Ostkrieg (84 page)

Of all Hitler's controversial decisions in 1944, none has seemed to demonstrate so well his irrational stand-fast mentality as the decision voluntarily to entomb German troops and tanks sorely needed to defend the Reich in a backwater place such as Courland. As an illustration of his irrationality, however, it might be better to seek explanations on the strategic rather than the tactical level, with the key to the Courland puzzle lying in the Ardennes rather than the Baltic. As is generally known, Hitler hoped with the Ardennes offensive in December 1944 (originally scheduled for late November) to achieve a sudden turnaround in the war through an operation remarkably similar to Sickle Cut of May 1940. In this latest version, Great Britain was to play the role of France, with the United States, emulating the English, expected temporarily to withdraw from European affairs. Having dealt a savage blow to his Western
enemies, and at the same time perhaps finally splitting the unnatural coalition arrayed against him, Hitler could then mass his remaining forces in the east to repel the Soviet invaders. In effect, he was clinging to the strategy outlined in November 1943 for the coming year: seek a turnaround in the war by striking in the west and holding on in the east. His forces had failed to achieve the desired results in both areas, but, Hitler believed, one last opportunity beckoned. For this plan to work, however, Courland had to be held as a springboard for a new offensive deep into the Soviet rear, while at the same time the new-model U-boats could be unleashed in the Atlantic. Although this interpretation is clearly a flight of fantasy, much speaks in support of it, not least the timing of Hitler's final decisions to hold Courland and launch the Ardennes offensive, made within two days of each other in late October. Just as importantly, such a scheme fit his all-or-nothing mentality, his conviction, as Speer noted, that the war could be won only through offensive action. The Führer yearned to throw off the “eternal defense” into which Germany had been forced and again seize the initiative, but, when his “Blitzkrieg without gasoline,” as Karl-Heinz Frieser termed the Ardennes offensive, failed, he was left with the bankruptcy of his strategy. Only now, in early 1945, did he permit some units to be evacuated from Courland and sent back to Germany, although, even here, he could not quite fully abandon the illusion of a miracle that would again turn the war in his favor.
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Even as the OKH struggled to build a stable front line out of the ruins of Army Group Center, it faced another disaster in the south in the area of Army Group South Ukraine, itself a mixed German-Rumanian conglomeration. The winter/spring campaign of 1943–1944 had left it in tatters, but under General Schörner's energetic leadership the army group had managed to reestablish its structure, order, and discipline. Nor did it hurt that its front remained quiet as the dramatic events played out to the north. It held seemingly strong forward positions with the formidable obstacle of the Carpathian Mountains at its rear but faced the inescapable German dilemma—in order to cobble together forces to stem the Red tide in the north, Guderian had stripped Army Group South Ukraine of six of its eight panzer divisions and six infantry divisions, leaving it little in the way of a mobile reserve. It was also hampered by a tenuous logistic situation, with its Rumanian allies often diverting supply trains for their own use, while its other nominal ally, the Hungarians, seemed more intent on fighting the Rumanians and Slovaks than the Russians. For political reasons, in order for the Rumanians to hold on to Bessarabia (Moldova) and protect the cities of Iassy and Kishinev as well as to guard the Ploesti oil fields, the Germans were
compelled to defend an extensive front that bulged eastward from the Carpathians and then along the Dniester to the Black Sea. Although the wise military move would have been to shorten this line and pull back to more defensible positions, this proved impossible, both because Hitler would not have approved such a move and because of the tenuous political situation of Marshal Antonescu, the Rumanian leader. Still, on paper, it seemed a strong force, with approximately 500,000 German troops and 170 armored vehicles, along with some 400,000 Rumanians, although the quality of the latter was, as always, maddeningly uneven. Some units could be counted on to fight bravely and fiercely, while others would simply melt away at the first sign of battle. Having witnessed the debacle to the north, German commanders were in little doubt that the next major Soviet blow would come against them.
