One thing that the Persian monarch will have been swiftly apprised of, now that the Phoenicians were willing servants of his imperial aspirations, was the long-term enmity between Phoenicians and Greeks. Western Hellenism in Sicily and southern Italy was under great pressure from the great Phoenician foundation of Carthage, as well as from the Etruscans in Italy. Furthermore, true to their egocentric and individualistic nature, the Greeks in their new colonies were as divided against one another as they were in their own homeland. Syracuse, one of their greatest foundations in Sicily, was bedevilled by party struggles while most of the other cities were in the grip of tyrannies; and successful tyrants, in order to maintain their hold upon their own city states, almost invariably made war upon one of their Greek neighbours. In 511-510 B.C. the city of Croton in southern Italy attacked its rich rival, Sybaris (which has become synonymous with luxurious living), and completely destroyed it - even going to the vindictive length of diverting the River Crathis over its site so that even its memory should perish from the earth. From the reports of spies and from information readily given by expatriate Greeks in his court Darius observed and digested all the information that he needed. Cyrus, Darius and, in his turn, Xerxes must never be confused with the simple Asiatic and Northern warlords of later centuries, for whom to conquer, loot and enslave was the prime object. The Persian monarchs, served by an efficient army and bureaucracy, were -whatever the Greeks may have called them - in no sense barbarians.
The major event that triggered off the great Greco-Persian wars was a revolt against Persian rule that had its origins in Ionia. One of the principal causes was undoubtedly the economic suffering that formerly rich and tranquil Ionia suffered under Persian hegemony and taxation. Their trade in the Black Sea area had been blocked ever since Darius had gained control of the Dardanelles, and their colonies in Sicily and Italy were either at loggerheads one with another or (as in the case of Sybaris) were being destroyed by fellow Greeks. But the deciding factor was almost certainly the loss of liberty that the Ionians felt under the interference of Persian satraps. Even more distressing than this was the Persian system of putting local government into the hands of Greek ‘tyrants’. Such men, hated by their fellow Greeks and dependent entirely upon maintaining sycophantic relations with Persia, were liable to be harsher in their dealings with the Ionians than the Persian satrap.
The rebellion flared up in 500 B.C. and a mission was sent to the Greek motherland asking for help. It is significant that only Athens and Eretria on the island of Euboea promised to send naval contingents. The Spartans held aloof because they were on the verge of war with their neighbour Argos, and they were furthermore always averse to foreign entanglements. The revolt opened with an attack on the great Lydian capital of Sardis which was burned to the ground, although the satrap and the Persian garrison managed to hold out in the acropolis. This early success inspired the other Greeks throughout Ionia, from the Bosporus southwards, to rise up against the Persian yoke, even the island of Cyprus joining in the rebellion. The Great King looked north and saw not only Ionia in flames but his new colony in Thrace cut off and his communications with the Black Sea and its settlements in danger.
The efficiency and the strength of the Persian Empire was quick to show itself. Starting from the south, Cyprus was first of all recaptured, its last stronghold capitulating in 496. A year later the fleet of the Ionian confederation was decisively defeated in a battle off the coast near Miletus. This city itself, which had been the mainspring of the revolt, was besieged and destroyed in 494, and the inhabitants - to prevent any further trouble in the area - were deported to the interior of the Persian Empire. In the mopping-up operations that followed, off-shore islands such as Chios and Lesbos were brought under Persian rule. The small Athenian force which had been sent to Ionia had been withdrawn as early as 498, but their action in giving encouragement, if little help, to the Ionians was not forgotten in the court of the king. Athens and Eretria were high on the list of mainland Greek states to be punished in due course.
Mardonius, a nephew and son-in-law of Darius, was the commander selected to carry out Darius’ designs after the revolt itself had been quenched. He captured the important northern island of Thasos, secured Thrace and accepted the submission of Macedonia. It was clear that these actions were all prior to an invasion of Europe proper. Unfortunately for Mardonius his fleet ran into a violent gale on its way round Mount Athos and a great many ships and their crews were lost on that rocky and inhospitable coast. (This disaster was something that the Persians did not forget and which was why Xerxes took such great care to circumvent it.)
