Silenced: How Apostasy and Blasphemy Codes Are Choking Freedom Worldwide (23 page)

On October 1, 2000, Shaikh had suggested at a meeting of the South Asian Union that the line of control in Kashmir between India and Pakistan should become the international border. In response, a Pakistani officer threatened him, saying, “I will crush the heads of those that talk like this.” The following day, Shaikh reportedly stated in response to a student’s query that Muhammad was neither a prophet nor a Muslim before he was forty, since there was at that point no Islam (according to Islamic teaching, Muhammad received Qur’anic revelation when he was forty). Shaikh was also reported to have said that Muhammad had not observed Muslim practices regarding circumcision or the removal of underarm hair before that age.
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Some students thought he contradicted the Muslim belief that Muhammad was predestined to become a prophet and hence was blasphemous. That evening, one of them, who was also employed at the Pakistani Foreign Ministry, complained to a cleric that the doctor had blasphemed.
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An organization that frequently targets alleged blasphemers (usually Ahmadis), called the Movement for the Finality of the Prophet, lodged a complaint against him and also incited a mob that threatened to burn the college and the local police station.
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On October 4, Shaikh was arrested on blasphemy charges.

His trial took place in closed session in the Central Jail. Even his lawyers received a fatwa calling them apostates, and their childrens’ lives were threatened.
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On August 18, 2001, he was found guilty and sentenced to death.
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He spent two years in solitary confinement in the Central Gaol in Rawalpindi. The two judges on the Lahore High Court could not reach an agreement on his appeal, and a senior judge to whom the case was referred on July 15, 2002, did not make a decision for over a year. On October 9, 2003, this judge found the original judgment unsound. However, he opted to remand the case back to a lower court for retrial rather than acquit Shaikh. At the retrial, Shaikh conducted his own defense and was acquitted on November 21, 2003. He says he was inspired by Sir Thomas More’s speech in
A Man for All Seasons
. To avoid further attacks, he was released secretly. He remained in Pakistan for a time but, when his accusers sought to appeal his acquittal, fled to Europe.
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On July 7, 2002, during mosque prayers, Faraz Jawad, an American Navy engineer who was visiting his family in Jaranwala, objected to the imam’s political speech that cursed the Pakistan government and the Americans. He said to the imam, “Instead of cursing America, you should teach us Islam.” The imam, Hafiz Abdul Latif, demanded that those in the mosque kill Jawad on the spot since he was an American and, as such, an enemy of Muslims. Jawad managed to escape with his relative Mohammed Naeem. In response, dozens of people attacked Naeem’s house, armed with iron rods, sticks, and other weapons. Naeem called the police, who dispersed the mob, but only after promising the rioters that Jawad
would be charged with blasphemy. Jawad contacted the U.S. embassy, which intervened and asked the government to save his life. Police subsequently charged the imam and twelve villagers with disturbing the peace, inciting the people’s religious feelings, and attacking Faraz Jawad’s relatives.
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Najam Sethi, the chief editor of one of Pakistan’s most respected English newspapers,
Daily Times
, is Cambridge-educated and a recipient of the Committee to Protect Journalists’ International Press Freedom award. He is well known for his paper’s stance against Islamic extremism. In July 2008, he received death threats, including a picture of a man whose throat had been slit, for publishing a cartoon of Umme Hassan, the director of a radical women’s madrassa, who was teaching her students to wage jihad. Hassan, as well as local clerics from the Red Mosque, condemned the cartoon as blasphemous and in so doing, according to Mr. Sethi, “have provoked people to kill me and my staff.”
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In Pakistan, as in other countries with blasphemy laws, people can, in practice, be charged with any of a range of vague offenses, such as damaging “religious feelings.” Rules of evidence are commonly violated, and the laws are very frequently used to settle private disputes, grudges, and vendettas. During blasphemy hearings, religious extremists often pack courthouses and threaten the accused, especially if there is the possibility of an acquittal. To make matters worse, in a vicious ratchet effect, those who question the blasphemy laws can then themselves be accused of questioning Islam, thus becoming suspects under the very law that they have challenged.

