The Battle of White Sulphur Springs (3 page)

Averell's personality mirrored that of the army's commander, Major General George B. McClellan, a trait that cost him dearly. “McClellan and Averell would take time to reorganize, reequip and retrain their forces even if it meant stopping the momentum of battle. Lack of a visceral desire to aim for the jugular of a defeated enemy eventually would cost both men their commands,” observed a modern historian.
²⁰
Like McClellan, Averell was a Democrat. Averell did not trust politicians, and he certainly did not trust the Republican administration, whose bungling he blamed for the war. He also did not believe that amateur soldiers and politicians had any role in the
army
, believing that only professional soldiers like him should command large bodies of troops in the field. His haughtiness greatly hindered his military career in the highly politicized environment of the Army of the Potomac.

At the end of December 1862, Averell, who now commanded the cavalry brigade assigned to the Army of the Potomac's Center Grand Division, proposed a daring cavalry raid on Richmond. Averell wanted fifteen hundred of the Army of the Potomac's best mounted elements to demonstrate along the upper Rappahannock River while Averell led an expedition of one thousand picked men from a variety of units, including the U.S. Regular cavalry regiments. He wanted to cross the Rappahannock River at Kelly's Ford, advance to the Rapidan, cross it at Raccoon Ford and then cross the upper James River. He expected to destroy the railroads, bridges and telegraph lines between the Army of the Potomac's position and Richmond and intended to live off the land during his raid.
²¹
Averell wanted to dash to the crucial railroad junction at Petersburg and then on to Suffolk, disrupting lines of communication and supply in the Confederate rear. In the meantime, while Averell's horsemen wreaked havoc in the Southern rear, Major General Ambrose E. Burnside, now the commander of the Army of the Potomac, would take the main body, cross the river and either sever Lee's lines of supply or defeat him in battle. Averell proposed the North's first large-scale cavalry raid of the Civil War.

Burnside enthusiastically approved the plan and instructed Averell to make the necessary preparations. However, Confederate cavalry chief Major General J.E.B. Stuart had already set out on a raid of his own, the Christmas 1862 raid on Dumfries, near the army's rear. President Lincoln told Burnside to call off Averell's raid, stating, “I have good reason for saying you must not make a general movement of the army without letting me know.” Lincoln probably scotched the planned raid in order to make certain that adequate mounted forces remained to chase after Stuart.
²²
However, Averell had devised a bold and dashing plan that planted the seed for future raids on Richmond by the Union cavalry. Stuart's Christmas raid cost the Union cavalry the initiative, and instead of a glowing triumph, the Federal army faced another embarrassment at the hands of its plumed rival, Stuart.
²³
However, Averell's audacious plan marked an important first for the mounted forces assigned to the Army of the Potomac. Averell's proposal would have taken an aggressive stance, which was not something that the Union cavalry had done to date. It also marked the beginning of a long-term dream of the Federal cavalry, the idea of a large-scale cavalry raid on the Confederate capital. Raiding not only became Averell's specialty, he also had more success at it than any other Union general during the Civil War.

During the long winter of the Army of the Potomac's discontent in 1862–63, rumors swirled. First, Burnside suffered a severe and bloody defeat at the December 13–14 Battle of Fredericksburg. Burnside then conceived of a follow-up campaign in January that bogged down in the deep, thick Virginia mud when torrential rains turned the roads impassable. At the end of January, Burnside was relieved of command at his own request after the misery of his failed Mud March, as it became known. Major General Joseph Hooker then assumed command of the Army of the Potomac.

“It is reported here that you will be made new chief of cavalry in this army,” wrote a fellow officer to Averell on February 3. “I hope it is so if you would prefer it. The brigade cannot spare you because it does not know when it can get a commander.”
²⁴
Another rumor held that the Army of the Potomac would be broken up and its horse soldiers sent to South Carolina. A few days later, Averell received a letter from his old friend Captain William Redwood Price stating, “General [William S.] Rosecrans's [Army of the Cumberland] is greatly in need of Cavalry. I thought it might be of interest to you under existing circumstances. If the Army of the Potomac is to be divided up, you might feel inclined to make efforts to come to the Western Army.”
²⁵

