Ostkrieg (97 page)

61
. Goebbels, “Wofür?,” quoted in Müller, “Das ‘Unternehmen Barbarossa' als wirtschaftlicher Raubkrieg,” 174 (see also 184–85); Tooze,
The Wages of Destruction
, 135–61 (quote 141). For a more extreme, and controversial, version of this argument, see Aly,
Hitlers Volksstaat
(translated as
Hitler's Beneficiaries
). For an earlier, less extreme assessment, see also Aly and Heim,
Architects of Annihilation
, passim.

62
. Domarus, ed.,
Hitler: Reden und Proklamationen
, 2:1663–64;
TBJG
, 1 February 1941. A full-text English translation of Hitler's speech of 30 January as recorded by the Monitoring Service of the British Broadcasting Corporation, courtesy of the Research Project for Totalitarian Communication, New School for Social Research, is available at
http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1941/410130a.html
(accessed 29 August 2008).

63
. For a comprehensive assessment of
Der ewige Jude
, see Hornshøj-Møller,
“Der ewige Jude
,” 3–39, 179–81, 309–15, “Der ewige Jude,” and “The Role of ‘Produced Reality.' ” See also
TBJG
, 17, 24 October, 1, 8, 28 November, 18 December 1939, 9, 12 January, 6, 27 February, 4, 17 April, 9 May, 9 June, 3, 12, 25 September, 11 October 1940; Aly,
“Final Solution
,” 171–72; Breitman,
The Architect of Genocide
, 146–47; Engel,
Heeresadjutant bei Hitler
, 2 February 1941, 94–95; Kershaw,
Hitler: Nemesis
, 349–51.

64
. Aly,
“Final Solution
,” 160–61, 171–74; Longerich,
Politik der Vernichtung
, 287–91; Breitman,
The Architect of Genocide
, 146–47, 151–56; Kershaw,
Hitler: Nemesis
, 349–53; Browning,
The Origins of the Final Solution
, 111–68. Revealingly, Himmler had mentioned to a select group of SS leaders in January 1941 that the Slavic population would have to be reduced by 30 million, roughly the same figure thrown about by army and agricultural planners.

65
. Streit,
Keine Kameraden
, 28; Schramm, ed.,
Kriegstagebuch
, 3 March 1941, 1, pt. 1:341; Noakes and Pridham, eds.,
Nazism: A History
, 2:1087; “Richtlinien auf Sondergebieten zur Weisung Nr. 21 (Fall Barbarossa) vom 13. 3. 1941,” in Ueberschär and Wette, eds.,
“Unternehmen Barbarossa
,” 246–48; Breitman,
The Architect of Genocide
, 148–49; Browning,
The Origins of the Final Solution
, 215–16; Kershaw,
Hitler: Nemesis
, 353–54.

66
. Halder,
War Diary
, 17 March 1941, 339; Aly,
“Final Solution
,” 171–74; Noakes and Pridham,
Nazism: A History
, 2:1088–89; “Befehl des ObdH, Generalfeldmarschall von Brauchitsch, über die Zusammenarbeit mit der Sicherheitspolizei und dem SD für den vorgesehenen Ostkrieg vom 28. 4. 1941,” in Ueberschär and Wette, eds.,
“Unternehmen Barbarossa
,” 249–50; Förster, “Operation Barbarossa as a War of Conquest,” 485; Browning,
The Origins of the Final Solution
, 217–18, 224–34; Kershaw,
Hitler: Nemesis
, 354–55.

67
. Halder,
War Diary
, 30 March 1941, 345–46; Förster, “Operation Barbarossa as a War of Conquest,” 497–98; Browning,
The Origins of the Final Solution
, 218; Kershaw,
Hitler: Nemesis
, 355–56; Warlimont,
Inside Hitler's Headquarters
, 162.

68
. Browning,
The Origins of the Final Solution
, 219–20; “Erlaß über die Ausübung der Kriegsgerichtsbarkeit im Gebiet ‘Barbarossa' und über besondere Maßnahmen der Truppe vom 13. 5. 1941, mit Ergänzungen des ObdH vom 24. 5. 1941,” in Ueberschär and Wette, eds.,
“Unternehmen Barbarossa
,” 251–54.

69
. Noakes and Pridham,
Nazism: A History
, 2:1090; “Richtlinien für die Behandlung politischer Kommissare vom 6. 6. 1941,” in Ueberschär and Wette, eds.,
“Unternehmen Barbarossa
,” 259–60; Browning,
The Origins of the Final Solution
, 220–21; Förster, “Operation Barbarossa as a War of Conquest,” 506–20; Streit,
Keine Kamaraden
, 44, 59.

70
. Kershaw,
Hitler: Nemesis
, 358–59; Streit,
Keine Kameraden
, 50–51; Browning,
The Origins of the Final Solution
, 221–23. On Poland, see Rossino,
Hitler Strikes Poland;
Westermann,
Hitler's Police Battalions;
and Böhler,
Auftakt zum Vernichtungskrieg
.