This ratcheting effect came into stark and violent relief in early 2011, when two brave politicians were brutally murdered specifically because of their calls to repeal the laws. Salman Taseer, a Muslim, was the governor of Punjab, Pakistan’s wealthiest and most populous state, and a friend of President Zardari. He was also a voice of moderation, one of the most prominent in the country, who worked for a free society and fought for the rights of all Pakistanis, Muslim and non-Muslim. He publicly called for a pardon for Asia Bibi and persistently criticized the blasphemy laws, calling them a “black law,” and arguing that they were pivotal to the future of the country. On January 4, 2011, he was killed by one of his own security guards, Mumtaz Qadri, who has since been feted as a hero in much of Pakistan. Taseer’s daughter, Sara, observed, “This is a message to every liberal to shut up or be shot.”
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Then, on March 2, 2011, Shahbaz Bhatti, federal Minster of Minority Affairs and the highest-ranking Christian politician in the country, was shot dead as he was visiting his mother. In leaflets left at the scene, Al-Qaeda and the Pakistani
Taliban Movement in Punjab claimed responsibility for killing the “infidel Christian.” Bhatti, who has been compared to Martin Luther King, devoted his life to religious freedom and other human rights, was well aware that he was targeted for death, and, in a video he left to be played in the event that he was killed, said he would not change his principles and was ready to die for his work.
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As we have seen, so far, none of the convicted in Pakistan has in fact been judicially executed, in part because the trials can take many years, and scheduling an execution can take even longer. However, mobs and vigilantes have killed hundreds of the accused.
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This intimidation means that while, in elections, the vast majority of Pakistanis reject radical parties, a free press and free debate on religion and politics is quashed. A
New York Times
report summarizes the country’s predicament: “[A]n intolerant, aggressive minority terrorizes a more open-minded, peaceful majority, while an opportunistic political class dithers, benefiting from alliances with the aggressors.”
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However, when former President Musharraf sought to change the laws, militants warned, “If the government tries to finish it, the government itself will be finished,” a threat personified in the killings of Taseer and Bhatti.

A more hopeful note was struck when, on March 9, 2011, Pakistan’s embassy to the United States held a memorial service for Bhatti, and Ambassador Husain Haqqani’s moving eulogy went far beyond formal diplomatic niceties and cut to the heart of the matter:

“[M]y colleagues in the embassy from all wings of the embassy, from our accounts department to our military leaders who serve here, to the diplomats, and to the non-diplomatic staff in this embassy—we all discussed this and it was our collective decision that we will not only pay tribute to Shahbaz Bhatti today but also to use this as an occasion to reiterate our commitment to a pluralist Pakistan, a tolerant Pakistan, a moderate Pakistan—a Pakistan in harmony with the rest of the world.… For the sake of Pakistan, for the sake of Islam, for the sake of humanity, and for the sake of Shaheed Benazir Bhutto, Shaheed Salman Taseer, and now sadly our brother Shahbaz Bhatti, it is time for us to stand up, courageously against intolerance, against discrimination and against extremism. My friends, “If not now, when?”

