On the other hand, the IDF-five times larger than the Legion and steadily resupplied from Czechoslovakia-more than made up for its losses in men and ammunition. Within weeks, the IDF was far stronger than it had been on the eve of the battle with the Legion.
THE EGYPTIAN INVASION
Muhammad Mamun Shinawi, the rector of Al-Azhar University, wished the Egyptian expeditionary force, initially consisting of some six thousand troops,235 Godspeed as it crossed the border at Rafah on 15 May: "The hour of `Jihad' has struck.... A hundred of you will defeat a thousand of the infidels.... This is the hour in which ... Allah promised paradise.... Fighters, this is a war there is no avoiding, to defend your women, homes, and the fatherland of your fathers and forefathers."236 The Egyptian invasion, of course, was geared not-at least in any immediate sense-to defending Egypt but to preventing Israel's establishment or perhaps destroying the Yishuv, and to "saving" the Palestinian Arabs. But, perhaps understandably, Farouk rejected Haj Amin al-Husseini's request to accompany the expeditionary force (or to support the establishment of a Palestinian Arab provisional government). 237
During the run-up to the war, the Egyptian army had failed to prepare. In line with the Anglo-Egyptian treaty of 1936, the British equipped and helped train the Egyptian army. But during World War II, with its loyalties in doubt, the British did not expand or modernize the force.
But at the end of the war-to meet British Cold War needs-a plan was set in motion to vastly expand the army to three divisions. A team of fifty British officers advised and trained it. In reports home, however, they wrote that the Egyptians were "corrupt," "lazy" "egotists" and "stupid." The initial target, for 1949, was a one infantry-division army with auxiliary armored and artillery contingents and a small navy and air force. But Anglo-Egyptian political tensions, centering on Cairo's demand for the closure of Britain's Canal side bases, stymied progress. Indeed, in December 1947-January 1948 the Egyptians sent the British military mission packing. Inevitably, this affected not only training but arms deliveries. Except for some Spitfire fighter aircraft, little new equipment reached Egypt during the countdown to the invasion.
At the end of 1947, the Egyptians pressed London, along with requests for heavy equipment-tanks, planes, and artillery pieces-for "a small quantity of mustard gas, phosgene cylinders and tear gas capsules for training purposes." The British said "no."238
Though on paper the Egyptian ground forces consisted of four brigadesthree infantry and one armor-they were in fact far smaller in May 1948. There were two infantry brigades and one undersized tank battalion (some thirty tanks in all, but without guns), and several dozen armored cars, most of them Bren gun carriers, with some Humber Ills and IVs and half-tracks dispersed among the infantry battalions. Egyptian artillery consisted of thirty twenty-five-pounders and two dozen or so undependable older pieces (eighteen-pounders and 3.7-inch and 4.5-inch howitzers). There were also some antitank guns.
On paper, the Egyptian air force-the Arab world's largest-consisted of seven squadrons, two of them (with thirty-two serviceable aircraft) of Spitfire IX fighters and two of bombers (mainly converted Dakota C-47 transports). The withdrawal of the British mission rapidly reduced the effectiveness of the force, which lacked qualified pilots, ground crews, and spare parts.-9
On a6 April General Ahmed Ali al-Muwawi was appointed to command the expeditionary force, whose lead elements were deployed that day in El 'Arish in eastern Sinai; Colonel Mohammed Neguib was his deputy. The force, which crossed into Palestine on i5-i6 May and (in Allenby's footsteps) pushed northward into the "Gaza Strip," up the coast road, consisted of a reinforced brigade group, composed of the First, Sixth, and Ninth battalions; a support battalion of three-inch mortars and machine guns; an artillery battalion consisting of twenty-four twenty-five-pounders, a battalion of twenty-four armored cars, and support units, including antitank and antiaircraft guns. During the following three weeks, the Egyptians reinforced the column with an additional regular battalion, the Second, and three reserve battalions, the Third, Fourth, and Seventh, and the battalion of light tanks and some old howitzers,240 and restructured the expeditionary force into two brigade groups, the Second and Fourth.
But the invasion was preceded by the entry into Palestine, while still under British rule, of two smaller forces, one of Muslim Brotherhood volunteers in April, and the other of regular Egyptian army volunteers on 6 May. These regulars (designated the Light Forces), initially 124 men and four officers, were charged with reconnaissance tasks preceding the invasion. With the invasion, the Light Forces, beefed up with more regulars (and, later, reserve units), were joined to the Muslim Brotherhood volunteers, whose number also substantially increased (some of the additional recruits hailed from the Maghreb),24' and improvised battalions were organized. The whole force was placed under the command of the Light Forces commander, Colonel Ahmed Abd alAziz, and was to constitute the right wing of the invasion.
