Authors: Juan Pujol Garcia
Operation Garbo (19 page)
Although he did not refer to it directly,
GARBO
was actually attempting to explain away the prime minister’s gaffe. He was to return to this embarrassing subject the following day when, at 9.58 on the evening of D+1,
GARBO
explained that the Political Warfare Executive had now agreed to alter its directive so that ‘certain limited speculation in general terms as to future
operations
’ might be included. As for the prime minister,
GARBO
gave a reasonably plausible explanation:
In spite of recommendations made to Churchill that his speech should contain every possible reserve, he based it on the consideration that he was obliged, on account of his
political
position, to avoid distorting the facts and would not permit that his speeches should be discredited by coming events.
This message is particularly remarkable, bearing in mind that it is, in effect, a German spy claiming that Winston Churchill had failed to adhere to his advice!
In the meantime, while
GARBO
was wriggling out of the discrepancy between his messages and the prime minister’s ill-timed speech, he had to report a distinct lack of activity
elsewhere
. Agent 3(3), the Greek seaman, could still see the fleet in the Clyde, so there was not much going on there, although there was apparently a continuing state of alert.
GARBO
had, therefore, decided to call all his subagents to London for a conference.
For the present, I can only state a definite argument based on the studies and appreciations which my work in the ministry has facilitated, and it is that the enemy are biding their
intentions
behind this first action.
GARBO
concluded his second transmission of the evening with the following observation:
Fortunately, the first action was robbed of the surprise which they wished to create through the information from
CHAMILLUS
as, from the hour at which the assault is said to have started, I am able to prove, with satisfaction, that my messages arrived in time to prevent the action coming as a surprise to our high command. There is no doubt that
CHAMILLUS
has accomplished through his action a service which, though it will make it impossible to use his collaboration in the future, has justified a sacrifice by his last report.
CHAMILLUS
left this morning accompanied by
DAGOBERT
who will arrange for him to be hidden in a safe place. For myself, and counting on your approval, I intend to take care of this friend and give him every consideration in order to make him aware of our recognition.
Once this text had been transmitted,
GARBO
pretended to have received a visit from Mrs Gerbers, who had informed him, for the first time, about the delay in getting his signals
acknowledged
the previous morning.
GARBO
was suitably indignant, and his tone changed from self-congratulation to simulated outrage:
On handing over today’s messages,
ALMURA
told the widow that he was not able to send the urgent messages until 0800 hours since you had not been listening. This makes me question your seriousness and your sense of responsibility. I therefore demand a clarification immediately as to what has occurred. If what I suspect is the case and
ALMURA
has failed in his duties, then I am absolutely decided in this event to abandon the radio service until I can find some other solution. I am very disgusted; in this struggle for life or death, I cannot accept excuses or negligence. I cannot swallow the idea of
endangering
the service without any benefit. Were it not for my ideals and faith I would abandon this work as having proved myself
a failure. I write these messages to send this very night though my tiredness and exhaustion, due to the excessive work I have had, has completely broken me.
The transmission had begun at 11.55 p.m. on D-Day, and Madrid’s reply came through at 8.10 p.m. on D+1, 7 June:
I have read your last two messages of yesterday and I perfectly well understand your state of morale and feel moved to answer you the following. It would be difficult, if not impossible, to find out who is to blame if a culprit really exists with regard to the delay in the transmission of
CHAMILLUS
. After finishing on Monday at 2350 hours, having received your message,
CENTRO
was listening according to plan every hour up to 0300 hours and again from 0700 hours on Tuesday, getting the message of
CHAMILLUS
at 0800 hours. It is possible that, in spite of the staff having been listening properly, due to bad conditions having set in, there would have been no other calls from
ALMURA
during the night. Let us know at what time
ALMURA
tried to call us without success. But, even supposing the worst and
ALMURA
did not call, you must remember that
ALMURA
, according to what you have told us, is not aware of the true significance of your mission, and it is possible that he, after his day’s work and having been transmitting that night for nearly three hours, should have felt very tired and, considering that he had fulfilled his duties, he could not imagine that the message was one of such importance that it could not have been delayed for a few hours. I wish to stress in the clearest terms that your work over the last few weeks has made it possible for our command to be completely forewarned and prepared, and the message of
CHAMILLUS
would have influenced but little had it arrived three or four hours earlier. Thus I reiterate to you, as responsible chief of the service, and to all your collaborators, our total recognition of your perfect and
cherished work, and I beg of you to continue with us in the supreme and decisive hours of the struggle for the future of Europe.
Clearly the absurd amateur psychology exercised by
GARBO
and Harris had paid off handsomely. The Abwehr were anxious to cover up their own blunder and, at the same time, were
desperate
to maintain contact with their best source. But
GARBO
was not going to let the matter drop and, when he replied on 12 June, D+6, he pressed home his advantage:
ALMURA
communicated that on the night of the crisis he called at 0300 hours for half an hour and that he repeated his calls at 0700 hours without any result. With regard to the belief that
ALMURA
would not imagine the extreme urgency of the message handed to him, this I can dispel, as whether or not he knew its contents is nothing to do with the fact that he had his instructions given to him by the widow, which were to tell him that it was of extreme urgency that that message should be sent that night. I cannot, therefore, accept negligence, even if he were tired from his long hours of transmission. I am also exhausted but I know to fulfil my duties. Furthermore, the payment he receives is the highest of the network and it would, therefore, be unwise for him to accept the possibility that the atmospheric conditions were bad but, on future
occasions
, I intend to take my security measures in urgent cases as in the one mentioned and will endeavour to see that the widow remains present at any important transmission.
