The Israel-Arab Reader (30 page)

. . . We have decided to concentrate our investigation of the blocking actions in the events of October 8 on the southern front and the events of October 6-7 (till the afternoon) on the northern front. The reasons, in brief, follow:

We had two alternatives—either to examine in a general way all the battles involved in the blocking stage or to analyse in depth the battle that was decisive. We chose the second. Our job was not to write the history of the blocking actions—that would have involved years of work—but to pinpoint the main defects uncovered in this stage.

Many of the defects in this stage derive from the element of surprise. A distinction must be made between the southern and the northern fronts. In the south, the surprise was complete both in time and method of attack so that no effective steps were taken beforehand. In the north, on the other hand, the surprise mainly involved the objectives of the enemy and his method, not so much the attack itself. We chose to examine the battle of October 8 in the south because these were to be the first time that the IDF took the initiative.

What caused this battle to go wrong, among other things, was the deviation from the objectives defined by the Chief of Staff as well as lack of control on the part of the command and its inability to correctly read the progress of the battle. Furthermore, some of the steps taken that day by various command echelons stemmed consciously or unconsciously from opinions formed by commanders a long time before the Yom Kippur War and not from an analysis of the current situation. It is not our purpose to contradict or endorse these assumptions but only to examine to what extent it was appropriate to apply them given the circumstances.

From this, it is clear that a detailed study should be of the lessons and implications of this battle. It had a far-reaching effect on the entire strategy adopted thereafter by the IDF in the war and it also had potential or actual political implications.

. . . In summing up the results of the battles of October 8, we note the following:

Although the battles failed inasmuch as they did not attain the objectives set by the Southern Command, they were of great significance in the progress of the war. They contained the enemy's bridgeheads, preventing him from completely achieving the first stage of his plan. Although one reserve division was unsuccessful in its attempt to wipe out the bridgeheads, its hard fight contributed to the containment of the enemy's advance and prepared the ground for counterattack. Although another reserve division did not fight for most of that same day due to reasons beyond its control and although it sustained heavy losses on the evening of October 8 and the morning of October 9, these battles opened the way for further moves.

On Tuesday afternoon, October 9, the division deployed for a westward advance. The attempt did not succeed. But when the battle ended towards evening, a battalion reached the vicinity of the canal and thereby exposed the weak spot in the Egyptian alignment through which the IDF would subsequently cross the canal.

Finally, it must again be stressed that on the battlefields where these fights were waged, there were unsurpassed manifestations of sacrifice and bravery on the part of officers and men alike.

At the conclusion of discussions of the October 8 battles, the Commission adds some reservations and remarks about the evidence submitted on this subject.

. . . The Command was aware that hostilities might break out and took appropriate measures. Reinforcements were sent in and although the number of units was fewer than considered necessary for the defence of the Golan Heights in the event of an overall war, the imbalance was not intolerable. Units on the Golan were on a relatively high state of alert, although they too were taken aback by the scope and timing of enemy operations when war broke out.

The regulars who fought on the Golan in the initial stages distinguished themselves generally by their stubborn fight and their perseverance, like the reserves who joined them later. Supreme courage was manifest at all levels. At the front itself, units led by junior officers showed great resource. Their sometimes independent and even lone operations influenced the tide of battle in certain cases.

After the Syrian attack had been stemmed, the Northern Command switched from a situation in which the enemy had penetrated to the vicinity of the River Jordan and endangered Eastern Galilee, over to a counter-offensive which left the troops close to the enemy capital and in control of the Hermon crest.

The interim reports issued last year covered the intelligence aspect in the days before the fighting began. The probe of the intelligence aspect after the fighting began, covered the quality and organization of intelligence work, which preceded and accompanied the October 8 offensive on the southern front, as well as the intelligence reaching the units which took part in the fighting itself.

Some of the lessons emerging from what the Intelligence Corps did on the eve of the war and how it functioned hold true for the course of the fighting as well. In the initial stages, field intelligence as such scarcely existed. The Intelligence Corps, moreover was shackled by preconceived patterns of thought.

On the southern front, faulty intelligence had a considerable influence on the battles to stem the Egyptian advance.

. . . The true test of any army is not only in its being able to win when it has the initiative, but precisely when it starts from difficult circumstances and goes ahead to victory. However, having been witnesses to the brilliance with which the army of the people stood up to its difficult test, it is essential to ensure that it will not have to meet a similar test in the future and it was this that we bore in mind in drawing up the three reports. It is to be hoped that the lessons to which we have pointed will be assimilated and that our recommendations will be implemented. . . .

It is generally accepted by the IDF that there were serious disciplinary faults. A minority of the commanders believed these did not adversely affect the IDF's fighting conduct during the Yom Kippur War. Our opinion on the basis of the evidence before us is different. We explained above that there is a strong link between the level of everyday discipline in the army and the quality of performance during the supreme test of war. The readiness to sacrifice and the ability to improvise as they were revealed during the Yom Kippur War—and these are not substitutes for discipline—to a large extent extricated the army from its straits. But who knows what hitches might have been prevented had a greater degree of discipline been added to the readiness to fight.

One cannot promote trust in the IDF, insofar as it has been impaired, by banal declarations and demands for an attitude of civilian trust in respect to the army. Our public is linked by a thousand threads to the army, and reserve soldiers know very well what is going on within it. If the soldier and the junior officer work in a climate in which there is proper discipline, fulfillment of standing army orders and proper administration based on fixed rules, there is a corresponding increase in mutual trust within the ranks, in willingness to join the permanent army and in devotion of soldiers at all levels. And there will disappear of its own accord the regrettable occurrence of reserve soldiers speaking badly of the army, and the army will gain the full public trust it enjoyed in the past.

