Self-Sacrifice (17 page)

Each of the ambassadors spoke, condemning the attack of 8 April, but each qualifying their remarks with negative points about the PMOI. I said that it was pointless and deeply worrying to hear the usual Mullah-inspired propaganda criticising the 3,400 residents of Ashraf as being Marxist, a listed terrorist organisation and a cult. I said, “These people have been brutally attacked twice now. They are under siege in Ashraf and denied adequate supplies of food, fuel and water; 300 loudspeakers blaring insults day and night constantly harass them and you see fit to direct some criticism at them?” I was very angry, but I could see which way the wind was blowing.

The next morning, Tuesday 26 April, we met with Ad Melkert, Tahar Boumedra and the UNAMI team. I opened the meeting by raising the question of the lack of fulfilment of the Erbil Agreement and the failure by Maliki to fill the posts of Ministers of Interior, Defence and Security. I said that this was supposed to be a government of national unity, but was looking increasingly like a sectarian government. I said that the massacre at Ashraf had exposed the fault-line in Maliki’s government, demonstrating clearly how he was prepared to abuse power and do the bidding of Iran. The massacre was a violation of everything the EU held dear, and was an appalling humanitarian tragedy for which a fully independent inquiry was needed to identify the perpetrators and bring them to justice. I reminded them that the European Parliament had twice sent strong resolutions to Iraq demanding an end to the intimidation and siege of Ashraf, with an appeal to the Iraqi authorities never to resort to violence.

The attack on 8 April showed contempt for the European Parliament and its Members, I said. I agreed that there had to be a long-term solution found for the residents of Ashraf, as the current situation was intolerable, and there was an increased risk of annihilation of the residents in a Srebrenica-style massacre. I asked Ad Melkert if UNAMI could not quickly embed a unit inside the camp to offer protection, or whether the US could offer military protection while a negotiated settlement was established. I asked whether the UN Security Council could raise this issue and demand protection for the
residents of Ashraf. However, I said that there could be no negotiation with the Iraqi government over a long term solution to Ashraf while the residents remained under the threat of the Iraqi military that had now bulldozed a huge embankment from which they could threaten the remaining camp. The troops must be withdrawn, the siege ended, immediate medical assistance provided to the critically wounded and a state of peace and normality restored in the camp. Only then could any resolution be discussed between the EU and Iraq.

Ad Melkert said that the Iraqi government was determined to close the camp by the end of 2011. They had considerable interaction with Iran on this issue. He said the EU and US position was of vital importance in resolving this issue because UNAMI could only monitor the situation. They could not intervene. Nor would the UN Security Council discuss Ashraf. There was no question of that. UNAMI had demanded an international inquiry into the massacre. Iraq wanted a government inquiry with UN involvement. But if UNAMI was to get involved in any way, the army must withdraw first, he said.

‘However,’ Melkert continued, ‘for the UN to be involved they must accept individual registration as refugees. For us, communication with the MEK is vital. We can talk readily enough to the camp leadership in Ashraf, but we need to communicate with the leadership in Paris. We need a channel for this, which you, Mr Stevenson, can provide.’

Our next meeting was with Osama al-Nujaifi, the Speaker of the Iraqi Council of Representatives. When I launched a tirade against the massacre, the Speaker said, ‘As far as Ashraf is concerned a full investigation is underway into the events of 8th April. But you have to understand that the Iraqi Government has its own side to this story.’ He was clearly not willing to engage any further on this issue.

We encountered the same reluctance to be drawn on Ashraf from our meeting with the chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee in the Council of Representatives, Humam Hammoudi, from the party of Hakim. His excuse was that this was a matter for the chair of the Human Rights Committee, rather than Foreign Affairs. It seemed as if everyone was astonished and embarrassed by the brutal attack ordered by Maliki. Mr Hammoudi did, however, emphasise the need
for great friendship and cooperation between the EU and Iraq. I told him that premeditated, extra-judicial murders of unarmed civilians were not the best way of cementing good relations with the EU.

