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Authors: Naomi Roht-Arriaza
Transitional Justice in the Twenty-First Century: Beyond Truth versus Justice (22 page)
The use of penal law for systemic crimes obviously has many advantages, but only if punishment is really delivered. Putting aside considerations as to the real capacity of the Mexican justice system to
effectively punish these types of crimes, the use of penal law as an exclusive strategy might hinder the development of an overall understanding of the patterns of repression and those responsible for it, thus making it difficult for Mexican society to undergo a real process of transitional justice.
The Mexican people will not obtain an official historical account of these events at least for a long time coming. This would have been the result of a
truth commission, but that mechanism was strongly opposed by the
PRI – which still controls the Congress and the majority of state governments – as well as by the governing party. Instead, the government attempted to merge the functions of punishment with those of truth‐telling in the same mechanism. The fact that the “Mexican solution” has not really addressed comprehensive truth‐seeking initiatives – involving the stories of the victims and ability to reveal the identity of the perpetrators of the past crimes and their position in the chain of command – does not bode well for the other objectives of reparation, reconciliation and guarantees of non‐repetition, allegedly part of the Fox government's strategy for transitional justice.
Serious judicial reform is a necessity if Mexico is to become a modern, law‐abiding country with an improved human rights record. This means many things aside from reforming the institutions that deal with public security and the administration of justice. It also requires the incorporation of international human rights law into domestic law, and the teaching and training of lawyers, judges and law enforcement officials how to use it. It also means upgrading the official human rights commissions and helping civil society organizations build and enhance their capacities. None of this can be achieved if the complex web of complicities and cover‐ups of past state crimes, especially the
systematic use of torture and enforced disappearance of political opponents, is not revealed and the perpetrators of these crimes are not brought to justice.
The situation of the rule of law in Mexico is still very precarious. The current administration's meek attempts at reforms in the justice system have so far failed. The legacy of the authoritarian past is very present and the current political context – a weak presidency and an independent legislature – is highly favorable to special, powerful and privileged interests which do not need to comply with legal restrictions. This does not bode well for the possible outcome of the “Mexican solution” to transitional justice. In fact, for the moment, it looks like the Mexican people might be left, once again, with very little justice,
scant truth and no reconciliation.
[1] *The authors wish to express their gratitude to Sofia Ramos and Maria José Guembe for their support in the legal interpretation of many aspects of this paper.
[2]
See Julio Scherer and Carlos Monisváis,
Los patriotas. De Tlatelolco a la Guerra sucia
(México: Nuevo Siglo Aguilar, 2004), p. 199; Sergio Aguayo,
1968, Los archivos de la violencia
(México D.F: Grijalbo, Reforma, 1998), p. 331.
[3]
Coletta Youngers and Eileen Rosin,
Drugs and Democracy in Latin America, The Impact of US Policy
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004), p. 274.
[4]
For example, in the massacres of Aguas Blancas and Acteal there is evidence that these operations were planned at the highest level of the respective state governments of Guerrero and Chiapas. There is also evidence that the federal authorities were at least aware of these preparations.
[5]
Alicia de los Rios, “Testimonio” in Comisión de Derechos Humanos del Distrito Federal, et al.,
Memoria, Seminario internacional. Tortura, reparación y prevención. Comisiones de la verdad, Foro Público. Perspectivas y Alcances. El caso de México
,
Ciudad de México, 20 de julio de 2002
(México, 2003), pp. 520, 434.
[6]
The first two human rights organizations to emerge in this period were the Centro de Derechos Humanos Fray Francisco de Vitoria O.P. (1984) and the Academia Mexicana de Derechos Humanos (1984).
[7]
This information was obtained by the author when she was acting as Deputy Minister for Human Rights and Democracy in the Ministry for Foreign Relations, in July 2003.
[8]
Alan Zamembo, “Mexico's History Test”,
Newsweek International
, July 2, 2002, in Louis Bickford, “Transitional Justice in Mexico”, Dec. 2005
Journal of Human Rights
4, pp. 537–57.
[9]
Case 5/2000, Juzgado Sexto de Distritos de Procesos Penales en el Distrito Federal, January 11, 2001.
[10]
Writ of “Amparo” under revision 140/2002, June 10, 2003. Extradition for torture was denied on statute of limitations grounds.
[11]
Inter‐American Commission on Human Rights,
www.cidh.oas.org/basicos.
The Convention already had a reservation that permitted military jurisdiction over any crime committed by a member of the Armed Forces.
[12]
Sergio Aguayo, “El derecho a la información: hacia una comisión de la verdad”, CDHDF, note 4 above, p. 460.
[13]
Mexico, “Disappearances: an ongoing crime”, Amnesty International, AI index: AMR 41/020/2002, 2002.
http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/engAMR410202002?OpenDocument&of=COUNTRIES%5CMEXICO
[14]
Comisión Nacional de Derechos Humanos,
Recomendación 26/2001, Informe especial sobre las quejas en materia de desapariciones forzadas ocurridas en la década de los 70 y principio de los 80
.
[15]
Ibid
.