71
. Förster, “Hitler's Decision,” 37, and “Operation Barbarossa as a War of Conquest,” 519–20; “Befehl des Befehlshabers der Panzergruppe 4, Generaloberst Hoepner, zur bevorstehenden Kampfführung im Osten vom 2. 5. 1941,” in
Ueberschär and Wette, eds.,
“Unternehmen Barbarossa
,” 251; Browning,
The Origins of the Final Solution
, 222–24; Kershaw,
Hitler: Nemesis
, 358–60.

72
. Browning,
The Origins of the Final Solution
, 224–29; Kershaw,
Hitler: Nemesis
, 381–82. On the Einsatzgruppen, see Krausnick and Wilhelm,
Die Truppe des Weltanschauungskrieges;
Ogorreck,
Die Einsatzgruppen und die “Genesis der Endlösung”;
Herbert,
Best;
Wildt,
Generation des Unbedingten;
and Browder,
Hitler's Enforcers
.

73
. Browning,
The Origins of the Final Solution
, 229–34; Kershaw,
Hitler: Nemesis
, 382. On the Order Police and the Reserve Police battalions, see Westermann,
Hitler's Police Battalions
, “ ‘Friend and Helper,' ” “ ‘Ordinary Men' or ‘Ideological Soldiers?' ” and “Himmler's Uniformed Police on the Eastern Front”; Kwiet, “From the Diary of a Killing Unit”; Mallmann, “Der Einstieg in der Genozid,” and “Vom Fussvolk der ‘Endlösung' ”; Klemp, “Kölner Polizeibataillone in Osteuropa”; Nachtwei, “ ‘Ganz Normale Männer' ”; and Browning,
Ordinary Men
.

74
.
TBJG
, 1–2, 5–6, 11–12, 24, 26 October, 2, 14 November, 8–9, 11, 13, 19, 20, 22, 24 December 1940, 14, 16–17, 19–20 June 1941; Kershaw,
The “Hitler Myth
,” 158–60.

75
. Kershaw,
Hitler: Nemesis
, 382–84; Halder,
War Diary
, 14 June 1941, 405–6; Below,
Als Hitlers Adjutant
, 277–78; Hitler to Goering quoted in Reese,
A Stranger to Myself
, vii.

76
.
TBJG
, 16 June 1941; Kershaw,
Hitler: Nemesis
, 387.

77
.
TBJG
, 16, 20 June 1941; Kershaw,
Hitler: Nemesis
, 387.

78
.
TBJG
, 22 June 1941; Schellenberg,
The Schellenberg Memoirs
, 223; Halder,
War Diary
, 21 June 1941, 408; Domarus and Romane, eds.,
The Essential Hitler
, 756–65; Hitler,
Hitler's Secret Conversations
, 59, 94; Leach,
German Strategy against Russia
, 156; Kershaw,
Hitler: Nemesis
, 386–87.

79
. Förster, “The Dynamics of Volksgemeinschaft,” 192; Tooze,
The Wages of Destruction
, 461–62.

80
. Förster, “Der historische Ort,” 633–35, and “Hitler's Decision,” 35; Engel,
Heeresadjutant bei Hitler
, 18 February 1939, 45.

81
. Förster, “Der historische Ort,” 634–35; Domarus, ed.,
Hitler: Reden und Proklamationen
, 2:1664.

1
. For a good sense of the atmosphere at the front on the eve of Barbarossa, see Grupe,
Jahrgang 1916
, 149–51; Lubbeck,
At Leningrad's Gates
, 84; Knappe,
Soldat
, 178–80; Schröder, “German Soldiers' Experiences,” 309–24, and
Die gestohlenen Jahre;
Wette, “ ‘Es roch nach Ungeheuerlichem,' ” 71–73; Fuchs,
Wer spricht von Siegen
, 12; Kuby,
Mein Krieg
, 95–99; Stahlberg,
Bounden Duty
, 160–62; and Hitler's “Aufruf an die Soldaten der Ostfront vom 22. 6. 41,” in Ueberschär and Wette, eds.,
“Unternehmen Barbarossa
,” 319–23.

2
. Leach,
German Strategy against Russia
, 192; DiNardo,
Mechanized Juggernaut?
40–50; Hoffmann, “Die Sowjetunion bis zum Vorabend des deutschen Angriffs,” 88–99; Rotundo, “Stalin and the Outbreak of War in 1941,” 280–81; Glantz,
Barbarossa
, 27; Tooze,
The Wages of Destruction
, 452–54; Förster, “The Dynamics of Volksgemeinschaft,” 195.

