Pearl Harbor Betrayed (39 page)

Stark, like Marshall, was probably chary of spoken use of the one o'clock information. He need not have mentioned it. Taking a cue from the British, who were adept at masking their use of Enigma-derived information by making certain that the same information could have come from another, more conventional, source, Stark might have camouflaged his real purpose with a spoken message such as the following: “In view of the deteriorating state of U.S.-Japanese relations, I remind you of OpNav's message to you last April first advising that ‘Axis Powers often begin activities in a particular field on Saturdays and Sundays or on national holidays of the country concerned.' I hereby advise you, if it has not already been done, that you go on maximum alert immediately—repeat immediately—and that you maintain such highest state of alert on all subsequent Saturdays and Sundays, as well as on Christmas and New Year's. More to follow.”

It would have been good advice, regardless.

Of course, a different personality might have taken this tack: “To hell with the diplomatic cipher! There's not going to
be
any more diplomacy. I'd rather risk Purple than my people. Get Admiral Kimmel on that telephone!”

Of course, too, Stark could have sent an enciphered explicit message by means of what he called the Navy's “quite rapid” radio system.

But he did none of these things. And, by 1944, it was clear that he regretted it. “There is only one thought,” he told the NCI “—that doesn't mean that I am right—in my mind there is only one thought that I regretted. What the effect would have been I don't know—and that was the dispatch which was sent by the Army on the morning of December 7, that I had not paralleled it with my own [radio] system, or that I had not telephoned it.… That is the one regret, that I have had.”

Pacific Fleet intelligence officer Layton wrote, “Admiral Kimmel [after he learned of it in 1944] considered the delayed warning of Tokyo's one o'clock deadline as the most shocking example of Washington's mishandling of the whole matter of intelligence.”
20
And Kimmel would hold his old friend Stark primarily to blame.

*   *   *

Commander Fuchida's air armada droned south both through and beneath the unbroken cloud cover that he measured at 2,000 meters. Then, as Kahuku Point came up, the clouds suddenly broke, and the first faint rays of the rising sun enabled the flight leader to look around at his fleet: forty-nine level bombers in triangular formations astern; forty torpedo planes to starboard and slightly below; fifty-one dive-bombers at about 200 meters overhead; and forty-three fighters, unable to keep to the low 125-knot base speed, snarling back and forth like warrior bees over the entire argosy.

Ahead he could see partly cloudy skies, except that the mountains were thickly wreathed with clouds at 1,000 meters. He had had no midair collisions to that point, and did not want to risk any in the mountains. So he banked to starboard as a signal that all aircraft, except those fighters detailed to strafe the Army's Wheeler Field, north-northwest of Pearl, would divert to the west, circle that shore of the island, and attack Pearl from the west and south. About fifteen miles to the west of Pearl, the torpedo bombers would divide into two groups, one of twenty-four Kates that would swing south and around the channel entrance and attack Battleship Row from the southeast over Merry Point and the submarine base; and another of sixteen Kates that would strike from the northwest across the West Channel against ships moored to the northwest of Ford Island.

Fuchida's second signal did not work as planned. When he thought he had achieved surprise—which he now did think since there were no American fighters airborne to contest him—he was to fire
one
flare from his Very pistol. On that visual signal the torpedo planes were to sweep in low and make the first strikes at Pearl. The level bombers would follow next, and then the dive-bombers. The planner had not wanted the dive-bombers to attack first in the event of surprise because the smoke generated by their bombs would obscure targets assigned to the torpedo and level bombers. If, however, surprise was not achieved, Fuchida was to fire
two
flares, in which case the dive-bombers would attack first to sow panic and confusion. In either case, the fighters were to peel off for their assigned duties of strafing airfields and interception of any American fighters that might be climbing to oppose them. As it happened, however, the air fleet demonstrated that Murphy's Law applied in the Orient as well as in the West.