[16]
Ley de la Comisión Nacional de los Derechos Humanos publicada en el Diario Oficial de la Federación el 29 de junio 1992 (Ultima reforma aplicada 26/11/2001).
[17]
Juan Manuel Venegas and Victor Ballinas, “Castigo a funcionarios de alto nivel por su responsabilidad en la
guerra sucia
, piden ONGs”,
La Jornada
, November 28, 2001.
[18]
The Committee for the Defense of Prisoners, the Persecuted, the Disappeared and Political Exiles founded in 1978 is also called Comité Eureka.
[19]
Georgina Saldierna, “Cuestiona Ibarra objetivos de la fiscalía especial”,
La Jornada
, November 28, 2001.
[20]
“Desconfían ONGs de Macedo y la fiscalía”,
El Universal
, November 28, 2001.
[21]
Jesús Aranda, Ciro Pérez and Victor Ballinas, “Hablar de
desaparición
impedirá que prescriban hechos de la
guerra sucia
”,
La Jornada
, November 28, 2001.
[22]
Jesús Aranda, “Rechazan militares que instalaciones del Ejército se hayan usado en la
guerra sucia
”,
La Jornada
, November 28, 2001.
[23]
Poder Ejecutivo de la República,
Acuerdo por el que se disponen diversas medidas para la procuración de justicia por delitos cometidos contra personas vinculadas con movimientos sociales y políticos del pasado
, November 27, 2001; See Kate Doyle, “Forgetting is not Justice, Mexico Bares its Secret Past”, Reportage,
World Policy Journal
, Summer 2003, pp. 61–72.
[24]
Poder Ejecutivo de la República, Articles 1 to 8.
[25]
Many members of the other side of the conflict have already been killed or punished with long prison sentences, torture and other inhumane practices.
[26]
Paul Seils, “A Promise Unfulfilled? The Special Prosecutor's Office in Mexico”, International Center for Transnational Justice (2004), p. 11.
[27]
Sergio Aguayo offers an interesting account of this process in Ricardo Ravelo, “Ahora falta la verdad”,
Proceso
, July 25, 2004.
[28]
Kate Doyle, “Forgetting is not Justice”, p. 69.
[29]
The Ethiopian Transitional Government established a similar kind of office in September 1992.
[30]
Paul Seils,
A Promise Unfulfilled?
p. 37.
[31]
David Vicenteño, “Reclaman al Presidente Fox su promesa de castigar los crímenes del pasado”,
Reforma
, June 10, 2004.
[32]
Daniel Wilkinson, “Justice in Jeopardy: Why Mexico's First Real Effort to Address Past Abuses Risks Becoming Its Latest Failure”,
Human Rights Watch
(2003) Vol. 15, No. 4 (B).
[33]
La Fiscalía Futil, entrevista al Fiscal Especial
, October 2003.
[34]
FEMOSPP
. “Informe”, (January 2002 – March 2004), 509–21.
[35]
Denise Dresser, “Cuentas por saldar”,
Nexos
, August 20, 2004.
[36]
Wilkinson, “Justice in Jeopardy”.
[37]
Ibid
., p. 25.
[38]
Interviews with the workers of the SPO on September 24, 2004.
[39]
Kevin Sullivan, “New Genocide Charges Planned in Mexico”,
Washington Post
, September 2, 2004.
[40]
See, for example, David Viceteño Ortiz, “Da Mecedo total libertad a Fiscalía”,
Reforma
, June 12, 2004.
[41]
Dato Param Coomaraswamy, presented in accordance with resolution 2001/39 of the UN Human Rights Commission, Economic and Social Council, E/CN.4/2002 Add.1, January 24, 2002, p. 11. The special rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers visited Mexico in 2001.
[42]
Resolución del asunto 1/2003 de la sala SCJN.
[43]
Silvia Otero, “Ordenan más capturas por ‘guerra sucia’,
El Universal
, February 27, 2004.
[44]
SCJN June 29, 2004, 49/2004.
[45]
Reuters, “Mexico High Court Boosts ‘Dirty War’ Trial Arsenal”, June 30, 2004.
[46]
Interview with Ignacio Carrillo Prieto, August 11, 2004.
[47]
Ginger Thompson, “Mexico's leader to Pursue Genocide case”,
New York Times
, September 1, 2004.
[48]
Ginger Thomson and Tim Weiner, “When Promises to Bring Justice in Mexico Come to Naught”,
New York Times
, July 26, 2004.
[49]
Fuerza Informativa Azteca, “Comisión de la Verdad ya estaba prevista: FEMOSPP”, September 2, 2004,
http://www.todito.com/paginas/noticias/160103.html.
[50]
Jorge Alejandro Medellín, “Consignarán más involucrados en guerra sucia”,
El Universal
, April 26, 2004.
[51]
Artículo 13,
Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos
, 5
a
ed., Texto Vigente, México, Comisión Nacional de los Derechos Humanos, 2002.
[52]
Jesús Aranda, “Exculpan de vuelos de la muerte a Acosta Chaparro”,
La Jornada
, July 9, 2004.