These were just rumors. Instead, Hooker massed the Army of the Potomac's cavalry into a single corps and placed Major General George Stoneman in command of it. Averell assumed command of the Second Cavalry Division, which included his own 3
^rd
Pennsylvania Cavalry. His command bore the brunt of the winter fighting, first at Hartwood Church in February 1863 and then during the daylong Battle of Kelly's Ford, fought on St. Patrick's Day, March 17, 1863. Averell's troopers fought Stuart's vaunted horsemen—led by his old friend Fitz Lee—to a draw at Kelly's Ford and then withdrew, proving for the first time that the Union cavalry could go boot-to-boot with the best that J.E.B. Stuart's cavaliers had to offer.
²⁶
“For gallant and meritorious services” at Kelly's Ford, Averell, whose regular army rank was still captain, received a brevet to major.

Hooker planned a massive movement of the Army of the Potomac that spring. He contemplated stealing a march around Lee's flank upriver from Fredericksburg, flanking the Army of Northern Virginia out of its strong positions at Fredericksburg and then interdicting Lee's lines of communication and supply with Richmond. Lee would then have to come out and fight the Army of the Potomac on ground of Hooker's choosing. As part of that plan, Hooker intended to send Stoneman's entire twelve-thousand-man Cavalry Corps on an interdiction raid deep into Virginia, but heavy rains delayed the commencement of the raid for nearly two weeks.

By then, the element of surprise had been lost, and when Stoneman finally moved two weeks later, the mission had changed. Averell's division only advanced a few miles beyond the Rappahannock River before running into stiff resistance from cavalry under the command of Brigadier General W.H.F. Lee. Repulsed, Averell fell back to Ely's Ford on the Rapidan River, not far from the main Union battle lines at Chancellorsville.

A livid Hooker relieved Averell of command on May 4, sending Brigadier General Alfred Pleasonton to deliver the bad news in person. Hooker claimed that Averell had entirely disregarded his orders for the expedition,

in consequence thereof, the services of nearly 4,000 cavalry were lost, or nearly lost, to the country during an eventful period, when it was his plain duty to have rendered services of incalculable value. It is not excuse or justification of his course that he received instructions from General Stoneman in conflict with my own, and it was his duty to know that neither of them afforded an excuse for his culpable indifference and inactivity. If he disregarded all instructions, it was his duty to do something. If the enemy did not come to him, he should have gone to the enemy
.

Hooker noted that Averell's command greatly outnumbered any enemy forces in the area, that his march was largely unopposed and that Averell's division covered more than fifty miles without fighting the enemy's cavalry. Hooker's greatest complaint, however, was:

It is unnecessary for me to add that this army will never be able to accomplish its mission under commanders who not only disregard their instructions, but at the same time display so little zeal and devotion in the performance of their duties. I could excuse General Averell in his disobedience if I could anywhere discover in his operations a desire to find and engage the enemy
.
²⁷

Twelve years after the war, Hooker remained bitter about Averell's conduct during the Stoneman Raid. “If he had attempted to give my orders a flagrant and full disobedience, he could not have made his dispositions to accomplish that purpose more complete,” he complained in a letter to historian Samuel P. Bates. “He did not strike the Rail Road on the 3
^rd
and encountered a train filled with prisoners and wounded men, but doing the Rail Road no damage, beyond a temporary delay…On the 3
^rd
of May, hearing that Genl. Averell was not one day's march from me, I ordered him in, his loss having been two men wounded and one killed.”
²⁸

Colonel William E. Doster of the 4
^th
Pennsylvania Cavalry spotted Averell sitting alone in his headquarters tent on the day before the disconsolate general departed for Washington. Averell sat “quite alone,” Doster observed, “with his head resting on his hand…dejected.” Doster thought that the deposed division commander resembled “a condemned cavalry horse.”
²⁹

When he arrived at Culpeper on May 1, Averell did just as Hooker ordered, directing his attentions to the Confederate railroads. He chased off the Southern defenders and obeyed the orders of his direct superior, Stoneman, who had instructed Averell to push the Confederates to Rapidan Station and keep them fully occupied. Again, Averell did just as was instructed. He obeyed both the letter and the spirit of his orders. If Hooker had not recalled him, Averell would have reached Gordonsville by dark on May 2, but he never got the chance. Stoneman, Averell's direct superior, had given the division commander differing orders from those given by Hooker. Averell did what good soldiers do—he obeyed the orders of his direct superior. Averell realized that if he took care of his troopers, they would take care of their mission. His instinct to protect his command is often misconstrued as undue caution and lack of aggressiveness. The New Yorker was keenly aware of his duty to protect the lives of the soldiers entrusted to his command, and he always acted accordingly. Undoubtedly, Hooker's inability to communicate with Averell further aggravated the situation.

