1948: A History of the First Arab-Israeli War (16 page)

With the passage of the UN resolution, the Arab "street," given its head, spoke unequivocally. There were massive demonstrations in cities across the Middle East and North Africa. In Cairo, there were daily protests, with "riffraff" quickly joining secondary school students. They vandalized European shops and cafes. But police prevented the mob from storming the Jewish Quarter. 192 On 4 December police fired on mobs in Cairo and Mansoura'93 before the government finally banned all demonstrations.194 In Damascus, the demonstrators called for "Jihad" and arms; the prime minister "promised" that the government would "comply and be in the forefront of the liberation of Palestine."'95 "The Syrian Government were [sic] largely responsible for organizing and directing the demonstrations ... [making] use of agents amongst the teachers, the Ulema [the religious authorities], the Ikhwan al Muslimeen [Muslim Brotherhood], and the leaders of the various city quarters," the British concluded.'96 Damage was done to the American and French legation buildings.'97 The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood denounced the UN decision, called for volunteers for Palestine and contributions, and announced that "it is a ... battle either for life or death to a nation of 70 million souls ... whom the vilest, the most corrupt, tricky and destructive people wish to conquer and displace. " 198

In some Arab states, the regimes-while issuing inflammatory statements-kept the mobs in check. But where the reins were loosed, or where the police joined the rioters, there was bloody mayhem. In pogroms in British-ruled Aden and the Sheikh Othman refugee camp outside the city, seventy-five Jews were murdered, seventy-eight were wounded, and dozens of homes, shops, and synagogues and two schools were torched during z-4December by Arabs and local Yemeni levies before British troops restored order. 199 Dozens of Jewish homes and a synagogue were also destroyed or looted, one woman was killed, and sixty-seven Jews were injured in rioting on 2 December in Bahrain.200 In Aleppo, Syria, there was widespread antiJewish rioting on 3o November and i December, with dozens of houses, including the town's synagogues and Jewish schools, being torched. It is unclear how many Jews, if any, were injured or killed;201 three thousand reportedly fled to Beirut.202 In Damascus, Jews were set upon, as were nationals of Western states identified with the UN decision.203 In Egypt, mobs torched the British Institute in Zagazig and attacked the British consulate general and Anglican cathedral in Cairo.204

The Arab governments weighed and responded to the partition resolution at the League Political Committee meeting in Cairo in the second week of December. Hostilities between the Arab and Jewish communities in Palestine had already begun. Five prime ministers, of Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan, attended. On the table was Safwat's second report, of 27 November, a thorough analysis of the military situation. Safwat bluntly concluded that "a victory over the Jews was not possible ... by means of [armed] bands and irregulars alone. Therefore regular forces must be thrown into the battle, trained and equipped with the best weapons, who will be assisted by Palestinian [Arab] bands.... Because the Arab states lack sufficient means for a long war, everything must be done to assure that the war in Palestine will be over as quickly as possible."205

The Iraqi delegation, backed by Safwat, proposed that the regular Arab armies intervene, to "save Palestine," even before the British departed and the Jews proclaimed a state. The Iraqi prime minister's aides privately pointed to the "street" and explained that had the prime minister taken a "more reasonable line," it was doubtful whether he could have survived "for more than five minutes."206 The clear-eyed prime minister of Lebanon, Riad al-Sulh, reportedly "very depressed," told British diplomats that "public opinion in Arab countries was so strong that it would be impossible for any Government to prevent volunteers coming to assist the Arabs [in Palestine] once serious fighting had begun."207 The Egyptian foreign minister, Khashaba Pasha, said the same-but added, perhaps with a touch of humor, that the "elements who would volunteer [for Palestine] were those among whom excitability was greatest and it was better for the sake of law and order in Egypt that they should be out of the country."208

Al-Husseini, who was left out of the deliberations, was well informedand deeply unhappy with Safwat's proposal for external military interven tion. He believed (or at least argued) that Palestine's Arabs could take care of themselves. He feared that such intervention would result in shunting Palestine's Arabs-and himself-aside and provide an opportunity for land grabs by Jordan, Syria, and Egypt.209 (He was, of course, right.)

Less hotheaded than the other Arab leaders and more reluctant to anger London, the Jordanians favored intervention-principally Jordanian intervention-but only after the British left. The Syrians were (rightly) suspicious that Jordan intended to annex Palestine or part of it. The other member states demurred, the Saudis and Egyptians leading the opposition. But the Egyptians announced that they themselves lacked the means to intervene.

In the end, the Arab League proved unable to agree on a clear goal for the unofficial war or to define a strategy by which it might be won. Instead, the leaders decided on something more modest. The League vowed, in very general language, "to try to stymie the partition plan and prevent the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine," and the member states pledged to give the Palestine Arabs ten thousand rifles (Jordan and Lebanon a thousand each, and Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt two thousand each, each rifle to be supplied with five hundred bullets) as well as other light weapons. In addition, three thousand volunteers were to be trained in Syria by 15 January 1948. The League promised an additional million pounds for the war effort."" British observers commented that although some Arab leaders were eager to avoid conflict, "popular feeling" was such that they were "convinced, probably with considerable justification, that if they accepted [a compromise] solution, their positions, and possibly in some cases their lives, would be most insecure."211 But the prime ministers were also driven by a desire to avoid a clash with the British and by the knowledge that they were not yet prepared for war. "The mood of the prime ministers was desperate rather than gasconading," stated one British intelligence report. Yet the Arab leaders were certain that the Jews would not make do with the area allotted them and were uplifted by the support they were receiving "not only from the Moslem world ... but from Arab sympathizers, and anti-Jews in many countries. "212

