The Savior Generals: How Five Great Commanders Saved Wars That Were Lost—From Ancient Greece to Iraq (46 page)

23.
Liddell Hart,
Sherman,
331. Sherman encouraged this notion that a western general, and a largely western army, were superior to easterners, hardier than Southern cavaliers, and would eventually have to save the Union.

24.
Bull,
Soldiering,
99.

25.
Sherman,
Memoirs,
518; Lewis,
Sherman,
359–60. Cf. a quote from a captured Confederate soldier (360), “Sherman’ll never go to hell; he will flank the devil and make heaven in spite of guards.” Lewis makes an astute observation (398) that “In practically every section where there was bold Federal action in the summer of 1864, there was a Westerner in command . . . The West was in the saddle.” If one argued that three men eventually won the Civil War for the North—Lincoln, Grant, and Sherman—then the idea of western credit for the victory seems logical.

26.
Sherman,
Memoirs,
492; Davis,
Sherman’s March,
4. Residents of Atlanta apparently assumed from the beginning of Sherman’s campaign in early May that their own city would be the eventual Northern objective. Cf. Carter,
Siege of Atlanta,
128–30. On the strategic value of Atlanta, see Liddell Hart,
Sherman,
233–34.

27.
On the relative advantages of each army as the campaign began, see Marszalek,
Sherman,
260–61. It was true that the majority of Confederate generals were probably more skilled and talented than their Union counterparts, yet the four best (and highest-ranking) Union generals—Grant, Sheridan, Sherman, and Thomas—were perhaps the most talented commanders on either side of the Civil War.

28.
For a description of Johnston’s army—and the quality of Union forces arrayed against him—see Castel,
Decision in the West,
110–19. For the quote and discussion, cf., again, Marszalek,
Sherman,
269. Johnston’s aims are discussed at Symonds,
Johnston,
328–31.

29.
There is a good review of how the Confederates had plenty of chances to cut Sherman’s rail lines—and why they largely failed—in McMurry,
Atlanta 1864,
198–203; Sherman as logistician: 26–41, 116–18.

30.
For Johnston’s inability to fathom the political aspects of his military strategy in Georgia, cf. Symonds,
Johnston,
384–86.

31.
Sherman,
Memoirs,
500. On the problem of keeping up with Sherman’s rapidly changing “thoughts and wishes,” see Hirshson,
White Tecumseh,
220.

32.
For the tactical shortcomings of both Sherman and Johnston at Resaca, see Castel,
Decision in the West,
182–86. Historians critical of generalship
during the Atlanta campaign should remember that the landscape was dense, and the weather often bad, resulting in little accurate intelligence on either side.

33.
After the war, Johnston claimed that his primary, though misunderstood, aim all along had been to help the Northern peace party “to carry the presidential election.” Cf. Lewis,
Sherman,
366 and 373–74. For accounts of popular admiration for Uncle Billy and rising morale among Union troops, see Hanson,
Soul of Battle,
230–31.

34.
See Castel,
Decision in the West,
200–209, for an analysis of the less than stellar generalship of both Sherman and Johnston between May 17 and 20. The problem with criticism of both Sherman’s and Johnston’s command is clear in hindsight: Hood’s later antithetical tactics would soon ruin the Southern effort. And the more Sherman worried about advancing without losses rather than about destroying the enemy army, the more he neared Atlanta with sky-high Union morale. That nothing either Johnston or Hood did stopped Sherman is testament to his tactical and strategic insight.

35.
Johnston’s strategy is assessed well in Symonds,
Johnston,
316–18, and especially 358–71.

36.
For the campaigning between Cassville and Pickett’s Mill and the general ensuing depression in the North, see Castel,
Decision in the West,
202–54. For a defense of McClellan, cf. Sherman’s letter to his wife (Simpson and Berlin,
Sherman’s Civil War,
743).

37.
Castel,
Decision in the West,
293–96. Hood’s rashness at Kolb’s Farm was a precursor to more to come when he took over from Johnston in July—and explains why Sherman welcomed the enemy change of command.

