([1941] 1960, 40, 42) argues that this dynamic reading of the law of identity was central to the Hegelian ontology. Both Aristotle and Hegel were system builders, unifiers of previous trends. Hegel had rediscovered “the extremely dynamic character of the Aristotelian metaphysic, which treats all being as process and movement.” According to Marcuse, this dynamic had been lost in the formalistic Aristotelian tradition, which viewed the law of identity as a static tautology. Hegel had grasped the process orientation of Aristotle’s ontology. Hegel, like Aristotle, regarded “being-as-such” as a “process or movement through which every particular being molds itself into what it
really
is.” Unlike Aristotle, however, Hegel historicized the temporal dimension.
34
. Binswanger (December 1981), “Q&A department,” in Binswanger 2.6.14. Binswanger explains that certain concepts, such as motion and location, are purely relational. Peikoff (1976T, Lecture 2) also accepts the Aristotelian explanation of time and space as relational; time exists in the universe, and the universe is eternal. Space applies to definite points within a relational context; it does not apply to the universe as a whole.
35
. Peikoff 1990–91T, Lecture 2. Binswanger also recognizes that consciousness may be an emergent property of physical matter, but we do not know this for sure. And in any event, this does not alter the fact that it is an irreducible primary. Binswanger [1987] 1991T, Lecture 2; Peikoff 1972T, Lecture 2.
36
. Efron 1966, 499; 1967. Efron 1967 was reprinted in
The Objectivist
in four parts, from February through May 1968.
37
. Peikoff 1990–91T, Lecture 9. Peikoff indicates that the three axioms were grasped explicitly at different periods in history: “existence” by Parmenides, “identity” by Aristotle, and “consciousness” by Augustine. Displaying a Hegelian flair, Rand remarks: “The human race developed the three axioms in the right order.… You know it’s been said many times that the human race follows in a general way the stages of development of an individual” (“Appendix,” 262–63).
38
. Peikoff (1983T, Lectures 7 and 9) criticizes those “rationalistic” Objectivists who try to reduce the three axioms to only one: A is A.
39
. Peikoff 1983T, Lecture 7; Adorno [1966] 1983; Kolakowski 1984.
40
. Peikoff (1991b, 12; 1990–91T, Lecture 1) emphasizes that a concept such as “entity” is axiomatic, but not basic. Since entity is a category of being, we do not know, on the basis of philosophy, whether it is universal. Primary entities (such as “dog,” “cat,” etc.) may be the form in which we perceive puffs of metaenergy. Philosophers should not try to answer questions that are properly scientific. “Existence” is a basic axiom because it is universal. Rand did not fully explore the nonbasic axioms. Peikoff 1987T, Lecture 2. They are “undeveloped waters” in Objectivist philosophy. On the simultaneous character of axioms, see Peikoff 1983T, Lecture 5.
41
. On the Marxist rejection of such “vulgar” materialist reductionism, see Meikle 1985, 154–63.
42
. Peikoff (1972T, Lecture 2) criticizes this very spiritualist-idealist tendency to counteract reductionist materialism by the reverse method of applying psycho-epistemological concepts to electrons.
43
.
Atlas Shrugged
, 1037. Peikoff (1990–91T, Lecture 1) believes that Objectivism offers a view of causality in the Aristoletian tradition. Gould (1978, 72–78) argues that Marx’s view of causality is just as Aristotelian.
44
. Rand (12–26 March 1973), “The metaphysical versus the man-made,” in
Philosophy
, 30.
45
. N. Branden (May 1962), “Intellectual ammunition department,” in
Objectivist Newsletter
1:19.
46
. Peikoff 1991b, 6–7; 1972T, Lecture 5; 1976T, Lecture 8.
47
. “Appendix,” 148–49; Binswanger [1987] 1991T, Lecture 2.
48
. This discussion is based on an exchange which appears in “Appendix,” 282–88. In
Chapter 6
I discuss the Objectivist
epistemological
perspective on the internalist-externalist debate.
