1948: A History of the First Arab-Israeli War (49 page)

The Battle of Jenin, 1-3 June 1948

Jenin's defenders, consisting of several companies of Iraqi troops and local irregulars, resisted stubbornly until a fresh battalion of Iraqis-apparently commanded by Lieutenant Colonel `Omar Ali313-and a battery of artillery arrived from Nablus. A confused seesaw battle ensued. Iraqi air attacks and the arrival of the reinforcements, who mounted a determined counterattack, broke the back of the Twenty-first Battalion. The battalion had bad luck. A chance shell hit its command post and killed and injured several officers, including the battalion's deputy commander, Shraga Mustobolski, who reportedly muttered "how awful and difficult to be wounded in such a place" before dying;314 and a rumor spread that a retreat had been sounded. The companies in the hilltops west of Jenin, having taken severe losses, broke and fled from one hilltop position after another. Flight proved infectious. Some of the retreating troops reached Twenty-second Battalion positions, which also began to crumble.

Throwing in his reserves, Carmel managed, by nightfall, to occupy the center of Jenin, now mostly abandoned. But the retreat of the Twenty-first Battalion and the precarious situation of the Twenty-second to the east of town, while the Iraqis held onto the police fort and harassed all IDF movement to the north, left the troops in the town center badly exposed. Carmel informed the General Staff that his situation was critical and offered a choice: if the IDF mounted an assault on Tulkarm, to relieve the pressure in Jenin, he would order his troops to stand fast; otherwise, he would retreat.

The General Staff responded that no attack could or would be launched against Tulkarm; Alexandroni wasn't up to it. He must decide. Carmel ordered a general retreat, and the units in Jenin, along with the Twenty-second Battalion, on the night of 3-4 June withdrew northward. By morning the IDF had redeployed along a line just south of `Arana.315 The Israelis had suffered thirty-four dead and one hundred wounded; the Iraqis and irregulars, perhaps some two hundred dead.-'16 The IDF had narrowly missed delivering a major blow to the invaders.317

Jenin had been a nasty defeat; superior IDF forces had been routed by a small number of Iraqis and irregulars. But as often happens in war, defeat can sometimes produce strategic dividends. The abortive attack on Jenin (coupled with a minor success by Alexandroni troops at Qaqun, northwest of Tulkarm) had persuaded the Iraqis-much as had happened with the Egyptians after Yad Mordechai and Isdud-to sit tight and not to venture again out of the Arab-populated "Triangle." The nightmare scenario of an Iraqi thrust to the Mediterranean across Israel's narrow waist had been averted.

The Syrians

With independence in 1946, the Syrian government had planned to enlarge its army to division size, with three brigade groups. But as with the Egyptian and Iraqi military plans, May 1948 caught the Syrians on the hop. On paper, the army mustered some ten thousand soldiers.318 In reality, owing to a lack of weapons, ammunition, and trained manpower, only one brigade, the First, commanded by Colonel Abd al-Wahab Hakim, was more or less ready; Hakim, indeed, apparently argued that it was not.319 The brigade had about two thousand troops and consisted of two infantry battalions, an armored battalion with a company of light Renault 35 and Renault 39 tanks (mounting 37 mm cannon), and two companies of armored cars, some mounting light cannon. The brigade had four-six batteries of 75 mm and io5 mm guns.320

Another brigade, the Second, was still being organized and would consist of two infantry battalions and a battalion of armored cars. The infantry was equipped mainly with obsolescent French rifles, though some of the soldiers carried British and German makes. The Syrian air force consisted of about twenty Harvard trainers, converted for use as fighters or bombers, and a number of light aircraft. A large proportion of the planes were unfit for action, as were many of the pilots. The Syrians suffered from a shortage of ammunition.321

The Syrian invasion got off to a poor start because of the last-minute change in the Arab war plan and because of the army's low "work standards" (as one Israeli observer was to put it: "The Syrians would generally fight in the morning. During the afternoon they would take a light siesta, and at night they would go to sleep in orderly fashion").322

Instead of pushing into northern Galilee from southern Lebanon, the First Brigade made tracks on i4 May for the Golan, from which it was to cross into Palestine at the southern tip of the Sea of Galilee. The Syrians aimed to help "save Palestine" and destroy Israel. But their immediate military objectives are less clear. Apparently, they had the vague aim of reaching Afula, linking up with the Iraqi army and heading for the Mediterranean at Haifa or Netanya, thus cutting the Jewish state in two or at least isolating the north.a23 But it is also possible that the Syrians intended only limited local gains, such as the conquest of Tiberias or even the whole of the Sea of Galilee shoreline, which they could then tout as a "victory."

