MARCUS : Well then, I’ll follow, as I have from the start, the lead of that inspired man whom I praise more often, perhaps, than is necessary, because I regard him with something like veneration.
| 1
|
ATTICUS: No doubt you mean Plato.
|
|
MARCUS : The very man.
|
|
ATTICUS : Ah no. You will never praise him too warmly or too often. Even our friends, * who don’t like to hear anyone praised except their own leader, allow me to be as devoted to him as I please.
|
|
MARCUS : And they’re quite right. What devotion could be more fitting for a man of your discrimination, who in my view has achieved in both his life and his writings the very difficult feat of combining seriousness with good humour?
|
|
ATTICUS : I’m glad I interrupted you, for you’ve given a splendid proof of your high opinion of me! But carry on as you began.
|
|
MARCUS : First, then, let us praise the law itself in terms which are both true and appropriate to its nature.
| 2
|
ATTICUS : By all means, just as you did in the case of the law governing religious practices.
|
|
MARCUS : You appreciate, then, that a magistrate’s function is to take charge and to issue directives which are right, beneficial, and in accordance with the laws. As magistrates are subject to the laws, the people are subject to the magistrates. In fact it is true to say that a magistrate is a speaking law, * and law a silent magistrate. Nothing is so closely bound up with the decrees and terms of nature (and by that I wish to be understood as meaning law) as authority. Without that, no house or state or clan can survive— no, nor the human race, nor the whole of nature, nor the very universe itself. For the universe obeys God; land and sea abide by the laws of the universe; and human life is subject to the commands of the supreme law.
| 3
|
If I may come, now, to matters which are closer to us and more familiar—all ancient peoples were once subject to kings. That kind of power was originally vested in the wisest and the most just. (And that practice prevailed, for the most part, in our country as long as the kings reigned over it.) Subsequently that power was also entrusted to their descendants in succession, a custom which survives even in contemporary monarchies. Those who were opposed to monarchy wished to obey—not nobody, but not always a single person. However, here I am providing a body of law for free communities; so I will adjust my laws to the type of government which I think best. (In the six earlier books * I presented my views about the best constitution.)
| 4
|
Magistrates, * then, are a necessity. Without their good sense and close attention there can be no state. In fact the whole management of a country depends on the apportionment of their functions. Not only must their authority be clearly delimited; the same applies also to the citizens’ duty to obey them. A man who exercises power effectively will at some stage have to obey others, and one who quietly executes orders shows that he deserves, eventually, to wield power himself. So it must be the case that anyone who executes orders will have hopes of holding power at some time himself, while the man at present in charge will bear in mind that before long he will have to obey others. I lay it down, as Charondas does in his laws, that the people should not only obey the magistrates and carry out their instructions, but should also give them honour and esteem. Our friend Plato * held that citizens who oppose the magistrates are descended from the Titans, who themselves opposed the gods. Having cleared the ground, let us now come to the laws themselves, if that’s all right with you.
|
|
ATTICUS : Yes, it’s all right with me, and so is the order in which you are treating the material.
|
|
MARCUS : Commands shall be just, and citizens shall obey them quietly and without protest. Magistrates shall punish the guilty and unruly citizen by fine, prison, or flogging, unless an equal or higher authority or the people forbid it. The accused shall have the right of appeal to those quarters. When the magistrate has delivered or pronounced his decision, a trial shall take place before the people * to fix the fine or other penalty. In the field there shall be no appeal * against the decision of the commanding officer; whatever order is given by the officer in charge of the campaign shall be fixed and final. A number of minor magistrates shall be appointed to several areas, each with authority in his own sphere. In the field they shall hold command over those to whom they have been assigned, and be their tribunes. At home they shall watch over public funds, * ensure the security of prisoners, punish capital offences, * coin bronze, * silver, or gold in the public mint, judge cases * brought before them, and carry out whatever the Senate decides.
| 6
|
There shall be aediles, who shall look after matters in the city, including the food supply and official entertainments. For them this shall be the first step on the ladder * leading to higher office.
