The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam From the Extremists (14 page)

claims to power. Fueled by the supremacist and puritan creed, these groups’ symbolic acts of power become uncompromis- ingly fanatic and violent.

It would be inaccurate to contend that militant supremacist groups fill the vacuum of authority in contemporary Islam. Militant groups such as al-Qa’ida or the Taliban, despite their ability to commit highly visible acts of violence, are a socio- logical and intellectual marginality in Islam. However, these groups are in fact extreme manifestations of more prevalent intellectual and theological currents in modern Islam. In my view, they are extreme manifestations of the rather widespread theological orientation of puritanism. While it is true that Bin Laden is the quintessential example of a Muslim that was cre- ated, shaped, and motivated by postcolonial experience, he is representative of underlying currents in contemporary Islam. Much of what constitutes Islam today was shaped as a defen- sive reaction to the postcolonial experience, either as the prod- uct of uncritical cheerleading on behalf of what was presumed to be the Islamic tradition, or as an obstinate rejectionism against what was presumed to be the Western tradition. As such, the likes of Bin Laden are the children of a profound dis- sonance and dysfunctionalism experienced toward both the Is- lamic heritage and modernity. In my view, Bin Laden, as the whole of the puritan movement, is an orphan of modernity, but their claim to an authentic lineage in the Islamic civiliza- tion is tenuous at best. They were produced by the onslaught of modernity—but like illegitimate children, they are an em- barrassment to the modern age that produced them, and they are not rooted in the Islamic civilization either.

All religious systems have suffered at one time or another from absolutist extremism, and Islam is not an exception. But the Muslim mainstream has always managed to prevail by forcing extremists to either moderate their views or risk

extinction.
3
Other than the Khawarij, there were other ex- tremists, such as the Qaramites and Assassins, whose terror became the raison d’être for their very existence, and who earned unmitigated infamy in the writings of Muslim histori- ans, theologians, and jurists. After centuries of bloodshed these two groups also learned moderation, and they continue to exist in small numbers in North Africa and Iraq. The es- sential lesson taught by Islamic history is that extremist groups are ejected from the mainstream of Islam; they are marginalized, and they eventually come to be treated as a heretical aberration to the Islamic message.

The problem today, however, is that the traditional institu- tions of Islam that historically acted to marginalize extremist creeds no longer exist. This is what makes this period of Is- lamic history far more troublesome than any other, and this is also what makes modern puritan orientations far more threat- ening to the integrity of the morality and values of Islam than any of the previous extremist movements. This is perhaps the first time in history that the center of the Islamic world, Mecca and Medina, has been under the control of a puritanical state for such a prolonged period of time.

In the course of lecturing and teaching about Islam in dif- ferent parts of the world, I have been asked by many people whether there is something in Islam itself that encourages ex- tremism, because how else would an extremist marginal fac- tion manage to gain so many adherents and become such a visible reality in the world today? If the puritans are a small percentage of the Muslim world, how could the puritans gain such strength to the point of threatening to fill the vacuum of authority in modern Islam? Although I think it is highly un- likely that this threat will become reality, the existence of the threat is indeed troubling and difficult to understand.

But in response I often answer in the following way: There

is a Jewish sect known as the Karaites that came into being in the eighth century. The Karaites continue to exist today, but in small numbers. The doctrine of the sect was characterized pri- marily by its rejection of the Talmudic and Rabbinical tradi- tion and its interpretive methods. The Karaites claimed to base all their laws on a literal and strict reading of the Torah, and they also claimed to apply God’s law without the interference of human subjectivities. Not surprisingly, the laws of the sect tended to be severe and at times harsh. The Karaites have re- mained a marginal minority in Judaism, but imagine if they were suddenly sponsored by an extremely wealthy Jewish na- tion that also happened to be in possession of the most holy of Jewish sites. If this happened, it is reasonable to imagine that the adherents of the Karaites would have significantly in- creased in numbers and that the sect would have become a se- rious contender in any effort to define Jewish orthodoxy.