The Syrian Invasion and its rebuff, i5-ao May 1948

Back in February, Syrian politicians apparently told the visiting Palestinian leader Musa al Alami-in line with traditional "Greater Syria" ambitionsthat they were interested in gaining control of "all Palestine" or at least its "Arab areas."324 But by mid-May, their ambitions appear to have been reduced substantially. On i8 May, the British minister in Damascus reported that the "combined Syrian-Iraqi objective is Tiberias."325 To judge from the Syrians' actions, he may have been right (at least as regards Syria).

Early on i5 May, elements of the ill-equipped Syrian Second Brigade attacked Kibbutz `Ein-Gcv, on the Sea of Galilee's eastern shore. At dawn, a lone fighter-bomber dove on the kibbutz and released a brace of bombs; they missed. Syrian infantry opened up with machine guns. The children and many of the women were already in shelters, and the men were in the perimeter trenches. The following night, after a heated debate, the kibbutz sent its iSo children, accompanied by seventy older members, by boat to Tiberias and safety. The Haganah regional commander reacted angrily; `Ein-Gev had not received permission. `Ein-Gev's poorly armed defenders awaited the ground assault.326 But none came.

In fact, `Ein-Gev was a diversion. The main, First Brigade's, assault, commanded by Colonel Hakim, was mounted at the southern end of the lake, into the lower Jordan Valley. Facing the Syrians was Golani's Twelfth (Barak) Battalion and local militiamen, dispersed in the kibbutzim. A company of the Palmah's Yiftah Brigade, and militia platoons from settlements farther afield, joined the fray during the following days.

The Syrians began crossing the border at al-Hama in the early hours of is May, shelling the kibbutzim to its west throughout the day. One infantry company attacked I ibbutz Shaar Hagolan but was beaten back. A kibbutz member described what she saw that evening, when she left her guard post and went to the shelter: "The children were wet with sweat. Inside it was crowded, all the noncombatant inhabitants were inside. Girls, members' parents, pregnant women, it was impossible to reach and see [my] girl.... I returned to the post."327 (Later that night, the children and many women were evacuated.) Half a mile to the north, a Syrian battalion occupied the ridge of Tel al-Qasir and pushed westward, taking the former Animal Quarantine Station, on the eastern edge of Samakh, and then attacked the village itself. The situation was confused; Haganah platoons from Jordan Valley settlements hastily deployed in the empty village. Two 20 mm cannon, a PIAT, a handful of bombing missions by Haganah Air Service Piper Cubs, and a company from the Golani Brigade were to prove crucial, and the Syrians were beaten back. Outside Tiberias, the Jews built barricades and fortifications; they believed the town was next. "The situation was very grave. There aren't enough rifles. There are no heavy weapons," Ben-Gurion told the Cabinet.328

The Syrian brigade, spearheaded by cannon-mounting armored cars, attacked Samakh again on 16 May. Again, the attack was beaten back, though the Syrians gained a toehold by occupying the former British army camp on the village's eastern edge. Syrian President al-Quwwatli, flanked by Prime Minister Jamil Mardam and Defense Minister Taha al-Hashimi, visited the front that day. Al-Quwwatli instructed his troops "to destroy the Zionists."329

At dawn on i8 May the First Brigade, now reinforced by an additional infantry battalion, renewed the attack on Samakh. Advancing in two columns, led by armored vehicles, this time including light Renault 35 tanks, and backed by artillery, the Syrian infantry outflanked the village from the south. The fire from the Syrians' 75 mm cannon and 81 mm mortars was accurate and devastating-while the Israeli 20 mm guns jammed.330 The defenders retreated in confusion, westward, to Kibbutz Degania Aleph, leaving wounded and dying in Samakh's rubble. Syrian artillery "chased" the retreating troops. But alQuwwatli reprimanded his officers for wasting shells.331 By noon, the Syrians had reached, and taken, the police fort on the western edge of the village. Israeli losses that morning were three captured and fifty-four dead, most of them Jordan Valley ldbbutzniks.332 (The Syrian general staff had a poor picture of what was happening. They appear to have believed that the Lebanese army had-also-crossed the border and conquered three settlements south of Ras al-Naqurah. )333

