Vietnam II: A War Novel Episode 3 (V2) (2 page)

Staff Sergeant Gerald Zachary

Texas National Guard

Andersen AFB, Guam

The weather is horrible.  We evacuated twice last night for tornado sirens.

Everyone is taking it as a bad sign.

The typhoon grazed Guam and was headed for Vietnam.  The deadline was in less than forty eight hours and one look told us nothing was moving for a while.  The planes were gone.  They had evacuated everything that could fly.  What couldn’t get in the air were put into whatever hangars the Air Force could spare.

The Navy moved some of their big ships out to sea.  The rest were docked and taking a pounding.

The Marines were loving the weather. 

Shit, they were out in the jungle doing maneuvers. 

Us Army folk, we had to attend sensitivity training in the days while we waited for the storm to clear.  At least four hours a day we spent in some hangar or classroom.  The classroom was worse.  It was just as humid inside as out only the air conditioner were turned down as low as it could go.  We’d freeze to our bones.  All this while some Chaplain was pouring through slides of atrocities from the first Vietnam War.  They showed films of the Mai Lai massacre and other fucked up shit that went down.  We were told in no uncertain terms that this would not happen again.

It sucked to sit through, but it made sense.  Political will on this one was thin and the last thing they needed was an incident.

The rules of the Geneva Convention were supreme no matter what the PAVs did.  The Chaplain said that we could not control what they did.  We could only control what we did.

It’s funny because propaganda used to be a big part of building guys up before a fight.  It helped psychologically to make the enemy appear subhuman so troops wouldn't feel guilty about killing them.  That’s why all those World War II posters make the Krauts and Japs look like monsters.  Playing it touchy feely was really a break from the established dynamic.

We also got briefed on the Vietnamese themselves.  The words Gook, Chink and anything else derogatory or racist would not be tolerated.  This was the first time I heard the term political correctness.  It would be a phrase I would become familiar with throughout our time in Vietnam as well as the War on Terror.

The Chaplain said we could say whatever we wanted while we were in that room, but after we walked out it was going to be by the book. 

When the Chaplain was done then the Platoon Sergeant did his brief.  His slides were a horse of a different color.  Lawson showed us pictures of how the North Vietnamese treated their prisoners.  Tiger cages.  Torture devices.  Unimaginable shit.

That got us pumped up again. 

When we left the classroom we were ready to murder the hell out of them.  In a culturally sensitive way of course. 

Senior Airman Doug Bradley

C-130 Loadmaster

Kadena AFB, Okinawa

There was something evil looking on the ramp in Kadena.  It was a black arrowhead with strange markings.  It looked like something fighter Darth Vader would fly.

Fucking evil.  It seemed to absorb light.

Nobody had ever seen an F-117 stealth fighter up close before.  We had seen them on the news, but now they were parked on the airfield on the next apron.  Rumors about them had been circling about them for years.  Like the A-10 they were another weapon designed during the first Vietnam War that would have been handy except they were completed too late.

I had a model of one when I was in high school.  That was back when DARPA was hiding them in the Skunk Works and no one knew what they were going to look like so the thing I had looked like a flying saucer with wings.

The F-117s got treated like royalty.  All of our C-130’s had to survive the storm out on the ramp.  They all got bumped for the F-117 squadron.

I guess stealth means fragile and expensive.

According to the senior loadmaster, Pat Tyler, the F-117 had the same environmental system as the C-130.  I can’t say that was comforting.  I always found the -130 to be cold at altitude and hot during taxi.  Tyler also said that a third of the aircraft’s weight is taken up with life support for the pilot.  He said in another twenty years the fighters would still be here.  Only they would be flying themselves around the battlefield.

I’ll believe that when I see it.

Lieutenant Colonel Carol Madison

Air Force Intelligence Officer

Pacific Command Operations Center

The strategic airlift in Jungle Storm was the largest airlift since World War II. Airlifters moved combat forces half way around the world.  By New Years, airlift had moved over 482,000 passengers and 513,000 tons of cargo into the Vietnam AOR.  This would be the equivalent of moving a medium sized American city like St. Louis to include all of its population, vehicles, food and personal property to the other side of the world.

Air Force C-5s and C-141s were the workhorses of Jungle Storm as they moved 72% of the air cargo and one-third of the personnel while commercial transportation accounted for the rest.  C-5s were 90% and C-141s 80% committed to Jungle Storm. 

Operation Jungle Storm was also the first time in its 38 year history that the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) was activated.  On 18 August, the first stage of CRAF, 41 aircraft were put into service, 18 passenger and 23 cargo aircraft.  The second stage, planned for if and when fighting commenced, an additional 77 passenger and 40 additional cargo aircraft, would be activated.  CRAF commercial aircraft carried the majority of the troops to the Pacific AOR.

