So Near So Far (17 page)

T
HE WINTER of 1803–4 might have been spent mostly ashore but Rear-Admiral Knight now thought proper to maintain a show of activity. Addington's government was tottering under heavy attack and Lord St Vincent had to prove that its naval side was unmatched for vigilance. So Knight kept his squadron busy although with little to show for it. On the French side the sole activity was in slowly assembling the invasion fleet at Boulogne and the adjacent ports. Many of the landing craft were built at small harbours to the westward. When completed they were sent to Boulogne in batches of four or five, keeping close to the French coast and running for shelter whenever a British man-of-war appeared. Under the guns of the nearest battery they would wait until the coast was clear and then resume their voyage. On rare occasions they were caught too far from harbour and were driven ashore and wrecked. Something could be made of this in the Gazette but Delancey, for one, thought that these efforts were useless. He had been in favour of an active policy in summer but these efforts in winter involved too much wear and tear. Apart from that, he preferred to see the landing craft full of troops before he attacked them. All he wanted, in the meanwhile, was to capture a specimen gunboat for future use. The Rear-Admiral was sufficiently impressed by this idea to place two sloops,
Cynthia
and
Plover,
under his orders and allot him a cruising area
between Cherbourg and Le Havre. Attached to this small force was the captured French fishing vessel
Pauline
manned by Lieutenant Le Couteur of Jersey with a partly Channel Islands crew, all clad as French fishermen. The hunting ground was the Baie de Seine, the stretch of coast where the landing craft would be tempted seawards, partly to shorten the distance from Barfleur to Le Havre and partly because that coast is particularly dangerous. Delancey thought that a capture might be made off the Plateau de Calvados. Assuming that the landing craft came from the coast of Brittany, they would round the Cap de la Hague and so eastwards. If pursued off the coast of Normandy they would make for Le Havre by going close inshore around Trouville. In that area an innocent-looking French fishing boat would snap up the last of them and the others would be too conscious of pursuit to turn back and attempt a rescue. They would all have crews for the passage only, signed on for the one voyage, not men craving for a place in naval history or national legend. The success of the operation must depend upon placing the fishing boat between the gunboats and their possible place of refuge. It was also essential that the capture should be made without damaging the prey.

Delancey's plan was sound enough but it depended for its success upon the enemy doing what they ought to do. For weeks they failed to play the part assigned to them, there being no movement of landing craft at all. Then the traffic began again but the craft pursued made straight for the shore and beached themselves under cover of a shore battery before they could be captured. Delancey later moved his forces nearer to the Seine estuary and was finally rewarded by a useful capture near Trouville. A group of five landing craft were chased by his two sloops towards Le Havre and the last of them was snapped up
by
Pauline
off Les Vaches Noires without a shot fired on either side. It was neatly done and Delancey recognised the vessel as a Peniche or large flat-bottomed rowing boat. He soon had her under a tarpaulin in the Naval Storeshed at Deal, not as a matter of preservation but in order to avoid reminding the French that there was such a craft in British hands. Delancey had only a vague idea of a plan for her use but he could at least imagine circumstances in which she might be the ace in the pack. With her he was able to store a small collection of French uniforms and seamen's clothing, items which could be copied as necessary. Rear-Admiral Knight congratulated Delancey on his coup but was only mildly interested in its possibilities.

