Women of Intelligence: Winning the Second World War with Air Photos (22 page)

Jane Cameron worked in the Airfields Section at RAF Medmenham.

A routine report on an existing airfield would include details on the dimensions of the landing area and the number, length and orientation of the runways with details on their serviceability – whether the surface of the runways was in a good enough state of repair to be operational or if there were obstructions and mines laid for demolition. The position of the fuel-storage tanks, the water supply and the ammunition storage were important, in addition to the number and size of the hangars, workshops and accommodation for personnel. Wireless telephony (radio) stations were always noted, as was the presence of a night landing facility called Visual Lorenz, which was a series of poles for carrying light cables that were sunk into the ground in line with the runway. The PIs could see this system clearly on photographs taken in daylight as the base of each pole appeared as a white dot. These were plotted for the navigators of RAF intruder aircraft, who would then home in on returning enemy bombers at the moment when the lights went on. Ursula wrote:

Our subject was as vital as any other at Medmenham, as we discovered, because we supplied information to the Air Staff, which could be used for the assessment of the order of battle of the Luftwaffe; the team being able to determine from the lay-out of an airfield under construction, the type of aeroplane likely to operate from it.
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Both Ursula and Constance battled with Air Intelligence departments at the Air Ministry, whose policy was to withhold information from other sources from the Medmenham PIs which would, on many occasions, have proved useful and time saving. Both eventually managed to visit the relevant departments and create lines of communication, although this was often dependent on the individual personality in post. Constance was consulted on aircraft development by several committees and was able to get her ideas across to them, although she became frustrated at the dismissive air or blocking attitude of some individuals, getting on better with the Americans, who listened to what she knew.

Kay Henry demonstrates the Altazimeter, an invention of Squadron Leader Claud Wavell, head of the Wireless Section. It was used to determine the height of aerial arrays on wireless transmitters from the angle of the sun.

The Wireless Section, ‘G’, had started at Wembley under the leadership of a mathematician, Squadron Leader Claud Wavell. Its outstanding contribution was the complete unearthing of the enemy’s offensive and defensive radio systems. The offensive transmitters acted as navigational aids to direct German air crew flying on bombing missions over Britain. The defensive system provided pre-warning of air raids in Germany and was later used to detect the first signs of invasion. The detection of the enemy’s radar installations in occupied territory was of first-rate strategic importance. The first WAAF recruit to this work was Section Officer Vera Marsden, who had been a radio-location operator before training as a PI; she became an area officer responsible for reporting on radar installations in France. Her colleague, Section Officer Kay Henry, was similarly responsible for reporting on radar in Belgium.

It was not until they had failed to invade Britain in 1940 that the Germans recognised their need for camouflage, smokescreens and decoys. The Third-Phase Camouflage Section, ‘E’, was established with the move to Medmenham and head of section was Flight Officer Mollie ‘Tommy’ Thompson, a graduate in economics, who had joined the WAAF in 1939 and worked at Wembley. She was an expert on the subject, a regular lecturer at the PI school at Nuneham Park and advised the British camouflage designers. Section Officers Pauline Growse, an actress, and Kitty Sancto, who had studied at the Slade College of Art, also worked in the Section, showing the necessary keen eye for detail and ability to study each photograph with an open mind. Camouflage was in large measure ineffective against air photography, and in wartime often only served to emphasise the importance of the object being hidden. Ursula Powys-Lybbe wrote:

There is an explanation for the apparent ease with which the interpreters could see through camouflage, both literally and figuratively, while a pilot might have been deceived. Camouflage was primarily designed in colour to blend with the background, so that aircrew would be unlikely to identify the target as they flashed by overhead with no time to search for it.

Monochrome or black and white prints in front of the interpreters, meant that a range of neutral tone made it easier to define form, colour not being there to distract the eye, and also there was time for examination. If we had been faced with colour prints in those days, it might have been almost as difficult for us as for the pilot to find the target.

The main guides by which camouflage could be detected were from tonal dissimilarity caused by differences in the surface of any material used, even though it might have been indistinguishable in reality because of good matching colours. Shadows and vague outlines would always show through netting, and anyway the structure or framework itself might produce strange shadows after a period of being subjected to weather and ageing.

Elaborate enemy camouflage was used in attempts to disguise factories, railway stations and oil-storage tanks as well as military targets such as gun pits, coastal barrages and ships. Sometimes the roofs of large buildings were laid out with dummy houses and trees to give the appearance of being part of the surrounding housing area. Water was the most important feature to try to camouflage, as it reflected in the dark and acted as a ‘signpost’ and a marker on target maps for bomber air crews. Larger items such as aircraft hangars and ships were difficult to camouflage, although disruptive painting on the hull of a naval vessel could break up the outline and make it hard for a PR pilot to recognise it.