Haqqani concluded: “Those who would murder a Salman Taseer or a Shahbaz Bhatti deface my religion, my prophet, my Koran and my Allah. Yet there is an overpowering, uncomfortable and unconscionable silence from the great majority of Pakistanis who respect the law, respect the Holy Book, and respect other religions.… This silence endangers the future of my nation, and to the extent the silence empowers extremists, it endangers the future of peace and the future of the civilized world.… When a Shahbaz Bhatti is murdered, and we remain silent, we have died with him.”
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In a 2002 interview with the
Washington Post,
Sayed Abdullah described being brutally tortured for months by Taliban agents. Abdullah, a Red Cross employee with some knowledge of English and an interest in the world outside Afghanistan, had a 500-book library that included two Bibles, one in English and one in Dari. In late 1999, the Taliban’s Intelligence Division took him into custody and searched his house. When they found the two Bibles, they immediately assumed they’d found evidence that Abdullah was an apostate. Abdullah maintained throughout every interrogation that he was still a Muslim and tried to explain, “I have those books for information, for learning, not for changing religions. Everyone should know about other religions and other parts of the world.” His Taliban adversaries were unimpressed with this explanation and instead tortured him repeatedly. Meanwhile, they demanded that he inform them about whom he was working for and provide them with names of others he had converted. A prison record found after the fall of the Taliban listed Abdullah as jailed for “belonging to the Christian religion.” He stated that his torturers chanted, “God is blessing us. God will reward us,” as they beat him and repeatedly accused him of being a Christian convert. Eventually, Abdullah made a false confession in order to end the torture. A Taliban official then threatened him with death: “We will take you to the roof of the Ministry of Communications.… First we will burn you. Then we will throw you over the edge so that everyone can see you and know the punishment for converting from Islam.” Eventually, Abdullah’s mother was informed about his situation and was able to bribe officials to obtain his release. Because of what he endured in the Taliban’s prisons, Abdullah now requires a brace to stand and suffers from chronic pain as well as problems with his kidneys, short-term memory, hearing, and sight
.
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In August 2007, approximately 100 Afghans demonstrated in the southeastern region of Khost after American soldiers presented local children with soccer balls decorated with the flags of various countries. One of the flags was that of Saudi Arabia, which carries the Islamic declaration of faith, the
shehada.
Afghan parliamentarian Mirwais Yasini explained the problem: “[T]o have a verse of the Koran on something you kick with your foot would be an insult in any Muslim country around the world.” A U.S. spokesperson expressed regret for the unintentional offense caused by the gifts
.
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The following month, the Afghan parliament announced, “The people’s representatives want them (U.S.-led forces) to formally apologize out of respect for public opinion and sentiment…we, representing the people of Afghanistan, want our friendly forces to respect the culture and tradition of people in their activities.”
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After the withdrawal of Soviet forces in 1989 and the toppling of the communist government in 1992, the Taliban (“students”) militia seized control of much of the country and installed a highly repressive version of Islam. In response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States launched a military campaign aimed at toppling the Taliban and eliminating the Al-Qaeda terrorist network’s safe haven there. Afghanistan ultimately adopted a new constitution and a new government, which has since been led by Hamid Karzai. The population of the country is about thirty million; of that, approximately 80 percent is Sunni, 19 percent is Shia, including a small Ismaili community, and 1 percent is “other,” including Sikhs, Hindus, Christians, and, in 2008, one remaining Jew. There is a correlation between religious and ethnic identities: the Sunni population comprises mainly Pashtuns, Turkmen, Uzbeks, and Tajiks, while the Shia Muslims are mainly Hazaras, with some Qizilbash from the mountainous central highlands. Though many Sikhs and Hindus fled the country during the Taliban’s rule, approximately 1,500 Sikh and 100 Hindu families remain, along with a Christian community consisting of 500 to 8,000 people. A handful of Sikh and Hindu temples are left in the country, along with one official Christian church and one Jewish synagogue.

The Taliban has persecuted, and, where it can, continues to persecute, anyone who does not adhere to its reactionary brand of Islam, and the vast majority of its victims have been Muslims. When in power, they also specifically targeted anybody thought to be connected to criticism or conversion of Muslims. On January 8, 2001, reputed leader Mullah Mohammed Omar made a radio announcement warning that his government would execute both apostates from Islam and any non-Muslim who attempted to convert Muslims. Omar also decreed that any owners of bookshops offering texts that criticized Islam, or that even discussed other religions, would receive a five-year jail sentence.
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In August of that year, Taliban officials arrested eight foreign Christians working for the Shelter Now International (SNI) aid organization, claiming that they had been “trying to convert Afghan Muslims to Christianity.” Two women from the group had been arrested on August 3 while presenting a Christian film to an Afghan family, and the six others were arrested on August 5. Taliban agents cited Dari-language Christian materials as evidence of the employees’ involvement in “proselytism.”
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Sixteen of the organization’s Afghan employees were also arrested, although their friends and coworkers maintained that they were all firmly Muslim. Unlike the foreigners, the incarcerated Afghans were not allowed
visitors, and Taliban representatives said they might face death or life imprisonment. The Taliban even detained sixty-four children who had been in contact with the aid workers, holding them until any possible “Christian influences” on them could be eradicated.
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In keeping with their assertions that there was a “larger conspiracy” behind SNI’s alleged proselytism, the Taliban closed the offices of two more Christian relief agencies, SERVE and the International Assistance Mission (IAM) and expelled their foreign workers at the end of August. After the expulsion, officials exhibited Bibles and Christian videos they claimed to have seized from the foreigners to prove their point. Thirty-five Afghan employees of IAM were later arrested when Taliban officials ordered them to pick up their salaries at the planning ministry.
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Following the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States, President Bush listed the release of the foreign workers among the demands made on the Taliban. On September 27, the Taliban said it would resume their trial. When the Taliban evacuated Kabul on November 13, they confined their prisoners in a steel container and drove them south: they were freed on November 15 when Northern Alliance troops liberated the prison in which they were held.
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