The Battle of Britain (37 page)

Night:
Scattered weak nuisance raids.

Aircraft losses:
RAF 8, Luftwaffe 19.

Thursday, August 15:
Fine over Britain. Began with cloud over France and the Channel, but this cleared by early afternoon. This, one of the three days that most influenced the outcome of the whole Battle, became known to the Luftwaffe as ‘Black Thursday'.

For the first time, Generaloberst Stumpff's Luftflotte 5, based in Norway and Denmark, was to take part in operations against Britain. Its targets were in north-east England. Air Fleet 2's were in the south-east and No. 3's in the south. Their aerodromes stretched from Stavanger to Cherbourg and they were dispersed as follows:

Bf 109 and Bf 110; Guernsey, Caen, Le Havre, Dieppe, Abbeville, Wissant, St Omer, Calais, Rotterdam, Stavanger.

Ju 87: Flers, Falaise, Pas de Calais.

Ju 88, He 111 and Do 17: Tours, Orléans-Bricy, Chartres, Evreux, Villacoublay, Montdidier, Laon, Cambrai, Lille, Brussels, Amsterdam, Iborg (Denmark), Stavanger (Norway).

The Luftwaffe Intelligence Section had wrongly assessed the RAF fighter strength as 300: approximately half the actual figure.

Day:
At 1130hrs 60 Ju 87s and about 40 Bf 109s attacked Lympne, which was out of use for the next two days, and also Hawkinge and Manston. Damage to mains electricity put radar stations at Dover, Rye and Foreness off the air. Nos. 54 and 501 squadrons intercepted this raid.

At 1245hrs, 63 He 111s from Stavanger escorted by 21 Bf 110s (with drop tanks) were 25 miles (40 km) north-east of their target, Newcastle-on-Tyne, when No. 72 Sqn jumped them, thanks to radar detecting activity soon after noon, apparently heading for the Firth of Forth. This was a feint, made by 20 German seaplanes. Coincidentally, when the real raid approached, it made a vast navigational error and also appeared off the Firth of Forth before turning south. This was No. 13 Group's first daylight raid. Nos. 14, 65, 79 and 607 were also sent up. The attackers were driven off with the loss of 8 Heinkels and 7 Messerschmitts. No bombs hit the target airfields. For a second raid of some 50 unescorted Ju 88s from Årlborg. Nos. 73, 264, 616 and 219 Sqns were ordered off. No. 616 and a flight of No. 73 intercepted these. Bombs fell on houses and an ammunition dump at Bridlington (Yorkshire). The bomber station at Driffield (Yorks) was damaged and 10 aeroplanes were destroyed on the ground. Six of the enemy were brought down.

Luftflotte 5 did not attack by day again,

In the afternoon Ju 87s, Bf 109s and 110s bombed and strafed the fighter station at Martlesham Heath (Suffolk). Raids of 150 and 100 were engaged by Nos. 1, 17, 32, 64, 151 and 601 Sqns, but damaged the aircraft factory at Rochester. Some attacked Dover, Rye, Foreness and Bawdsey radars but without doing much harm. Late that afternoon more heavy raids were mounted. Seven fighter squadrons took off to deal with them. Biggin Hill, Worthy Down and Odiham aerodromes, and Portland, were damaged. Bombs intended for Kenley hit Croydon airfield. This was in Greater London and therefore proscribed by Hitler. Both he and Goering were enraged; not for humanitarian reasons, but because they feared a reprisal on Berlin. RAF flew 974 sorties. Abteilung 8, the Research Section, calculated that the Luftwaffe flew 1,786 sorties: 801 by bombers and dive bombers, 1,149 by fighters, of Air Fleets 2 and 3; and 169 of both by Air Fleet 5.

Night:
Bristol, Birmingham, Boston, Southampton, Crewe, Harwich, Swansea, and the Yorkshire non-industrial town of Beverley were bombed.

Aircraft losses:
RAF 30 fighters and 17 pilots, 16 pilots wounded. Luftwaffe: 75. Because the weather had looked unpromising that morning, Goering had summoned Sperrle and Kesselring to his home, Karinhall. His main theme was that the Stukas were too vulnerable to fighter attack. The decisions he took that day were:

1. That ‘Operations are to be directed exclusively against the enemy air force, including the aircraft industry. Shipping should be attacked only when circumstances are exceptionally favourable. Other targets are to be ignored.'

2. That three fighter formations must accompany each Stuka formation. The first would go ahead to take on the defending fighters. The second would dive with the Stukas. The third would give high cover.