49
. “Appendix,” 284. Peikoff (May-September 1967, in
Introduction
, 108–9) provides a similar critique of the dichotomy between necessary and contingent facts. Facts merely
are.
To use the term “necessity” is superfluous. Some man-made facts did not have to be, but once they are, they too are necessary. Objectivism stresses not a dichotomy between necessity and contingency, but between the metaphysical and the man-made.
50
. “Appendix,” 266. Den Uyl and Rasmussen (“Ayn Rand’s Realism,” in Den Uyl and Rasmussen 1984, 7) argue persuasively that even though Rand would not accept a distinction between form and matter, she does accept one between substance and accident. This is a distinction between primary existents and those things that exist in a relationship to them. Presumably, this would mean that an entity is a primary existent, and that its attributes (accidents) inhere in the entity. This would make the attributes dependent on the existence of the entity.
51
. Peikoff (May–September 1967), “The analytic-synthetic dichotomy,” in
Introduction
, 105.
52
. In Rand (8 March 1947), “From Ayn Rand’s unpublished writings: Notes for
Atlas Shrugged
,” in Binswanger 5.2.3, she explains that our grasp of “entity” is almost simultaneous with our grasp of “acting entity,” even though we must grasp the former before the latter. What is clear is that we abstract the concept of “action” by observing
entities
that act.
53
. Rand (“Appendix,” 265) uses this example of the table and its legs. Blanshard ([1962] 1964, 475) uses this example, though it involves more substantive issues. Blanshard asks if the “essence” of the table can be present whether or not a book was sitting on its top. If the table is internally related to the book, and to everything else in the universe, we risk dissolving its nature into its relations. This issue of the table’s “essence” relates more to the theory of definitions, which I discuss in
Chapter 6
.
54
. Peikoff 1982T, Lecture 7. But this does not imply strict organicity. See
Chapter 6
.
55
. Rand (12–26 March 1973), “The metaphysical versus the man-made,” in
Philosophy,
30.
56
. Ibid., 33.
57
. Sciabarra 1988a, 1988c, and 1995b. Did Rand give any credence to Hayek’s concept of the unintended consequences of human action? Can the contributions of Rand and Hayek be reconciled to achieve a more comprehensive grasp of the constructivist fallacy? I address these issues in
Chapter 8
.
58
. Rand (12–26 March 1973), “The metaphysical versus the man-made,” in
Philosophy
, 29.
59
. Walsh 1992; Reedstrom 1993a, 1–4; Walsh, 14 October 1993C. Among other Objectivist interpreters of Kant is Peikoff; see Peikoff 1982 and 1970T, Lectures 2 and 3.
60
. Kant [1781/1787] 1933, A491/B519. A refers to the first (1781) German edition of Kant’s
Critique of Pure Reason
, whereas
B
refers to the second (1787) German edition.
61
. Schopenhauer,
Kritik der Kantischen Philosophic
, in Dryer 1966, 499 n. 1. In
Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology
, Rand quotes not Schopenhauer, but the nineteenth-century Kantian Henry Mansel. Rand argued that Mansel provides a more explicit statement of the attack on consciousness than Kant himself (80–81).
62
. Lossky 1934c, 265–66. For Lossky ([1906] 1919, 112), though Kant is an improvement over his rationalist-empiricist predecessors, he failed to provide any validation for his subjectivism. “Search through the
Critique of Pure Reason
as diligently as you may, you will nowhere find a proof of this important position, but merely assertions to the effect that it must be true.”
CHAPTER 6. KNOWING
1
. Peikoff 1990–91T, Lecture 5. Despite Rand’s contention that her epistemology was based upon induction, some have characterized her theory as rationalistic. Barry (1987, 112), for instance, argues that Rand’s epistemology is “a series of rationalist assertions” deduced from authoritarian first principles. I dispute such a characterization.
2
. Binswanger (December 1982), “Ayn Rand’s philosophic achievement, part four,” in Binswanger 3.6.11.
