Authors: Adam Roberts,Vaughan Lowe,Jennifer Welsh,Dominik Zaum
The United Nations Security Council and War:The Evolution of Thought and Practice since 1945 (155 page)
18
SC Res. 59 of 19 Oct. 1948.
19
The clearest examples of UN authorizations of states to use major military force to reverse the results of military attacks are SC Res. 83 of 27 June 1950 on Korea, and SC Res. 678 of 29 Nov. 1990 on Iraq.
20
Urquhart notes that, upon completion of the Rhodes negotiations, Bunche was offered a senior job in the US State Department but declined. Urquhart,
Bunche: A Life.
21
See Roger Louis’ discussion of Suez in
Chapter 12
.
22
The establishment of UNOGIL was based on SC Res. 128 of 11 June 1958.
23
Henry Kissinger,
Years of Renewal
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999).
24
Urquhart,
Bunche: A Life
, 407; see also U Thant’s letter to the General Assembly from May 18, 1967, UN doc. A/6669.
25
Urquhart,
Bunche: A Life
, 400–16.
26
‘Cable containing instructions for the withdrawal of UNEF sent by the Secretary-General to the Commander of UNEF on May 18, 1967, at 2230 hours New York time’, UN doc. A/6730/Add. 3 of 26 June 1967, Annex. Cited in Michael K. Carroll, ‘From Peace (Keeping) to War: The United Nations and the Withdrawal of UNEF’,
Middle East Review of International Affairs
9, no. 2 (June 2005), n. 27.
27
Eban,
An Autobiography
, 323.
28
Ibid.
29
Michael Oren,
Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
30
Eban,
An Autobiography.
31
For Lord Caradon’s own account of these negotiations, see Lord Caradon ‘Security Council Resolution 242’ in Lord Caradon et al.,
UN Security Council Resolution 242: A Case Study in Diplomatic Ambiguity
, Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Georgetown University, Washington, DC, 1981. See also Eban,
An Autobiography
, 451.
32
SC Res. 242 of 22 Nov. 1967.
33
A text that specified that ‘the territories’ seized in war would be interpreted by Israeli as constituting reference to the entirety of the territories east of the ceasefire line that they seized during the 1967 war; Israel was not willing to specify in advance of negotiations that peace was conditional on return of 100% of that territory. On the other hand, no mention of territory seized by war would be interpreted by the Arabs as meaning that they were supposed to enter political negotiations with no guarantee of the return of land. Both positions were unacceptable. By making a general reference to the principle of the inadmissibility of territory acquired in war, the resolution balanced the concerns of both sides. Speaking before the adoption of the resolution, Lord Caradon stated that, ‘the draft Resolution is a balanced whole. To add to it or to detract from it would destroy the balance and also destroy the wide measure of agreement we have achieved together. It must be considered as a whole as it stands. I suggest that we have reached the stage when most, if not all, of us want the draft Resolution, the whole draft Resolution and nothing but the draft Resolution’: UN doc. S/PV 1382 of 22 Nov. 1967, 31.
34
See Anwar Sadat, ‘The October War’
In Search of Identity: An Autobiography
(New York: Harper & Row, 1978), ch. 9.
35
SC Res. 338 of 22 Oct. 1973.
36
See SC Res. 339 of 23 Oct. 1973; SC Res. 340 of 25 Oct. 1973; and SC Res. 341 of 27 Oct. 1973.
37
SC Res. 250 of 31 May 1974.
38
See
www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/undof/facts.html
39
Kissinger,
Years of Renewal
, 457.
40
Sadat,
In Search of Identity
, 232.
41
The definitive account of these negotiations is found in William Quandt,
Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab–Israeli Conflict Since 1967
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2001).
42
The decision to invade was one of the most controversial in Israel’s political history, and remains the subject of sharp debate in Israel and beyond. The Defence Minister at the time, Ariel Sharon, was eventually the subject of an investigation by the Kahan Commission over his conduct during the period, an investigation that recommended and led to his removal from office. Sharon overcame this obstacle in 2001 by winning election to another political office, that of Prime Minister.