Lieutenant Lance Shepard

F/A-18 Hornet Naval Aviator

Yankee Station

In the distance I saw the battleship USS Missouri taking a pounding.  That poor old ship would later become the last battleships to actively participate in a foreign war. 

Of course we all were.

The buildup of US Navy forces utilized the normal forward-deployed posture of the fleet.  On 2 August the ships of Joint Task Force Indochina were cruising for the Gulf of Tonkin.  For the Midway battle group, V2 was an extraordinary inconvenience as it was the last month of a in the last month of a scheduled six-month Mediterranean deployment.  The Kennedy battle grouped faired better in the mix.  They were in the early months of a scheduled Indian Ocean deployment.  Both battle groups moved toward the crisis area and by the next day they were on station and ready to conduct air strikes with Kennedy at Yankee Station and Midway at Dixie Station. 

Thus, on C-day, 7 August--the day that the President committed U.S. forces to the recovery of American soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines lost in V1 the naval presence in the strike area consisted of two carrier battle groups with more than 100 fighter and attack aircraft plus a surface action group and command ship in the Gulf of Tonkin.  Later the two initial battlegroups were reinforced by four additional carrier battle groups. The Navy also deployed the command ship USS
Blue Ridge
(LCC 19), a 31 ship amphibious task force, plus various support ships, combatants and mine warfare ships in preparation for beach landings if things went that far.  In January we had no idea things would.

The Navy forces requested by PACOM were initially geared toward defense of Saudi Arabia so there was a big about face as they geared up for the South Pacific.  The elements of those forces came from both Atlantic and Pacific Fleets and from units stationed ashore in CONUS.  The Navy sailed and was in position quickly due to their forward deployed posture and the Navy’s ability to be self-sustaining.

More than 50 ships formed the Jungle Storm fleet, including USS Independence (CV 62), USS Midway (CV 41), USS Ranger (CV 61) and USS Missouri (BB 63) battle groups as well as approximately 20 more amphibious ships.  The ships and their crews were initially used to support the economic embargo set up against Vietnam.  If Vietnam failed to meet the January 15, 1991 deadline the ships would be in a position to commit forces to a first strike attack.

With the storm as bad as it was that was all becoming unlikely.  It was January 14th and we found ourselves riding out the worst winter typhoon this part of the world had seen in recorded history.  We hadn’t been able to launch planes in twelve hours.

I went up to see the CAG that evening and all you could see was black clouds and rain.  The setting sun was diffracted through the storm.  It looked like a big red eye watching us from the clouds.

It was spooky.

As rough as its been we’ve all been hoping the storm would quit so that we could get down to business.  Every hour that passed after the deadline that we didn’t do anything the more credibility we would lose.

Lieutenant Colonel Carol Madison

Air Force Intelligence Officer

Pacific Command Operations Center

Storm or not we were moving forward.  Every air asset was being positioned for combat.

As early as 7 August the year before air power began flowing into the Pacific.  Fixed wing Navy and USAF combat aircraft were on scene the first day, and their number grew at a steady rate, reaching a level of about 700 fighter and bomber aircraft by the end of the first month.  The aircraft carriers provided over 100 fighter and attack aircraft in addition to airborne early-warning, electronic warfare and surveillance aircraft. 

The carriers were only hours ahead of two Air Force F-l5C squadrons flight-ferried by air refueling tankers from the U.S. directly to Okinawa.  The Air Force fighters operated out of Kadena, Clark, Andersen and later Thailand once the rights to use bases there were secured. 

The carrier aircraft were stocked and ready for sustained combat operations on arrival into the AOR.  Every battle group carried a full combat load of ordinance and avgas for their aircraft, plus a complete aircraft maintenance facility with all of its associated spare parts, test equipment and maintenance personnel. 

Then there was trouble

The Air Force had to depend on fuel and maintenance assets already in theater.  For further operations ordinance, spare parts and support personnel would have to be airlifted from the states.  Everything else would be shipped in by sea.

Marine and Army attack helicopters for close air support and anti-armor missions were moved into theater.

More land-based fixed wing aircraft began arriving by 9 August.  Save for a maintenance issues all fixed-wing aircraft deployed to the Gulf within the first month were capable of forward deploying and operating within the first few days.  The actual deployment times depended on the availability of aerial refueling and the establishment of a support infrastructure for sustained combat operations.  This would include ground support equipment and personnel, maintenance equipment and personnel, spare parts, ordnance, ordnance storage and handling equipment, and general base operating support.

There were standing preparations for all the services to provide support for forward deployment.  Still it took time for the Army, Air Force and Marine Corps to move the equipment, supplies and personnel for combat operations.  For example airplanes could fly themselves to the conflict zone, but the large stocks of ordnance required for an air campaign must generally come by sea.  The first maritime supply ships with Navy and Marine ordinance arrived in the conflict zone on 14 August, only seven days after the deployment order.  The first Air Force munitions arrived three days later.  The embargo bought time for American forces to deploy in the numbers and with the necessary equipment to accomplish the mission.

