Pearl Harbor (14 page)

 

 

B
y early evening, however, the initial calm and confidence that greeted the news gave way to fear. As day turned into evening and the newsboys' cries of “war extra” filled the streets of cities across America, the reality of war became impossible to ignore. Front-page headlines screamed the news. “WAR!” covered the top of the late edition of the
Philadelphia Record
. The
New York Times
was more restrained: “JAPAN WARS ON U.S. AND BRITAIN.”
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The anxiety was greatest in Hawaii, where many people wondered whether the assault on Pearl was a prelude to a land invasion. Shortly after the attack, military authorities took to the airwaves to provide civilians with instructions. “Stay off the streets, get your car off the street, do not use the telephone except in cases of extreme emergency, seek shelter, boil all water in case of contamination.” Shortly afterward came a call for all doctors, police officers, nurses, disaster squads, and Pearl Harbor workers to report to their stations. Officials told plantation owners to plow open fields in order to prevent Japanese planes from landing. At 4:30 p.m. the governor announced that he had imposed martial law on the island.

Many people defied the warnings to stay off the streets, as they gathered on street corners and in drugstores and taverns to share the latest rumors. There were numerous unconfirmed reports of Japanese paratroopers dispersed over the island. One radio report claimed the Japanese had landed at Diamond Head. Another said that Waikiki Beach had been overrun with Japanese troops. There were also false reports that
the entire north shore of Oahu was occupied and that both Pearl Harbor and Schofield Barracks were in Japanese hands. “Long lines had formed at all grocery stores and there was a mad rush as semi-hysterical people tried to buy everything on the shelves,” noted an observer. “Bakeries were short of flour and yeast and the meat markets were down to their last hamburger.”
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There were rumors that Japanese pilots who had been shot down carried American money in their pockets and tokens for using the public transportation system in Oahu. One pilot who was supposedly shot down was more than six feet tall—too tall to be Japanese. Since his body was burned beyond recognition, the word spread that he was German.
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Many of the rumors were picked up by the wire services and rushed into extra editions of newspapers across the country. The
Oakland Tribune
ran a large headline in its second extra on Sunday evening announcing “Parachute Troops Seen over Harbor.”

