NonAlignment 2.0: A Foreign and Strategic Policy for India in the 21st Century (5 page)

The positive levers will aim at once to create incentives for Pakistan to respond to India’s concerns and to prepare the ground for an eventual normalization of relations with Pakistan. These levers will have to be used in conjunction with the negative levers outlined above.

Our policy of making a comprehensive dialogue conditional upon Pakistan’s action against terrorism has not yielded the desired results. It only provides Pakistan more opportunity to grandstand. Besides, it invests the idea of a comprehensive dialogue with needless symbolism. Indeed,
we should work to reduce the symbolic significance of the mere fact of conversation and present it as no more than normal diplomacy.

Instead of breaking off talks in the event of a major provocation, we should declare that we favour continuation of the dialogue. Our position should be that it is necessary to maintain channels of communication with Pakistan at all levels to ensure that misperceptions and misunderstandings are avoided, and to enable us to convey our redlines without ambiguity. But we should leave Pakistan in no doubt that the actual pace of negotiations would be contingent on its behaviour. Our willingness to engage in discussions will have the added advantage of forestalling external interest and involvement in India–Pakistan relations. This format of engagement may be best used in conjunction with backchannel negotiations and with direct engagement with the Pakistan Army. We could then have multiple tracks and options that could be modulated in keeping with the circumstances.

We should press for military-to-military exchanges even if there is resistance on the Pakistani side. These could include proposals for sporting exchanges, military educational exchanges, invitations to military exercises, among others. If even some of these succeed, we could open up a regular exchange of personnel and views. This
may not only come handy in the event of a crisis, but may also help dilute the hostile mindset.

We also need to adopt policies that will work towards the creation of constituencies in Pakistan that have a stake in peaceful and friendly relations with India. This is admittedly a long-term objective, but we should begin to lay the foundations now. We should start by promoting bilateral trade with Pakistan, by offering greater access to our market. We should keep pushing for enhanced trade relationships. Although Pakistan seems open to granting most favoured nation (MFN) status to India we cannot take it as a foregone conclusion. India should be actively pushing for a far larger volume of overland trade through the Wagah and other border points, where we could install modern inspection equipment to prevent security lapses, and facilitate two-way trade while minimizing national security concerns. We should also examine whether our developing financial sector could service some of Pakistan’s business and investment requirements. India can also be a source of finance for Pakistan, thereby binding their economy into our own.

We should take the initiative on two pressing issues confronting the people of Pakistan: shortages of energy and water. We should look seriously at regional energy projects involving Pakistan, Iran, Afghanistan and Central
Asia. We should also propose discussion with Pakistan on integrated watershed management and best practices in the use and distribution of water.

The greater the exposure of ordinary Pakistanis to India, the less effective will be the official policy of deliberately cultivating a hostile attitude towards India. The promotion of exchanges at all levels among civil society, scholars, artists and students will provide a strong positive leverage for India. We can adopt unilateral measures to promote cross-border movement of people, even if there is no reciprocity. A more liberal visa regime, removing the restriction on the number of places to be visited, dispensing with the requirement of police reporting, issuing multiple-entry visas for known benign forces, especially those in the media, all these could be done unilaterally even if Pakistan does not respond. Importantly, these practices should not be interrupted in the event of rise in tensions.

The measures outlined above constitute a strategic toolbox with mid-range, positive and negative levers to influence the behaviour of Pakistan in the desired direction. The combinations in which these are wielded will depend on the evolving situation. But these capabilities and stances will provide the political leadership with a broader range of options than hitherto employed.

The current situation in Pakistan underlines the importance of preparing ourselves for certain contingencies. While a number of these could be envisioned, two situations need close attention. The first pertains to the possibility of nuclear terrorism emanating from Pakistan. This is discussed in the section on nuclear security in
Chapter Five
.

The second contingency that we need to prepare for is the possibility of spiralling instability in Pakistan (through political and civil conflict, or even a major environmental disaster), leading to a humanitarian crisis at our doorstep. Is it possible for us to seal our borders? If not, how do we expect to cope with a potentially large influx of Pakistanis? What lines of communication do we need to have in place to be able to work with those in Pakistan who might attempt to control this situation? These questions and more will need to be thought through well in advance. While we need to keep a close eye on the current unstable equilibrium in Pakistan we need also to develop operational contingency plans if the situation should unravel. We should not assume that all forms of instability are bad from our perspective. The challenge for our strategy is to cope with the consequences of its tipping over into outright instability.

The most important thing is that the relationship
with Pakistan should be seen in all its complexities. We should keep in mind the long-term goal of restoring the strategic unity of the subcontinent in a way compatible with the well-being of all the peoples of South Asia. A simple-minded approach that focuses only on a limited set of instruments, or is held hostage to narrow political considerations, will whittle down our strategic options and constrain our future horizons.

In few parts of the world, outside its immediate periphery, does India have greater interests at stake than in West Asia. The region accounts for 63 per cent of our crude imports, $93 billion of trade and provides employment to 6 million Indian expatriate workers who remit over $35 billion every year. Securing and advancing these diverse sets of interests has become a pressing challenge in the wake of the political turmoil in West Asia and the contiguous parts of North Africa. This situation is likely to persist in the near to mid-term future, with unpredictable consequences for the region as a whole. While our policy towards each country will be determined by its particularities and by the evolving situation, it is important to consider these in an overarching strategic framework. In thinking about such
a framework, we need to bear in mind four factors that are likely to remain in play for some time in West Asia.