The Jungle Storm planning called for a new aviation deployment concept.  The Navy and Marine Corps served their role of quick deployment, bringing combat ready, sustainable airpower to the conflict at short notice.  The majority of fixed wing aircraft would still be provided by the Air Force who arrived later.  Unlike earlier conflicts the Navy and Marine airpower would be folded into the overall joint airpower scheme.  The Air Force was limited by the flying distances from their nearest bases and the rented airfields in Thailand could only hold so many planes.  In the end the three aircraft carriers on scene accounted for 20% of the total combat airpower.

Much to the surprise of post-Cold War planners the buildup of ground forces for Jungle Storm demonstrated that sizable U.S. ground forces and major deployments would still be required.  In the Pacific Theater, unlike Europe, with the exception of Korea, the U.S. did not have significant ground forces or equipment on scene and ready to go.  With the escalating threat of hostilities in the fall of 1990 the U.S. was faced with a major expeditionary operation that was not anticipated and in which speed of deployment was potentially crucial to the lives of the POWs.

The U.S. military was generally well prepared for a major deployment.  Major improvements in expeditionary capabilities were instituted in the 1980s providing a solid expeditionary force structure on which to base JUNGLE STORM.   The specific mobility highlights of the program included the following:

The AFLOAT PREPOSITIONED SHIPS (APS) which were ships, carrying ordnance, supplies as well as fuel for the Army and Air Force, plus a naval field hospital ship. These ships are manned by civilian crews on a continuous basis under contract to the Military Sealift Command.  Most of the ships used for the V2 buildup came from the fleet at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean.

The MARITIME PREPOSITIONING SHIPS (MPS) which were ships carrying unit equipment and 30 days of supplies for three Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs).  These ships sailed from Guam the day after the embargo started. 

The improved C-5B GALAXY airlifter was the biggest plane in the DOD fleet.  The Air Force upgraded the C-5 airlifter and the newer version doubled the size of the C-5 fleet, giving the U.S. an increased capacity to move heavy cargo via air.

Finally the READY RESERVE FORCE (RRF) was used extensively.  Many troops sailed to V1 in an aging mothballed fleet of WWII era cargo ships.  At the end of the war, the Navy began looking for newer ships to replace the antiques.  Over the next ten years, the RRF grew to 96 ships including roll on/roll-off ships, barge carriers, bulk ships and small tankers.  These ships are maintained at various U.S. ports by the Maritime Administration without crews, in an inactive status.  The RRF program was built to activate the ships in 5, 10, or 20 days depending on readiness status.  On C-day an activation order was received and the RRF ships were towed to a shipyard for mechanical preparation to sail.  Then the merchant marines were contacted to produce crews.

The Joint Force concept dominated the strategic deployment of all assets.  Army Airborne Divisions were the first to arrive via Air Force airlift to provide an initial presence and to provide additional security at the air bases and airports that would be used for the operation.  The Army did not rely on their own previsions, but on provisions from the Marine Corps.  They were quickly reinforced by MEBs as well as Mechanized Divisions coming via sealift. 

The bulk of the soldiers were flown to the Pacific.  Their heavy gear was not.  With the exception of the Airborne Divisions, strategic sealift brought the Army’s weapons and equipment to them.

During WWII, Korea and V1, sealift was heavily dependent on the U.S. flag fleet and the National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF) of World War II-era Liberty and Victory ships.  This changed in the late 1970’s when the procurement of newer APS, FSS, and RRF ships became necessary due to the deteriorating conditions of the NDRF.  Sealift forces were sized for a global war growing out of a conflict against the Soviet Union with the Persian Gulf in mind.  The eight SL-7 fast sealift ships were specifically designed for rapid deployment of a heavy division.  This fit the initial Jungle Storm deployments well.  A heavy division was moved to the Guam in days even though no real thought or plans had been put into place to put troops on the ground in Vietnam.  The further deployment of other divisions would depend on activation of the U.S. flag ships in the Sealift Readiness Program and the charter of commercial vessels.

About three-fourths of Jungle Shield cargo and personnel deliveries were made by ships resulting from the post V1 investment in strategic sealift programs during the last ten years.   Without the new strategic sealift, there would have been no afloat prepositioning ships and no fast sealift.   The APS/MPS ships prepositioned in Diego Garcia, Japan and the Philippines delivered ordnance and supplies two or three weeks sooner than sealift from the U.S. could have delivered it.  Military fast sealift ships delivered cargo at twice the speed of most commercial shipping.
 
The deployment in Jungle Shield was the first real test of sealift and it performed to its full potential.  It would become the model for conflicts stretching into the 21st century.