| 7
|
The censors * shall draw up a list of the population, recording ages, children, households and possessions; they shall watch over the city’s temples, streets, and aqueducts, and also the treasury and taxes; they shall divide the citizens and assign them to tribes; then they shall divide them according to possessions, age, and rank; they shall distinguish the sons of the cavalry and the infantry; they shall not allow men to remain bachelors; they shall regulate the behaviour of the citizens and not permit a disreputable person to remain in the Senate; they shall be two in number and shall hold office for five years; the other officers shall be annual; the post of censor shall always have occupants.
|
|
There shall be a legal official, or praetor, to decide civil cases or to give directions for their decision. He shall be the guardian of civil law. Equal to him in power there shall be as many officials as the Senate shall decree or the people command.
| 8
|
There shall be two with royal power; * and from their leading, judging, and consulting they shall be called praetors, judges, and consuls. They shall hold the supreme military power and shall take orders from no one. To them the safety of the people shall be the highest law.
|
|
No one shall hold the same office again until a period of ten years has elapsed. They shall abide by the ages laid down in the year-law. *
| 9
|
But when a particularly serious war or civil disorder occurs, one man * shall for a period no longer than six months hold power equal to that of the two consuls, if the Senate so decide. After being appointed under favourable auspices he shall be Master of the People. He shall have an officer to command the cavalry * with an authority equal to that of the legal official. *
|
|
When there are no consuls and no master of the people there shall be no other magistrates. The auspices shall be in the hands of the Senate, and it shall from its number appoint a member with the power * to arrange for the due election of consuls through the Assembly of Centuries.
|
|
Magistrates, with and without imperium * and ambassadors shall leave the city when the Senate shall so decree or the people so command. They shall conduct just wars in a just manner; * they shall treat the allies with consideration; they shall exercise control over themselves and their staff; they shall increase the glory of their country and return home with honour.
|
|
No one shall be appointed ambassador * for the sake of conducting his private affairs.
|
|
The ten officials whom the plebs shall appoint on its own behalf to protect it from violence shall be its tribunes. * What they forbid and what they enact through the plebs shall be binding. They shall be sacrosanct and shall not leave the plebs without tribunes.
|
|
All magistrates shall have the right to take auspices and to 10 conduct trials. The Senate shall be made up of their number. Its decrees shall be binding. But if an authority equal to or higher than [the presiding magistrate] shall veto its decrees, those decrees shall be written out and preserved.
| 10
|
The [senatorial] order shall be of unblemished behaviour and shall set an example to the rest.
|
|
When the people’s appointment of magistrates, judicial verdicts, and legislative decisions, positive and negative, have been made by vote, the details shall be disclosed to the aristocracy * and shall reflect the free choice of the people.
|
|
But if anything needs to be attended to outside the scope of the magistrates, the people shall appoint someone to attend to it and shall confer on him the authority to do so.
|
|
A consul, a praetor, a master of the people, a master of the cavalry, and any official proposed by the Senate for conducting the election of consuls, shall have the right to preside over meetings of the people and the Senate. And the tribunes appointed by the plebs shall have the right to preside over meetings of the Senate; they shall also bring before the plebs whatever is required.
|
|
Proceedings with the people and in the Senate shall be conducted with decent restraint.
|
|
A senator shall have a reason for his absence or else shall be liable to censure. A senator shall speak in his turn and at moderate length. He shall have a grasp of public affairs.
|
|
Meetings of the people shall be free from violence. An authority equal to or higher than [the presiding magistrate] shall have the power to overrule. * But if any disturbance takes place during the proceedings, the responsibility shall rest with the presiding magistrate. Anyone who blocks a harmful measure shall be deemed a public benefactor.
|
|
Presiding magistrates shall observe the auspices and obey the official augur; when bills have been read, they shall keep them on file in the treasury; they shall not take a vote on more than one question at a time; * they shall inform the people about the matter at issue and allow them to be informed by magistrates and private citizens.
|
|
They shall not propose laws directed at private individuals. * They shall not propose a motion involving a citizen’s life * except through the chief assembly * and those whom the censors have enrolled in the citizen body.
|
|
They shall not accept gifts * or give them when seeking or holding or having held office. If a person transgresses any of these rules, the penalty shall fit the crime.
|
|
The censors shall preserve the true meaning of the laws. On leaving office, men shall give a report of their acts to the censors; by doing so, however, they shall not be any the less liable to prosecution.
|
|
The law has been read. ‘Depart * and I shall order voting-tablets to be distributed.’
|
|