The fall of Samakh shook the morale of the Jordan Valley Haganah-and precipitated a minor crisis in HGS. There was even confusion about the identity of the invaders. Ben-Gurion jotted down in his diary: "We have received word that the Legion has occupied Samakh.... There is something of a panic in the Jordan Valley."334 Moshe Dayan, the Haganah's Arab affairs officer, was appointed OC of all forces in the area. The Syrian advance now threatened the kibbutzim Sha ar Hagolan and Masada, south ofSamakh, and Degania Aleph (Dayan's birthplace and the first kibbutz) and Degania Bet, to the west. Without permission from headquarters, the members of Shaar Hagolan and Masada abandoned their homes and fled to nearby I ibbutz Afikim.335 The abandoned sites were immediately looted by local Arabs. The Deganias evacuated their women and children.

That night, 18 -iq May, a newly arrived company of Yiftah Brigade troops counterattacked at Samakh but was driven back. The company came across "tens of bodies" of Jews who had died in the Syrian assaults on the village.336 That same night, a seaborne platoon from `Ein-Gev landed at Samra, to the south, and raided the Syrian concentration on Tel al-Qasir. Though unsuccessful, the raid may have delayed the subsequent Syrian push on the Deganias by twenty-four hours, which were well used by the Israelis to prepare.337 That night, another Yiftah company crossed the Jordan eastward and attacked the Syrian camp at the Customs House, near the main Bnot Ya`akov Bridge, north of the Sea of Galilee. The raid was a major success. The Syrian defenders, one or two companies, fled after a brief firefight, and the Palmahniks, without loss, destroyed the camp and a number of vehicles, including two armored cars.338

But commando raids do not win battles, and by i9 May morale in the lower Jordan Valley had plummeted. The events at Samakh, Sha'ar Hagolan, and Masada had badly affected the inhabitants. "In several settlements the spirit of resistance had collapsed because of the strength and armor of the enemy," reported two veteran kibbutzniks. They added that without further reinforcements, the remaining settlements could not hold out.339 A delegation of kibbutz members set out for Tel Aviv. But even without seeing them, the Haganah high command set about repairing the damage. Reinforcements were readied, and a back-stiffening order was issued by Yadin: "No point should be abandoned. [You] must fight at each site."3411 Yadin and Ben-Gurion faced off over the Yishuv's only available asset, the battery of four pre-World War 165 mm mountain guns (without proper sights). BenGurion wanted to send them to Jerusalem; Yadin insisted on the Jordan Valley. Ben-Gurion backed down, and to the valley they went, arriving in the nick of time on the slopes to the west of the Deganias.341

The denouement of zo May came as something of a surprise-and not only to the Syrians. As anticipated by the Haganah, the Syrians launched a major push against the two Deganias. The defenders-about seventy in Dcgania Aleph and eighty in Degania Bet, the majority kibbutz members, with a leavening of Haganah and Palmah squads342-were ordered to fight, and die, where they stood; there could be no retreat.

The defenders enjoyed the support of three 20 mm guns at Beit Yerah, enfilading the road from Samakh to Degania Aleph, and four 81 min mortars, three of them positioned in Kinneret, a kibbutz just to the north, and the fourth at Degania Aleph itself. The kibbutz also had a Davidka mortar, but it exploded during the battle, injuring a crewman. Each of the Deganias also had a PIAT with fifteen projectiles. And the Haganah had the battery of 65 min mountain guns.

The Syrians attacked at dawn. First there was a half-hour artillery barrage on the two kibbutzim. Then the Third Infantry Battalion, backed by eight to twelve Renault 35 tanks and about twenty armored cars, in three columns, advanced across the seven hundred yards separating the Samakh police fort from Degania Aleph's eastern redoubts.