High rates of joblessness and low pay for those who do work leave large numbers of inner-city men virtually incapable of supporting families financially, making them less desirable marriage partners.
14
It also tends to be emotionally difficult for such men to stay in relationships when they cannot fulfill the socially expected male role of family breadwinner. Studies show that when a single father has a job, he is much more likely than a jobless man ultimately to marry the child’s mother. Of course, the extraordinarily high numbers of young black men locked in the criminal justice system only adds further strains to familial relationships.
Poverty leads to despair. Chronic poverty impairs one’s motivation to aspire to something greater than what one sees in the environment. Poverty and despair mean that young men see few options for “proving themselves” other than fathering a child; young women see few options for finding a valued place in the community other than becoming a mother. For many young women (young girls, really), having a child may be the only way of finding someone to love and be loved by. Sex and childbirth among teenagers in the ghetto, then, is more about personal affirmation than about status, a ticket to a better life, or the future. Economic prospects for young, inner-city women are so bleak, regardless of marital status, that there is little reason to value marriage. Desperation can lead to a sense that there is little to lose or that everything is already lost. In fact, a girl from a poor, inner-city family sacrifices only a few of her already limited options by having a child out of wedlock.
Indeed, one aspect of the increase in single-parenthood is usually neglected. We are gradually discovering that the rate of spousal abuse under the stresses of ghetto life is much higher than previously thought. Even though it may be the road to extreme poverty, a woman who fears or expects abuse by her partner may feel herself far better off without him.
15
This combination of changing societal mores, low pay, joblessness, stress, desperation, despair, futurelessness, and oppression has severely weakened cultural norms in support of husband-wife families and against out-of-wedlock births. In most ghetto communities, there is no longer
any
stigma attached to having an “illegitimate” baby.
16
Many young ghetto women, in fact, have come to see a man in the house as a liability.
It is important, however, to dispel some of the widespread myths that cling to single parenthood and out-of-wedlock births. One myth identifies welfare payments as a cause of such births. If this were true, one would expect that higher benefits would lead to higher rates of out-of-wedlock births. But a comparison of states with very different levels of welfare payments shows no connection between the size of payments and African-American out-of-wedlock childbearing or teen pregnancy. (Interestingly, there may be a
small
cause-and-effect relationship among whites). Between 1975 and 1990, the real dollar values of welfare and food stamps fell significantly. According to the myth, therefore, there should have been a reduction in the proportion of out-of-wedlock teen childbearing during these years. Instead, the rate nearly doubled during that time period.
Contrary to popular belief, mothers on welfare have, on average, slightly fewer children than other mothers. It
is
likely, however, that the bureaucratic requirements of welfare (such as refusing payments to married couples) have caused some intact couples to stay out of formal marriages.
It is also widely believed that black single women are having more children now than they did forty years ago. Not so. The statistics here can be confusing. The “non-marital fertility rate” of unmarried black women has remained, with some fluctuations, relatively constant: for every 1,000 single women there have been about 100 births per year over the entire period. The rate of single parenthood measures something different, namely the share of all babies born to single women, which has increased sharply among black women from a little more than 20 percent in 1960 to about 69 percent in 1999.
17
The cause of the high rate of single parenthood in the black community, in other words, is not that individual single women are having more children but that so few women are marrying and that married women are having fewer children.
Single parenthood in the ghetto is a self-perpetuating condition. Since almost all the female role models in ghetto neighborhoods are now single mothers, young women see few other options. Adolescent children of single mothers are more likely to be school dropouts, to receive lower earnings in young adulthood, and to be recipients of public assistance. The single mother can exert less control over adolescents (especially young men), so peer values toward sex, pregnancy, and marriage more easily dominate. It is only a short step to single parenthood as the socially accepted norm.
UNEMPLOYED AND INVISIBLE
One common measure of how well the economy is doing is the unemployment rate. The last few years of the twentieth century saw a sustained unemployment rate of approximately 4 percent, well below what economists had thought
possible
in an economy such as ours. Even among African-American men, the official rates were at historic lows, about 8 percent. But if we break down the statistics by education, it looks a bit different. Among African-American men who had not completed high school, the official rate of unemployment in 2000 (after a decade of an economic boom) was over 14 percent.
18
Furthermore, the way the unemployment rate is calculated makes it a misleading indicator in poor areas. The only people counted as unemployed are those who are still actively looking for a job, that is, those people who register at unemployment offices. Uncounted are all those too disabled to work, those in prison, those working in the underground economy, and those who have given up even looking for a job.
It is also possible to measure the rates of people “not working,” including those in all of the above-uncounted categories. Looking at all American men of working age, 27 percent are not working. Among African-American men, over 35 percent are not working. And among African-American men who have not completed high school, 63 percent are not working. At the end of the longest period of prosperity ever measured, with unemployment at historic lows, five out of eight black men who dropped out of school are not working.
19
Economists speak of “labor force attachment.” Quite obviously, too many inner-city residents—especially men—are
not
attached to the labor force. The problem is a self-reinforcing one. Without a reliable work history, one appears to be a less desirable employee. Once an adult male has been out of work for a significant length of time, he may no longer consider himself part of the work force at all. He sees little chance of ever getting a decent job, and the hopelessness he feels only strengthens his unemployability. He no longer “sees” even the jobs that might be available.