3
. Rand (19 June 1958), “From Ayn Rand’s unpublished writings: Philosophic notes,” in Binswanger 5.4.8.
4
. Rasmussen 1984, 330 n. 25; Adorno [1966] 1983; Caputo 1988; Johnson 1990.
5
. Peikoff (1972T, Lecture 9) suggests that Rand characterized most classical “objective” or “realist” approaches as intrinsicist, rather than as “objectivist.”
6
. Rand (17 February 1960), “Faith and force: The destroyers of the modern world,” in
Philosophy,
75.
7
.
Introduction
, 80; Peikoff 1983T, Lecture 6.
8
. Lossky [1906] 1919, 413. Interestingly, this very same desire was manifested by Rand and other Objectivists. For instance, in
The Evidence of the Senses
, Kelley (1986, 255) aims to provide the foundations for “an epistemology with a knowing subject.”
9
. On this conflation of the mode of cognition and the contents of consciousness, see Rasmussen 1983b, 85, and 1984, 332, and Den Uyl and Rasmussen 1984, 13.
10
. Lossky (1923), in Shein 1973, 25.
11
. Lossky (1913–14), “Intuitivism,” in Edie, Scanlan, and Zeldin 1965, 321–22, 338.
12
. On these philosophical distinctions, see Peikoff (May–September 1967), “The analytic-synthetic dichotomy,” in
Introduction.
Lossky too attacks the analytic-synthetic division. See Edie, Scanlan, and Zeldin 1965, 318.
13
.
Introduction
, 79. Peikoff (1982, 56; 1976T, Lecture 6) provides a comparable analysis of the “dogmatist” versus the “pragmatist.” In eschewing the duality of dogmatism and skepticism, Objectivist analysis is similar to the Nietzschean
metacritique
, which, as Habermas ([1968] 1971, 290) explains, unmasks “the modern form of skepticism … as a veiled dogmatism.”
14
. “Appendix,” 251–53; N. Branden [1969] 1979, 6, and 1983b, 29; Binswanger 1990, 193, and (August 1986), “The goal-directedness of living action,” in Binswanger 7.4.10.
15
. Peikoff 1987bT, questions, period 1; (1990–91T), Lecture 3.
16
. Rand is not the only modern thinker to grow out of Aristotelian realism. On the relationship of hermeneutics to the Aristotelian tradition, see Caputo 1988, 5. Copleston ([1963] 1985, 334) also argues that many modern Thomists and Marxists share an ontological and epistemological realism, even though the latter dismiss the former as idealists.
17
. Something that is “unconscious” is
not
conscious. All forms of conscious awareness involve
action.
18
. Rand (9 February 1961), “The Objectivist ethics,” in
Virtue of Selfishness
, 19.
19
. Kelley 1986, 88–90. Kelley acknowledges that Rand had the greatest impact on his thinking about perception. Though Rand did not write much on this subject, her views on perceptual form are expressed briefly in “Appendix,” 279–82; N. Branden 1967T, Lecture 2; Peikoff 1970T, Lecture 11; 1972T, Lectures 5 and 12; 1987bT, questions, period 1; and 1991b,
chap. 2
; and Binswanger 1989T, Lecture 2.
20
. Rand would never have characterized perception as “objective.” This is a point which needed clarification since there was a time when Peikoff himself committed the error of applying the objective-subjective-intrinsic trichotomy to the realm of perception. Peikoff was corrected by Rand in later presentations for this misapplication of her
theory. Peikoff 1987bT, questions, period 1. Peikoff (1991b, 112, 117) argues that normative terms such as “objectivity” cannot be applied to automatic processes such as perception. Since perception is nonvolitional, it cannot be characterized as “objective” or “intrinsic” or “subjective.” Perception “cannot depart from reality.” “Objectivity,” is volitional adherence to reality “by following certain rules of method based on facts
and
appropriate to man’s form of cognition.”