The next item on MI5’s deception agenda was
GARBO
’s much vaunted conference of subagents. In general, his messages had fallen into three categories: those that expressed his own
opinion
(which, of course, expressed well-judged scepticism when the occasion suited); those that contained his own, first-hand observations (and were, therefore, verifiable and accurate); and,
finally, those that summed up the combined wisdom of several agents. This latter group were reserved for matters of crucial importance and were only used for items which were required to be delivered with weight. The conference of 8 June was just such an opportunity, because three of
DAGOBERT
’s best agents had been called to London. The idea for the gathering had been Tommy Harris’s, and he had justified it in his secret master plan for
GARBO
’s contribution to
FORTITUDE
, dated 4 May 1944. In this historic document Harris observed:
With the approach of D-Day and even after, until the nature and full significance of
NEPTUNE
(the landings in Normandy) is discovered, there will almost inevitably be a certain
divergence
of opinion as to Allied intentions, even in the German high command. There will, we hope, be among the leaders of Germany some who will draw the conclusion we are trying to inspire through
FORTITUDE
. If we can continue through
GARBO
and the Abwehr to supply those Germans who are already inclined to believe in our cover plan with further ammunition for our arguments … it may well be that we shall be helping those elements in Germany to influence plans in our favour during the few critical days of the post-assault period.
Accordingly, those members of
GARBO
’s network who were reasonably available to come to London held a unique meeting to discuss the strategic implications of the events of the
previous
forty-eight hours.
DONNY
had travelled up from Dover;
DICK
, the Indian, had arrived from Brighton;
DORICK
had rushed over from Harwich; and
BENEDICT
had arrived late the previous evening.
GARBO
had set the scene just after midnight, imparting the first definite intelligence the Germans had received since the invasion had begun:
I found
BENEDICT
awaiting me after a short interview he had had with
DICK
. Urgent points communicated; he learned that
the 3rd British Battalion landed in the first assault and has identified it as the one with the insignia of the inverted
triangle
. The Guards Armoured Division will enter in action three days after initiating the first attack. The division has left the area.
At 7.28 p.m.
GARBO
sent the following message to whet the Abwehr’s appetite further.
I have had an extremely agitated day today, but I have the
satisfaction
of being able to give you the most important reports of my work. As I have not got all the messages ready, I hope you will be listening tonight at 10 GMT.
GARBO
was finally ready to start sending at seven minutes past midnight, and the resulting message was sent by Charles Haines for the next 122 minutes. The transmission was easily
GARBO
’s longest and by far his most important, for it encapsulated the entire
FORTITUDE
deception:
From the reports mentioned, it is perfectly clear that the present attack is a large-scale operation but diversionary in character, for the purpose of establishing a strong
bridgehead
in order to draw the maximum of our reserves to the area of operation and to retain them there so as to be able to strike a blow somewhere else with ensured success. I never like to give my opinions unless I have strong reasons to justify my assurances, but the fact that these
concentrations
, which are in the east and south-east of the island, are now inactive means that they must be held in reserve to be employed in the other large-scale operations. The constant aerial bombardments which the area of the Pas-de-Calais has suffered and the strategic disposition of these forces give reason to suspect an attack in that region of France which, at the same time, offers the shortest route for the
final objective of their illusions, which is to say, Berlin. This advance could be covered by a constant hammering from the air since the bases would be near the field of battle and they would come in behind our forces which are fighting at the present moment with the enemy disembarked in the west of France. From J(5) I learned yesterday that there were seventy-five divisions in this country before the present assault commenced. Supposing they should use a maximum of twenty to twenty-five divisions with which to attempt a second blow. I trust you will submit urgently all these reports and studies to our high command, since moments may be decisive in these times and before taking a false step, through lack of knowledge of the necessary facts, they should have in their possession all the present information which I transmit with my opinion, which is based on the belief that the whole of the present attack is set as a trap for the enemy to make us move all our reserves in a hurried strategical disposition which we would later regret.
This single message is of extraordinary historic significance, and the decrypters watched its progress through the enemy’s military intelligence structure. From Madrid it was relayed to Berlin and then delivered to Hitler’s headquarters at Berchtesgaden, where it was received by Colonel Friedrich-Adolf Krummacher, the head of the Wehrmacht High Command’s intelligence branch. By that time it had been edited several times and code names had been slightly corrupted in the process, but it is entirely recognisable when compared to MI5’s original version, and the central theme remained intact:
After personal consultation on 8 June in London with my agents
JONNY
,
DICK
and
DORICK
, whose reports were sent today, I am of the opinion, in view of the strong troop concentrations in south-eastern and eastern England, which are not taking part in the present operations, that these operations are a diversionary
manoeuvre designed to draw off enemy reserves in order then to make a decisive attack in another place. In view of the
continued
air attacks on the concentration area mentioned, which is a strategically favourable position for this, it may very probably take place in the Pas-de-Calais area, particularly since in such an attack the proximity of air bases will facilitate the operation by providing continued strong air support.