The Watchers (59 page)

93
The team built another staging center near the DARPA building, hiring a Hollywood set designer and former head of Disney Imagineering to give the place a futuristic quality:
Interview with Poindexter. Other officials who visited the center and saw the Genoa demos also recalled its location and its interior.

95
When Curt Weldon picked up the phone to call George Tenet, the director of the CIA, he wasn't expecting much:
See the transcript of two of Weldon's long speeches on the floor of the House of Representatives, in which he recounts much of the narrative about Dragomir Karic and the Information Dominance Center. The first was on May 21, 2002, at
www.fas.org/irp/congress/2002_cr/h052102.html
. The second was on June 27, 2005, at
www.fas.org/irp/congress/2005_cr/s062705.html
. I also wrote about the Karic case and quoted from Weldon's remarks in a story for
National Journal
, “Intelligence Designs,” published December 3, 2005. I interviewed Weldon about these matters in his office in 2005. Then, in 2006 I interviewed him again and shadowed him around Washington for a day, as part of a profile I wrote for
National Journal
titled “The Troublemaker,” published on September 29, 2006.

97
Weldon once walked out on a closed-door briefing by CIA officials:
See “Missile-Threat Report ‘Politicized,' GOP says,” by Rowan Scarborough and Bill Gertz in the
Washington Times
, January 30, 1996.

98
When Erik Kleinsmith got the request from Weldon's office to draw up a profile on the enigmatic Karic, he didn't expect it to be an onerous task:
Kleinsmith's account of the work on the Karic program come from interviews conducted in 2005 and 2008. All descriptions of his early work at the Information Dominance Center and any statements, thoughts, and actions attributed to him also come from those interviews.

103
The IDC was the next generation of intelligence, Weldon thought:
Weldon's fixation on intelligence is well known. For a good encapsulation of his thinking, which usually runs contrary to the norm, see his book
Countdown to Terror: The Top-Secret Information That Could Prevent the Next Terrorist Attack on America . . . and How the CIA Has Ignored It
(Washington, D.C.: Regnery Publishing, 2005).

103
Over at the Pentagon, word was getting around about the IDC's exploits:
It was clear from interviews with Weldon and Kleinsmith that this was the case. Other interviews, especially with John Hamre, then the deputy secretary of defense, confirmed this. The IDC was an up-and-coming outfit.

104
The Defense Department had been aware for some time that hostile intelligence services were running agents against U.S. government facilities and military contractors:
See the Defense Department inspector general's report on the Able Danger program, “Alleged Misconduct by Senior DoD Officials Concerning the Able Danger Program and Lieutenant Colonel Anthony A. Shaffer, U.S. Army Reserve,” case number H05L97905217, dated September 18, 2006. It states: “In February 1999 Dr. John Hamre, former Deputy Secretary of Defense, proposed a ‘threat mapping model' for industrial security. Dr. Hamre testified the proposal was a reaction to ‘an active espionage operation by a hostile intelligence force.' ”

I also interviewed Hamre about the Able Danger program, and about the Information Dominance Center and its work on industrial espionage, in 2005. We also exchanged a few follow-ups by e-mail.

104
a special congressional committee had revealed that since at least the late 1970s, Chinese spies had stolen design information about advanced thermonuclear warheads from the U.S. national laboratories:
This document, “U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People's Republic of China,” is better known as the Cox Report, after its chairman and chief proponent, Christopher Cox, who was then a Republican congressman from California. The report was classified, but a redacted version was released publicly in May 1999, at
www.house.gov/coxreport/
. The report prompted renewed attention to the problem of industrial espionage, but it was not without its critics. Some accused the panel of overstating both the threat of Chinese espionage and the capability of the weapons for which designs were allegedly stolen. The report was also inextricably linked to questions of Chinese political influence on Democratic campaigns and President Bill Clinton. Nevertheless, I mention the report here because it laid bare publicly what senior officials in the Pentagon already knew: Chinese intelligence operations against the U.S. industrial base were in full swing. It is worth noting that less than a decade later intelligence officials would allege publicly that Chinese agents were stealing proprietary information again, but this time over the Internet, by hacking into the computers of U.S. government officials and business executives.

105
Not long after, he reported his impressions back to Weldon: “It's amazing what they're doing down there”:
Interview with Weldon. Hamre also confirmed that he shared his thoughts with the congressman.

106
Hamre wanted to know whether he should invest in these cutting-edge tools for the new Joint Counterintelligence Assessment Group, or JCAG:
Interview with Hamre. Also see the Defense Department inspector general's report on Able Danger.

106
Kleinsmith saw a perfect opportunity to impress the Pentagon brass:
All the details about the IDC's work on the China experiment came from interviews with Kleinsmith in 2005 and 2008. In 2005, I also interviewed a former employee of the IDC who worked for Kleinsmith but asked not to be named. The inspector general's report also provides corroborating information about these accounts. Interviews with Hamre and a former congressional official also added important details about the reaction senior officials had to the IDC's work.

110
The FBI had set up a covert spying operation against the Black Panthers:
In the course of my reporting I spoke with a former member of this FBI team who confirmed its mission and requested anonymity.

112
That's how the Army's lawyers saw it, and they conveyed that concern to the Pentagon's senior leadership:
The Defense Department inspector general's report documents this chain of reporting.

113
Hamre wanted to come up to the Hill and talk to the staffers personally:
This account comes from a 2008 interview with Tim Sample, who eventually became the staff director of the House Intelligence Committee under Porter Goss. Sample worked for the CIA as an imagery analyst before coming to the Hill.