‘The expedition returned to Asia after a disastrous campaign/ wrote Herodotus, but he was exaggerating. The northern Aegean coast was completely occupied and the shipbuilding capacity of the Persian Empire was such that in every port not only were the losses made good but also a whole new fleet was being constructed. This was clearly intended for an invasion force, since it included a great many transports designed for carrying horses. Darius was not to be deterred by one attempt against mainland Greece, especially since it had been aborted not by the Greeks but by weather and natural hazards. As evidence of his intentions he sent heralds to demand formal submission from the islands and city-states. All the islands, menaced by the overriding seapower of Persia, submitted, as did most of the mainland states - Athens and Sparta being notable in refusing. Sparta, as has been seen, treated the envoys with contempt and threw them down a well ‘to get their earth and water from there’.
When the Persian invasion force sailed for Greece in 490 Mardonius was still incapacitated from a wound received in the previous expedition and his place was taken by Datis, a Mede, who is credited with having evolved a new plan for the attack on Greece. This was to ignore the north and strike directly across the Aegean, securing those outriders of the mainland, the Cyclades islands, and then descending upon Athens and Eretria to punish them for their behaviour during the Ionian revolt. Proceeding from Samos the fleet passed barren Ikaros and fell upon Naxos, where the inhabitants fled before them and took to the hills. Since Naxos was one of the largest islands and renowned for its pride and courage, the destruction of its capital and its easy conquest had an immediate effect upon the other Cyclades. All, within a short time, surrendered to detachments of the Persian fleet. Only sacred Delos, home of Apollo and Artemis, was treated with the greatest respect by Datis. He would not even allow his ships to anchor there and sent word to the Delians, who had taken refuge in nearby Tenos, to return and assist him to pay homage at the great altar of Apollo. The priests of Delos came back to witness the frankincense brought by the Persian general flare and fume before the giant statue of the god Apollo. All this was a very clever piece of politics, for the priests of Apollo and the oracle at Delphi were then, and later, to prove themselves of considerable help to the followers of Zoroaster. It was not difficult to equate the sun-god Ahuramazda with Apollo. Propaganda is not a twentieth-century invention.
Euboea, the long fish-like island that guards the coast of Attica, was the next target, and within six days its city of Eretria was reduced, the inhabitants like those of Miletus being deported into the heart of Persia. The disastrous news from Eretria was carried from Athens to Sparta by a professional runner, Pheidippides, who covered some 140 miles of rough road, goat-track and scree-covered slopes, reaching the unwalled city in the Eurotas plain on the second evening. Unfortunately the Spartans could not march at once. It was the feast of the Carneian Apollo, the most sacred part of a sacred month when no Spartan might go to war. ‘When the moon was full’, they said (that was in about one week’s time), ‘their army would march to the assistance of the Athenians.’ Some moderns have suggested that this was no more than a cynical ruse to keep the Spartan army for the defence of their homeland. This is to ignore the strict rules and regulations imposed by ancient religious cults. It could, in any case, in no way have availed the Spartans to lose their only powerful ally, and the only one possessing a fleet that could be any defence against the Persians.
Possibly to the surprise of the Athenians, who may have thought that the Persians would land in Phaleron Bay to the south of the city, Datis had decided to disembark his forces at Marathon. It was a sensible choice, for the plain afforded plenty of space for the deployment of his troops, and the fact that it was over twenty-five miles from the city would, in theory, give them time to get the men in order, fed, and ready for action - all very necessary measures after a sea-voyage in the rough and cramped conditions of those days. The most forceful personality among the ten Attic strategoi (generals) was Miltiades, and it was he who, in a debate of the Athenian Popular Assembly, prevailed upon the others to march out at once and engage the enemy on Marathon plain. It was a bold decision and contrary to the thinking of many, who would have preferred to wait for the enemy to advance upon the city itself. Athens was already walled at the time, but the decision of Miltiades and the agreement of the Assembly to engage the Persians at
Marathon suggests that it was not sufficiently strong to be able to withstand a well-conducted siege - and they knew what had happened to the cities in Ionia.