Some of the Muslim Brotherhood volunteers had been in the northern Negev for weeks and had twice unsuccessfully attacked Kibbutz Kfar Darom (on 14 April and io May).242 On r9 May Abd al-Aziz's force headed eastward, occupying Beersheba, and then veered northeastward, into the Hebron Hills, passing through Hebron and reaching the Bethlehem area and the outskirts of Jerusalem three days later. On 22-24 May the force joined the Legion and local irregulars in the attack on Kibbutz Ramat Rachel.
It is just possible that this force split from the main Egyptian thrust up the coast road and, "contrary to orders," advanced toward Hebron-Bethlehem because Abd al-Aziz refused to accept al-Muwawi's authority and because Palestinian Arab notables from the Hebron-Bethlehem area had pleaded with him to come and protect them.243 But it is more likely that, at the last minute, Cairo decided to split the expeditionary force and dispatch 'Abd alAziz's slapdash brigade northeastward to occupy as much as possible of the West Bank to avert a complete Jordanian takeover. Moreover, installing the brigade in the Hebron-Bethlehem area had the advantage of threatening the left flank of the Israeli forces trying to bar the main Egyptian push northward.
Al-Muwawi's main force advanced slowly and cautiously, up the coast road. The tardiness was due in part to severe logistical disabilities.244 Nasser, then a major, later recalled that his troops had gone into Palestine without combat rations or a field kitchen: he was given a thousand pounds, and "I bought all the cheese and olives I could lay hands on in Gaza. My heart ached at the thought of the soldier who was to attack fortified positions with his bare body and then sit in a hole like a mouse nibbling away at a piece of cheese.... My heart cried out with every beat: `This is no war."'245 AlMuwawi was also worried by the threat posed by the kibbutzim along his route of march: they could harry his supply convoys and might try to cut off his forward units. He was to expend great resources in subduing the kibbutzim-at the expense of pressing speedily northward.
The Haganah held the northern Negev approaches and the settlement enclave in the northern Negev with two brigades, Giv`ati, in the north, with five battalions, and the (Palmah) Negev Brigade, in the south, with two battal ions (the Second and Eighth); two additional battalions, the Seventh and Ninth (the latter constituted as a raider force, based on thirty jeeps, each mounting two machine guns), were hastily organized and reached the Negev in the third week of May. Together, the two brigades had some four to five thousand troops. Giv'ati was organized in regular battalions; some of the Negev Brigade's troops, especially from the original two battalions, were dispersed among the settlements. The brigades had several dozen Israeli-made armored cars and two- and three-inch mortars but, in the first days of the invasion, no field artillery or proper armor.
In classic fashion, the Egyptians heralded the invasion with a dawn attack by a foursome of Spitfires on 15 May on Tel Aviv's airfield, Sdeh Dov-where the bulk of the Haganah aircraft were concentrated-and the neighboring Reading Power Station. A number of Israeli aircraft were destroyed and others hit, and five Israelis were killed. The antiaircraft gunners were caught with their pants down.246 During the following hours additional waves of Egyptian aircraft bombed and strafed targets around Tel Aviv, but with little success. One Spitfire was downed and its pilot captured.247 (The Egyptian air force continued raiding Tel Aviv during the next six days, the most severe attack, on 18 May, killing forty-two civilians and wounding one hundred in the central bus station.248 The attacks, and the complete absence of Israeli interceptors, severely, if briefly, shook civilian morale and caused serious economic harm. But Egyptian losses, including five Spitfires shot down by British airmen on 22 May when the Egyptians mistakenly bombed Ramat David Airfield, east of Haifa, which was still in British hands,249 and more effective anti-aircraft defenses, brought the Egyptian air raids-which were never more than extremely light, by World War II standards-to a halt. By the end of May, the Egyptians had lost almost the whole Spitfire squadron based in El Arish, including many of their best pilots.)
Just as the first Egyptian Spitfires were on their way to Tel Aviv, two infantry battalions, reinforced with armor and artillery, crossed the border just south of Rafah and-one battalion for each-attacked the settlements of Nirim, on the western edge of the Negev settlements enclave, and Kfar Darom, which sat astride the Rafah-Gaza road. The two kibbutzim and several neighboring settlements were the Yishuv's first line of defense. They were to prove exceptionally hard nuts to crack; waves of Egyptian troops were severely bled and stalled at each outpost.