3. That there must be only one officer in any crew flying over Britain.

4. That he doubted the value of raiding radar sites ‘as not one of those so far attacked has been put out of action.'

The first two decisions betrayed either his obstinacy or his obtuseness: it was not possible for fighters to fly as slowly as any bombers without wasting time and fuel on weaving; and, having no air brakes, they would out-dive the Stukas and leave them unprotected when they were at their most vulnerable. And he could, or would, not see that the RAF fighters were breaking up his raids: hence bombs falling elsewhere than on airfields and aircraft factories were either being jettisoned or aimed at secondary targets chosen by the pilots. The third decision acknowledged his sudden fear of Fighter Command. The fourth was a delusion for which faulty German intelligence was to blame.

Friday, August 16:
Fair, but Channel hazy. Despite the inaccuracy of their Intelligence, the Luftwaffe opened the day with justified optimism. Germany calculated that Fighter Command's strength was down to 430, of which 300 were operationally serviceable; and assessed monthly aircraft production as a maximum of 300. The facts were that Dowding had 570 Spitfires and Hurricanes and 102 Defiants, Gladiators and Blenheims at his disposal, with a reserve of 235 Spitfires and Hurricanes. Aircraft production had risen to 440 a month. (Bf 109 production was 164 in June, 220 in July, 173 in August, 218 in September.) Britain's lack lay in fighter pilots, and that day there were only 1,379 against an establishment of 1,558.

But the enemy did have the advantage in numbers, because Fighter Command's squadrons were spread throughout the British Isles, whereas the preponderance of the Luftwaffe's strength was thrown against one, two or three small areas at a time. Also, the enemy bombers, which outnumbered even their escorting fighters, had a formdable aggregate of fire power. Every raid that the RAF, met, therefore, out-gunned it massively. The obvious comparison is with David and Goliath, and it is a good one.

Day:
Raids began by noon. West Malling was rendered unserviceable for four days. This, Tangmere, and its satellite Westhampnet, and Manston were the only fighter stations attacked. Other airfields hit were Farnborough, Harwell, Brize Norton, Lee-on-Solent (Fleet Air Arm). Many aircraft were destroyed on the ground, but only three fighters. London docks and suburbs attacked, civilians
killed, railway lines hit. Ventnor (Isle of Wight) radar put out of action despite Goering's edict. Flight Lieutenant James Nicolson of No. 249 Squadron won Fighter Command's first Victoria Cross. His aircraft set on fire by a Bf 110, he stayed with it until he had shot his enemy down.

Night:
Light attacks on Bristol, Chester, Newport, Swansea, Portland, Tavistock (Devon non-industrial town), Worcester (cathedral city).

Aircraft losses:
RAF 22, Luftwaffe 45.

Saturday, August 17:
Fine.

Day:
Frustrated, weary Luftwaffe flew only reconnaissance.

Night:
Small raids on Wales, north-west England and Midlands.

Aircraft losses:
RAF 0, Luftwaffe 3.

Sunday, August 18:
Fine, becoming cloudy.

This was the day on which Germany expected to smash Fighter Command once and for all. Goering had available 276 Ju 87; 768 Ju 88, He 111 and Do 17; 194 Bf 110; 745 Bf 109; and, for reconnaissance, 52 Bf 110, Ju 88, He 111 and Do 17.

Fighter Command's serviceability state was 419 Hurricanes and 211 Spitfires. There were also 25 Blenheims, 21 Defiants, 1 Gladiator.

Day:
Midday saw attacks by huge formations on West Malling, Biggin Hill, Kenley – grievously damaged by 100 bombs – and Croydon. In early afternoon, heavy raids struck three Coastal Command and Naval airfields at Gosport, Thorney Island and Ford, and Poling radar station. No. 152 Sqn Spitfires and No. 43 Sqn Hurricanes did such terrible execution among the Stukas – I/St 77 alone lost 12 out of 28, and six barely limped back to France – that these were withdrawn from the battle. Galland was absent, on his way to see Goering. His second-in-command, Oberleutnant Schöpfel, leading III/JG26, shot down four Hurricanes in two minutes in the Folkestone–Canterbury area. On the subject of the Luftwaffe's losses during the past 10 days, Galland said, comparing the Hurricanes' and Spitfires' eight machine guns with the Bf 109s' one cannon and two machine guns, that the latter armament was ‘A good idea for a very good shot, but the average pilot is not so good: he needs a shotgun. The Spitfire is a real shotgun, so is better armed than the 109 when shooting while turning.'

Night:
Bombs fell on Bristol, eastern England and south Wales. Minelaying in Bristol Channel.