Convinced of surprise, at 0740 Fuchida raised his signal pistol above the canopy and fired a single “black dragon” flare. At that his level bombers assumed the 3,000-meter altitude they would maintain through their bombing runs, the dive-bombers climbed to 4,000, and the torpedo bombers began a slow descent to near sea level. The fighters, however, flew on as before instead of banking left toward their targets. Apparently, at their high altitude they had missed seeing the signal because of clouds beneath them. Fuchida thereupon fired a second flare in their direction, which got their attention. But it also got the attention of the commander of dive-bombers, Lt. Comdr. Takahashi Kakuichi, who saw the flare as the second of two indicating “dive-bombers first.” He promptly ceased his climb to altitude and pushed his fifty-one-plane flight into fast forward. Seeing this, and apparently thinking that his own flight of torpedo bombers was slow off the mark, Murata hurried his descent. Fuchida now realized that Genda's carefully crafted plan had gone awry. The dive-bombers would strike five minutes before Admiral Yamamoto's firmly established start time of 0800. At this moment the
Chikuma
's scout seaplane broke radio silence to report—not very accurately—that ten battleships, one heavy cruiser, and ten light cruisers were anchored in the harbor. The pilot also reported on meteorological conditions at Pearl: “Wind at 14 meters from bearing 080, 7-density clouds at 1,700 meters.”
21

There was nothing to do but go ahead with the final attack order. Fuchida turned to the radio operator aft and called out: “
To-renso
.” The operator began tapping with his Morse key, repeating the single first syllable of
Totsugeki
(Charge!): “
To, to, to, to, to, to
…” The time was 0749, and the attack was irrevocably on. Because of the total surprise achieved, the slight hitch in attack sequence and timing was not likely to make any real difference in the result. As he looked forward through his windshield with binoculars at the immobile array of unexpectant warships, Fuchida would be forgiven if he imagined himself Napoleon in 1800, after taking his army across the St. Bernard Pass before the snow had melted, catching entirely by surprise the rear of the Austrian army besieging Genoa. He called out a second order to the radio operator: transmit the prearranged code signal to Admiral Nagumo indicating that complete surprise had been achieved: “
Tora, Tora, Tora
.” The time was 0753.

Thanks to an unusually reflective ionosphere, the code signal was received 3,400 miles away in the radio shack of Yamamoto's flagship
Nagato,
anchored in Hiroshima Bay. The message was rushed to the admiral in the ship's operations room, where the creator of
Hawai sakusen
was seated on a folding chair, his eyes shut, his mouth set. When the news was read to him, he opened his eyes and nodded.
22

At 0755 the first dive-bomber struck, placing a delayed-fuse bomb on the PBY ramp at the south end of Ford Island. Its explosion was followed by others in rapid succession as the torpedo Kates, pouncing from the southeast and northwest, launched their first missiles starting at 0757. Lieutenant Goto Jinichi later described himself as “shocked to see the row of battleships in front of my eyes.” He squared off at
Oklahoma:

Three things were the key elements to the attack: speed must be 160 knots, the nose angle zero [horizontal to the sea], an altitude of 20 meters. We were told if one of these were off, it would change the angle and the torpedo would go deep under the water and miss the target. I didn't have time to say “ready” so I just said “fire.” The navigator in the back pulled the release lever. The plane lightened with the sound of the torpedo being released. I kept on flying low and flew right through, just above the ship.… I asked my observer, “Is the torpedo going all right?” … I saw two water columns go up and go down.… But then I realized we're being attacked from behind.… I was avoiding bullets by swinging my plane from right to left. I felt frightened for the first time and thought my duty was finished.
23

Meanwhile, bombers and fighters simultaneously bombed and strafed Army and Navy aircraft parked at the Hickam, Wheeler, Ford Island, Kaneohe, and Ewa bases. It was a predicate of operational success that American air strength be neutralized so that the first and second Japanese waves could work over the battleships and cruisers unimpeded. Fighters and dive-bombers also struck the U.S. Army's Schofield Barracks and Fort Kamehameha, adjacent to Hickam. At Pearl, the level bombers struck last, but only moments later than the other attackers. Fuchida had formed them into a single column with intervals of 200 meters, his best pilot and bombadier in the lead:

As my group made its bomb run, enemy anti-aircraft suddenly came to life. Dark gray bursts blossomed here and there until the sky was clouded with shattering near misses which made our plane tremble. Shipboard guns seemed to open fire before the shore batteries. I was startled by the rapidity of the counterattack which came less than five minutes after the first bomb had fallen. Were it the Japanese fleet, the reaction would not have been so quick, because although the Japanese character is suitable for offenses, it does not readily adjust to the defensive.

