ATTICUS:
I would certainly like to hear about such things.
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MARCUS:
And what does Quintus say?
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QUINTUS:
There’s nothing that I’d sooner hear about.
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MARCUS:
Quite right too; for you may be sure that there is no topic which brings out so clearly
*
what nature has bestowed on man, how many excellent things the human mind contains, what task we were born and brought into the light to address and accomplish, what sort of factor unites human beings and what natural fellowship exists between them. For these matters must all be clarified before the source of law and justice can be identified.
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ATTICUS:
Does this mean that you consider the science of law to be derived, not from the praetor’s edict
*
(as most authorities hold today), nor from the Twelve Tables
*
(as our forefathers believed), but from the deepest recesses of philosophy?
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MARCUS:
That’s right, Pomponius. For in this discussion, we are
not asking how to frame legally binding conditions or how to answer this and that question for our clients. Let’s suppose such problems are important, as indeed they are. They have been handled by many distinguished men in the past, and are now being dealt with by a person
*
of the greatest expertise and authority. But in our present analysis we have to encompass the entire issue of universal justice and law; what we call civil law will be confined to a small, narrow, corner of it. We must clarify the
nature
of justice, and that has to be deduced from the nature of man. Then we must consider the laws by which states ought to be governed, and finally deal with the laws and enactments which peoples have compiled and written down. There the so-called civil law of our own people too will not be overlooked.
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QUINTUS:
You certainly
are
going far back, Marcus! Quite 18 rightly, you are tracing the object of our search back to its source. Those who present civil law in a different way are presenting modes of litigation rather than justice.
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MARCUS:
Not so, Quintus. Ignorance rather than knowledge of the law leads to litigation. But that can wait till later; now let’s inspect the first principles of justice.
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Well then, the most learned men
*
have chosen to take law as their starting point. I’m inclined to think they are right, if indeed (as they define it) law is the highest reason, inherent in nature, which enjoins what ought to be done and forbids the opposite. When that reason is fully formed and completed in the human mind, it, too, is law. So they think that law, whose function is to enjoin right action and to forbid wrong-doing, is wisdom. And they believe it received its Greek name
*
from giving each his own. I think its Latin name
*
comes from choosing. As they stress the element of fairness in law, we stress that of choice; but in fact each of these is an essential property of law. If this assertion is correct, as on the whole I think it is, the origin of justice must be derived from law. For law is a force of nature, the intelligence and reason of a wise man, and the criterion of justice and injustice. At the same time, as our whole discourse has to do with ordinary ways of thinking, we shall sometimes have to use ordinary language, applying the word ‘law’ to that which lays down in writing what it wishes to enjoin or forbid. For that’s what the man in the street calls law. But in establishing what justice is let us take as our point of departure that highest law which came into being countless centuries before any law was written down or any state was even founded.
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QUINTUS:
Yes, that’s more fitting and sensible in view of the method we have chosen for our discussion.
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MARCUS:
Shall we, then, look for the origin of justice at its source? Once we have found that, we will have a reliable standard for testing our investigations.
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QUINTUS:
Yes, I think that’s the way to proceed.
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ATTICUS:
Include me, too, in your brother’s opinion.
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MARCUS:
It is our business, then, to maintain and preserve the constitution of that state which Scipio in those six books
*
proved to be the best. All the laws must be framed to fit that kind of community. Patterns of behaviour are also to be implanted, and not everything is to be laid down in writing. For all these reasons I shall look to nature for the origins of justice. She must be our constant guide as our discussion unfolds.
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ATTICUS:
Absolutely right. With her as our guide there can be no danger of going astray.
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MARCUS:
Well then, Pomponius, will you grant me this (for I already know Quintus’ view)
*
that the whole of nature is ruled by the immortal gods, with their force, impetus,
*
plan, power, sway (or whatever other word may express my meaning more plainly)? If you don’t accept that, our argument will have to start on that very point.
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ATTICUS:
I’ll grant it if you insist;
*
and in fact, because of all this birdsong and the gurgling of the river, I’m not worried that any of my fellow-disciples may overhear.
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MARCUS:
Ah, but you must be careful! For, like all good men, they are apt to become very angry;
*
and they won’t put up with it if they hear that you’ve failed to uphold the excellent man’s first chapter, where he has written that a god is never concerned
*
either on his own account or anyone else’s.
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ATTICUS:
Please carry on. I’d like to know the relevance of my concession.
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MARCUS:
I’ll be brief; this is the point. The creature of foresight, wisdom, variety, keenness, memory, endowed with reason and judgement, which we call man, was created by the supreme god to enjoy a remarkable status. Of all the types and species of living creatures he is the only one that participates in reason
*
and reflection, whereas none of the others do. What is there, I will not say in man, but in the whole of heaven and earth, more divine than reason
*
(a faculty which, when it has developed and become complete, is rightly called wisdom)?
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Since, then, there is nothing better than reason, and reason is present in both man and God, there is a primordial partnership in reason between man and God. But those who share reason also share right reason; and since that is law, we men must also be thought of as partners with the gods in law. Furthermore, those who share law share justice. Now those who share all these things must be regarded as belonging to the same state; and much the more so if they obey the same powers and authorities. And they do in fact obey this celestial system, the divine mind, and the all-powerful god. Hence this whole universe must be thought of as a single community shared by gods and men.
*
Now in communities there is a system (which I shall describe at the appropriate point) whereby differences of status within families are determined by blood-relationships.