The military repeated the rumors, giving them an air of credibility. Throughout the day, officials reported sightings of Japanese saboteurs wearing “working-blue coveralls with red circles on breasts,” troop landings, and enemy aircraft dropping parachutes over Honolulu. A report at 11:40 local time stated, “Parachute Troops have landed on north shore & have been identified as wearing blue coveralls with RED DISC ON LEFT SHOULDER.” At 12:05, military officials told of a “hostile force” that was “attempting to swim ashore,” but being repelled by U.S. troops. At 2:30 p.m., the navy stated that one or two hundred parachutists had landed at Barbers Point. A few minutes later came a call that a force of enemy planes had flown over the island and been repelled by navy forces.
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By late afternoon, the military had investigated many of the supposed sightings and proven them false. At 4:00 p.m., the 27th Infantry stated that “all reports of enemy activity in Honolulu area have been investigated and found false.” But even as the old claims were being discredited, new ones came flooding in. As late as 10:00 p.m., there were
reports that bombs had been dropped at Pearl Harbor and enemy troops had landed in northern Oahu.
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Though false, the information became part of official intelligence estimates about Japan's capability and intent. On Sunday evening, under the heading of “Summary of Enemy Situation,” military officials reported “four or five transports,” one battleship, and three aircraft carriers off the coast of Hawaii. There were “numerous reports that parachutists landed throughout the island,” along with a “few individual attempts at sabotage.” The intelligence estimate predicted that Japan was planning a full-scale invasion that evening. “It is not improbable that the enemy will attempt to demolish Pearl Harbor and our entire air force prior to attempting a landing in force. Small landing parties may attempt to force landings on favorable beaches tonight during darkness.”
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In response to these false reports, General Short sent an alert to army commanders in Hawaii that the Japanese were attempting to invade and occupy Oahu. Soldiers took up defensive positions along the Oahu shoreline and prepared for the onslaught. Not wanting to provide a potential Japanese air raid with easy shooting targets, the army ordered a complete blackout for that night. It also forced all cars off the road, except those authorized by the police. Any cars that went on the road had to go to the local police station and have their headlights painted blue. People were ordered to stay in their homes. All stores, bars, and restaurants were closed, and the sale of alcohol was banned.
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Anxiety levels were also high on the West Coast, where public officials assumed that the same Japanese armada that launched the attack on Pearl was now approaching the mainland. Lieutenant General John DeWitt ordered troops to stand guard every fifty yards along the beach near San Francisco and look for signs of Japanese submarines. In San Francisco, streetlamps were turned off. Air raid sirens sounded. A panicky General DeWitt told newsmen that Japanese aircraft had been spotted in the skies over the city. “I don't think there's any doubt the planes came from a carrier,” he said.
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Worry was not limited to the West Coast and Hawaii. In New York, Mayor La Guardia declared the attack the direct result of the “Nazi technique of mass murder.” People knowledgeable about world affairs, he declared, know that Nazi “thugs and gangsters” had orchestrated the attack. He warned residents that they should not feel secure just because they were on the eastern seaboard.
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D
uring his 3:00 p.m. meeting with his foreign policy advisers, FDR had made it clear that he wanted censorship of the press. But it took a few days for formal procedures to be put into place. In the meantime, the administration kept a tight control on information. Press secretary Steve Early instructed government departments, including the War Department, that all information to the press had to come from the White House. He made clear there would be no further updating of casualty figures beyond the 104 dead and “slightly over 300 wounded” that had already been announced. During the day, he held regular briefings with reporters, updating them on the president's activities, but carefully avoiding any discussion of specific casualty figures or damage reports.
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The administration could control the flow of information, but it could not stop the spread of rumors or prevent people from asking questions. At his press briefings on Sunday, reporters quizzed Early about the damage at Pearl Harbor, pointing out that they were hearing many different, and often conflicting, stories. At 5:15 p.m., for example, NBC reported that 350 men were killed at Hickam Field alone. Early, however, refused any comment.
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CBS radio broadcaster Eric Sevareid, whose calm and reasoned coverage of the crisis in Europe had made his one of the most recognized and respected voices in America, was now sitting in the White House pressroom covering America's entry into the conflict. He told his listeners on Sunday evening that credible but unconfirmed reports were floating around that the damage at Pearl was extensive and far more severe
than the White House acknowledged. “Now there is one report which I must give you which is not at all confirmed—a report which is rather widely believed here and which has just come in,” he said in his soft, unassuming voice. “And that is that the destruction at Hawaii was indeed very heavy, more heavy than we really had anticipated. For this report says that two capital ships of ours have been sunk, that another capital ship has been badly damaged, and the same report from the source says that the airfield hangars there in Hawaii were completely flattened out and that a great many planes have been damaged.” Sevareid went on to remind listeners again that the report was “unconfirmed,” but said that “it has come in from a fairly reliable source and many reporters here indeed believe it.”
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According to Robert Sherwood, every reporter had a source telling him that the damage was much worse than the administration was reporting. But even before the government censorship rules went into effect, most papers continued their policy of self-censorship. The White House had already made the case that revealing information about the extent of the damage at Pearl Harbor would potentially aid the Japanese. In the hours and days after the attack, no newspaper wanted to appear to be aiding the enemy by publishing unconfirmed rumors. They needed official confirmation from Washington—something that the Roosevelt White House refused to provide.