The story of the classic battle that followed has been often told, has inspired poets, and has passed enduring into the history of the western world. Among those who took part in the battle was Aeschylus, one of the greatest poets and dramatists of all time, whose brother was killed at Marathon. The battle itself has no part here, except in so far as the defeat of the Persians led to the later meticulously planned expedition of Xerxes - designed to wipe out for ever the memory of that fateful day in mid-August 490. Better arms and better training gave the 10,000 Athenians and their allies, the 600 or so Plataeans, a victory over a much larger army - but one which, it must be remembered, had been under the ugly conditions of shipboard for some time. It was in fact the hoplites, the heavily armoured Greek foot-soldiers who established a dominance over the archers, lighter-armed men, and a number of hastily deployed cavalry (the horses, again, not at their best after a sea voyage). Less than zoo Athenians had fallen, but the Persian dead, which were carefully counted, numbered 6400.
To the Greeks this was an amazing figure, and indeed the disparity in losses remains remarkable. To the Persians, however, it was comparatively insignificant. The greater part of their army was re-embarked aboard their ships, out of which, although exposed on a hostile shore, only seven were lost. In the Greco-Persian wars it is always important to remember that the available manpower of the two principal Greek states, Athens and Sparta, must be numbered in only a few thousands. The Persians, however, as the campaign of Xerxes was to show, could count on forces running into hundreds of thousands. A hundred dead fighting men was a more serious loss to the Greeks than several thousand to the Persians and their allies. (The situation was very similar in these terms to that of the Israelis versus the Arab states in recent years.)
Worsted at Marathon, the Persians still had no intention of conceding defeat. Rounding the southern tip of Attica, their fleet made for the Bay of Phaleron where the Greeks had originally expected them to land. Miltiades had anticipated this secondary move and -just as he had brought his troops so rapidly from Athens to Marathon, ‘running to the battle-cry’, - he now led them back at a similar pace. Nothing can better attest to the fitness, discipline and physical endurance of the Attic hoplites than their advance to Marathon, their triumph over a far larger enemy force, and then their immediate return to confront the enemy. When the Persian fleet appeared off Phaleron Bay they found the victors of Marathon drawn up in order and ready to receive them. They were not about to beach their ships and disembark in the face of those grim, visored men, their long spears a thicket of death, and their bronze shields and corselets gleaming in the triumphant sun of Greece. Datis turned the fleet about and made sail for Asia.
Three days after the full moon, the Spartans, in a notable feat of forced marching, arrived at Athens - possibly on the very same day that Datis had withdrawn. The Spartans open-heartedly congratulated the Athenians on their victory, and then ‘desired to see the Medes’. They went out to the battlefield at Marathon and viewed the dead. The Spartans had never engaged the Persians, and no doubt they wanted to inspect the quality of their arms and armour. They must have suspected (as indeed did the Athenians themselves) that this was not the last that the mainland Greeks would be hearing of the Persians.
Marathon was, indeed, a victory of the greatest significance for all of Greece. It had strengthened the resolution of Athenians and Spartans alike; it had proved the superiority of the hoplite over the Persian foot soldier; and it had confirmed the authority of Greek leadership. (The news that the Spartans were on the march, which almost certainly must have reached Datis via his scout-ships to the south, may well have hastened his retreat.) While the Greeks everywhere rejoiced, and while Marathon assumed for all time in their history the same mystique as Waterloo in that of Britain, the Persians had time to ponder over the campaign. They had lost a battle, but they had not lost the war. Their defeat at Marathon was to lead to the infinitely careful war-plan of Darius’ successor, Xerxes, and the studied preparation of an immense army and fleet designed for the conquest of Greece and of all Europe that lay beyond. In the workshops of Persia, on the slipways of the East, and out of the almost inexhaustible manpower of the empire, would be forged the hammer to crack the small stone of mountainous Greece.
The Athenians, who had saved all Greece at Marathon, were for the moment, and very understandably, imbued with optimism. They, and they alone (although they never forgot the heroic contribution of the little city of Plataea), had been successful in routing the awesome Persians; the conquerors of Ionian Greece and most of the Aegean islands; the army and the navy which had hitherto been considered invincible. This heady triumph was to prove of immense value to their morale when, in due course, the Persian Empire under the direction of Xerxes returned for the second round. To Athenians their triumph seemed all the greater because it had been achieved on land rather than their familiar environment, the sea. It was Attic hoplites who had defeated the Persians without any help from Sparta - normally considered the masters of land warfare.