113
The committee staff also wondered why the IDC was on this job in the first place:
Interview with Sample.

Unless otherwise noted, accounts of the IDC's work on Able Danger come primarily from interviews with Kleinsmith and a former IDC employee who worked with him and asked not to be identified. Where other sources amplify certain passages, I note them.

115
A pair of officers showed up unannounced, a Navy commander and a Marine captain:
This encounter is also documented in the Defense Department inspector general's report on Able Danger, “Alleged Misconduct by Senior DoD Officials Concerning the Able Danger Program and Lieutenant Colonel Anthony A. Shaffer, U.S. Army Reserve,” case number H05L97905217, dated September 18, 2006.

116
When it came to Al Qaeda, Special Operations most wanted one thing: Boots on the ground to go after the terrorists:
The report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, better known as the 9/11 Commission, contains an authoritative history of Special Operations' efforts against Al Qaeda during this time. See
The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States
(New York: W.W. Norton, 2004).

116
The military hadn't seen anything comparable since the bombings in Beirut fifteen years earlier:
While this is demonstrably true, I also note here that in the course of reporting over the years I interviewed a survivor of the bombing at the embassy in Kenya, Ambassador Prudence Bushnell. She provided vivid memories of the event, which helped underscore both the ferocity of the explosion and the extent of the damage.

116
In October 1999, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs had directed Special Operations to map out Al Qaeda and all its support mechanisms, including its linchpin members:
The 9/11 Commission's report contains no mention of Able Danger, although its staff did interview officials who were involved in the program. The Defense Department inspector general's report established that Able Danger began pursuant to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs' orders to target Al Qaeda.

117
Special Operations had ideas about how to hit Al Qaeda:
This account is contained in the 9/11 Commission's report.

117
The agency had reestablished contacts more recently, and they were paying some dividends:
The CIA's lack of human intelligence-gathering capabilities in Afghanistan and other key counties is well documented. But the 9/11 Commission's report also provides a well-sourced account of this problem. The report also documents the CIA's plans for striking at Al Qaeda.

118
Special Operations begged to differ:
The turf war that erupted between Special Operations and the CIA is documented in the 9/11 Commission's report. Kleinsmith and the former IDC employee also told me that by the time Special Operations reached out to their team, officers were fed up with the CIA's approach to dealing with Al Qaeda and were prepared to try a new approach.

120
They ran the usual sources—public information on the Internet, as well as the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System:
Interview with Kleinsmith. Also, in a separate discussion, a former intelligence employee who worked at the IDC but was not involved in the Able Danger program confirmed that the center had access to the joint communications system.

123
Less than a month later, the staff of the House Intelligence Committee learned that Special Operations had tapped the IDC for data analysis:
Interview with Tim Sample, who eventually became the staff director of the House Intelligence Committee under Porter Goss.

123
In the winter of 2000, with the IDC several weeks into its Able Danger work, no one in the senior ranks of the Army or the Pentagon realized that Kleinsmith's team was once again pulling in thousands of names of U.S. persons:
The chronological record contained in the Defense Department inspector general's report confirms this. Again, Kleinsmith was aware that legal concerns about the IDC's work persisted, but they hadn't yet impeded his work on Able Danger.

124
Rear Admiral Michael Lohr, the legal counsel to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, got involved:
See the Defense Department inspector general's report. It also contains excerpts from Lohr's memo.

124
Weeks before Lohr wrote his memo, Philpot briefed General Peter Schoomaker, the Special Operations commander:
Ibid.

127
At the time, the NSA was using Parentage to trace attacks on computer networks back to a discrete Internet address:
See notes on research into “high confidence systems” on the Web site of the National Coordination Office for Networking and Information Technology Research and Development, at
www.nitrd.gov/pubs/bluebooks/2000/hcs.html
.

Unless otherwise noted, accounts of the IDC's work on Able Danger come primarily from interviews with Kleinsmith and the former IDC employee who worked with him but asked not to be identified. Where other sources amplify certain passages, I note them.

129
Colonel Tony Gentry, the top lawyer for the Intelligence and Security Command, had paid Kleinsmith a visit:
Interviews with Kleinsmith in 2005 and 2008. The Defense Department inspector general also found that Kleinsmith was advised that he was facing a ninety-day deadline and would have to destroy information (“Alleged Misconduct by Senior DoD Officials Concerning the Able Danger Program and Lieutenant Colonel Anthony A. Shaffer, U.S. Army Reserve,” case number H05L97905217, dated September 18, 2006). Kleinsmith also testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee on September 21, 2005, about his meeting with Gentry.

132
The analysis would move to a private facility, an intelligence operations center owned and operated by Raytheon in Garland, Texas:
Interviews with Kleinsmith and the former IDC employee. Also see Defense Department inspector general report. Also discussed in interview with Curt Weldon in 2005.

133
Back in the White House, Dick Clarke and the other career NSC staffers had been working furiously, and now they were in panic mode:
See Dick Clarke's memoir,
Against All Enemies: Inside America's War on Terror
(New York: Free Press, 2004), and the 9/11 Commission's report.

133 What is it that fits?
she asked herself.
What is it that matters?
:
Interview with McCarthy.

133
In June 2001, the intelligence community issued a warning that a major Al Qaeda attack would occur within the next several weeks:
For a concise account of the frenzied months preceding the 9/11 attacks, see PBS's
Frontline: The Man Who Knew,
a profile of former FBI special agent John O'Neill. He was one of the few at the bureau to give early warnings of the Al Qaeda threat. O'Neill died at the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001.

134
Clarke held a meeting in his office during which CIA officials briefed domestic law enforcement agencies about the possibility of an attack in America:
Ibid.