38.
For Sherman’s own attitude after Kennesaw Mountain, cf. Marszalek,
Sherman,
274–75. In short, Sherman defended his frontal charges against dug-in troops—and then never repeated them again.

39.
Liddell Hart,
Sherman,
252; for different analyses of the late June and early July tactics of Sherman, see, again, Castel,
Decision in the West,
342–47. The more Johnston retreated, the more the Union public was buoyed by Sherman’s progress—and the more Sherman was reluctant to risk incurring high casualties.

40.
For Hood’s life and earlier career, see Miller,
Hood,
106.

41.
Castel,
Decision in the West,
367; cf, 32, 58. For Union officers rejoicing at the news of Hood’s replacement of Johnston, see Carter,
Siege of Atlanta,
193–94.

42.
See Lewis,
Sherman,
382–83, for the comparative statistics on losses between Lee’s and Johnston’s records of resistance.

43.
Kennett,
Sherman,
243: “That spring and summer Sherman the commander could be seen at his best in the conventional warfare of his day.
He was now free to direct as he wished the efforts of a hundred thousand men . . . That spring he had just turned forty-four. His keen mind had been further honed by three years of war and he was still possessed of his remarkable stamina. In Georgia he would reach the zenith of his career.” For Hood’s quotes, Miller,
Hood,
2007, and see Simpson and Berlin,
Sherman’s Civil War,
694, for the Sherman quote about taking up the dare of war.

44.
Castel believes that Union estimates of Confederate casualties at Peachtree Creek and elsewhere were exaggerated and might be reduced by half; cf.
Decision in the West,
381. Ezra Church: Secrist,
Sherman’s Trail,
53.

45.
Sherman,
Memoirs,
578–79. There was an air of unreality in the South as newspapers and officials clung to the analogy to Napoleon’s disaster in Russia a half century earlier—as if Georgia experienced subzero weather, Sherman’s lines were thousands of miles long, and Hood’s dwindling forces were Cossacks.

46.
On the controversial decision to let Hood flee from Atlanta, see Marszalek,
Sherman,
282–83. On Sherman’s fairness about McClellan: Simpson and Berlin,
Sherman’s Civil War,
57.742–43.

47.
Sherman,
Memoirs,
583. For the change of heart and the stunned Southern reaction, see Caudill and Ashdown,
Sherman’s March,
42–44. For all Sherman’s hatred of the press—understandable, given its sensational headlines during his depression of early 1862—no Union general was now more worshipped.

48.
Castel,
Decision in the West,
540–47, offers examples from contemporary newspapers and diaries, attesting to the general consensus that Atlanta’s fall had ruined the morale of the South, saved the Lincoln candidacy, and doomed McClellan’s hopes. Cf. also Bailey,
Chessboard of War,
8–12; Trudeau,
Southern Storm,
34–35; Waugh,
Reelecting Lincoln,
297–99; Hirshson,
White Tecumseh,
241.

49.
Davis,
Lincoln’s Men,
202–7; Lewis,
Sherman,
409–11.

50.
Sherman,
Memoirs,
583. For most of August, Lincoln despaired that Sherman could not take Atlanta before Grant ground up his army outside Richmond. It was to Grant’s credit that he congratulated Sherman even though in some sense his subordinate’s success only highlighted his own failure.

51.
Simpson and Berlin,
Sherman’s Civil War,
733. Sherman deplored the politics of September 1864 in a letter to his brother, Senator John Sherman. Rumors were rampant that the Midwestern and centrist Sherman might in fact favor McClellan, a fantasy dispelled by Sherman in another letter to his wife, Ellen Ewing Sherman (cf. Simpson and Berlin,
Sherman’s Civil War,
743).

52.
Sears,
McClellan,
604.

53.
For the various arguments downplaying the importance of Sherman’s capture of Atlanta, see McMurry,
Atlanta 1864,
204–8, who examines in
depth the argument of Castel that the capture of Atlanta did in fact ensure Lincoln’s election. Cf. McDonough and Jones,
War So Terrible,
319–21; and for some statistics on the vote breakdown, compare Waugh,
Reelecting Lincoln,
354–55.