43
See
Appendix 5
.
44
Boutros Boutros Ghali,
Unvanquished: A US–UN Saga
(New York: Random House, 1999).
45
This section of the chapter draws on previously published material; see Bruce Jones, ‘The Middle East Peace Process’, in David Malone (ed.),
The UN Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2004).
46
Author’s field notes.
47
Frederic Hof, ‘Practical Line: The Line of Withdrawal from Lebanon and its Potential Applicability to the Golan Heights’,
The Middle East Journal
55, no. 1 (2001), 25–44.
48
UN doc. S/PRST/2000/18 of 21 May 2000; and UN doc. S/PRST/2000/21 of 18 June 2000.
49
William Quandt, ‘Clinton and the Arab–Israeli Conflict: The Limits of Incrementalism’,
Journal of Palestine Studies
30, no. 2 (2001), 25–40. Also, author’s field notes.
50
Kirsten E. Schulze, ‘Camp David and the
Al-Aqsa Intifada:
An Assessment of the States of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process, July–December 2000’,
Studies in Conflict and Terrorism
, 24, 222.
51
Press release pertaining to the internal investigation available at
www.un.org/News/dh/latest/
videorpt.htm
52
Author’s field notes.
53
SC Res. 1373 of 28 Sep. 2001.
54
SC Res. 1397 of 12 Mar. 2002.
55
SC Res. 1402 of 30 Mar. 2002.
56
Author’s field notes.
57
SC Res. 1397 of 12 Mar. 2002.
58
SC Res. 1402 of 30 Mar. 2002.
59
SC Res. 1435 of 24 Sep. 2002.
60
UN doc. S/PRST/2005/44 of 23 Sep. 2005; and UN doc. S/PRST/2005/57 of 30 Nov. 2005.
61
SC Res. 1559 of 2 Sep. 2004.
62
SC Res. 1595 of 7 Apr. 2005.
1
Victoria Schofield,
Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan and the Unfinished War
(London: IB Tauris, 2000), 62.
2
See text of Address delivered by Quaid-i-Azam, Muhammed Ali Jinnah in Lahore on 22 Mar. 1940, at
www.Story of Pakistan.com
.
3
Sumit Ganguly,
Conflict Unending: India–Pakistan Tensions since 1947
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 1.
4
Text of ‘Instrument of Accession of Jammu and Kashmir State’, 26 Oct. 1947, at mha.nic.in/accdoc.htm; and text of ‘Reply from Lord Mountbatten to Maharaja Sir Hari Singh’, 27 Oct. 1947, in Rajesh Kadian,
The Kashmir Tangle: Issues and Options
(New Delhi: Vision Books, 1992), 175.
5
The sequencing of these events, especially the date of signing of the Instrument of Accession, is disputed, giving rise to controversy over whether the latter was signed before or after Indian troops landed in Srinagar. For this version of events, see Alastair Lamb,
Incomplete Partition: The Genesis of the Kashmir Dispute: 1947–1948
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 150–60.
6
C. Dasgupta,
War and Diplomacy in Kashmir 1947–48
(New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2002), 99–100.
7
Text of ‘India’s Complaint to the Security Council’, Letter from the Representative of India to the President of the Security Council’, 1 Jan. 1948, at
www.jammu-kashmir.com/documents/jkindian-complaint.html
8
Dasgupta,
War and Diplomacy in Kashmir
, 107.
9
Text of ‘India’s Complaint to the Security Council’.
10
Dasgupta,
War and Diplomacy in Kashmir
, 115.
11
SC Res. 38 of 17 Jan. 1948
12
Ibid.
13
SC Res. 39 of 20 Jan. 1948.
14
Ibid.
15
SC Res. 47 of 21 Apr. 1948.
16
SC Res. 47 of 21 Apr. 1948.
17
Ibid.
18
Dasgupta,
War and Diplomacy in Kashmir
, 131.
19
Schofield,
Kashmir in Conflict
, 52–3.