The prime ministers agreed to help the Palestine Arabs but understood that they could not solve the problem on their own. The question in Cairo was not really whether the Arab states would go to war but when and how. The emergent, vague consensus was that they would have to march when the Mandate ended, in mid-May 1948. This was implied in Iraqi foreign minister Jamali's query to officials in Whitehall: "What would be the attitude of HM Government if the Arab States sent their armies into Palestine on the termination of the mandate? The assumption would be that the [Arab] armies would occupy the whole of Palestine, but without molesting the Jews."213

The Arab get-togethers from Bludan onward had been marked by disunity, mutual suspicion, and cross-purposes. The antagonisms and suspicions undermined any hope of firm, realistic decision-making in the League councils. At the same time, in order not to appear weak-kneed and hesitant, moderate rulers-such as Abdullah-allowed themselves to be pressed into extremist policies (or at least utterances), lest they be seen as insufficiently zealous. All paid lip service to Arab unity and the Palestine Arab cause, and all opposed partition. But all were at a loss about how to prevent it. Most, though they could not admit it to the others (or, perhaps, to themselves), knew that their armies were weak. Egypt and Jordan's military commanders estimated that the Haganah would prove formidable; other Arabs may have been more optimistic. One thing was clear, however: there could be no intervention so long as the British were in Palestine. None wished to fight the British, with whom most were aligned and who all understood were too powerful to challenge.

Still, having committed themselves to oppose partition, the Arab leaders felt they had to do something. The public bluster, the fear of their own populations whom they had helped whip up with militant rhetoric into a frenzy, and the pressure of fellow Arab politicians and leaders all combined to egg them on. The Arab states had embarked on a course leading to war. What remained to be seen was who exactly would take part and how it would all end.

The British response to the UN resolution was formulated at the cabinet meeting of 4 December 1947 on the basis of a joint memorandum submitted by the foreign and colonial secretaries. Whitehall had begun to plan the withdrawal-a vast logistical and political enterprise, given the hundred thousand Britons in the Mandate's military forces and civilian bureaucracies and the more than a quarter of a million tons of stores and ammunition and fourteen thousand vehicles214-soon after Bevin's withdrawal announcement of February 1947. Britain had been impoverished by the world war (indeed, by the two world wars), and a pullout had become "an economic as well as a political and ethical imperative .1121-5 Maintaining the army and police in Palestine had cost the Labour government more than two hundred million pounds sterling in the eighteen months after it assumed office.216 Starting in June 1947, military manpower in Palestine was gradually reduced, the numbers declining from seventy-eight thousand to fifty-five thousand by i December. The rest would be gradually withdrawn during the following months.

The planning and pace of the withdrawal needs to be viewed against the dual backdrop of developments in Palestine and the international arena. Bevin regarded the UNSCOP majority report of i September 194.7 as unjust and immoral. He promptly decided that Britain would not attempt to im pose it on the Arabs; indeed, he expected them to resist its implementation. The publication of the report significantly invigorated British planning for the withdrawal. The army argued that it would need a minimum of eighteen months.217 But the international political momentum was inexorable, and in October the British authorities began hurriedly to plan the wind-down of the Mandate. The UN partition resolution had stipulated i August 1948 as the deadline for both the termination of the Mandate and the completion of the military withdrawal. The British cabinet went one better: in the meeting on 4 December 1947 it resolved that the Mandate would end on 15 May and the withdrawal would be completed by i August.

But the cabinet decision added a fatal twist to its apparent conformity to international will. It decided, in a sop to the Arabs, to refrain from aiding the enforcement of the UN resolution, meaning the partition of Palestine. And in an important secret corollary, in line with the recommendation of the foreign and colonial secretaries, it agreed that Britain would do all in its power to delay until early May the arrival in Palestine of the UN (Implementation) Commission."ix The Foreign Office immediately informed the commission "that it would be intolerable for the Commission to begin to exercise its authority while the [Mandate] Palestine Government was still administratively responsible for Palestine." Britain asked-in effect, it was an order-that the commission delay its arrival until "May ist."219

This sealed the commission's fate and nullified any possibility of an orderly implementation of the partition resolution. Though an "Advanced Party" of the commission arrived in Palestine at the start of March 1948, the commission itself never reached the country or functioned. British hostility, Arab boycott, and the descent of the country into full-scale civil war assured that the partition resolution would not be implemented and that the commission would be redundant. The Advanced Party, headed by Spanish diplomat Pablo de Azcarate, was effectively isolated in a house in the British-guarded security zone near the I ing David Hotel, with its two secretaries forced to do the cooking and cleaning. The British made their stay "as uncomfortable ... as possible."220 The Jewish Agency's liaison officer to the commission, Walter Eytan, reported that "the poor man [Azcarate] simply did not know where to turn."221 Azcarate spent the following weeks meeting with British and Jewish officials (Arabs refused to see him), but to no purpose. On 14 May, with the conditions on the ground radically transformed, the commission was formally disbanded by the General Assembly. Azcarate had spent most of late April and early May trying to assist the UN (Consular) Truce Commission, appointed by the UN Security Council on 23 April, to achieve a ceasefire. The Truce Commission proved as effective as the Implemnentation Commission.