Authors: Tom Vanderbilt
The drivers are locked into what is called a Nash equilibrium, a strategic concept from the annals of Cold War thinking. Popularized by the Nobel mathematician John Nash, it describes a state in which no one player of an experimental game can make himself better off by his own action alone. If you cannot improve your situation, why move to a different road? The irony is that when everyone does what is best for him- or herself, they’re not doing what is best for everyone. On the other hand, if a traffic cop stood at the junction of the two roads and directed half the drivers to Sure Thing Street and half to Take a Chance Highway, the drivers on Sure Thing Street would get home no sooner, but the highway drivers would get home twice as fast. Overall, the total travel time would
drop.
If all this puzzles you, Braess’s finding really makes the head spin. To simplify greatly, imagine again the two hypothetical roads I mentioned, but this time imagine that halfway between the two cities, Take a Chance Highway (where the trip takes less than an hour by however many fewer drivers choose it) becomes like Sure Thing Street (always an hour), and vice versa. Since each two-part route is likely to take the same amount of time, drivers split between the two routes, putting us in one-hour equilibrium.
But now imagine that a bridge is built connecting the two roads, right at the halfway point where Take a Chance becomes Sure Thing, and vice versa. Now drivers who began on Take a Chance Highway and found that it was not so good take the bridge to the
other
Take a Chance Highway segment. Meanwhile, drivers who began on Sure Thing Street are not about to cross the bridge and move to the other Sure Thing Street when, instead, they could stick around as their road becomes Take a Chance Highway (who knows, they might get lucky).
The problem is that if everyone tries to do what they think is the best thing for themselves, the actual travel time for all drivers goes up! The new link, designed to reduce congestion, has made things worse. The reason lies in what computer scientist Tim Roughgarden has called “selfish routing.” The way each person is moving through the network seems best to them (“user optimal”), but everyone’s total behavior may be the least efficient for the traffic network (“system optimal”).
This really brings us to the heart of traffic congestion. We are “selfish commuters” driving in a noncooperative network. When people drive to work in the morning, they do not pause to consider which route they could take to work, or at which time to take that route, so that their decision would be best for everyone else. They get on the same roads and wish that not so many others had also chosen to do the same thing.
As drivers, we are constantly creating what economists call, in the thorny language of economics, “uninternalized externalities.” This means that you are not feeling the pain you are causing others. Two legal scholars at the University for California at Berkeley have estimated, for example, that every time a new driver hits the road in California, the total insurance cost for everyone else goes up by more than $2,000. We do not pay for the various unsavory emissions our cars create—to take just one case, the unpaid cost of Los Angeles’ legendary haze is about 2.3 cents per mile. Nor do we pay for the noise we create, estimated by researchers at the University of California, Davis, to be between $5 billion and $10 billion per year. How can you estimate the cost of something like noise? Real estate provides a clue. Studies have shown that house prices decline measurably as traffic rates and speeds increase on the adjoining street, while, on the other hand, when traffic-calming projects are installed on streets, house prices often rise. One might argue that the lower price of a house on a high-traffic street already takes into account these costs, but what happens when a buyer purchases a house at a certain price and then traffic increases on that street, lowering its value? Living near a major road also exposes people to more hydrocarbons and particulates of car exhaust, and any number of studies have reported links between proximity to traffic and conditions like asthma and coronary problems.
There are other kinds of costs, more difficult to measure, that you as a driver put on the people you drive by. When the urban planner Donald Appleyard surveyed San Francisco in the 1970s, he found that on streets with more road traffic, people had fewer friends and spent less time outside. In the same way that traffic has been blamed for habitat fragmentation of the wild, cutting off species from foraging areas or reducing the tendency of birds to breed, high traffic helps starve social interaction on human streets (maybe
this
is how congestion hurts romance). Somewhat paradoxically, Appleyard found that people who lived on the streets with less traffic (who made more money and were more likely to own their homes) actually
created more traffic themselves,
while the people who lived on the high-traffic streets were less able to afford cars. The rich, in effect, were taxing the poor.