Politicians were less circumspect. “The jittery conduct of some of the most eminent of our Government officials was downright disgraceful,” Sherwood noted. “They were telephoning the White House, shouting that the President must tell the people the full extent of this unmitigated disaster—that our nation had gone back to Valley Forge—that our West Coast was now indefensible and we must prepare to establish our battle lines in the Rocky Mountains or on the left bank of the Mississippi or God knows where.”
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The fires were still burning in Pearl as the recriminations in Washington commenced. Reporters covering the State Department overheard Foreign Service officers asking, “Where were the patrols? How
could they have let an aircraft carrier get so near the Islands[?] The carrier must have got within two hundred miles. Are they playboys or sailors?” Edmund Starling, the head of the White House Secret Service detail at the time of the attack, noted in his duty log for December 7: “Understand one admiral on duty at Pearl Harbor. All of the others out at parties.”
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Congressman John Dingell of Michigan demanded that the top five army and navy leaders, including Admiral Kimmel and General Short, be court-martialed. “Hundreds of our boys have paid with their lives for the seeming deficiency of their superiors,” he told reporters the following day. “The Army and Navy in Hawaii obviously were caught off guard, if they were not sound asleep in the same bed.
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9

“Do you think we ought to have soldiers around the White House?”

J
APAN'S SUCCESSFUL surprise assault on Pearl Harbor forced the Secret Service to reevaluate its plan for protecting the president. For the first time since the Civil War, political leaders faced the threat of an assault on the symbols of American political power. If the Japanese could pull off a surprise attack on a secure naval base at Pearl Harbor, then no place was safe, not even the White House.

The immediate task of protecting the president fell to Mike Reilly, who had been assigned to the White House detail since 1935. On the morning of December 7, he was second in command of the president's security detail, reporting to Colonel Edmund Starling. By the end of the day, Secret Service chief Frank Wilson had promoted Reilly to supervising agent. He believed the colonel, who was sixty-four years old and in poor health, lacked the energy to respond to the new security environment. “I decided that the need for a young and very active man to head the Detail was urgent,” Wilson reflected.
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Reilly did not wait for his promotion to assume control. As soon as he heard the news of the attack on Pearl Harbor, he told the White House operator, “Start calling in all the Secret Service men who are off duty. Don't tell 'em why, just call 'em in. All the White House police, too.” He then called Ed Kelly, Washington's chief of police, and
asked him to send sixteen uniformed police officers over to the White House.
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Shortly after 2:00 p.m., Reilly placed a call to Frank Wilson, who was at home and about to sit down for dinner. When the phone rang, his wife answered and was told “Get the Chief on the phone, quick.” When Wilson grabbed the receiver, he heard Reilly's excited voice. “Chief,” he said, “the Japs have bombarded Pearl Harbor.”
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Wilson recalled that he was “stunned to silence” by the news, but quickly regained his voice and instructed Reilly to start calling every Secret Service agent and White House policeman and have them report to duty—a task that Reilly had already completed.
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A
lthough we are now used to heavily guarded government buildings, prior to World War II the White House had been open and casual. Visitors, for example, could have picnics on the grounds during daylight hours. The guards protected only the house, not the surrounding grounds. There were no guardhouses at any of the four entrances to the building. On most days, a lone policeman stood at each entrance to control traffic. Every day, thousands of visitors came through the White House's formal rooms. There were no bag checks or metal detectors. Reporters covering the president found the same lax rules. “The gates were wide open and no one had heard of a White House pass,” recalled Merriman Smith.
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But when war broke out in Europe, the Secret Service reevaluated White House security. A 1940 report had noted that the White House lacked enough guards to provide adequate security in the event of an emergency. Prior to Pearl Harbor, the Secret Service had 25 men—policemen plus agents—assigned to the presidential protection team when FDR was at the White House. In the event of an emergency, those who guarded the president had access to twenty riot guns and three subma-chine guns, which were held in locked cases around the grounds. In addition, the existing guard could be supplemented with 73 city and U.S.
park patrolmen, 43 U.S. infantryman, and 55 off-duty White House guards. Although these forces were adequate for normal times, they were insufficient during a time of war.
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