When Yitzhak Sadeh, Ben-Gurion's military adviser, proposed immediately abandoning a few of the isolated southern settlements (which, ultimately, were militarily untenable), Ben-Gurion responded: "There is no hurry. Gaining time is a big thing.""() Ben-Gurion was proved right. The Egyptian thrust lost momentum, and the Haganah gained time in which to reposition its forces and absorb and deploy the heavy weapons that it had purchased in Europe and the United States but had been unable to bring in before 15 May.
Nirim (in Arabic, Dangour) was defended by forty-five well-entrenched Haganah members, twelve of them women, armed only with light weapons (their heaviest armaments were two machine guns and a two-inch mortar with twelve bombs, six of them, as it turned out, duds). The perimeter was mined and well fenced. The local bedouin left the area a few days before on Arab orders; like the bedouin, HIS knew that the kibbutz would be targeted.
The Egyptian Sixth Battalion attacked that morning, pounding the settlement first with artillery and mortars and then with an infantry assault. The Egyptians went in without adequate intelligence or planning.251 The infantry, perhaps four to five hundred strong, were backed by two batteries of twenty-five-pounders, a battery of three-inch mortars, twenty Bren gun carriers, and half a dozen armored cars mounting two- and six-pounders. But the armor failed to reach, and break through, the perimeter fence, perhaps fearing land mines. The infantry was "slow and ... appeared lethargic and without energy." The attackers were halted at the perimeter fence and retreated, leaving behind twelve to thirty-five dead; additional casualties were taken to the rear. Nasser, who joined the battalion just after the attack, later recalled: "I felt that the dead left behind at Dangour symbolized the battalion's [lack of] faith in the cause for which it was fighting."252 Israeli observers estimated that "40%" of the Egyptian casualties were caused by their own mortars.
After the attack, the infantrymen sat down for "lunch," some 65o yards away, within sight of the settlement. The Egyptians then resumed their barrage-and withdrew to Rafah, where they held a "victory rally." Egyptian radio announced that "Dangour" had been taken.253 During the next two days the Egyptians repeatedly bombed and shelled the settlement, but there were no further infantry assaults. A Palmah squad, with a doctor, reached the settlement between bombardments. The defenders had suffered seven dead and a handful of wounded, and "the settlement [buildings] were completely destroyed."254
By the end of that first day, one Negev Brigade officer, Haim Bar-Lev (IDF chief of general staff, 1968 -1971), concluded that "the outcome of the war had been settled, because if 45 defenders had withstood about i,ooo [sic] Egyptians, who were aided by fighter aircraft, artillery, and armor, and beat them-then the whole Yishuv would hold out in the war. "ass
Something similar happened at Kfar Darom, which Muslim Brotherhood fighters had previously attacked.256 On 15 May, the kibbutz was defended by forty members (ten of them women) and twenty Palmah Negev Brigade reg ulars, who had light weapons, PIATs, and Molotov cocktails. A Palmah relief column was ambushed a mile short of the kibbutz on the night of 14-1S May, and more than a dozen were killed or wounded.
The Egyptian First Battalion, backed by more than a dozen armored vehicles, attacked after dawn. Dozens of infantrymen, and perhaps a few vehicles, were hit, and the battalion, commanded by Said Taha, withdrew-and then, bypassing the settlement, headed for Gaza. Three ofKfar Darom's defenders were killed, and thirty were wounded.257 A number of Israeli settlements to the east-Nir- Am, Be'eri, and Be erot Yitzhak-were heavily shelled but not assaulted.
That evening, the Ninth Battalion joined the First in Gaza, where alMuwawi established his headquarters. The next three days were spent reorganizing, while air and artillery forces pounded the Jewish settlements to the east. The Egyptians also dropped leaflets, calling on the settlements to surrender "in the name of the merciful Allah ... for Allah sides with the Good."258
On ►9 May the Egyptians resumed their advance northward, immediately taking fire from the roadside Kibbutz Yad Mordechai (in Arabic, Deir Suneid), which, perched on a hill, dominated the coastal road midway between Gaza and Majdal (today Ashkelon). The Hashomer Hatza'ir kibbutz was founded in 1943 and named after Mordechai Anielewicz, the commander of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising. Many members were expartisans: "Among us were many whose homes had once before been demolished around them, in the ghettoes of Poland, in Stalingrad," one veteran of the impending battle was to write.259