The most basic externality, however, is congestion itself. Your presence in the traffic stream helps add time to others’ commutes, just as others’ presences add time to yours. But no one driver is gaining more than those others are collectively losing. In economics, a “public good” is something that a person can consume without reducing someone else’s ability to consume that same thing or exclude them from doing so—sunlight, for example. An empty road late at night might be thought of as a public good, but a road with any kind of congestion on it quickly becomes “subtractable”—the more people who use it, the worse it performs.
This is the famous “tragedy of the commons,” as described by Garret Hardin, in which a pasture open to all is quickly filled up by herders who want to graze as many cattle as possible. Every time a herder adds a cow, he gains. The pasture eventually begins to suffer from overgrazing, but a herder
still
adds animals because he alone benefits from his gain, even if the returns are diminishing (and they ultimately vanish), while everyone shares the costs of that new animal. (Overfishing is another such oft-invoked “tragedy.”)
The “tragedy of the highway” is seen as every car joins the peak-hour freeway. As each car gets on, things get worse for everyone, but as there is still a gain for each driver (getting to work, getting home) that exceeds the gain from not driving, and as the loss is shared by all, people keep joining the freeway.
98%
OF U.S. COMMUTERS FAVOR
PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION FOR OTHERS
—headline in the
Onion
So how can traffic congestion, this age-old dilemma, be solved? “Build more roads!” is a typical answer. “But more roads bring more traffic!” is the typical response. “Then build even more roads!” “But that will bring even more traffic!” Looking beyond that hall of mirrors, it’s worth pointing out a few things. The most obvious problem with building more roads to alleviate congestion is that we, in the United States at least, cannot afford them. Talk to just about any traffic engineer and they will repeat what the numbers already tell us: We do not have enough money to maintain the
current
roads, much less build new ones. What about all those fuel taxes? Drivers in the United States pay one-half the fuel taxes of drivers in Canada, one-fourth that of the Japanese, and
one-tenth
of the English. Adjusted for inflation, the fuel tax brings in less revenue than it did in the 1960s.
But even if we could afford to build more roads, that might not be the best way to spend the money. For one, as the transportation scholar Martin Wachs has pointed out, “Well over 90 percent of our roads are uncongested for well over 90 percent of the time.” Many congested roads are congested for only a few hours a day, which brings up the Wal-Mart parking lot problem of the previous section. Do you build a parking lot that will be below capacity for 364 days of the year so that it can accommodate every shopper on Christmas Eve? On the one hand, it might be a socially negative thing that some people have to get on the roads at five a.m. in Los Angeles to make it to work on time, or that both directions of the highway are crowded at many hours of the day. On the other hand, this is a good thing. It means the road network is being used efficiently. Empty roads may be fun to drive on, but they’re also wasteful.
Adding more lanes to a road is not always the traffic-busting silver bullet you might think it is. Imagine that you’re at the extremely crowded intersection of two three-lane roads. Why can’t they make it bigger? you ask. Look at all those people who want to turn left—why can’t they add another left-turn lane? The problem, as two Canadian researchers have pointed out, is that adding more lanes is a process of diminishing returns.
The bigger intersections grow, the less efficient they become. Adding a second left-turn lane, for instance, means that, for safety reasons, “permissive” (or on the green) left turns can no longer be allowed. Only “protected” left turns (on the green arrow) will be allowed. As fewer cars can now turn left on the green signal (through gaps in oncoming traffic), the arrow phase will have to be longer. This means most other movements have to be halted. More lanes also mean more “friction,” as engineers call it; a car wanting to turn left, for example, will find it harder going—and have a greater impact on the total traffic flow—when it has to cross three lanes instead of one. Given that bigger intersections take longer to cross, the clearance phase—that dead zone engineers introduce to make sure everyone has gotten through, including pedestrians—needs to become longer as well, further increasing delay. The result is that where an intersection with a single-lane approach would handle an average of 625 vehicles per hour, the next lane allows only 483 vehicles per hour, the third 463, and the fourth just 385. The more you spend on new lanes, the smaller the return—and the faster it becomes recongested.