Smokescreens were also used to protect important targets from day and night attacks and as soon as German radar stations detected approaching aircraft, they would be raised. These were a severe handicap to the Allied bomber and reconnaissance aircraft but by the latter part of the war, PIs had built up enough information on position, extent, density and pattern to make it possible for air crews to avoid or minimise the effects of the smoke pall. Decoys were also used by the enemy by simultaneously raising one smokescreen over a target about to be attacked and another over an open piece of countryside some miles away where bombs would fall harmlessly.

The Decoy Section, ‘Q’, worked very closely with camouflage and the Target Section that produced material for briefing bomber air crews. Helga O’Brien worked with the head of Section, Squadron Leader Geoffrey Dimbleby, searching for decoy fire sites, such as mock burning buildings, near to large industrial concerns. These, like the decoy smokescreens, were designed to lure the night bomber pilots away from the actual target. As well as sham factory sites and dummy oil-storage tanks, the Germans produced complete decoy airfields, with one in Norway even having a model aircraft on rails to make it appear more real.

The Camouflage Section. From left: Pauline Growse, John Bowden RAF, Flight Officer Mollie Thompson (foreground), head of section, and Kitty Sancto.

Camouflage and decoys were, of course, also used defensively by the Allies to disguise their own industries, airfields and ports by building dummy airfields and pretend buildings in Britain. This was monitored to ensure its effectiveness by two ATS mapmakers at RAF Nuneham Park.

Joan ‘Bo’ Bohey was living in Dorset waiting to take up a teacher training place at Goldsmiths College, London, when the war changed her plans and she joined the ATS instead. At the end of her basic training at Aldermaston, all the ‘artists’ were picked out to train as draughtswomen, but Joan, whose main subjects at school certificate were geography and survey, was not classed as an ‘artist’ and was sent to be a clerk:

I was filing papers one day when I came across the draughtswoman trade test requirements and thought, ‘I could do that without even going on the course’ and managed to get sent to an aptitude assessment where I got the highest marks ever! As a result I was sent on the three-month draughtswoman course at Ruabon in North Wales. I met Barbara Chandler there, who was a talented calligraphist, and she and I were posted to the Drawing Office at RAF Nuneham Park where we worked on map making. The photography came from RAF Benson or bomber stations and we dealt with all the English cover and the small amount of cover, usually taken by accident, of neutral countries such as Sweden, Switzerland, Greenland and Iceland.

Barbara and I were the only two ATS at Nuneham. Our work was so secret that every week we had to walk to the guard room by the gate to the station to collect our pay from an officer sent over from Oxford, but not allowed in! Standing in the guard room the two of us each gave our number, saluted, were handed our pay and signed for it.
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Joan Bohey ATS (left) with a colleague at RAF Nuneham Park.

The English cover Joan refers to was used to test the adequacy of Britain’s own protective camouflage and decoy system. She and Barbara marked out the camouflaged areas using the varying textures and tones seen under the stereoscope in the same way as the Camouflage Section at Medmenham.

The Industry Section, ‘D’, was one of the earliest Third-Phase sections to be set up, designed to gather information relating to the output of enemy war material. It worked closely with the Wild Section for measurements and production of plans used for monitoring and assessing industrial plants. These were used to identify new manufactories and assess industrial output, in the allocation of targets for the Allied bombing campaign, and for the Damage Assessment Section to calculate the necessary time for an industrial plant to become operational again. Scientists, engineers and those with a specialised industrial knowledge, such as the oil geologists, were recruited to the Section as German oil production was always of crucial importance. While men predominated in the Industry Section, because at that time the majority of scientists and geologists were male, several women, including Ruth Langhorne, a geographer from Oxford University, Winifred Bartingale, who became a doctor, Celia McDonald and Anne Whiteman, an Oxford historian, all worked in the Section.

The storage and, later on, the production of oil was always a major part of the work of the Section. Oil-storage tanks were easy for PIs to spot but soon the enemy made it harder by constructing huge underground reservoirs concealed from sight with trees planted on top; fortunately the ventilators were still visible on photographs. With the failure to secure the oil fields in the Caucasus for their use, the main German source of oil came from sixteen synthetic plants constructed across Europe, which manufactured oil from lignite. These were subjected to Allied precision-bombing raids, however, which had a decisive effect on the German capability to continue the war.