The War Within (13 page)

In an interview two years later, the president acknowledged that Iraqi society indeed had been "rending."

"And the reason why is that, because in the absence of a government that is providing the average person security, they're choosing sides," he said. "If I might ask myself a question that you should be asking me hereÖ"

"Please," I said.

"What caused you to believe that this was not inevitable?"

"Good question. And the answer?"

He said he believed people want to live in peace and eventually would reject the violence. But without an effective government, they weren't being given much chance. "They now found themselves in a situation where they had to rely on the local cat with the big gun."

* * *

The next day, Rice appeared on several of the Sunday morning talk shows. She voiced optimism and disagreed with negative assessments that Tim Russert quoted on NBC's
Meet the Press
. "Iraqis have made a choice for a unified government that can deliver for all Iraqis," she said. "And when I say Iraqis, I mean not just their leadership, which clearly has not made a choice for civil war, but their population."

On Monday, Bush and Rice held a joint press conference. The president cited Iraq as a "notable battleground in the advance of liberty," adding, "What the American people need to know is we've got a strategy."

By August 16, Bush was out on the campaign trail, stumping for Republicans in the upcoming November elections.

At a political rally in Lancaster, Pennsylvania, he said that his war strategy was to keep on the offense. "The stakes are high," he declared to a crowd of 400 people at a Republican fund-raiser. "But I clearly see where we need to go."

* * *

That same week, Bush and Cheney, with Rumsfeld, Hadley and longtime adviser Dan Bartlett, had lunch at the Pentagon with four Iraq experts, including Reuel Gerecht, from the conservative American Enterprise Institute, and Eric Davis, a political scientist from Rutgers University.

Bush made it clear that he wished the United States got more credit for its efforts and sacrifice in Iraq.

The president noted the "mass psychology" that al Qaeda had inflicted in one solitary actóthe February bombing of the Samarra mosque. Isn't there anything positive in Iraq? he asked.

Davis said that education was getting better and a civil society was beginning to emerge.

"Well, that won't matter if this cycle of revenge keeps accelerating," Gerecht said. "You need Americans monitoring the situation with a heavy American presence."

Exasperated, Bush said he was growing weary of the ingratitude on the part of the Iraqis. He said it was hard for him to understand.

Chapter 9

O
n Thursday morning, August 17, the president gathered his war council in the windowless Roosevelt Room of the White House for a secret meeting on Iraq that Hadley had planned for nearly a month. The Situation Room, the normal venue for such an important meeting, was being renovated.

The temperature outside was headed toward 90 degrees, humid and muggyóvacation time for most anyone who could escape the summer doldrums of the nation's capital. Rice was away for a rare breakóa five-day stay at the Greenbrier Resort in West Virginia. But in the West Wing, it was a time for reflection. Hadley had given the president special briefing material in advance, including the SECRET summary of the July 22 question-and-answer session with Casey and Khalilzad.

Above the mantel in the room, just a few steps from the Oval Office, hung a picture of Republican President Theodore Roosevelt, the Rough Rider himself, astride a great black horse. Solemn and determined, Roosevelt looks as if he and his horse might bound off the canvas.

"The situation seems to be deteriorating," the president began, acknowledging to his closest advisers a rebuttal of his public optimism. He said he was searching for a way to go. "I want to be able to say that I have a plan to punch back." He had to find a way to explain to the American people what defeat might mean so they would understand the consequences. He recalled, as he often did, that Central Commander General John Abizaid had said that if the United States withdrew under pressure, the extremists and terrorists would follow to the United States. Defeat for the United States would embolden the enemy. They must "make it clear that we have a plan to defeat them," Bush said. "We need a clear way forward coming out of Labor Day." They had nothing close to a clear way forward that day, with less than three weeks to go.

The number of attacks in Iraq had risen to more than 900 each week. Bush was clearly unhappy, almost dejected.

After nearly six years in office, the presidencyóand the warówere wearing on him. He had turned 60 the previous month, and the photographs of the young Texas governor of the late 1990s contrasted with the gray-haired president who now sat before them. The high-octane optimism of the Bush persona was in remission.