There can be no postponing the effort to remedy things that are wrong; this must be integrated with the difficult task of broadening the forces and physically strengthening them, because between these two there is a strong reciprocal link. The IDF and Israel's people are indeed one. Thus it is precisely for the IDF, and primarily for its senior command, to pave the way for the elimination of faults which began to penetrate into its ranks from the civilian sector—and thus to make a decisive contribution to the improvement of society generally. The IDF is capable of meeting this difficult task for which it was given instruments and sanctions that are not at the disposal of civilian society.

Q.
—What is your analysis of the Palestinian and Arab political situations after the October War?

A.
—Almost nine months have elapsed since the cease-fire; during this time, some Arab and some international powers have worked from the principle of political struggle based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 to insure the Israeli withdrawal from the Arab territories, on the one hand, and to achieve what was called giving the Palestinian people their full right to self-determination.

What are the results of this policy? Part of the Arab land was regained—on the Syrian and Egyptian fronts—but in lieu of what? What exactly is the price?

On the imperialistic level: the prominent achievement of American imperialism as a result of this policy is the return of American influence to the area, and the continuous expansion of this influence politically, economically and morally. This truth reaffirms the enemy's nature and its aggressive identity, in spite of all attempts by the subservient systems and reactionary forces to decorate imperialism's ugly face. The results of the return of imperialism's influence to the area affected the close relations between the USSR and the Arab people. These are the most important concrete truths that surfaced during the recent nine months.

On the Arab level: in return for the disengagement steps on the Egyptian and Syrian fronts, those systems sacrificed their power of military confrontation which enables them to continue the struggle and secures for them the complete extraction of their rights. Additionally, there was the step of lifting the oil embargo from the imperialistic countries which supported Zionism in its war against the Arab people.

Here, it must be indicated that the proposed plans of “settlement” might be affected by the internal developments in America (for example, the Watergate scandal) or any developments that may occur in the world. But what must be clear is that America will remain eager and will push in the direction of settlement as long as this “settlement” guarantees the return of its interests and their continuity for the longest possible interval. Therefore, efforts will continue in the direction of more steps towards “settlement.” Based on this obvious principle, in return for every piece of land recovered by the Arab side, the Arabs are required to pay the price to the imperialistic powers and Israel—part of this price paid to imperialism and part to Israel.

Q.
—What is the position of the Front toward the official visit of the PLO delegation, headed by Yasser Arafat, to the USSR in August of this year?

A.
—The Front decided not to join the delegation. This position is not against the USSR despite our disagreemnts on many issues. Rather, we consider the USSR a power that is supporting our people's struggle. We also consider the Soviets friends of the Arab and Palestinian struggle. It is a mistaken position to put the Soviets and the Americans in one basket for only their general convergence of opinion concerning Resolution 242 and their agreement on the general lines of a political settlement. We consider the USSR a friend of the Palestinian struggle. We are convinced that the continuity of the Palestinian political and military struggle and our success in guaranteeing this continuity, eventually to the level that will mobilize the Arab masses according to a well-rooted revolutionary political line, will definitely lead to a reconsideration by the USSR of the nature of the existing struggle in the area, and the truths about the presence of the Zionist state which means no more than the existence of a racist, fascist and aggressive state. No peace will materialize as long as the Zionist state exists. This is the only conclusion that can be drawn by our masses based on this fact. The day will come when the Communist and leftist powers will uncover the true core and substance of the Zionist system.

We should not misinterpret international contradictions. The Front's decision not to participate in the PLO's delegation to Moscow does not express a position estranged from the Soviets, for whom we possess every appreciation, but it is a position against the PLO's leadership who wished the delegation travelling to Moscow to be “homogeneous.” In our opinion, homogeneity means the common representation of a political line, which is the line leading towards political settlement. But we must keep in mind that within the Palestinian circle there exist two completely contradictory political lines, one on either end. One line wants the PLO to be a part of the political settlement and the other line considers this a dangerous national divergence, and considers the present mission of the struggle to keep the PLO outside the boundaries of the settlement. Based on this came our demand that the delegation be composed of all the member organizations of the Executive Council so that the delegation fairly represents the coexisting and contradictory political lines within the Liberation Organization.

There is another reason for our nonparticipation in the organization's delegation to Moscow: the delegation which was appointed to travel left without the Executive Council of the organization discussing the specific missions to be deliberated with our Soviet comrades, and without specifying a position on all the subjects proposed. The unilateral decision-making of the PLO must not continue. Our position is an expression of our rejection of the sense of unilateral decision-making that is predominant in the leadership of the PLO.

Q.
—What practical steps will the “rejection front” take at the Palestinian and Arab levels?

A.
—In fact what is called the rejection forces is nothing but an expression of Palestinian and Arab forces that emerged from an analysis, summarized as follows: the Palestinian revolution is strained and ends when it becomes a part of the political settlement presently proposed, and the continuity of the revolution is only ensured by resisting and fighting the proposed political settlement plans. These forces now work as though they are one front. But such a front did not arise until now. It is the duty of these forces to organize one front that has its own political programme, a list of specified organizational interrelationships and consolidated struggle programmes. Presently it is the duty of this front to work within the framework of the Liberation Organization to prevent its complete deviation, so that the Liberation Organization does not become part of the settlement.