It should not be surprising that, thanks to Saudi largesse, the puritans have become a considerable force in modern Islam. Considering the realities, it was inevitable. But there is another reality to consider: when extremist groups become more successful and thrive, their extremism only increases. This is especially the case when extremist groups are on the one hand supported by some and on the other hand oppressed by others. Their continued ability to spread successfully de- spite the oppression that confronts them further radicalizes them and strengthens their polarized vision of the world. Therefore, it is not surprising that the puritan movement that Saudi Arabia has for so long supported and nurtured is now turning its zeal against the Saudi state. Al-Qa’ida and several other Wahhabi organizations have sought to overthrow the Saudi government for not being sufficiently Wahhabi. Re- cently, there has been a wave of terrorist attacks in Saudi Ara- bia, and also armed clashes between the military and

puritanical groups. Like the Ikhwan, who in the early twenti- eth century rebelled against their Saudi rulers because those rulers failed to meet their puritanical expectations and stan- dards, puritan groups today are exacting from Saudi Arabia the price for nurturing the same type of monster. As in the early twentieth century, the Saudi rulers today find themselves forced to seek the aid of non-Muslims (this time the Ameri- cans instead of the British) in trying to contain the puritan monster seeking to overthrow their government.

Although history demonstrates that attempting to sponsor and leverage the zeal of puritanism to serve the state’s interest is playing with the proverbial fire—a fire that is likely to burn everything, including those who ignited it in the first place—it is unlikely that the Saudi state will reverse its support of puri- tanism. If Saudi Arabia were to sponsor a more moderate ver- sion of Islam, it would lose its ability to define orthodoxy in the Muslim world. Other Muslim countries are eminently bet- ter positioned to authoritatively contribute to the definition of Islamic moderation, and the Saudi state would lose its privi- leged position in the Muslim world. While it is not impossible for the Saudi state to reinvent itself, other Muslim states, like Indonesia, Egypt, and Malaysia, have had a much longer and better-established tradition of practicing Islamic moderation. The Saudi state has sponsored puritan Islam and derived its le- gitimacy from that extremist creed for so long that a major political restructuring would be very difficult to achieve.

In my view, the most remarkable fact in this whole narra- tive is the resilience of the Islamic faith. Despite all the sus- tained efforts of the Saudis, and all the bombastic criminality of the puritans, the Islamic mainstream lives on. The vast ma- jority of Muslims are not puritans, but they practice a tradi- tional form of Islam based on inherited beliefs and practices that is distinctively different from the puritan creed. For in-

stance, the puritans prohibit all forms of music, and yet there is no Muslim country that is not flooded with all kinds of Western and non-Western music. The puritans prohibit women from seeking employment outside the home, and yet women make up a sizable percentage of the workforce in most Muslim countries. The story of the puritans told in this book is the story of the exception to the mainstream in Islam.

Nevertheless, the Muslim mainstream is targeted by puri- tans. The puritan creed is strongly evangelical, and through proselytizing, the puritans hope to convert the mainstream to what they consider to be the true Islam. In my view, this is where moderate Muslims must play a critical role. For the rea- sons discussed, the juristic class will not be able to play its his- torical role in marginalizing the puritans. The burden must fall on moderate Muslims to articulate the alternative to the puri- tan menace. Moderate Muslims must be able to tap into the collective inherited memory of Muslims and remind them that the moderate way is indeed the heart and soul of Islam. The moderates should seek to fill the vacuum of authority by standing steadfast, upholding Islam as it was before it was co- opted and forced to alleviate the puritans’ sense of social and political alienation. Moderates should seek to recapture the purity of the Islamic message as it was before it was twisted and altered by the puritans and forced to cater to the egoism and opportunism of puritanical causes. Moderates should seek to convince the Muslim world that they are the guardians of the true faith, which existed for centuries—long before the modern puritans came along and decided that the Islamic faith needed fixing.

To accomplish any of that, first it is imperative that moder- ates start by setting out the tenets of their beliefs. To my knowledge, this book is the first attempt to do just that. In set- ting out the moderate perspective, I have strived to summarize

the fruits of years of involvement and experience with Muslim thinkers and scholars around the Muslim world. Humility and honesty demand that I admit the subjective nature of this task. The theology and law explained below in subsequent chapters are the culmination of the writings, lectures, and conversa- tions by and with individuals that either described themselves as moderate Muslims or that I clearly perceived as moderate. In my view, moderate Muslims are individuals who believe in Islam as the true faith, who practice and believe in the five pil- lars of Islam (see Chapter 5), and who accept the inherited Is- lamic tradition, but who modify certain aspects of that tradition in order to fulfill the ultimate moral objectives of the faith in the modern age.