54.
For a harsh appraisal of Grant’s tactics and accompanying losses, see the spirited attack by Liddell Hart,
Sherman,
274–75 (e.g., “If the commander had not lost hope, his men fought without it.”). For Sherman not going after Hood from Atlanta, see Woodworth,
Sherman,
138–39. On the politics, cf. Liddell Hart,
Sherman,
275. Grant felt that taking Richmond at any cost might end the war; Sherman believed that nearly destroying his army to capture Atlanta would still lose Lincoln the election. For McClellan’s discomfort, see Waugh,
Reelecting Lincoln,
291–94. Even the Confederacy was confused, as the
Augusta Constitutionalist
wondered, “Are we to take [McClellan] for a peace candidate or a reconstruction war Democrat?” A much quoted declaration from a Union soldier, “It knocks McClellan into pie,” summed up the general reaction to McClellan’s dilemma; cf. Wortman,
Bonfire,
322.

55.
On Sherman’s decision to outsource Hood to Thomas and ignore his movements, cf. Carter,
Siege of Atlanta,
352–54. In September and October, Sherman variously considered several marching routes before settling on Savannah as his destination; cf. Trudeau,
Southern Storm,
40–43. On breaking and smashing things, see Sword,
Southern Invincibility,
308–9.

56.
Sherman,
Memoirs,
589. On “irretrievable ruin,” see Bailey,
Chessboard of War,
9. If Grant had continually promoted Sherman as his own career ascended, Sherman had also saved Grant: talking him out of resigning after accusations of drunkenness at Shiloh, and now taking Atlanta when Grant was stalled outside Richmond.

57.
Atlanta was shortly reoccupied by southerners after Sherman left, but the city was in such dire condition that the returnees could hardly turn it into a Confederate asset; cf. Wortman,
Bonfire,
326–28; Carter,
Siege of Atlanta,
22–30. On the importance of the reliable Thomas for Sherman’s gamble, see Einolf,
George Thomas,
255–57. For Sherman’s letter to Hood, cf. Simpson and Berlin,
Sherman’s Civil War,
711.

58.
For complete texts of the exchanges over Atlanta with Hood, cf. Simpson and Berlin,
Sherman’s Civil War,
704–7. Once again, Sherman tried to equate his version of success with a certain moral clarity in war. If Atlanta was truly a city of noncombatants, then it would neither have hosted artillery that fired upon Sherman’s columns nor served as a manufacturing center and railhead to supply the army that was killing Sherman’s men. In his logic, the city was culpable and much of its population, both for their own protection and his own advantage, would have to be evacuated.

59.
Cf. Hanson,
Soul of Battle,
236–60; Caudill and Ashdown,
Sherman’s March,
6–7. On the continuing controversy over the character of Sherman
and the morality of his brand of war, cf. the review in Marszalek,
Sherman’s March to the Sea,
126–29.

60.
Simpson and Berlin,
Sherman’s Civil War,
694. Elsewhere in the letter, Sherman dismisses “sickly expedients,” the previous half-measures that the Union had embraced, that only prolonged the misery of civil war. In other words, beating back the armies of the Confederacy was not the real solution to healing the wounds of the nation as long as the South believed it had morality and courage on its side; marching into the heart of the Confederacy, daring the enemy to match armies, and punishing the nexus of rebellion in Sherman’s mind were essential to both unambiguous victory and lasting peace.

61.
Machiavelli,
The Prince,
17.7. Trudeau,
Southern Storm,
534. It was not just property, but
landed
property that was so dear to collective Southern mentality, and that Sherman especially targeted. For a summary of the charges against Sherman—anti-Semite, racist, terrorist, womanizer, etc.—see, in general, Michael Fellman’s
Citizen Sherman
(New York: Random House, 1995). For the argument that Sherman was a terrorist, see the invective of John B. Walters,
Merchant of Terror: General Sherman and Total War
(New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1993).

62.
See Sword,
Southern Invincibility,
on Sherman’s various pronouncements about what was essentially the notion of collective culpability and punishment, 308–10. On a fine appreciation of Sherman’s ultimate legacy, cf. Woodworth,
Sherman,
177–78.