"We get only rare glimpses of anything positive going on," he said, sounding disheartened. Mass bombings and killings in Iraq were the staple not only of the television news but often of the classified reports he received and the daily Iraq Note from the National Security Council staff. "Surely, something else is going on?" Bush asked.

At one point, trying to puncture the gloom, Rumsfeld interjected. "Terrific!" he said, referring to the president's opening remarks. "We need that leadership." Perhaps a new message, a new speech, could be used to "show that a defeat of the United States would amount to defeat of the Iraqi people," he proposed.

"We are constantly adjusting our tactics," the president said, repeating one of his favored lines, "but we're firm in our objectives." He cited Mosul, Iraq's second largest city, where the recent fighting had been brutal and slow. U.S.

forces had fought hard, demonstrating a willingness to stay, he said.

"We have to fight off the impression that this is not winnable," the president said. Support for the war had plummeted. In a recent Gallup poll, 56 percent of Americans said the war was a mistake, as 41 percent said it was not. Bush's approval ratings hovered at about 37 percent.

"Can America succeed?" he asked, one of the few times he seemed to entertain the possibility that it might not. "If so, how? How do our commanders answer that?"

General Abizaid had joined the meeting through the secure video link, as had General Casey. Before they could answer, the president recounted his conversation with a widow of a soldier. The woman had said, according to the president, "Look, I trust you. But can you win?"

Then the president recited his goalsóa free society that could defend, sustain and govern itself while becoming a reliable ally in the global war on terrorism. Then he added a dreary assessment, saying, "It seems Iraq is incapable of achieving that."

"The region is in a sour mood," General Abizaid said. "It seems like it's hitting an unseen tipping point." He said they needed to focus on and assist moderates such as Prime Minister Maliki, while always driving toward turning responsibility over to them. This was the theme Rumsfeld, Casey and he were still pushing. It was necessary to get the hand off the back of the bicycle seat, to take the training wheels off the Iraqi government.

Abizaid said he saw three big regional problemsóconflict between the Muslim sects, the Shia and the Sunnis; the Israeli-Palestinian disputes; and the general undercurrents of extremism. Many others in the region were in the fightóthe Pakistanis, the Afghans and the Iraqis. "The way we're focusing on this problem is too military. We need to help them help themselves." The political and economic elements needed more resources and attention. "We need to think about how to get a different message out," he said. The president was interested in a new message. Abizaid seemed to be missing the point the president was making: They had to consider a more fundamental change. Bush urged Abizaid to write his ideas and give them to Rumsfeld. The secretary reiterated his theme: "Help them help themselves."

"Senators," Bush said, "are now hearing intelligence briefings about the fact that Iraq is now in a civil war"óan idea that he had dismissed. "This is an important moment, and people are also looking at how things are going in Baghdad."

"We need a defining speech," said Khalilzad. It was another mind-bending moment. Bush had given dozens of speeches and public presentations on Iraq, many intended to be "defining." Like Abizaid, Khalilzad failed to recognize that the change the president was talking about meant more than rhetoric.

"We need to show how we deny a safe haven for terror," Casey said. That was one presumed accomplishment: Iraqis were not exporting terror to other countries. Terrorism was being imported into Iraq. "The plan is not unfolding fast enough for some people," Casey said. "Enduring success will only be achieved by Iraqis." The new Iraqi government of Prime Minister Maliki, in office less than four months, was still finding its legs. "It's moving forward at a better pace than the last government," Casey said. "There's steady progress, but it needs another four to six months. It's too soon to tell if the government will turn out good or bad."

Casey's forces were going to try to decrease the violence in Baghdad between then and Ramadan, the Muslim holiday barely a month away. Casey said they would try to increase local neighborhood efforts everywhere and try to transition Baghdad to the local security forces. Of the announced strategy of "clear, hold and build," he said,

"Clearing is the easiest part. It is harder to hold. We're doing a transition of control to the Iraqi government in the provinces."