*
In the context of the cosmos the same applies on a much vaster and more splendid scale, establishing ties of blood between men and gods.
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In debates on the nature of man it is usually maintained, doubtless correctly, that in the course of the continuous circuits and revolutions of the heavens the right moment arrived for sowing the human race;
*
that after being scattered and sown in the earth it was further endowed with the divine gift of mind; that whereas men derived the other elements in their make-up from their mortal nature—elements which are fragile and transitory—their mind was implanted in them by God. Hence we have what can truly be called a lineage, origin, or stock in common with the gods. That is why, out of so many species, no creature apart from man has any conception of God; and why, within mankind itself, there is no tribe so civilized or so savage as not to know that it should believe in a god, even if it is mistaken about the
kind
of god it should believe in. As a result, man recognizes God in as much as he, as it were, remembers his place of origin.
*
Again, the same moral excellence resides in man and in God, and in no other species besides. And moral excellence is nothing other than the completion and perfection of nature.
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There is, therefore, a similarity between man and God. Since that is so, what kinship, I ask you, can be closer or firmer? Nature has lavished such a wealth of things on men for their use and convenience that every growing thing seems to have been given to us on purpose; it does not come into existence by chance. And I don’t mean just what shoots forth from the fertile earth, but also domestic animals; for they were obviously created for man’s use
*
or his enjoyment
*
or his food. Again, countless skills have been discovered thanks to nature’s teaching. By copying her,
*
reason has cleverly acquired the necessities of life.
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Nature, too, has not only equipped man with mental agility; she has provided him with senses which act as his servants and messengers.
*
She has given him, as a preliminary outline, dim and not fully developed perceptions of very many things, which form a foundation, as it were, of knowledge. And she has blest him with a versatile physique in keeping with the human mind. For whereas nature made other animals stoop down to feed, she made man alone erect,
*
encouraging him to gaze at the heavens as being, so to speak, akin to him and his original home. She also shaped his facial features so as to express his innermost character. Our eyes tell our emotional state very clearly; and what we call the expression, which cannot exist in any creature except in man, indicates our character. (The Greeks know what the word means but have no equivalent
*
at all.) I need not mention the faculties and abilities of the rest of the body, such as the control of the voice and the power of speech, which is above all else the promoter of human fellowship.
*
For not everything is germane to our present discussion, and I think Scipio has dealt adequately with this topic in the books which you have read.
*
Since, then, God has created and equipped man in this way, intending him to take precedence over everything else, this point should be clear (not to go into every detail) that nature on her own account goes further. Without any teacher, starting from the sort of things she apprehended through that original rudimentary perception, she herself strengthens and completes human reason.
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ATTICUS:
Good Lord! You’re certainly going a long way back in your search for the basis of justice. For that reason I shan’t hurry you on to the discussion of civil law which I was hoping for. I would gladly have you spend the whole day on this subject. For these points that you are bringing in, as ancillary perhaps to other matters, are actually more important than the things which they serve to introduce.
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MARCUS:
Yes, the points which I am now briefly touching on
are
important. But of all the issues dealt with in philosophical debates surely nothing is more vital than the clear realization that we are born for justice, and that what is just is based, not on opinion, but on nature.
*
This will at once become clear if you examine the society of men and their relations to one another.
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Now there is no single thing that is so similar to, so like, anything else as all of us are like one another. If corrupt habits and foolish opinions did not twist and turn aside our feeble minds from their original paths, no individual would be more like himself than everyone would be like everyone else. Thus, however one defines man, the same definition applies to us all. This is sufficient proof that there is no essential difference within mankind. If there were, the same definition would not cover everyone. Reason in fact—the one thing in which we are superior to the beasts, which enables us to make valid deductions, to argue, refute our opponents, debate, solve problems, draw conclusions—that certainly is common to us all. While it may vary in what it teaches, it is constant in its ability to learn. For the same things are grasped by the senses of all, and those things that act on the senses act on the senses of all alike; and those rudimentary perceptions that are impressed on the mind (the perceptions I mentioned above) are impressed alike on
all
minds. Speech, which interprets the mind, uses different languages but expresses the same ideas. Nor is there any member of any nation who cannot attain moral excellence by using nature as his guide.
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The similarity between human beings is evident in their vices as 31 well as their virtues. They are all beguiled by pleasure, which, though it leads on to vice, bears some resemblance to what is naturally good; for it gives delight by its lightness and charm, and so, through an error of judgement, is accepted as something beneficial. Owing to a similar misconception death is shunned as though it involved the extinction of our true nature, while life is sought because it preserves us in the condition in which we were born. Pain is counted as one of the greatest evils, because it is harsh in itself and apparently leads to the dissolution
*
of our nature. Again, because good character and good reputation look alike, those who receive public honours are regarded as blessed, and the obscure are objects of pity. Troubles and joys, desires and fears, haunt the minds of all alike; and if men differ in their opinions it does not follow that those who worship a dog or a cat
*
as divine are not afflicted by the same superstition as other nations. What community does not love friendliness, generosity, and an appreciative mind which remembers acts of kindness? What community does not reject the arrogant, the wicked, the cruel, and the ungrateful—yes, and hate them too? So, since the whole human race is seen to be knit together, the final conclusion is that the principles of right living make everyone a better person. If you agree with this, let us move on to the rest of our discussion; but if you have any questions we should clear them up first.
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