Prisoner of the State: The Secret Journal of Premier Zhao Ziyang (21 page)

[H
u] Yaobang was forced to resign in January 1987. There has been a lot of talk about this issue. One version has it that Deng, under pressure from Party elders, was forced to abandon Hu in order to protect Zhao. I don’t think this was true. Certainly there were people fomenting trouble between Deng and Hu by making accusations against Hu in Deng’s presence. However, I don’t think it was the main reason.

The reason that Deng Xiaoping abandoned Hu Yaobang was not that he was misled or that he had to compromise under outside pressure. Rather, Deng’s attitude toward Hu gradually changed until he finally lost trust in Hu.

From 1980 to 1986, Deng grew to feel that Yaobang was increasingly at odds with him concerning the liberalizing trend among intellectuals. The differences between them grew wider over time. Starting from 1980, whenever Deng came out to condemn liberalization or propose campaigns against it, he was almost always responding to reports he had received from [influential leftist leaders] Hu Qiaomu and Deng Liqun. However, it was a fact that Deng and Yaobang held sincerely different views on this matter. Even without people brewing trouble between them, their conflict was bound to grow more serious. The end result was unavoidable.

Here are some of the things that happened over those years.

Deng gave a report at the Theoretical Discussion Meeting for upholding the Four Cardinal Principles
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in 1979. Ever since, it was clear that Hu and Deng held differing views on the issue of liberalization.

As the years went by, their differences grew more obvious and their positions moved further apart. In July 1981, Deng Xiaoping accused the theoretical front
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of being “lax and weak” and spoke on the matter. In October 1983, at the Second Plenum of the 12th Central Committee Deng said the theoretical front should not be involved in any “spiritual pollution.” He made these comments because he felt that the liberal trend among intellectuals had been gaining ground, and he believed Hu Yaobang should be held responsible for it, since this realm was under Hu Yaobang’s management.

Hu Yaobang himself never raised such questions, nor did he ever report to Deng on issues of this nature. Rather, Deng sensed it for himself or heard about it from Hu Qiaomu or Deng Liqun, so he felt compelled to intervene. This naturally implied a dissatisfaction with Hu.

I would like to specifically mention the matter of the Anti–Spiritual Pollution Campaign.
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I feel that the way Hu Yaobang handled this matter aggravated the conflict between them a great deal. This ultimately played a key role in the final rift between the two.

After the Second Plenum of the 12th Central Committee, Deng’s Anti–Spiritual Pollution Campaign was disseminated nationwide. “Leftist” thinking made a comeback, not only in the cultural, metaphysical, and economic arenas, but also in people’s daily lives. Even the hairstyles and fashion of female comrades fell within the control of the Anti–Spiritual Pollution Campaign, and another Cultural Revolution almost seemed to be on the horizon. Strong reactions came from intellectuals across China and international commentators.

I was visiting the United States that winter, and everywhere I went I had to respond to people’s questions about it and ease their concerns. The momentum of the campaign was strong enough to threaten economic policies and reform.

[Vice Premier] Wan Li and I announced that the Anti–Spiritual Pollution Campaign would not be applied to economics or agricultural matters, so as to avoid a disruption to the economy. We also proposed that the campaign should not touch the realm of lifestyle habits. This had the effect of cooling the overall atmosphere. Since anti-liberalization was unpopular to begin with, if we indicated that the economic, agricultural, and science and technology arenas were “off limits,” the movement would lose momentum even in the metaphysical and cultural arenas. Even Deng became worried about the way things were going and revealed some of his feelings about this. So the Anti–Spiritual Pollution Campaign was not going to last long.

Yaobang always doubted the campaign. He apparently wished to ease the anger of intellectuals and reduce the negative impact on international opinion. While visiting Party chiefs in Shanghai in February 1984 and again when meeting Japanese visitors, he said that the phrase “Cleansing of Spiritual Pollution” was inappropriate. He said that the phrase led to overreaching in the campaign and that it would not be used again.