3
. Halder,
War Diary
, 22 June 1941, 410–12. Proponents of the idea that Stalin intended a strike against Germany include Suvorov,
Icebreaker;
Topitsch,
Stalin's War;
Raack, “Stalin's Plans for World War II”; and Hoffmann, “The Soviet Union's Offensive Preparations in 1941.”

For good historiographic assessments and critiques of this argument, see Uldricks, “The Icebreaker Controversy”; Pietrow-Ennker,
Präventivkrieg?
and “Deutschland im Juni 1941”; Förster, “Die Grosse Täuschung”; Ueberschär, “Das ‘Unternehmen Barbarossa' gegen die Sowjetunion”; and Gorodetsky, “Was Stalin Planning to Attack Hitler in June 1941?” “Stalin and Hitler's Attack on the Soviet Union,” and “Stalin und Hitlers Angriff auf die Sowjetunion.” For a balanced assessment of Stalin's perceptions of the Wehrmacht, see Arlt, “Die Wehrmacht im Kalkül Stalins,” 105–11.

4
. Rotundo, “Stalin and the Outbreak of War in 1941,” 289–96; Gorodetsky, “Stalin and Hitler's Attack on the Soviet Union,” 346–50, and
Grand Delusion
, chaps. 8, 12; Churchill,
The Grand Alliance
, 55; Litvinov quoted in Gorodetsky, “Was Stalin Planning to Attack Hitler in June 1941?” 72.

5
. Rotundo, “Stalin and the Outbreak of War in 1941,” 289–96; Gorodetsky,
Grand Deception
, chap. 6, and “Stalin and Hitler's Attack on the Soviet Union,” 346–47, 355–56; Mawdsley,
Thunder in the East
, 32–41;
TBJG
, 16 June 1941.

6
. Rotundo, “Stalin and the Outbreak of War in 1941,” 284–85, 290–92, 295–96; Uldricks, “The Icebreaker Controversy,” 635–36; Mawdsley,
Thunder in the East
, 32–37.

7
. Mawdsley,
Thunder in the East
, 32–37; Churchill,
The Hinge of Fate
, 493; Gorodetsky, “Stalin and Hitler's Attack on the Soviet Union,” 357–59.

8
. Leach,
German Strategy against Russia
, 172; Rotundo, “Stalin and the Outbreak of War in 1941,” 280–81; Mawdsley,
Thunder in the East
, 26–31, 42–43, 46–51. Although, as is often supposed, the Soviets had made no special effort in the 1930s to expand industry across the Urals, they had created new factories in the eastern part of European Russia between Moscow and the Urals.

9
. Mawdsley,
Thunder in the East
, 44–46. For a good assessment of German intelligence failures, see Thomas, “Foreign Armies East.”

10
. Mawdsley,
Thunder in the East
, 41–43; Förster, “Hitler's Decision,” 48; Leach,
German Strategy against Russia
, chaps. 5–6; Tooze,
The Wages of Destruction
, 456–57; Bock,
War Diary
, 31 January 1941, 196–97.

11
. Clausewitz,
On War
, bk. 1, chap. 2.

12
. Hayward, “Hitler's Quest for Oil,” 99–103; Cooke and Nesbit,
Target, Hitler's Oil
, 16; Reinhardt,
Die Wende vor Moskau
, 117–18.

13
. On the problems of horse-drawn transport, see DiNardo,
Mechanized Juggernaut?
40–50.

14
. Förster, “The Dynamics of Volksgemeinschaft,” 201; Leach,
German Strategy against Russia
, 234–35. On Soviet military dispositions, see Gorodetsky,
Grand Delusion
, 115–30, 227–45; Mawdsley,
Thunder in the East
, 37–41; and Rotundo, “Stalin and the Outbreak of War in 1941,” 286.

15
.
TBJG
, 23 June 1941.

16
. Glantz,
Barbarossa
, 35; Leach,
German Strategy against Russia
, 192–93; Kershaw,
War without Garlands
, 37, 51–52, 55.

17
. Glantz,
Barbarossa
, 37–39; Mawdsley,
Thunder in the East
, 55–59; Overy,
Russia's War
, 73–79. Stalin supposedly commented to Timoshenko and Zhukov, “Lenin founded our state and we've fucked it up,” then drove to his dacha at Kuntsevo, where he remained incommunicado until 30 June, when members of the Politburo went to demand he again actively lead the state. Stalin quoted in Radzinskii,
Stalin
, 451–52.

18
. Klink, “The Conduct of Operations,” 525–26; Megargee,
War of Annihilation
, 46–47; Glantz,
Barbarossa
, 37.

19
. Klink, “The Conduct of Operations,” 527–32; Megargee,
War of Annihilation
, 47; Guderian,
Panzer Leader
, 158–66; Bock,
War Diary
, 23, 25–26 June 1941, 225–28.

20
. Halder,
War Diary
, 22–29 June 1941, 410–32; Leach,
German Strategy against Russia
, 194–95; Bock,
War Diary
, 25 June 1941, 227.