20
Nehru’s cable to Prime Minister Attlee on Kashmir, 25 Oct. 1947, at
www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/kasnehru.htm
21
Text of ‘Reply from Lord Mountbatten to Maharaja Sir Hari Singh’.
22
Navnita Chadha Behera,
Demystifying Kashmir
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2006), 31.
23
Ibid.
24
Dasgupta,
War and Diplomacy in Kashmir
, 131–2.
25
Ibid., 132.
26
Ganguly,
Conflict Unending
, 21.
27
Dasgupta,
War and Diplomacy in Kashmir
, 161 and 165.
28
Ganguly,
Conflict Unending
, 21.
29
UNCIP Resolution of 13 Aug. 1948.
30
Ibid.
31
Dasgupta,
War and Diplomacy in Kashmir
, 166.
32
UNCIP Resolution of 5 Jan. 1949.
33
‘Kashmir-The History: UN Resolutions’, at
www.pakun.org
34
Sumantra Bose,
Kashmir: Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace
(Harvard University Press: Cambridge, 2003), 41.
35
‘Agreement between Military Representatives of India and Pakistan regarding the Establishment of a Cease-fire Line in the State of Jammu and Kashmir’ (Annex 26 of UNCIP Third Report-UN doc. S/1430 Add. 1–3), 29 July 1949.
36
SC Res. 80 of 14 Mar. 1950.
37
SC Res. 91 of 30 Mar. 1951.
38
Ibid.
39
SC Res. 98 of 23 Dec. 1952.
40
Christopher Snedden, ‘Would a Plebiscite Have Resolved the Kashmir Dispute?’,
South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies
28, no. 1 (Apr. 2005), 64–83.
41
Ibid.
42
UN doc. S/5143 of 22 June 1962. See also Schofield,
Kashmir in Conflict
, 87.
43
B. G. Verghese, ‘Pakistan’s Stuck Record’,
Indian Express
, 2 July 1999, at
www.indianembassy.org/new/NewDelhiPressFile/Kargil_July_1999/Pakistan_Stuck_Record.htm
44
Ganguly,
Conflict Unending
, 45.
45
SC Res. 211 of 20 Sep. 1965.
46
SC Res. 209 of 4 Sep. 1965.
47
SC Res. 210 of 6 Sep. 1965.
48
SC Res. 211 of 20 Sep. 1965.
49
SC Res. 214 of 27 Sep. 1965.
50
SC Res. 215 of 5 Nov. 1965.
51
Ganguly,
Conflict Unending
, 47.
52
The Kargil Review Committee Report, ‘From Surprise to Reckoning’, 15 Dec. 1999, (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1999), 47.
53
The Security Council had requested in SC Res. 211 that the Secretary-General should establish a monitoring mechanism on the India-Pakistan border to supervise the ceasefire and the withdrawal of all armed personnel.
54
Adam Roberts, ‘The So-Called “Right” of Humanitarian Intervention’,
Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law
, 3, 2000 (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2002), 22.
55
UN doc. S/10416 of 4 Dec. 1971; UN doc. S/10423 of 5 Dec. 1971; and UN doc. S/10446/Rev.1 of13 Dec. 1971.
56
SC Res. 303 of 6 Dec. 1971.
57
GA Res. 2793 (XXVI) of 7 Dec. 1971.
58
SC Res. 307 of 21 Dec. 1971.
59
Ibid.
60
‘Simla Agreement on Bilateral Relations between India and Pakistan’, signed by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, and President of Pakistan, Z. A. Bhutto, in Simla on 3 July 1972, at
www.indianembassy.org/policy/Kashmir/shimla.htm
61
Ibid.
62
The Kargil Review Committee Report, 47.
63
Simla Agreement.
64
SC Res. 1172 of 6 June 1998.
65
Ibid.
66
Ibid.
67
The Kargil Review Committee Report, 207.
68
Pauline Dawson,
The Peacekeepers of Kashmir: The UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan
(London: Hurst and Company, 1994), 310–12.
69
Website of the UN Military Observers Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), at
www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unmogip/mandate.html