Another problem is that most traffic jams are what engineers call “nonrecurring congestion.” This means a highway that normally functions fine is congested, perhaps because of construction or weather but, most often, because of crashes. Rather than build more lanes, the best congestion solution here is for people to get in fewer crashes—which, as described in Chapter 3, would happen if drivers simply paid more attention to their driving.
The actual crash, which may or may not close a lane, is only part of the problem, of course. The highway’s capacity drops an estimated 12.7 percent because of the line that forms—often on
both
sides of the highway—to take a look. This is where human psychology fails us. Not only do we have a morbid curiosity to rubberneck, but we feel we should not miss out on what others have had a chance to see. The economist Thomas Schelling points out that when each driver slows to look at an accident scene for ten seconds, it does not seem egregious because they have already waited ten minutes. But that ten minutes arose from everyone else’s ten seconds. Because no individual suffers from the losses he inflicts on others, everyone is slowed. “It is a bad bargain,” concludes Schelling. The ubiquity of cell phone cameras is making things worse, as “digi-neckers” slow things even more to take photos of incidents. To top it off, drivers looking at crashes quite often get into crashes themselves. A study by researchers at Virginia Commonwealth University found that the second-leading cause of distraction-related crashes (behind fatigue) was “looking at crashes, other roadside incidents, traffic, or other vehicles.”
What this means is that, at times, we have a perfect self-generating traffic jam: People slowing to look at crashes get into crashes, which causes other people to get into crashes, and so on. If traffic were a cooperative network and we could agree not to slow and look, Schelling notes, everyone could save time. Since that will never happen, traffic engineers have instead countered with antirubbernecking screens, which can be unfurled at crash scenes to block prying eyes. In theory these should help matters, but they have severe limitations. Just getting a screen to a crash site, past the traffic that has already developed, is hard enough. Then picture emergency responders, who probably have more pressing matters to attend to, trying to erect—in strong winds or snow—a giant wall of fabric, as if imitating the artist Christo. Plus, ironically, there is the interest in the screen itself. Janet Kennedy, a researcher at England’s Transport Research Laboratory, told me the screens had been tried on construction projects on the M25 motorway. “To start with it didn’t have much effect because people just looked at the screen anyway,” she said. “But already we’re finding people have stopped looking at the screen. They’re used to it.” That’s fine for construction sites, which the same people drive past each day. Unfortunately, this suggests that for crashes, the events that generate the most rubbernecking, the screens are of little help—the crash would be cleared long before drivers became accustomed to seeing the same screen.
But what about the congestion that’s “recurring,” that happens on the same roads every day? If money was available, we could build more lanes. Only this still does not get us past the pasture problem: Create a bigger pasture, and people will bring even more cows. Traffic congestion is a kind of two-way trap. Because driving is a bargain (drivers are not picking up the full tab for the consequences of their driving), it attracts many people to roads that are not fully funded; this not only makes them crowded, it makes it hard to find revenue to build new ones.
When Costco discounts televisions during its Christmas shopping promotions, pricing them so low that stores do not make a profit, what happens? There are huge lines at the door at five a.m. When cities provide roads that are priced so low that they lose money on them, what happens? There are huge lines on the highway at five a.m. Pricing changes behavior. This is hardly a revelation, but it’s always striking to see it in action. At a Pizza Hut in Beijing, I watched with some wonder as patrons at the salad bar carefully arranged towering piles of salad on their plates, then carefully walked away with mounds of teetering greens. Why did they do this? There was a flat fee for one visit, so patrons made sure they got their money’s worth. They traveled as efficiently as they could. What if the fee was good for unlimited visits to the salad bar? People would have made multiple trips, carrying smaller portions of salad. The traffic flow back and forth to the bar would have gone up.