On the Iraqi security forcesóarmy and policeóBush asked, "Is there a way to quantify how good they are?"

"The Iraqi army is in the fight. We're doing well," Casey answered, dodging half the question. He believed that the president still saw Iraq in terms of measuring how much damage was being inflicted on the enemy. Bush always asked about offensive operations. So Casey threw the commander in chief a bone. "We're killing 300 to 350

insurgents a month."

"We don't want to make this a body count," injected General Pete Pace. Pace hated body counts, the clear echoes of Vietnam; he knew it was a false measure, and that using numbers as a metric of success could be seen by the troops as encouragement to kill more. Because the mission in Iraq was to get out of the country, killing more did not necessarily help. But Pace submitted to the president's intent. "We've gotten thousands," he said.

Bush stated that the numbers were just for his personal comfort level, but for Casey it was another sign the president did not get it.

Casey and others knew three wars were raging in Iraq. First, there was the battle with the Sunni insurgency, including those from Saddam's Baath Party. Second, there was a fierce conflict with the terrorist al Qaeda network that had sprung up inside Iraq only after the invasion. Third, there was an increasingly violent sectarian war between the Sunni minority and the Shia majority.

"Ninety percent of the sectarian violence is within 30 miles of the center of Baghdad," Khalilzad said. "We need to get the different forces in Iraq to come together." He ran through the political prioritiesóequal distribution of oil and gas revenue, letting more of the lower-ranking former Baathists into the government, and curbing the role of the local militias, which were increasingly sectarian and violent. Another headache was the Ministry of Interior, which oversaw the sectarian and corrupt national police, and which needed drastic overhaul and reform.

"Folks are not in a compromising mood," Casey said. "We have to force action in this timeline." Two months earlier, in June, he had presented his SECRET three-phase timeline that would lead to Iraqi self-reliance in 2009.

Bush turned to the thorny problem of the Iraqi police and reminded General Casey somewhat sarcastically that the general had said 2006 would be "The Year of the Police." So, the president inquired, how's that going?

"We're doing a good job of building them up," Casey answered. "It will be completed in 2006." A new program to pull the police off-line for inspection and training was under way and would be complete by year's end. He was moving forward with an effort to bring American soldiers into Baghdad police stations.

Rumsfeld asked if there was anything that could be done to better advise Prime Minister Maliki to develop a plan, show if it were on track, and force dates for action.

"This is a critical issue," Khalilzad replied, "but it is hard to threaten the Iraqi government." The United States had little leverage. This flew in the face of the simple fact that the United States occupied the country. "You can only just drink tea with them," Khalilzad said, referring to his endless sessions with Iraqis that produced meager results.

The focus turned to Bush's statement that they needed a plan with concrete, measurable steps, rather than abstract goals.

Philip Zelikow, the State Department counselor who was sitting in for Rice, said there were four important conditions that were favorable for the coalition. The enemy was unpopular with the Iraqi people; the Iraqi government was getting better; the United States was growing more experienced; and most of the violence was not aimed at overthrowing the government.

Turning back to Baghdad, the president said, "It looks pretty bad."

"There's really a difference of views on the threat," Khalilzad said. The Shia majority, which controlled the government, wanted to go after al Qaeda and the Baathists. "To them, the Shia death squads are defensive. All their enemies are Baathists. On the Sunni side, the real problems are Shia militias and Iran," which was supporting the militias.

"How are we doing on al Qaeda?" Bush asked. "Do we have enough manpower to do Baghdad and keep taking on al Qaeda and the Baathists?"

"We have an effort against al Qaeda that is keeping a steady operational tempo," Casey answered.

"Lots of people being picked up," Rumsfeld said. "Lots of people being interrogated."

"Just uncovered a big car bomb network in Baghdad," Casey added. "We don't need more troops to do that. In Baghdad, we have enough for right now." He had just doubled the number of U.S. forces in Baghdad from about 7,000 to 14,000. The Iraqis would have to "hold" the areas that had been cleared, the general said, but he said he wasn't sure the Iraqis could deliver.