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Nonetheless, the power of the enemy attack and the speed of the Rumanian collapse took the Germans by surprise. Even at this stage of the war, they seem to have underestimated the striking power of the Soviets, not least since they knew that the Stavka, too, had pulled units from the Second and Third Ukrainian Fronts in order to feed the demands of the larger operation to the north. In addition, although the Red Army in this sector disposed of large numbers of troops, a sizable percentage of them had little or no training. These men, primarily Ukrainians who had been swept up to make good manpower losses as the Red Army liberated Ukraine, filled out the ranks, although German analysts were convinced that Soviet infantry divisions did not have quite the striking power as before. This was likely true, but the Red Army made up for this deficiency by relying more on artillery, tanks, and air support, to devastating effect once the attack had begun. Typically, the Russians amassed a huge force of over 1.3 million men with almost nineteen hundred tanks and assault guns for the offensive. As in Belorussia, the Soviets planned to concentrate their forces at key points in order to achieve an operational breakthrough. The original intention seemed to be just to force the Germans to divert troops away from the central front, thus opening the Warsaw-Berlin axis to further attack. Ultimately, however, the Soviets devised an ambitious new plan that aimed to encircle and destroy enemy forces around Iassy and Kishinev, then advance deep into Rumania to seize Bucharest and the Ploesti oil fields.
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The attack began on 20 August, but, despite the fall of Iassy the next day and Kishinev on the twenty-fourth, it did not initially proceed as smoothly as the Russians had hoped. While, in many areas, Rumanian troops put up little opposition, German units resisted stoutly. Not atypically in Rumanian history, politics played a key role in determining
the outcome of the battle. Prompted by the attack, opposition leaders in Bucharest, who had been seeking a way out of the war for months, launched a coup against the pro-German government of Antonescu on 23 August. Troops loyal to the new government under the young King Michael, who had promptly taken Rumania out of the war, then successfully prevented a German countercoup. This incited Hitler, who had evidently counted too heavily on the anticommunism of Rumanian politicians and, thus, was taken completely by surprise by the political turn of affairs, to order the bombing of Bucharest, an action that only motivated the Rumanians to enter the war on Russia's side (which allowed them the additional benefit of fighting the hated Hungarians as well as recovering Transylvania). Within a few days, Rumanian troops in some sectors thus went from working alongside the Germans to fighting against them. Although German troops responded to the unexpected collapse of their ally with their usual skill and tenacity, by early September Army Group South Ukraine had suffered a fate similar to that of Army Group Center: the Sixth Army had been destroyed (again), the German front in Rumania had completely collapsed, and both Bucharest and the Ploesti oil fields had been lost. Although earlier in the war the loss of the latter would have occasioned German economic collapse, by this stage it proved largely meaningless. Persistent American bombing raids over Ploesti had virtually ended production at its refineries even before the Russians arrived, while the Germans had long since turned to synthetic production to supply most of their fuel needs. Still, at a relatively small cost of 67,000 casualties, the Red Army had again shattered an entire front, destroyed twenty German divisions, and inflicted a loss of more than 200,000 soldiers on the Germans. The renamed Army Group South, with only some 200,000 men left, now embarked on a lengthy retreat across the Carpathians that did not stop until Soviet forces had penetrated Bulgaria and turned west into Hungary.
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As the Soviet advance continued into Hungary, however, it ran into more problems from logistics than from German opposition. By the end of September, Russian forces had swept aside the rather light German and Hungarian forces covering the Carpathian passes and had passed into Hungary. The Stavka now directed that German and Hungarian forces be destroyed and Hungary knocked from the war, but this was to prove much more difficult than anticipated. With the loss of the Ploesti oil fields and refineries as well as the extensive damage done by American bombers to the synthetic fuel plants, Hitler put great store in the oil fields southwest of Lake Balaton as well as those on the Hungarian-Austrian border. Still, with German defenses in Hungary rather thin,
the Soviets advanced rapidly, seizing Debrecen, about 120 miles east of Budapest, on 20 October. There they stalled, brought to a halt by a concerted German counterattack. The Soviets now tested the Hungarian defenses to the south of Budapest, taking Szeged, little more than a hundred miles southeast of the capital, on 10 November. Once again, however, stiff German resistance, as well as bad weather, stopped the Russian advance. The Red Army kept up steady pressure, however, and by 3 December had reached the shores of Lake Balaton, no more than forty miles southwest of Budapest. The Soviets tried again in a two-pronged attack on 5 December to seize the city, but, despite a successful opening advance, the Germans shifted forces and prevented the capital either from falling or from being encircled.