Aircraft losses:
RAF 31, Luftwaffe 53.

This day's fighting forced a radical change of policy on Hitler and Goering. The
Luftwaffe's morale was greatly lowered by the disparity between their leaders' assurances of easy victory and the reality of Fighter Command's performance. The invasion date was postponed to September 17.

Monday, August 19:
Cloudy, eastern England showery.

Day:
Weather limited activity. The Luftwaffe flew many photographic reconnaissance sorties. Raids occurred at Dover, Portsmouth, Southampton and Pembroke Dock, in south Wales, where oil storage tanks were set alight. German records state: ‘In the second phase of the Battle of Britain from August 19 to September 6, 1940, airfields in inland England were attacked. These attacks were made by small bomber forces under strong fighter escort while other fighters flew “free chase”. That was a continuation of the action that had started on 21 July.' (The term ‘free chase' refers to fighter sweeps clearing the way and challenging RAF fighters to engage them.)

Night:
Nuisance raiders bombed Bristol, Southampton, Sheffield, Wolverhampton, Derby, Hull, Nottingham, Leicester, Liverpool.

Aircraft losses:
RAF 3, Luftwaffe 6.

Goering held a conference at Karinhall, attended by his Air Corps and Geschwader commanders. He told them that the decisive period of the air war against Britain had been reached, and reiterated, ‘Our first priority is the destruction of the enemy's fighters. If they do not take the air, we shall attack them on the ground. Surprise attacks on the aircraft industry must be made by day and night.' The secondary targets were bomber stations. ‘There will no longer be any restriction on the choice of targets, but I reserve the right to order the bombing of London and Liverpool.'

After this meeting, decorating Galland and Mölders, his two most successful Gruppen-Kommandeure, with the gold pilot's badge with jewels, he told them that he was not satisfied with the general performance of the fighters. He wanted young men with a high tally of victories to lead his Geschwader. Accordingly, he appointed Galland Kommandeur of JG26 with effect from August 22, 1940, in place of Major Gotthardt Handrick, winner of the gold medal for the modern pentathlon in the 1936 Olympic Games; and Mölders was appointed to command JG51 in place of Major General Osterkamp. Further, he replaced the Kommandeure of JG3, JG52 and JG54.

Air Vice Marshal Keith Park took fresh measures to counter the enemy's air strategy, by instructing sector controllers:

1. To avoid forced landings on the sea by positioning fighters to intercept over land or within gliding distance of it.

2. Not to let fighters chase reconnaissance aeroplanes or small fighter formations out to sea.

3. To intercept single reconnaissance aircraft overland with a pair of fighters.

4. When the enemy approaches in cloud, to patrol one or two fighters over any airfield under threat.

5. To use the minimum number of fighters to intercept enemy fighters: bombers being the more important targets.

6. To request fighters from No. 12 Group to patrol certain No. 11 Group airfields, if all No. 11 Group squadrons based near London are airborne.

Tuesday, August 20:
Mainly fine over Channel. Elsewhere, rain and cloud.

Day:
Pembroke Dock bombed. West Malling, Manston, Eastchurch airfields and Dover balloon barrage hit. Ships off Welsh and East Anglian coasts attacked.

Night:
Bombers over south-west.

Aircraft losses:
RAF 2, Luftwaffe 6.

Winston Churchill made his famous speech in the House of Commons that ended with, ‘Never in the field of human conflict was so much owed by so many to so few.'

Wednesday, August 21:
Rain and cloud.

Day:
In the morning Bf 109s shot down some 50 barrage balloons at Dover. Formations of one bomber Gruppe escorted by a Geschwader of fighters attacked Debden, Eastchurch and Detling. In the afternoon Hornchurch and Biggin Hill were severely hit. But the raiders were badly mauled each time and Oberleutnant Hahn of I/JG3 spoke for them all when he said, ‘Only a few of us have not yet had to ditch in the Channel with a badly damaged aeroplane or dead engine.' Weariness and discouragement were sapping the Germans. According to Lieutenant Ostermann of III/JG54, ‘Utter exhaustion had set in. For the first time, pilots discussed the prospects of posting to a quieter sector.'

Bombers over airfields: Bircham Newton, Coltishall, Stradishall, Horsham St Faith, St Eval, Exeter, Watton. Towns attacked: Southampton, Grimsby, Norwich, Canterbury, Bournemouth, Newmarket.

Night:
Small raids on Harwich, Firth of Forth and Hull.

Aircraft losses:
RAF 1, Luftwaffe 12.