First, the political landscape of the region has been dramatically transformed and there is no possibility of reverting to the erstwhile status quo. Popular movements comprising new or re-energized forces powered by new forms of social communication and mobilization are now an ineradicable feature of the West Asian political terrain. These popular uprisings will throw up forces, especially Islamist political parties, which have hitherto been suppressed or marginalized by several regimes in the region. The extent to which these states’ bureaucracies, military and intelligence services will be prepared and able to work with these parties remains an open question. While the elected Islamist parties might not be overtly suppressed, they are unlikely to be fully acceptable either. This will remain a key source of instability across West Asia.

Second, the strategic consequences of the US war in Iraq will continue to play out in the years ahead. It is now clear that the principal beneficiary of the war was Iran. Not only has the war resulted in the emergence of a Shiite Iraq, but it has also extended Iranian influence in Syria, Lebanon and Gaza. A corollary to this has been the Iranian drive to acquire nuclear weapons—a desire that has almost certainly been accentuated by the Western intervention
in Libya. The confluence of these trends has created a sharp geopolitical divide between Iran and Saudi Arabia, and their respective allies and clients. The resulting spiral of insecurity and armament will be a principal source of tension in West Asia in the years ahead. This dynamic will play out against the backdrop of existing problems: above all Palestine, which will remain a driver of conflict in the region. The interaction of these two axes of tension will result in a more unstable regional environment.

Third, the nature of Western interests in the region is undergoing an important shift. With increasing access to other forms of energy (particularly gas) and accompanying breakthroughs in technology and marketability, Western dependence on oil from the region will certainly decline in the years ahead. However, the geopolitical importance of the region will remain undiminished—not least because of its centrality to the economies of the emerging powers. As a consequence, the United States and its allies will have greater room for manoeuvre in West Asia.

Fourth, the combination of these three factors implies that the Western propensity for intervention in the region is likely to persist despite the thinning out of Western forces on the ground. West Asia may well become the main arena for introducing and testing new norms of great power intervention. Such intervention is likely to be
justified on humanitarian grounds, though these principles will continue to be applied rather selectively. One can already see this happening in Syria.

These four factors underscore certain strategic principles that need to frame our policies in West Asia. For a start, we need to engage more widely in the region than we have done so far and to build our capacity for such wide-ranging engagement. We need to be in a position to anticipate and shape developments rather than merely reacting to them. Indeed, certain types of reactive responses—evacuation of expatriate Indians during crises, for instance—will become difficult in the climate of uncertainty that lies ahead.

In particular, we need to carefully distinguish between the emerging Islamist political forces and jihadi terrorist organizations like Al Qaeda and its affiliates. In the past, there has been intense rivalry between them and alliances have usually been tactical and short-lived. We must be ready to work with Islamist groups that have entered the political mainstream in their countries and are competing by legitimate means to enter government. But we should also be clear that their hold on power will be contested by institutions that have existed long before the democratic turn in these countries. Some of these institutions will be important to us in securing and stepping up cooperation
on security-related activities like counterterrorism and intelligence.

Related to this is our response to continuing political unrest in various countries of the region. In principle, we continue to support the sovereignty and integrity of these countries, and are averse to use of force by all sides. In practice, though, external intervention will remain a possibility. Our approach therefore has to be a proactive engagement with both the lawfully constituted authority and the democratic forces outside the government, with a view to creating the space for the emergence of a political settlement.

To preclude the possibility of intervention by external powers, we need to go beyond simply reiterating our support for sovereignty and non-intervention. We need to advance strategic arguments in the UN and other forums about the advisability and feasibility of intervention: Is the case for intervention clear-cut? Have all diplomatic options been exhausted? Are there military options that could be sensibly and prudently undertaken? Are the intervening powers prepared for the ensuing transition and the long-haul reconstruction usually required? We also need to be more forthright in contesting the normative justifications advanced by the intervening powers and their rather selective application.

The other key principle that should guide our strategic engagement with West Asia is the avoidance of sharp choices. In particular, we should try and steer clear of the escalating rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia. We have major interests in our relationships with both these countries, and need to strike a careful balance in our dealings with each. The acquisition of overt nuclear weapons capability by Iran is undesirable. An additional nuclear weapons state in our strategic neighbourhood will make regional stability more precarious—not least because it may embolden other regional actors to take pre-emptive measures.

The preservation of our economic interests in West Asia will require considerable attention to building up our capabilities in the maritime domain (this is dealt with at greater length in
Chapter Three
). But we also need to be prepared for a situation where persisting instability in the region results in a steep fall in energy supplies and a sharp rise in prices. We need to carefully monitor our strategic energy reserves and accelerate our efforts to diversify our sources of supply, and expand investment in alternative forms of energy.

India’s enhanced engagement with the countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) commenced with the announcement of India’s Look East Policy in 1992. From a sectoral dialogue partner, India is now a summit partner of ASEAN. At the India–ASEAN Commemorative Summit held in New Delhi in November 2012, the two sides decided to establish a strategic partnership that will encompass every significant component of our relations with ASEAN—political, security, economic, trade and culture. Our vision should be to revive and reinforce, in a contemporary context, the myriad historical linkages which bound India and the countries of South-East Asia together.

A major asset for our pursuit of India’s interests in the region is that virtually all South-East Asian countries welcome a much more enhanced engagement by India, firstly as a significant countervailing security actor, and secondly as a key economic and trade partner, serving as an expanding market and both a source of and a destination for investment. These sentiments are driven by a pervasive, though sometimes muted, anxiety over China’s expanding and often assertive presence in the region. This has been accentuated by concerns over the decline in US power and
influence despite the recent US ‘pivot’ to Asia. However, India will have to manage its engagement with South-East Asia in a carefully calibrated manner, since the countries of South-East Asia do not wish to be caught in a crossfire between confronting powers, even as they wish to retain some room for manoeuvre and strategic space vis-à-vis China.