Individuals who accept the inherited tradition but do not modify any aspect of that tradition at all I categorize as con- servative. However, for the purposes of this book, for the most part I discount their views. Conservatives accept the inherited tradition without modification because they refuse to admit that the modern age mandates any reforms whatsoever. Practi- cally speaking, the line separating the conservatives from the puritans is so thin that the difference is often blurred. In effect, conservatives end up adopting a literalist method of interpre- tation and do not believe that any aspect of the Islamic tradi- tion, as they understand it, needs to be reinterpreted in order to better achieve the ethical and moral objectives of the faith in the modern age. Other than the fact that I find the conser- vative approach unconvincing, I do not believe that conser- vatism is the creed of most Muslims in the modern age. In any case, this book is not about the belief system of the conserva- tives, and therefore I address their convictions only for the purposes of contrast and comparison.

Methodologically, I have discounted the views of two other groups as well. There has been a tendency among certain

circles, particularly in the West, to accredit Islam-bashers, or former Muslims, as
reformers
and
moderates
. This seems to me offensively incongruous. The category I have in mind here are individuals who write books seeking to explain why they are not Muslims, or claiming that they are clinging to Islam with their fingertips because they were born Muslim but now find nothing about Islam appealing or convincing. Accordingly, this category of people does not believe in or practice the five pil- lars of Islam, and accepts no part of the Islamic tradition as ei- ther desirable or personally binding. It is fair to describe this group of people as critics of Islam, but they are certainly not re- formers. What they offer is a deconstruction of the Islamic faith; and regardless of how helpful their views might be, they have chosen to take themselves out of the Muslim fold. They can be considered Muslims only if it is possible to consider Bertrand Russell, who wrote a book explaining why he is not a Christian, a Christian. Nevertheless, remarkable as it might be, some non-Muslim Western writers designate these critics as true and real moderate Muslims. This is akin to saying that the true moderate Muslim is a self-hating Muslim who finds his faith utterly absurd and offensive. This, of course, is their pre- rogative, but it is silly to call this group of people moderate Muslims. In all cases, this book is not about them, and hence I did not attempt to represent their views.

The other category of people that I have discounted is what may be described as the magic-wand reformers. In the current crisis of authority, the Islamic world has become plagued with armchair pontificators who are self-declared experts and who decree what Islam is because they
will
it to be so. This group of individuals does not bother with annoyances such as methodology, evidence, or alternative views. I do not mean id- iosyncratic views: idiosyncratic views that are based on dili- gence in researching the evidence, and on a fair consideration

of the method of analysis, are worthy of consideration. I am referring instead to what has become a well-known phe- nomenon in contemporary Islam—that of self-declared ex- perts who claim to take on the job of reforming Islamic thought without being minimally qualified to do so. Typically, these magic-wand reformers are by profession engineers, med- ical doctors, or even social scientists who might be competent as sociologists or political scientists, but their knowledge and command of the Islamic intellectual tradition or its texts is minimal at best. Despite their poor knowledge of Islam, or perhaps because of their lack of familiarity with the Islamic in- tellectual tradition, these magic-wand reformers write books containing sweeping and unsubstantiated generalizations about what Islam is and what it ought to be. Although invari- ably lacking any systematic training in Islamic jurisprudence and its methodologies, often such writers designate themselves as
muftis
and call for what they describe as widespread per- sonalized
ijtihad,
which often amounts to nothing more than a call for egotistical self-idolatry. But in attempting to set out the creed of moderate Muslims, I did not give much heed to these egotistical views, which are expressed by individuals who do not show any awareness of the fact that a religion cannot be built on self-idolatry, and whose only evidence that Islam is this or that is that they decided that it is so. People often ask me by what standards they should measure the knowledge and qualifications of someone from whom they should accept counsel on matters of Islamic law. While this is a complex matter, at a minimum such a person should have received at least twenty years of formal training in Islamic law, should be intimately knowledgeable of the local culture, and should have a balanced, humanistic view (since, for example, someone who hates women cannot render fair judgment on issues per- taining to women).