DESCENT INTO HELL
Joblessness and consequent poverty, low levels of education and consequent hopelessness, and segregation and consequent alienation from middle-class norms all combine to create a fertile field for nurturing workers in the drug trade. Young men can earn more in hours than their peers in low-paying jobs do in weeks. Children are recruited as “runners” because of their relative immunity from prosecution, and mothers with no other source of income may look the other way when their sons come home with gifts of money, food, clothing, and other needed items.
With the illegal drug trade comes violence. In addition, during the 1980s and the first years of the 1990s, a staggering increase in the availability of guns, including sophisticated, high-powered, rapid-fire assault weapons, sent the murder rate in the inner cities skyrocketing. As guns became the accepted way of resolving drug disputes, more and more people uninvolved in drug trafficking also acquired and began using them, sometimes for protection, sometimes simply to resolve private disputes.
These weapons have terrorized the wider community. Author Geoffrey Canada, who grew up in an impoverished part of the Bronx and now works with and advocates for youth, reminds us that physical violence has long been a way of settling disputes within the ghetto.
20
Before the proliferation and easy availability of the guns, however, this violence was linked to physical strength, cleverness, courage, and the degree of gang organization, which provided a natural check on the level of violence. Violence was largely a way of establishing a pecking order within a gang or between gangs. Once the new individual in the neighborhood had fought to secure his place, or one gang had demonstrated a convincing superiority over another, a certain tenuous stability would be established that kept the violence under some degree of control. With assault weapons, however, it is not only easier to maim and kill, but it also takes little courage and no strength or skill. Anybody can kill anybody anytime, and there are no natural limits. According to 1998 data, a fifteen-year-old African-American male from Washington, D.C., faced a one-in-twelve chance of being murdered before reaching his forty-fifth birthday.
Although still higher than they were a generation ago, the levels of violence and crime in the cities have fallen dramatically since the mid-1990s. Everyone wants to take credit, of course, and it is not entirely clear what the cause or causes have been. Local police departments, most notably in New York, point to their “zero tolerance” policies, instituted in the early 1990s after some studies indicated that even minor deterioration within a community led to increased crime and violence (the “broken window effect”). Under zero tolerance, people committing minor crimes like loitering or defacing property with graffiti are arrested and prosecuted. Critics, however, have noted that crime and violence rates seem to have fallen just as strikingly and just as fast in cities without such policies. They further note that these policies have led to selective enforcement of laws, with young people of color bearing the brunt of police intervention.
Advocates of the unprecedented expansion of the prison system over the last twenty years have also taken credit, pointing to longer sentences as the major reason for the decrease in crime. And it is likely that just removing certain people from the streets—what criminologists call the “incapacitation effect”—has indeed served to decrease “high-rate offenses” like burglary and robbery, where incapacitation of offenders might make a difference. But closer study of the statistics shows little or no relationship between the severity of a state’s laws and decreases in murder, rape, or assault in that state and only a modest effect on the rates of robbery.
21
There is general agreement that two factors have had at least some role in reducing crime and violence. One is the fading of the ghetto crack epidemic. The popularity of any particular drug has a natural cycle lasting fifteen to twenty years. When cocaine recycled back into popularity in the early 1980s, it entered the ghetto in the form of crack because it was cheap and easy to sell in small doses. But cocaine is a stimulant, and smoking crack leads to especially intense though brief (thirty minutes) stimulation. The intensity of the stimulation leads directly to higher levels of violence, while the brevity of the high puts the addict almost immediately back out in the street needing more. That epidemic has now receded, crack having been replaced again by the depressant heroin, lowering the levels of drug violence.
Most important in reducing crime and violence, however, has been the growth in the economy and the falling rates of unemployment. If one believes that a major cause of inner-city violence is desperation, then an expanding economy—as limited as its effect on the inner city may be—reduces that desperation.
Substance abuse, including a general increase in the use of illicit drugs, is a major problem everywhere in our society, but its damage is especially obvious in the inner city. There, hopelessness and despair are endemic, leading to an intense desire to escape and a sense that one has little to lose. Intoxication provides a seemingly easy, affordable route “out,” and drugs are ubiquitous and easily available. Even young children know where drugs are sold. To complete a vicious cycle, as drug use in the ghetto becomes more common, social prohibitions relax. Increasingly, children have addicted people for role models.
Social disorganization and a consequent loss of parental control also help to create a fertile environment for the development of addiction. With less family-imposed structure, young people become even more susceptible to the peer pressure that is everywhere powerful during adolescence. Middle-class adolescents “experiment” with drugs and alcohol, too, and lots of them become addicted. It’s more than coincidental, of course, that our language usage has middle-class kids “experimenting” with drugs and using them “recreationally.” We use no such mitigating language when speaking about drug use among black ghetto adolescents and young adults.
Finally, of course, affluent people who do become addicted have access to addiction treatment programs not available to those from the ghetto. Most cities do offer some limited kind of public drug treatment program, but these tend to be outpatient programs that send the addict back every night to the very environment that produced the problem in the first place. The few inpatient programs in place are generally too short-term to give sobriety enough time to take hold before the recovering person returns home.