Continuing our series of meetings with the Council of Representatives, our next port of call was with the Chair of the Security and Defence Committee, Hassan al-Sunaid, a close ally of Maliki and several of his committee members. The Chairman said: ‘Clearly the MEK is the main reason for your visit. We want Iran, Iraq and the MEK to sit together to settle this issue. We are not against the MEK and will always deal with them from a humanitarian position. But you should understand the camp is filled with weapons. I can take you there now and show you them. They attacked neighbouring areas near Ashraf. They attacked our forces. They constantly abuse our Prime Minister and government and call for their downfall. They have abused their position as guests in our country and are no longer welcome. But nevertheless our Committee on Defence and Security will investigate what happened on 8 April and punish those responsible.’

I thanked Mr al-Sunaid for his kind offer to take me right away to Ashraf to see all the weapons and evidence of terrorism for myself, and said that I readily accepted his suggestion. I asked when we could leave and he simply ignored my question!

We moved on to meet with Salim Abdullah al-Jabouri,
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chair of the Human Rights Committee. He said that the members of his committee were deeply alarmed at what had happened on the 8th April, but they were aware of the Iraqi sovereignty situation and the situation regarding neighbours like Iran and the provocation to them from Ashraf. He suggested that the UN must take over and help to resolve the issue. But any resolution must respect Iraq’s concerns over sovereignty and Iran.

We were met with a similar reaction from the Foreign Minister, Hoshyar Zebari, a prominent Kurd. He said: ‘You must be clear that the Iraqi Government has no animosity towards the MEK. The US disarmed them and then the US and Bulgaria provided them with protection in Ashraf. I signed the handover agreement of Ashraf. The
residents agreed to follow Iraqi laws and we agreed that there would never be any forced extraditions to Iran. We agreed that we would respect their human rights. But now the MEK regard Ashraf as their liberated territory, as if they have conquered it in a war. They are our guests. They cannot seize part of Iraq and claim it as their own. Of course they are strong and effective lobbyists in the US and EU. But in 2009 we asked them to allow our police into the camp and it ended in a riot where 12 people were killed. This year, in April, there was an even worse attack. They have to realise that this is Iraqi land and they are Iranians. They even asked us if they could pay a rent for it! We supplied them with water, electricity and this is how they repay our friendship.’

Of course I knew that most of his allegations were baseless. The Iraqi government did not provide water and electricity to the Ashraf residents. In fact it was the residents themselves who pumped water from a nearby river, supplying more than 20,000 Iraqis in villages near the camp; US military officers officially confirmed this.

Zebari continued: ‘Now Iraq and Iran are friends, so the situation has changed. We have tried hard to suggest voluntary repatriation to the Ashraf residents, but the trouble is that no country will agree to take them. This is unfortunate, because the government has taken a clear decision that there is no place for them in Iraq by the end of 2011. The government are prepared to work closely with UNAMI on a solution. Extensive talks have been held with Iran and the Iranians had agreed to voluntarily repatriate to Iran those who wished to return, with a cast-iron guarantee signed by both governments that they would not be arrested or prosecuted. They would even seek the International Commission of the Red Cross cooperation on this. Alternatively, Iran had even agreed to supply all 3,400 residents with Iranian passports so that they could go wherever they liked. So the last window of opportunity is now. We will try to help to re-settle them. As for the 8th April events, there is no clear answer on what happened, but we have launched our own investigation to uncover the truth.’

I said that there was a very clear answer to what happened on 8th April. It was a massacre by 2,500 heavily armed troops and armoured vehicles ordered by the Prime Minister. I asked if my delegation could
go to Ashraf to see for themselves what had happened. Zebari said absolutely not. He could not permit us to visit Ashraf under any circumstances. It was out of the question. I then asked what would happen at the end of the year if all attempts to repatriate the residents of Ashraf had failed. In that case, Zebari said, they would be forcibly moved to an alternative camp.

Zebari then launched into an astonishing defence of Maliki’s sectarian and divisive policies and added: ‘Our democracy has acted as a spur for the Arab Spring in North Africa and the Middle East. Other countries want our freedom. That is why almost every suicide bomber in the Middle East was, for a time, sent to Iraq.’