This was a very sensitive issue. As soon as word spread of what he had said, people, especially intellectuals, had the impression that the Cleansing of Spiritual Pollution Campaign had been wrong. Yaobang had specifically explained that “Xiaoping originally called for ‘Anti–Spiritual Pollution,’ but the media campaign had distorted it into a ‘Cleansing of Spiritual Pollution,’ therefore resulting in an overreaching.” In other words, it wasn’t that Deng had been wrong, but rather that it had been executed incorrectly. In fact, the campaign was based on Deng Xiaoping’s speech, so when it was printed in the newspapers, or mentioned by leaders in speeches, the word “cleansing” was used many times. Everyone knew that the campaign was waged according to Deng’s remarks. So Yaobang’s explanation could not reduce Deng’s responsibility in people’s minds.

Deng was not happy with this kind of talk from Yaobang. Even though Deng did not say anything at the time, he did not back down an inch from his previous stand, whether you call it “anti–spiritual pollution” or “anti-liberalism.”

On January 15, 1987, at the Party life meeting
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that concluded the case of Hu Yaobang, [Politburo member] Hu Qili disclosed that on June 28, 1984, Deng had spoken alone with him. Deng had said, “The main reason I have asked you here today is to talk about Yaobang. Not only in the way that he dealt with Guo Luoji, Hu Jiwei, and Wang Ruoshui,
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but with the upholding of the Four Cardinal Principles and in anti-liberalization efforts; as the party’s General Secretary, Yaobang has displayed a weakness that is a fundamental shortcoming.” Deng didn’t talk to Yaobang directly, but asked Hu Qili to relay his message, even harsh wording such as “weakness against liberalization is a fundamental shortcoming in a General Secretary.”

This evoked a question: If Yaobang could not change in a fundamental way, was he still suitable for the position of General Secretary? Hu Qili told Yaobang what Deng had said, word for word, but even after this, Yaobang did not pay attention or respond seriously to the matter. This was in 1984.

In July 1985, Deng Xiaoping asked Hu Qili and [Vice Premier] Qiao Shi for a talk. Again he pointed out that the real problem was the growing trend of liberalization. Deng said, “Some people (he meant people like Wang Ruoshui) encouraged Yaobang while using Yaobang’s name to oppose our domestic and foreign policies. You should ask Yaobang to raise the issue of anti-liberalization more often.” Qili and Qiao Shi did as Deng instructed and relayed the message to Yaobang and to me at Beidaihe [the beach resort where Party officials gather each summer].

I thought then that because Deng was repeatedly emphasizing this issue, the Secretariat needed to hold a meeting to discuss it seriously, as an appropriate response to Deng. I suggested this to Yaobang, but when [Hu] Qili asked Yaobang when the meeting would take place, Yaobang’s only reply was to say that he was about to leave for Xinjiang. Later, he did indeed go to Xinjiang, so the matter was postponed. Yet he should have dealt with the issue before leaving for Xinjiang; he did not view it as important.

In 1985, Xiaoping spoke of the matter again. Why? I believe it had to do with the fourth Congress of the All China Writers’ Association in December 1984.

That meeting was held after the Cleansing of Spiritual Pollution Campaign had been unceremoniously ended amid negative domestic and international responses. In accordance with Yaobang’s suggestion, the message from the Central Committee to this meeting made no mention of anti–spiritual pollution or anti-liberalization. When the message was being drafted, Yaobang said that he would like to see the phrase “anti-liberalization” gradually fade away. It was also decided that the Department of Organization would not interfere in the leadership of the Writers’ Association, allowing the group to elect its own leaders. Full creative freedom was emphasized.

All of these were right to do. The problem, however, was that under the circumstances, those who had been criticized or punished through the Anti–Spiritual Pollution Campaign would then feel free to unleash their anger in meetings of this kind, sometimes making extreme or inappropriate comments against those who had actively participated in the campaign. As for the leadership, almost everyone who was a “leftist” or had been active in the campaign lost in the elections.