For Delancey the campaign of 1804 began with a conference held at Dover Castle on 3 April. It was presided over by Admiral Lord Keith, whom Delancey now saw for the first time. He was a rather handsome man aged 58 who had been in the Navy since 1767 but who had never been present in a general action. He it was who suppressed the naval mutiny at Sheerness, having had a generally distinguished career in many parts of the world. George Keith Elphinstone, ennobled in 1797, was a Scotsman of known ability to whom the naval defence of the English coasts had been largely, but not entirely, entrusted. He was chiefly famous in the service for having probably made more prize money than anyone else. His flag was in the
Monarch
but he had called this conference on shore so as to have the generals present, together with Rear-Admirals Montague, Thornborough, and Knight, Commodore Sir Sidney Smith and such of his captains as were available, Delancey being one of them. The castle courtyard was filled with horses and orderlies, junior officers and grooms. Outside the precincts, Dover itself was a scene of frantic activity, with large garrisons
in the Castle and the Citadel and vast tented camps stretching inland as far as the eye could see. It was a fine spring day in early April and the French coast was in full view and was obviously the scene of similar activity but with a more aggressive purpose. British agents had been active on the French side of the Channel and it was one of the first objects of the conference to acquaint all present with the French order of battle. The one civilian at the conference, introduced as Mr Xenophon, was clearly the master spy for the Calais-Boulogne area. Lord Keith opened the proceedings by addressing his senior military colleagues on the subject of co-operation between the services, never more important than it was going to be during the present year. If Bonaparte was going to invade England it would have to be between June and September. They would hear evidence that his preparations were well advanced. Against his designs our first lines of defence consisted in the men-of-war which constantly ranged the French coast. Our second line lay in the main fleets based on Portsmouth and Chatham. Our third line lay in the troops which defended our shores, our fourth in the armies which are concentrated at points further inland.

“Let me say, Sir Charles,” he concluded, “that I am greatly impressed by the good order and discipline which is evident among the military formations I have seen in both Kent and Essex. That they will give a good account of themselves, should the enemy land, I am wholly convinced. Before we discuss practical measures of defence, however, I thought it appropriate to hear the latest intelligence about the enemy forces. If you agree, Sir Charles, I shall ask Mr Xenophon to address us on this subject, about which he is better informed, I believe, than anyone else on this side of the Channel. I think that we shall
learn from him that our preparations, which some people think excessive, are in fact barely sufficient. Mr Xenophon.”

Mr Xenophon was a lean, hawk-faced man dressed in dark clothes which were intended, no doubt, to be inconspicuous. Carried beyond a certain point the effort to avoid notice is apt to make anyone the centre of attention, and this could have been said of Mr Xenophon. He spoke, however, with great confidence and clearly considered his own efforts as central to a war effort of which Lord Keith and the rest knew only the fringes.

“I shall arrange the intelligence we have collected under four general headings: the harbours on which an attempted French invasion will be based; the landing craft available; the troops to be committed; and the time of year at which the attempt will be made. As regards the harbours, it is now sufficiently clear that they are all between Etaples and Dunkirk. Boulogne, Calais, and Dunkirk are all important but Boulogne is the port from which the main effort will be made. Other places like Dieppe may have a part to play but it is not from there that the flotilla, or any part of it, will sail. Our concern is with nine harbours in all, centred upon a headquarters at Boulogne. Now, as regards the craft available, we estimate that there may be about nine hundred designed for the purpose and up to five hundred requisitioned fishing boats, tonnage enough for some seventy thousand infantry but with the total numbers still increasing. I come now to the troops actually in the area. I would not myself put the number at more than forty thousand men, but the engineers are laying out additional camps, perhaps doubling the accommodation now available, not all these camps being on the coast. What is significant about the Army of England, as it is called, is not its present strength but the presence there of some
crack units which would never be used in a mere diversion or feint. Last of all, I should assume, as you do, Lord Keith, that the invasion attempt must be made between June and September. I have no actual information on that point but I should judge that arrangements cannot be completed within eight weeks and that October would be too late in the year. In Bonaparte's place I should choose the month of July and would prefer the period leading up to the full moon. I should be made to realise, however, that embarkation of a large army would depend upon a week of calm weather, more than the Channel will usually offer.”

“Thank you, Mr Xenophon, for a very useful and clear summary of the facts known to us. Do you suggest, in effect, that the Army of England is to number seventy thousand to eighty thousand men?”

“No, my Lord, that would be too small a force to serve the Corsican's purpose. To embark less than a hundred thousand would be to risk immediate defeat on landing.”