I had been led to believe that Zebari’s background and political inclinations differed greatly from those of Maliki, so I was dismayed to discover that he was now prepared to defend the Prime Minister’s repressive sectarian policies, presumably in an effort to hold on to his own high-ranking post. It was disappointing to find an eminent Kurd like Zebari willing to distance himself from the honourable position of the Kurdish President Massoud Barzani. Zebari was even prepared to justify Maliki’s attacks on PMOI members, claiming that they had been involved in assisting Saddam Hussein’s repression of the Iraqi Kurds. This was an astonishing U-turn by Zebari, because I had seen his own testimony to a Dutch court on 14 July 1999 when he had written as the Head of KDP International Relations that: ‘[We] can confirm that the Mujahedeen [sic] were not involved in suppressing the Kurdish people neither during the uprising nor in its aftermath. We have not come across any evidence to suggest that the Mujahedeen have exercised any hostility towards the people of Iraqi Kurdistan.’
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Zebari’s veiled threats and hostility to the Ashrafis were refreshingly countered by the Deputy Prime Minister, Dr Saleh al-Mutlak, who told us that he felt deeply saddened by the events at Ashraf. ‘I said so to my colleagues in government. It hurts the reputation of Iraq after 5,000 years of civilization that we now resort to murdering unarmed
guests. These are unarmed civilians. We need to find a humanitarian solution that involves the EU, Iraq, Iran and UNAMI. But any solution must serve both the interests of the MEK and Iraq. I am happy to cooperate with you to find a solution.’

That evening, we were taken by our armed security guards to a meeting with the Iraqi President, Jalal Talabani, another senior Kurdish political leader. The Presidential Palace is outside the Green Zone, so we had been warned that we must spend no longer than 60 minutes in the meeting. ‘Any longer,’ Mark, our gun-toting guard said, ‘will give terrorists time to target a mortar attack or an ambush, so you have to get out strictly after one hour.’

President Talabani began by apologising on behalf of Nouri al-Maliki. ‘The Prime Minister is sorry that he cannot meet you, as he is currently in Korea.’ In a rather too audible whisper, I commented, ‘North Korea, I presume?’ The President ignored this and continued by stating: ‘I am personally against all forms of violence. Iran uses the MEK as an excuse to put pressure on us. I went to Tehran and asked them to stop sending arms to terror groups in Iraq. They responded by demanding we close Ashraf. In these circumstances what can we do? We cannot allow them to stay. Terrorists, supplied with weapons by Iran, are killing Christians and other minority communities almost daily.’

He repeated the allegations of Zebari about the role of the PMOI in repressing the Kurds and the Shiias and added: ‘The MEK are hated by the Kurds and by the Shiites, although not by the Sunnis. Iran is threatening to launch rocket attacks on Ashraf if we don’t do something. We need to act.’

This was quite a paradox, because I had seen Zebari’s letter to the Dutch courts and I also knew that the PUK, the party of Talabani, after cementing strong links with the Mullahs in Tehran, had begun to repress the PMOI members in Iraq, even going as far as launching armed attacks against them. Dozens of PMOI members were killed in those unprovoked attacks. The PUK also boasted of handing over PMOI members to the Iranian regime, who were later executed (Agence France-Presse, 13 April 1991).

The next morning we emerged from our concrete bunkers to face another day in Baghdad. We were heading for the US Embassy, a
vast complex covering hundreds of acres inside the Green Zone, and a routine target for terrorist mortar attacks. We had to go through tight security checks to get into the Embassy compound, and then we were led in to a large study and offered seats while tea and coffee were prepared. In due course US Ambassador Jim Jeffrey and a senior American diplomat stationed in Iraq, Ambassador Lawrence Butler, arrived.

I thanked the US ambassadors for their time and hospitality, and told them of my fears that Maliki was rapidly becoming a dictator, having breached the Erbil Agreement and seizing all of the key state powers for himself; I said he had clearly demonstrated his willingness to do the bidding of the Iranian Mullahs and to abuse his position as Prime Minister by ordering repeated violent military assaults on Ashraf and subjecting the residents to constant psychological torture.

Ambassador Jeffrey opened the proceedings by stating: