1948: A History of the First Arab-Israeli War (36 page)

"The Thirteen," as the People's Administration was called-and only ten were present that day (two were stuck in besieged Jerusalem and one was in New York)-then turned to the questions of the truce and the declaration of statehood. Most spoke out against both the general truce proposals and a limited truce in Jerusalem alone. The matter was decided by a vote of six to four.346 As to declaring statehood, Ben-Gurion was adamant about not defining the new state's borders, arguing that if "our strength proves sufficient," the Yishuv will conquer Western Galilee and the length of the Tel Aviv-Jerusalem road-and, it was implied, coopt West Jerusalem-"and all this will be part of the state.... So why commit [ourselves to a smaller state? ]"347 By a vote of five to four it was decided not to define the borders; the name, "Israel," was decided by seven votes to zero. The text of the declaration was approved unanimously. No vote was apparently taken on a postponement; it was clear that Ben-Gurion, backed by Shertok, enjoyed majority support. 348

On the afternoon of 14 May, just after High Commissioner Cunningham and his staff had left Jerusalem and flown from Kalandiya airstrip to Haifa, the leaders of the Yishuv-members of the National Council, the People's Administration, the Zionist General Council, and party politicians, local leaders, and journalists-gathered in a hall in Tel Aviv Museum. Some officials were stranded in Jerusalem; others remained outside the hall, which was too small to accommodate all the invitees. The Palestine Philharmonic Orchestra, which was to play the national anthem, "Hatikva" (the hope), was relegated to the floor above the hall. The preparations had been hectic, everything arranged at the last minute; and everything was overshadowed by the impending invasion. "We moved about our duties ... as if in a dream.... The days of the Messiah had arrived, the end of servitude under alien rulers," was how Ze'eve Sharef, Ben-Gurion's assistant, later described it. 349

An honor guard of spruced-up Haganah cadets, "white belts gleaming from afar," lined the sidewalk by the entrance. Ben-Gurion's limousine drew up, and he vigorously strode past them up the stairs into the building. The hall itself had been hastily redecorated: a cluster of historically apt paintings-Marc Chagall's A Jew Holding a Scroll of the Law, Maurycy Minkowski's Pogroms, Shmuel Hirshenberg's Exile-had been freshly hung. A large portrait of Herzl, flanked by blue and white flags, dominated one wall. The hall was packed, and the heat-photographers' arc lights and flash bulbs contributing-intense. At the dais sat eleven members of the People's Administration; along a table perpendicular to it sat fourteen additional members of the National Council. Behind them sat row upon row of other dignitaries.

At 4:0o PM all rose, spontaneously, and sang "Hatikva." Ben-Gurionsixty-two, a five-foot, three-inch pragmatist with rock-hard convictions, who had devoted his life to amassing power, for himself and his people, with the aim of resurrecting Jewish self-determination in Palestine, a land he had reached (from Poland) in 19o6 on the back of an Arab stevedore who carried him from skiff to shore-then read out the declaration, the "Scroll of the Establishment of the State of Israel": "The Land of Israel was the birthplace of the Jewish people.... Here their spiritual, religious and national identity was formed." They had ruled the land for centuries but then had been crushed and exiled. For centuries, they had yearned to return. They began to return at the end of the nineteenth century, and the international community had gradually come to support their claim to the land and sovereignty. The Holocaust had energized the Zionist struggle. On 29 November 1947 the United Nations had formally endorsed their quest. "Accordingly ... We hereby proclaim the establishment of the Jewish State ... the State of Israel." The audience rose and clapped: "all were seized by ineffable joy, their faces irradiated."-s0 The proclamation was adopted by acclamation, and the leaders signed the document. "Hatikva" was sung once more, and BenGurion proclaimed: "The State of Israel is established! This meeting is adjourned."

The ceremony had lasted thirty-two minutes. Those gathered-of Zionism's prominent leaders, only Chaim Weizmann was missing; he was abroad; later, Ben-Gurion vindictively refused Weizmann's request to add his signature to the document-fell on each others shoulders, cheered, and wept. Outside, in the streets, the crowds broke into celebration: "the city danced and made merry."-351 Eleven minutes later, Truman announced de facto recognition of the new state, shocking most State Department officials, who had been given no inkling of the move.352 Truman had been spurred to action by a letter from Weizmann pleading that "the greatest living democracy" be "the first to welcome the newest into the family of nations."353

"In the country there is celebration and profound joy-and once again I am a mourner among the celebrants, as on 29 November," Ben-Gurion jotted down in his diary. a54 A few hours later, the Royal Navy flotilla, with the bulk of the Mandate administration on board, sailed out of Haifa harbor. By midnight, the aircraft carrier HMS Ocean, the flagship, the cruiser HMS Euryalus, carrying Cunningham, and the accompanying destroyers and frigates, were outside territorial waters, making for Malta. On Ocean's windswept flight deck the band played "Auld Lang Syne."