Of course, this embarrassed [conservative ideologues] Hu Qiaomu and Deng Liqun while provoking the displeasure of Party elders. Ultimately, it left Deng Xiaoping the impression that Hu Yaobang had encouraged people in the literary and artistic realms to unleash their dissatisfaction with Deng’s Anti–Spiritual Pollution Campaign. That is why he repeated his request to Qili and Qiao Shi to relay his message to Yaobang, asking him to speak more about anti-liberalization. The wording that he used was very harsh; he said that some people had opposed China’s domestic and foreign policies in the name of Yaobang, in other words, “using Yaobang’s name to oppose Deng Xiaoping.”

However, Yaobang did not take the matter seriously. On issues such as this, there ordinarily would have been a meeting of the Secretariat; Yaobang would have delivered a speech and then afterward gone to Deng for a talk. At the time, it was impossible to take a position opposed to Deng Xiaoping’s. Of course, various opinions could be voiced and issues could be discussed with Deng.

The question I still can’t answer is: Why did this not get Yaobang’s attention? Why did he not take it seriously? It is possible that he believed Deng’s method was inappropriate, that he himself had not done anything wrong and was therefore not willing to change course. And he may have believed the issue would not have been resolved by talking to Deng, that Deng would not have accepted his position—and so he avoided the issue. All of this aggravated Deng’s sense that Yaobang was moving further and further away from him on the issue of anti-liberalism.

From October 1983, when Deng proposed the Anti–Spiritual Pollution Campaign, to July 1987, when Deng suggested that some people were pursuing liberalization in Yaobang’s name, the dispute centered on the correctness of the campaign. Their disagreement grew increasingly obvious and intense; they became increasingly confrontational.

The last debate on the Anti-Liberalization Campaign before Yaobang stepped down erupted at the end of the Sixth Plenum of the 12th Central Committee in September 1986, when the Central Committee was passing the “Resolution on Building a Spiritual Civilization.” The first draft was written under Yaobang’s supervision. There was no mention of anti-liberalization. When the draft was discussed at Beidaihe, Hu Qiaomu and Deng Liqun proposed adding a reference to anti-liberalization, and most people, including myself, agreed. Yaobang made a concession by accepting the addition.

However, when it came up for discussion at the group level at the Sixth Plenum of the 12th Central Committee, Lu Dingyi [a liberal writer in the Party’s ranks] and a few others said they did not agree with such content. When the resolution was put up for a vote, Lu Dingyi gave an impromptu speech, in which he said, “The Gang of Four used the term ‘bourgeois liberalization’ during the Cultural Revolution as a way to punish people, and it is therefore inappropriate.” Lu’s speech won some applause from those attending the meeting.

[Conservative elders] Wang Zhen and Bo Yibo gave speeches insisting that anti-liberalization be retained, and also won applause. Yaobang gave an ambiguous response. I also made a simple statement, saying that the draft had been discussed many times over, and since most people supported keeping the phrase, I agreed that it remain unchanged.

Then Deng Xiaoping spoke extremely seriously. He said, “I have talked about anti–bourgeois liberalization more than anyone, and have been the most persistent. Not only must we mention it now, but we will continue to mention it for the next ten, twenty years. It doesn’t matter when the phrase was used and who used it in the past. That is not important.” That was it; he had made it final. The plenum passed the resolution with all participants raising their hands.

Since the meeting was chaired by Yaobang, the General Secretary, and his ambiguous stand had caused Deng to directly intervene at the last moment, Deng’s dissatisfaction with Yaobang was undeniable. When reports about the meeting were later circulated, Yaobang arranged for dissemination only of the passed resolution, without mention of the discussions that had taken place or Deng’s speech. Later Bo Yibo attacked Yaobang on this issue, asking why Deng’s speech had not been disseminated.

On the surface, the debate at the meeting concerned Deng’s criticism of Lu Dingyi’s speech. But it was clear that Deng was actually criticizing Yaobang, because he knew Lu’s views represented Yaobang’s.