“Thank you, Mr Xenophon, I agree with you.” After a short pause he addressed the senior army officer: “Sir Charles?”

“Well, my Lord, I was surprised to hear no mention of cavalry or artillery.”

“We can assume, General,” said Mr Xenophon, “that Bonaparte will not have forgotten either, he himself being a gunner. We know, in fact, that some of the larger craft are fitted to carry up to fifty horses. But no cavalry regiments have yet appeared. My agents are all clear on this point.”

“Nor need it surprise us,” said another general. “If cavalry were now there in force they would have used up all the local forage long before July. The same would be true of the artillery.
When they appear it will be because the invasion is imminent.”

“I am sure you are right, General,” replied Mr Xenophon.

“Agreed,” said Sir Charles, “but I question whether a force of a hundred thousand could be thought sufficient. I should be surprised to hear of less than a hundred and fifty thousand men being deployed.”

“The total may well exceed that number, Sir Charles, for all we know.”

“If it does,” said Lord Keith, “Bonaparte must be relying on using the same craft for a second or even a third trip. If that is so, he must choose the shortest sea passage.”

“We have no intelligence on that subject, my Lord,” replied Mr Xenophon.

“From Boulogne the nearest point would be Dungeness,” continued Lord Keith, “and I would assume that the invading army must land between Folkestone and Hastings.”

“Our assumption has been the same,” said Sir Charles, “but we have included Dover and Brighton among the points we must be prepared to defend.”

“Very rightly, Sir Charles. If Bonaparte should change his mind about this hazardous campaign—and it is my opinion that he will eventually cancel it—your military preparations will be a principal cause of his discouragement.”

“Your naval vigilance, my Lord, will give him still greater pause for thought.”

“Thank you, Sir Charles. But I should myself consider that his hesitation, when the time comes to give the order, must arise more from the inherent difficulties of the task. One consideration which led, I believe, to my present appointment is that I commanded, on the naval side, at the invasion of Egypt
in 1801. My problem was to sail from Malta and to land about sixteen thousand men at Aboukir from over three hundred boats. I thus have actual experience of a large-scale conjunct expedition, more perhaps than most of my fellow flag officers. This Egyptian affair was an opposed landing under heavy fire but the presence of the enemy was, in truth, the least of my worries. To embark and disembark an army is no easy task at any time and the whole operation can be disorganised at any moment by a change in wind direction or a patch of mist. When confronted by the sort of difficulties I have met with, Bonaparte may well conclude that the thing he means, at present, to attempt is not even possible.”

A short silence followed, broken by Rear-Admiral Thornborough, who asked whether Bonaparte was likely to use any secret weapons. There were rumours, it seemed, of vessels driven by steam-engines, of new explosive devices, and even a boat able to travel below the surface. Had Mr Xenophon any facts on the basis of which these rumours could be supported or denied?

“All we know for certain, Admiral, is that the American inventor Fulton gave a demonstration of steam navigation at Paris and that his invention was rejected. His underwater boat was similarly demonstrated at Brest and judged to be impracticable. He is now in England, offering these and other devices to the Admiralty.”

“And if he has a sympathetic hearing from Lord St Vincent,” remarked Sir Sidney Smith, “I for one will be astonished.” There was some laughter at this.

“And I would share your astonishment,” said Lord Keith. “While remembering, however, that his lordship's period of office may not be eternal.” This comment produced a murmur
of subdued conversation, all being aware that the government's fall was expected within weeks. “There are others aspiring to high office who may be less sceptical of innovation.”

Some further discussion followed but the general conclusion, summarised by Lord Keith, was that Bonaparte might be expected to attempt his invasion of England in July, that his army centred on Boulogne would number no fewer than 150,000 men, and that he would aim to land at points between Folkestone and Hastings. “Whether he will really make the attempt must remain to be seen and I have my doubts about it. These are nevertheless the assumptions on which we must act. If he comes, we must be ready for him.”