The result of the five and a half months of fighting between the Palestinian Arab community, assisted by foreign volunteers, and the Yishuv was a decisive Jewish victory. Palestinian Arab military power was crushed, and Palestinian Arab society, never robust, fell apart, much of the population fleeing to the inland areas or out of the country altogether.

The Haganali, after holding its own on the defensive for four months while it transformed from a militia into an army, launched a series of offensives-most precipitated by Arab attacks-that, within six weeks, routed the Arab militias and their ALA reinforcements. Important pieces of territory assigned in the UN Partition Resolution to Palestinian Arab or international control-including Jaffa and West Jerusalem-fell under Zionist sway as hundreds of thousands of Arabs fled or were driven out. Meanwhile, the prestate Zionist institutions transformed themselves into solid, relatively effective departments and agencies of state, and the Haganah managed to consolidate its hold on a continuous strip of territory embracing the Coastal Plain, the Jezreel Valley, and the Jordan Valley, which it would prove able to hold against combined Arab attack from outside and from which it was able, eventually, to conquer additional territory. In the process, the Yishuv convincingly demonstrated that it was militarily formidable and capable of selfrule and that the emergent State of Israel was viable, persuading an initially hesitant United States, and in its wake, others around the world, to support it. Moreover, the decisive victory over the Palestinian Arabs gave the Haganah the experience and self-confidence necessary subsequently to confront and defeat the invading armies of the Arab states.

Motto: "He said that the Arabs were not afraid of our expansion. They resented our very presence as an alien organism.... `Politics were not a matter for sentimental agreements; they were resultants of contending forces. The question is whether you can bring more force for the creation of a Jewish State than we can muster to prevent it. If you want your State, however, you must come and get it. It is useless asking me for the Negev.... You can only get your Negev by taking it. If you are ... strong enough to do this, or if you enlist strong partners-Britain, America . . . -you may well succeed. If you cannot, then you will fail."'

- Azzam Pasha, secretary-general of the Arab League, September 1947

THE ARAB STATES DECIDE TO INVADE

In November 5947, days before the eruption of hostilities, General Ismail Safwat, head of the Arab League Military Committee, wrote: "Victory over the Jews-who are well trained and well equipped-by gangs and irregular forces alone is not feasible. So regular forces must be thrown into the battle, trained and equipped with the best weaponry.... As the Arab states do not have sufficient means for a protracted war, everything must be done so that the war in Palestine will be terminated in the shortest possible time."'

As the months passed and the Palestinian Arabs, beefed up by contingents of foreign volunteers, proved incapable of defeating the Yishuv, the Arab leaders began more seriously to contemplate sending in their armies. The events of April 1948-Deir Yassin,2 Tiberias, Haifa, Jaffa-rattled and focused their minds, and the arrival of tens of thousands of refugees drove home the urgency of direct intervention. By the end ofApril, they decided to invade. The following fortnight saw the leaders and their generals trying to hammer out agreed objectives, a coordinated strategy, and a unified command structure. They failed.

But the invasion, propelled by the combined momentum of their own rhetoric and pressure from below, went ahead. (As General John Bagot Glubb later recalled: "The Arab statesmen did not intend war.... But in the end they entered [Palestine] and ordered their commanders to advance as a result of pressure of public opinion and a desire to appease the `street."1)3 The American Legation in Damascus described the mechanism thus: "Government appears to have led public opinion to brink of war and now unable to retreat. Demand for war led by students, press and Moslem religious leaders.... Manifestos of students and ulemas ... alike uncompromising."4

In the preceding two years of summitry, though occasionally hinting at the possibility of direct intervention, the Arab leaders, warned off by Britain and the international community, had shied from committing themselves to sending in their armies (though intermittently Syria and Iraq had privately and publicly threatened to do just that, even before the Mandate was terminated). In general, in private they appreciated and admitted their military weakness and unpreparedness.-' But in public, militant bluster was the norm. Knowledgeable British observers opined that "the Arab states should [that is, would] receive some nasty surprises" if they invaded Palestine.' Indeed, Alan Cunningham dismissed talk of invasion as so much hot air-because, he reasoned, "these armies have neither the training, equipment nor reserves of ammunition ... to maintain an army in the field far from their bases for any length of time, if at all."7 But Cunningham was ignoring the possibility of irrational decision-making-and underestimating Arab resolve and capabilities.