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Having ousted Admiral Horthy, the aged Hungarian leader, from power following his unsuccessful attempt in mid-October to take Hungary out of the war, Hitler was more determined than ever to hold on to Budapest. In early December, he dispatched two panzer divisions and three sixty-tank Tiger battalions for a counterattack. The question, however, was, Where? In the north or in the south? General Friessner, over-matched and destined along with Busch to become the least successful of German eastern front commanders, saw the greatest danger in the south, while Guderian believed that the main danger lurked in the north. In the end, Hitler approved Friessner's dispositions, with the result that the infantry from the panzer divisions was deployed in the north while the unsupported armor was left to defend the line in the south. These odd deployments meant that, if the Soviets beat the Germans to the punch, the latter were in serious trouble. Bad weather and a bout of caution caused the Russians to delay their assault, but, despite repeated urging from Guderian, Friessner hesitated to attack before the ground froze. As a consequence, much as Guderian had feared, the Soviets struck first, launching a massive two-pronged assault both north and south of Budapest on 20 December. By the twenty-seventh, they had encircled the city, but Hitler was determined to hold the Hungarian capital since, in his mind, success in the Ardennes and success in Hungary were linked. In addition, since it lay athwart the main route to Austria and Bohemia and was the main rail hub in the region, the Russians could not simply bypass it, so, for the first time in the war, the Soviets found themselves laying siege to a major city. Budapest, with its civilian population swollen to 2 million, was to be assaulted in savage air and artillery bombardments to force its surrender.
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To break the enemy encirclement, the Germans diverted scarce resources from Army Group Center, most importantly, the Fourth SS
Panzer Corps with the Totenkopf and Viking Divisions, a decision that would have dire consequences when the Soviets resumed their offensive on the Vistula in January. These units proved unable to lift the siege, but bitter fighting continued through the end of December and into the new year. Ironically, in assaulting a major urban area whose buildings provided good cover for the enemy and negated their own strength in armor and air power, the Soviets now got a taste of their own medicine. By mid-January 1945, Pest, on the eastern bank of the Danube, had been secured, but fighting still raged for Buda and the citadel on the west bank. Perhaps most damaging to the Germans was Hitler's decision on 16 January to send the Sixth SS Panzer Army, recently withdrawn from the Ardennes, to Hungary instead of Poland. This decision was incomprehensible from a military perspective since the Russians had already begun the Vistula-Oder offensive but might well have betrayed Hitler's vague hope of forcing the Soviets to the negotiating table by achieving at least a partial military success. Both sides suffered heavy casualties, which neither could afford, as the fighting approached that of Stalingrad in ferocity. Not until 12 February did the last remaining Germans seek to break out. They were repulsed by the Soviets in a bloody slaughter, and, the next day, the citadel finally fell. Even now, however, Hitler refused to relent. On 6 March, Sepp Dietrich's Sixth SS Panzer Army launched the last German counteroffensive of the war, Operation Frühlingserwachen (Spring Awakening). It aimed to push the Russians back from the Danube and retake Budapest. The German force of ten panzer divisions was considerable, including the still formidable Adolf Hitler, Das Reich, and Hitlerjugend Divisions. The Soviets resisted bitterly, however, and after ten days of heavy fighting, largely out of fuel and bogged down in mud, Dietrich was forced to break off the effort. As at Kursk in 1943, it had been a waste of valuable German tank forces to no purpose: it did not seriously distract the Soviets and, with the Red Army on the Oder only forty miles from Berlin, had been a senseless use of elite German units. Lacking any reserves, Germany's other eastern armies could only await the inevitable Russian offensive toward Berlin with resigned trepidation.
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