In his zeal to find scapegoats for the disaster that befell him at Chancellorsville, Hooker directed his wrath at the unfortunate Averell. When he reported to the adjutant general of the army in Washington, D.C., Averell did not go quietly: “[A]s the orders seem to be unjust towards him, he asks for an enquiry respecting his conduct.”
³⁰
His request for a court of inquiry was swept under the rug, and nothing more came of it.

On May 14, Averell noted in his diary, “Tried to gain some satisfaction at War Dept. did not succeed.” A few days later, he recorded, “[C]ould get no explanation of the causes of my being relieved from my command in the Army of the Potomac.”
³¹
Averell knew that Hooker intended to scapegoat him for the loss at Chancellorsville, and he resisted it to the best of his ability, ensuring that the official records reflected his protest and declarations of innocence.
³²
The experience crushed Averell, who never forgave Hooker for the treatment he received at the commanding general's hands.

However, William Averell was nothing if not a good soldier, so he obeyed the orders, boarded a train of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad and reported to Wheeling, where, on May 23, he assumed command of the Fourth Separate Brigade, a ragtag command of cavalry and infantry from Ohio, Pennsylvania and West Virginia. These undisciplined troops desperately needed a firm hand and training, and Averell was just the man to turn them into a reliable command. The success of the Jones-Imboden Raid had caused the Federal high command to reevaluate its strategy for fending off cavalry raids. Small outposts of infantry were scattered throughout the mountains, but without much cavalry support, meaning that the Union units were not very mobile and not able to react quickly to cavalry raids. The ineffective response to the advance of Jones's cavalry as far north as Morgantown brought about a change in strategy, and Averell was just the man to make it happen.
³³

“General Averell and staff arrived here yesterday afternoon and today after Church we had a grand parade and review of all the force here,” noted one of Averell's new soldiers. “Infantry, Cavalry, and Artillery all together—it was a nice show, but it was awful warm.”
³⁴
The men of the Fourth Independent Brigade saluted Averell's assumption of command “with demonstrations of genuine rejoicing by the officers and men,” as one veteran recalled.
³⁵
His new command took an instant liking to the New Yorker. One of his West Virginians recalled that they “always had a great liking for the dashing general and admired his courage and ability” and also observed that Averell “was one of the ablest cavalry officers in the army.”
³⁶
Another noted, “General Averell's reputation as a gallant and successful cavalry fighter had preceded his coming by several months, and to be placed under such a leader was inspiring to these troops, who were at all times eager for the active operations of war.”
³⁷
With good leadership, the Fourth Separate Brigade could become a good, reliable command.

The Fourth Separate Brigade consisted of three regiments of West Virginia infantry, the 14
^th
Pennsylvania Cavalry, Major Thomas Gibson's Independent Cavalry Battalion, Battery G of the 1
^st
West Virginia Light Artillery and a signal detachment of the 68
^th
New York Infantry.
³⁸
His brigade probably numbered about sixteen to eighteen hundred men at the time that he took command on May 23.
³⁹

Averell immediately converted the 2
^nd
, 3
^rd
and 8
^th
West Virginia Infantry Regiments into mounted infantry and sent them to a “camp of instruction” near Clarksburg, where they received horses and cavalry accoutrements. The idea was to organize a highly mobile strike force that would be able to meet Confederate partisan rangers on their own ground, as the soldiers of the Fourth Separate Brigade were intimately familiar with the area and with the difficulties associated with mountain fighting. Unless they were mounted, the infantrymen would be unable to keep up with the enemy's cavalry. The Union high command specifically selected these regiments for this difficult and dangerous service.
⁴⁰