Suddenly, the plane bounced as if struck by a huge club. “The fuselage is holed to port,” reported the radio man behind me, “and a steering-control wire is damaged.” I asked hurriedly if the plane was under control, and the pilot assured me that it was.
24

Because of clouds that obscured their target, Fuchida's group missed their release point, and had to circle around for another try. As they did so, Fuchida could see between the fleecy clouds tall columns of black smoke and waterspouts rising from the harbor below—then, startlingly, one enormous explosion of “dark red smoke” erupted in Battleship Row. It was
Arizona
in fiery death. He called the pilot's attention to the scene. “Yes, Commander,” the pilot answered, “the powder magazine must have exploded. Terrible indeed!” Smoke from the fractured ship covered
Nevada,
directly astern, which was the group's target, and Fuchida saw that
Tennessee,
ahead of
Arizona
at quay F-6, was already burning, so he ordered the Kates, still in single line ahead, to release their bombs over
Maryland,
inboard of the capsizing
Oklahoma,
at F-5. As they did so, Fuchida lay flat on the deck and watched through a peephole as the armor-piercing bombs fell toward their target. Most of what he saw was misses—“wave rings in the water”—but two small flashes led him to shout: “Two hits!”
25
Maryland
did suffer two hits: one bomb exploded prematurely on an awning rope, another struck frame 14, penetrated, and detonated, holing the shell, decks, and bulkheads forward of frame 24. Like
Tennessee
astern, she escaped more threatening damage that would have come from torpedoes by virtue of her inboard berthing position.
26
Fuchida ordered all other bombers in his group that had made their bomb drops to return to their carriers, while he and his crew remained over Pearl to direct operations, take photographs, and estimate damage.

During the attack many of our pilots noted the brave efforts of the American flyers able to take off who, though greatly outnumbered, flew straight in to engage our planes. Their effort was negligible, but their courage commanded the admiration and respect of our pilots.
27

*   *   *

By 0825, their fury spent, the remaining aircraft of the first wave were on northerly headings back to the carriers. (Given the confusion that existed later in American commands over the location of those carriers, it is curious that no service personnel from Pearl north to Kahuku seemed to have noticed and reported that the retiring air armada overhead was flying
north.
Nor was the Lockard-Elliott plot at Opana consulted by the Army's Information Center. The first wave was remarkably intact, having lost only five torpedo planes (all from
Kaga
), three fighters, and one dive-bomber. Fuchida remained over Pearl awaiting the arrival of the second wave. Launched 200 nautical miles north of Oahu, by 0840 that flight was east of Kahuku Point and descending on a course just off the island's east shore. It consisted of eighty-one Val dive-bombers to make additional attacks on the fleet; fifty-four Kate level bombers to make secondary attacks on Kaneohe Naval Air Station and Hickam Field; and thirty-six Zero fighters to make strafing attacks on airfields and targets of opportunity.
28
No torpedo Kates were in this wave, their vulnerability now too heightened by the absence of surprise.

As Fuchida watched from overhead, the new arrivals at Pearl had difficulty sighting ship targets through the dense pall of black smoke that rose from the crippled battleships and from oil fires on the water. Particularly high columns of smoke drifted over the harbor from
Tennessee,
afire from two bomb hits and flaming debris from
Arizona,
seventy-five feet astern, herself a ghastly funeral pyre; from
West Virginia,
which absorbed no fewer than nine torpedoes; and from
California,
which burned fiercely from two torpedo hits and a bomb explosion amidship. But Fuchida would not be aware of those details. He concentrated on trying to ascertain which of the battleships had sunk.